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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a political study of the Yemen and 
its relations with the central Islamic authorities from 
9/630 to 233/847. The present study consists of eleven 
chapters divided into three parts. 
The first part of this thesis consists of three 
chapters (i. e. I, II, III), and deals with the political 
situation of the Yemen before the migration of the Yemeni 
tribes into the conquered provinces, i. e. 9-12/630-34. 
This part also examines Yemeni-Muslim relations.. Chapter I 
describes briefly the political situation of the region 
before Islam and the beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations. 
The political situation of the Yemen in the last phase of 
the Prophet's life, i. e. the movement of cAbhalah b. Kacb, 
and its relations with Medina is covered in Chapter II. 
The following chapter is devoted to the political situation 
of the region during the early period of Abu Bakr's reign, 
i. e. the War of Apostasy, and the Medinan attitude towards it. 
The second part is concerned with Yemeni-Muslim 
relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs, 
11-40/632-661, and consists five chapters, (IV, V, VI, VII, 
0 
VITI). T he first chapter of this part, i. e. Ch. IV, deals 
with the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the battle fronts 
and their participation in the early Islamic conquests. The 
settlement of these tribes in the conquered provinces is 
examined in Chapter V. The following Chapter, VI, is 
devoted to the political situation in the Yemen, after the 
ii 
migration of some of its tribes, during the period of the 
first three Orthodox Caliphs. The role of the Yemeni 
migrants in the uprising against cUthman and the first 
Civil War is discussed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII 
treats the political situation of the Yemen at the time of the 
f irst Civil War. 
The third part of this thesis consists of three 
Chapters (IX, X, XI) and is devoted to the political situation 
of the Yemen during the Umayyad and cAbbasid Caliphate 
(41-233/661-847). The policy of the Caliphs toward this 
region and the local uprisings against the Islamic authorities 
throughout this period are also discussed in this part. 
The first Chapter of this part, i. e. IX, examines the pol- 
itical situation in the Yemen during the Umayyad Caliphate, 
41-132/661-750. The political situation in the region during 
the early cAbbFsid Caliphs is covered in Chapter X. Chapter 
XI is devoted to the political situation of the Yemen from 
the Caliphate of al-AmIn to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's 
reign 193-233/809-847. 
iii 
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D PP Tý A r"P 
At the same time as the Muslims were taking control 
in the Hijaz, the Yemen was undergoing political unrest as a 
result of tribal struggles in some of its regions. This 
situation reflected on Yemeni-Islamic relations at that time. 
Thus the Muslims interfered indirectly in the affairs of 
these tribes during the last phase of the Prophet's life, 
and directly in the early period of his successor. By the 
end of the first year of Abu Bakr's reign, Muslim authority 
was established in some of the Yemeni regions. The following 
year Yemeni tribes began their migrations to the conquered 
provinces, participating in the fighting and settling in 
these new regions, even forming the majority in some of them. 
Two main results have been noticed after the 
of the Yemeni tribes : first, the considerable participation 
of these tribes in both the early conquests and the internal 
events of the Islamic state during the late period of the 
Orthodox Caliphs; second the effect of these migrations on 
the political situation in the Yemen throughout the first 
two centuries of Hijrah, especially during the first/seventh 
i. e. which were distinguished by a political lull. 
The Yemen, its relations with the Islamic authority 
and its political history, is the scope of the present work. 
The period chosen for research is 9/630 to 233/847, i. e. 
from the official correspondences between the Prophet and the 
Yemeni chiefs, concerning the adoption of Islam, until the 
first year of al-Mutawakkil's Caliphate. 
xiii 
The purpose of this study is tripartite : first, to 
show the state of Yemeni relations with the Islamic authority 
before the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered 
areas, i. e. between 9/630 to 12/634; the second to illustrate 
these relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs 
(11-40/632-641); the third to cover the political history 
of the Yemen and the caliphal policy toward it throughout the t> 
Umayyad and the cAbbasid caliphates (41-233/661-747). 
The importance of this study lies in the fact that 
it is the first essay so far as I am aware, to deal with the 
political history of the Yemen and its relations with the 
Islamic state from 9/630 to 233/747. 
For the present study our sources are annals, local 
histories, geographies, literature and the numismatic 
evidence. Each part of this thesis is dependent on different 
sources. For the first and most of the second part the 
bulk of our information has come down to us from the non-local 
sources. For the third part, however, the local Yemeni 
sources are in the majority. 
In addition to the fact that most of the local sources 
are late in respect of the period of the present study, 
each historian repeating the information provided by his 
predecessor. Since there is no alternative to quoting 
these sources, great care has been exercised in building 
up our research from them. 
Relevant boolks and articles by contemporary authors 
have also been consulted, reviewed and are referred to in 
the notes. 
x1v 
In the early years of this period we can see the 
f irst step relations of the Yemeni tribes with the Islamic 
government. Their correspondences, delegations and their 
attitude towards Islamic authority in the region will be 
discussed in detail. The period of the Orthodox Caliphs 
(i. e. 11-40/632-61) is that in which the considerable 
participation of the Yemeni tribes in the early conquests can 
be placed. This was followed by their settlement in the 
conquered provinces and the effect of the Yemeni migrants 
in the major internal crisis during the last phase of 
cUthm9n b. cAffants caliphate and the period of his 
successor (i. e. the uprising against the former and the 
Civil War) can then be seen. The effect of the Yemeni 
migrations on the political situation of their homeland and 
the escalation of the local resistance to the caliphal 
regime also can be seen in this work. 
The years between 9/630 to 233/847 have been divided 
into three periods; 9-11/630-2; 11-40/632-61; 41-233/661-847. 
Each period has been covered by a part of this study. In 
the case of certain themes, some overlap from one chapter to 
the next., though in the same part this has been unavoidable'. 
The transliteration adopted in the present study is that 
of Arabian Studies. 
-1- 
PART0NE 
/Tt 
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CHAPTER I 
The Yemen before Islam 
A. An Introductory Study 
a. The ancient history 
The origins and early movements of southern Arabs 
still constitute a matter of scholarly inquiry and spec- 
ulation, with little light thrown on the subject by the 
ancient authors. 
(1) 
A detailed study of the early history 
of the Yemen is beyond the scope of the present work; our 
aim is to present a brief illustration of the political 
history and the religion of the area before the advent of 
Islam. 
i. The political history 
"From the imposing ruins of several cities, from 
thousands of inscriptions written in a peculiar alphabet and 
in the so-called South Arabic language, and from a few 
passages of Greek and Roman historians and geographers, we 
know that South Arabia was organized under four main 
kingdoms - of Sabaeans, Minaeans, Hadramautians and 
Qatabanians - and some other minor states. " 
(2 ) However, 
each state had its own principal dialects. 
(3) 
(1) Playfair, Arabian Felix, 3; Stookey, Yemen, 10. 
-t (2) Della Vida, "Pre-Islamic", 30. See also ý', Tinneil 
"The place", 3f; Zayddn, al- C Arab, 132. 
Cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 6-8. 
-3- 
"The supposition formerly held that these two states 
[, Idac in and Saba succeeded one another chronologically has 
given way, under rigorous analysis of the available evidence, 
to the recognition that they existed side by side for 
several hundred years, and that Macin. 's historical period 
was entirely included in that of Saba . It 
(4) 
The kingdom of Macin was established in the region of 
al-Jawf. In addition to the capital, Qarnawj, other urban 
centres, such as Baraqish and Nashq were also built. 
(5) 
The Kingdom of Saba however was the most important 
state of the Yemen., its early kings were contemporaneous 
with the last rulers of Macin. 
(6) 
Before the Christian era., 
the Sabaeans became heirs to the Aingdom of their earlier 
kinsmen and duly established -themselves as masters of South 
Arabia and., as such, were rulers during the most brilliant 
era of its history. Thus the Sabaean domination extended 
over several local states., such as Hadramawt,, Awsan, Qataban 
and Mac-in. 
(7) 
Up to about -the beginning of the Christian era, the 
rulers of Saba bore either the title of '\, Lk/sb "King of 
(4) Winnett., 3f Stookey, 11; See also Hitt 1, History, 53; 
Della Vida, 31; Little., South Arabia, 2. 
(5) t. itti, History, 54; Zaydan, al-cArab, 130; Little, 2. 
The sites of Qarnaw and Baraqish are a little way north 
of the Nla-: 'rib region, cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 7. 
(6) ýJittl, History, 54; Zaydan, 
' 
al- c Arab,, 138, the former gives 
950-115 B. C. and the latter suggests 850-115 B. C. for the ZD 
early period of the Sabaean era. However, the earliest 
state of South Arabia is still a vexcal question. and no fin, L 
solution has yet been reached. Cf. Beeston, A Descripti\., e, 2. 
(7) Cf. Hittli, 54f; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic Sanca" 
-4-- 
Saba or mkrb/sb_ 'priest - ruler of Sab*a 
(8) 
In the 
latter half of the 4th century B. C. the transition between 
the two Sabaean periods., i. e. muk' arrib - Xin-:,, s took place. 
0-ý 
Zz> y 
It was with the reign of Karib : 'il Watar who called himself 
muIC-arrib in an inaugural speech, but later on referred 
to himself as king. 
(9) 
In the early centuries A. D., the Sabaean K-ingdom 
depended for its strength on a military caste, something t:: ) 
like a professional army, drawn from two rival tribes, 
namely Uimyar and Hamdan. The tribes of the latter were 
fully incorporated into the political structure, while 
ýJimyar occupied the crucially strategic southwest corner 
of the Peninsula. 
(10) 
Dur-ing the first three centuries A. D., the south 
Arabian Monarch adopted a new title "King of Saba and Dhu 
Raydan". Between A. D. 280-300, Shainmar Yuharcish appeared as 
sole monarch, adding the titles of "Hadramawt and Yamanat" 
to the earlier ones. Thus, the political unification of all 
(11) - of southern Arabia under one ruler was achieved. From 
the death of Shammar Yuharcish until the early sixth century 
A. D. nine of the Sabaean IITý-Iimyari" Kings are known to us 
from inscriptions; traditionally they are known as tubbac 
Beeston, "Problems", 42; Zaydan, 138f; Hitti, 54. 
(9) Beeston., "Problems" . 42; Stookey, 14. 
(10) Little, South Arabia, 4; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic Sanca 
36,38; Stookey, 15. 
)r (11) Cf, Beeston, "Problems", 41; ýIittl-, lllistor, ý , 
60. 
-5- 
(plural - tababicah). 
(12) 
By the end of the first quarter 
of the sixth century A. D., the era of the tababicah, the 
late Sabaean era, came to an end as a result of the Abyssinian 
invasion. According to al-Tabari, Dhu Nuwas, the last 
Himyari (i. e. Sabaean) tubbac spurring on his steed plunged 
it into the waves of the sea and was never seen again. " 
(13) 
Following the invasion, the Yemen remained under 
Abyssinian rule for some fifty years (525-75 A. D. ) with 
San a as the occupiers' headquarters. 
(14) 
During the 
occupation several independent., anti-Abyssinian movements 
led by various Himyari chiefs took place, but none with any 
success. 
(15) 
This situation lasted until the unsuccessful 
campaign of Abrahah, the Abyssinian ruler of the. Yemen, 
against Mecca in A. D. 570-1. 
(16) By that time, the national 
movement to free the Yemen from the Abyssinian domination 
had found its hero. This was Sayf b. Dhl Yazan, a Himyarl 
chief, who travelled to the Sasanid court in al-Mada in 
where he appealed to Chosroes I, the Persian Emperor, for 
help against the Abyssinians. Sayf's request was accepted 
and in A. D. 575 the Persian Emperior furnished him with the 
support of eight hundred men under the command of Vlahriz. 
(17) 
(12) Hitti., History, 60. 
C ýor the meaning of the tababi ah, see Ibn 1-Tanz5ur, 
lisHn, VIII, 31. 
(13) A! -Tabari, 1,927 f. See also ýIitti., History, 62; Zaydan, 
al-tArab, 124,148f; Little, 5; Stookey, 21f. 
(14) Anorf, Tarlkh, f7b-8a; 
(15) Al-Himyarl, Muluk, 149. 
(16) Known as c am al-fil. See al-Tabari, 1,936-45. 
(17) Al-Yacq-L-Lbli, Ta-rikh, 1,162; al-Tabar-i, 1,946-8; 
al-Mas'ýudi, Muruj, 111,162-4; al-Isfaliani, Agnani, 'V/711, 
308-10; al-Himyari, Muluk, 
-6- 
With this force, plus those Yemeni fighters who joined 
him., Sayf was able to def eat the Abyssinians and kill their 
leader Masruq. However, the Himyari kingdom was not 
restored and the administration of the country was divided 
between Himyar and the Persians. 
(18) 
After the murder of 
Sayf, by his Abyssinian slaves., the Persian Emperior des- 
patched an army to secure his rule there. 
(19) 
The Persians 
were able to gain a foothold in the Yemen and subsequently 
scattered themselves throughout the country, although they 
remained strongly concentrated in Sanca: ' and Aden. 
(20) 
Other provinces remained in practice under the control of 
their own local tribes., although Persian rule made its 
presence felt quite considerably throughout the whole 
country. The Yemen remained under this re(Time until the Z-D 
Islamic state was established in Medina and its power 
extended to other Arabian regions, the Yemen included. 
ii. The rise of monotheism 
Apart from paganism, the ancient. Yemen adhered 
essentially to a planetary astral system in which the cult 
of the sun and moon gods prevailed. The large tribal 
entities coterminous with political units were united in 
their devotion to one or more deities, most commonly a 
supreme god related to either the moon or the sun. 
(18) AI-Janadi, Suluk, f 36b; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat -F32b. 
(19) Al-Tabar-i, I, 957f; al-, 'lvlas'u-d-ii, Mur-Li. III, 175--lF. 
Cf. 'also al-cAsali-, 363: al-Hadithi, 84. 
v 0 
(20) See Ibn Habib., Alu4abbar, 266, who says that the Abna 
controlled the c, -, mmerce of Aden and Sancao and 
levied cUshr. 
-7- 
Frequently these tribal entites considered themselves 
associated with the planet Venus. Other tribal groups 
also worshipped local gods, often of an animistic or 
ancestral nature. 
It was in such a religious environment that mono- 
theism gained a foothold in the Yemen. Both Judaism and 
Christianity flourished in the pre-Islamic Yemen, spreading 
extensively throughout the country during the second Himyari 
era (about 300-525). 
Following the conquest of Palestine and the destruction 
of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus in A. D. 70 many Jews fled 
to Arabia., where they established settlements in the 
north - the Hij-az. It is most likely that some of them 
migrated southwards, to the Yemen, and stayed there. 
(22) 
In the Yemen, however, Judaism had formed neither tribal 
groupings nor settled communities, nor even formed settlements 
of the type that existed in the Uijaz. 
(23) 
By the early 
part of the sixth century A. D., Judaism featured strongly 
in the Yemen as a result of the conversion to it of the 
ýIimyari king Yusuf Ascar, generally known as Dhu- Nuwas, 
who subsequently declared his new faith the official 
(24) 
religion of the state. 
Up to the third century A. D., Christi-anitý- in the 
(21) Al-Yacqubi, 
- 
Tarikh., 1,162; Hitti, FlistorN,, -, 60; 
Ba Faqih, Tarlkh, 211-7; Stookey, 11. 
(22) Hitt!, History, 61; Stookey, 11. 
(23) Trimningham Christianity, 289. 
(24) Hitti, History, 61f; Della Vida, 44; Trimingham, 289. 
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Yemen had been veiled in obscurity, with actual evangelistic 
work only beginning in the middle of the following century. 
However., it was during the reign of Constantius II, the 
Byzantine Emperor, (A. D.. 337-61) that the Yemen received the 
first official Christian mission. This was sent by th-e- 
Emperor himself under the leadership of Theophilus, 
(25) nicknamed "the Indian". Theophilus met the Himyarl 
D king, Tha ran and his son Malki-karib., at their capital, 
Zafar. The king subsequently adopted Christianity and- 
Theophilus founded a church in the city and planned others 
in the region. 
(26) 
In this way, Christianity gained a 
foothold in Him ar territory, gradually spreading throughout &y 
the Yemeni regions. 
established in Najran. 
In the early part of the sixth century A. D. rivalry 
between the two newly introduced monotheistic religions - i. e. 
Judaism and Christianity - led the country to an armed 
struggle. In A. D. 515 the leadership of the Himyari 
Kingdom fell to Dhu- Nuwas, who had already adopted 
Judaism. (28) The new king led the movement against the 
Abyssinians, who were occupying the Yemen at that time. 
The movement also took on an anti-Christian -flavour, leading 
(25) ý-Iitti, History, 61; Stookey, 19; Trimingham, 291. 
(26) 1jitti, History, 61; Stookey, 19f; 'Lrimingham, 292. 
(27) See Hitti, History, 61; Trimingham, 294 ff. Cf. 
also 30 below. 
(28) AI-Ya c qubi Tarikh, 1,161; Zaydan, al-cArab, 148; 
Hitti, History, 61f; Stookey, 21; Trimingham, 297f. 
0 
The religion was most strongly 
(27) 
-9- 
to several attacks against the Christians, culminating in 
the famous massacre of the Christians at Najran in 
A. D. 523. (29) 
The survivors of the Najran incident spread the 
news of the massacre far and wide. Eventually it reached 
the ears of the Byzantine Emperor, who at that time was 
regarded as the protector of all Christians. The emperor 
immediately wrote to the King of Axum urging him to fight 
(30) Dhu Nuwas. The Axumite army, led by a certain Aryaý, 
duly crossed the straits of Bab al-Mandab in A. D. 525 
overthrew and killed Dhu- h7uwas and installed military 
governors in his place. 
(31) 
Garrisons were left by them 
in the Yemen to protect the Christian communities., and 
Sumayfac Ashwac., a Himyari chief, was installed as king 
Years later., however, the Yemenis, led by the Abyssinian 
general, Abrahah, staged a successful revolt against their 
king. 
(32) 
In A. D. 530 Abrahah became king and consolidated 
his influence as the sole master of the Yemen. At his 
(33) 
capital ýan a, he built a church, al-Qalis, and in 
570 or 571 he led his troops to the north, to Mecca, in 
(29) Al-Yacqudblii, Tarlikh, 1,161; IVahb Ibn 
C 
Munabbih, Tijan, 
312; Vitti, History, 62; Zaydan, al- Arab., 148. For 
full information on this massacre, see Shahid, Martyrs, 
passim; Trimingham, 295-9. z:: > 
(30) See Hitti, History, 62; Stookey, 21f. 
(31) Trimingham, 29-9. 
CC (32) Al-ya qubi, Tarikh, 1,162; Zaydan, al- Arab, 150f. 
(33) Al-Waysi, al-Yaman, 189; Hitti, Historý,, 62: Zaydan, 
151 Trimingham 30-lE. For a f-Lllll discuss-Lon of al- 
"Th. -ý Church", Qalis, see Sel-jeant &- Le-,.,, - 
4. 
-', --8. 
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order to destroy the Kacbah. However, the Abyssinian army 
was destroyed by smallpox, the "small pebbles" (ýLijjll) 
(34) 
cited the Quran The year of Abrahah's unsuccessful 
campaign came to be known as the Year of the Elephant 
(cam al-fil); it was also the year in which the Prophet 
Muýammad was born in Mecca. Approximately sixty years 
later 9/630-1 , the Yemeni tribes began to embrace Islam, 
and their country was more or less absorbed by the caliphal 
state. 
b. The political geography of the Yemen on the 
eve of Islam 
The first step a historian must take is to define 
his area of interest and describe it in geographical terms. 
In the following section, the political geography of the t> 
Yemen, i. e. its boundaries, main internal divisions) and 
the geographical distribution of local influential powers - 
on the eve of the advent of Islam in the area - will be 
covered, 
i. The boundaries of the Yemen 
The definition of boundaries of the. Yemen on the eve 
J 
of Islam is, compared to other areas of interest, a task 
of considerable difficulty. "The ancient Greek and Roman 
geographers were in the habit of dividing Arabia into three 
great provinces, Arabia Felix, Arabia Petrea, and Arabia 
Deserta. : the first nearly corresponding to the modern Yemen, 
but including Mahra and 4aqramawt. " 
(35) The early Arab 
(. 1,34) Surat al-Fil, 4. See also V, -ahb Ibn Alunabbih, Ti r Jan, c 314; al-Tabari 1,9,336-45; al-Mas udi., NIuruj, III, 
158-62. ýf. also Hittli, History, 64; Trimincyham, 304f. 
(35) Cf. Playfair, Arabia Felix, 1. Cf. also Uitti, 
History, 44. 
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geographers., however, differ in their definitions of the 
boundaries of the Yemen; nevertheless, they agree upon a 
general definition of the country, with some differences 
in detail. 
C- 
Al-Asma 1 mentions that "its boundaries run from 
Oman across to Najrdn. Then, [the boundary] follows the 
Arabian Sea as far as Aden and al-Shiýr, and even extends 
beyond Oman and terminates at Baynunah. " 
(36 ) 
Al-Muqaddasi 
records that "al-Yaman was composed of two parts : the 
lowland., called Tihamah, which extended as far as the sea 
and had Zabid as its centre, plus other towns such as 
Macqar, Kadrah, Mawr, al-Sharjah etc; and the highland, 
known as Najd, which he described as cold. " 
(37 
Al-Hamdani 
writes that "the Yemen was bounded by the sea to the east, 
west and south. A line running between Oman and Yabrin 
separated al-Yaman from al-Yamamah. This line separated 
(38) the Yemen and Kinanah from Tihamah inland. " Yaqut 
maintains that, "The boundaries of the Yemen lie beyond 
Tathlith down to Sanca ) and the areas parallel to it down 
to Hadramawat., al-Shihr and Oman as far as Aden Abyan, 
as well as the adjoining areas, including the lowlands 
and the highlands. " 
(39) 
(36) In Ya- qu-t,, Vy 447; Cf. also Khahhalah, 
Jughrafiya , 
286f. This description is*iar from clear. 
Does al. -A: ý-, ma - i's "Arabian Sea" include the Red Sea? 
Is he suggesting that the Yemen encompasses Oman? 
(37) Al-Muqaddasi Absan al-Taqasim, 69f. 
(38) Al-Hamdani, ýifat, 1,51. 
(39) Yaqut., Mucjam, V, 447; see also Kahhalah, 
Jughrafiyat, 287. 
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In fact it is a difficult task for the writer to 
demarcate the boundaries of the Yemen during that period Z-D 
for several reasons; firstly, the Yemen is part of the 
Arabian Peninsula, with no physical boundaries between it 
and other regions, 
(40) 
especially on the northern side; 
secondly, tribal movement around and across these boundaries 
and their intermingling with eaoh other; thirdly the absence 
of a strong state in the Yemen at that time which could have 
imposed its control on the region and drawn up fixed 
boundaries. However, the meaning of the Yemen in the present 
study is the area which was bound on the north-east by -the 
Empty Quarter, (al-Rubc al-Khal-1); on the north by the 
C- 
province (sing. mikhlaf) of Jurash., in Asir; on the west 
by the Red Sea; and on the south by the Gulf of Aden and t1he 
Arabian Sea. 
(41) 
ii. The divisions of the Yemen 
The Yemen was distinguished by the large number of 
its provinces, of which al-Yacqu-bi 
(42) 
says that there 
were eighty-four in all, most of them named after the 
various Yemeni tribes that inhabited there. Generally 
speaking, however, the Yemen is separated into four main 
divisions as follows: 
1. the highlands area (Najd al-Yaman), which extends 
from the province of Jurash in the north, 
(43) 
now 'As'l: -r, 
(40) Al-HaditRi, Ahl, 37. 
(41) Cf. Map l. - 
(-12) T-arli ! -ýh 1 162. Cf. also ', r\rhahh 
-alah jughr-a-Fiyat, 292. 7 ZD , , .. 
(43) For the province of Jurasiti, se e a! -Hamdani, Sifat, I, "I - 117- 9. The town of Jurash is ank- of b on the ý,, -estern 
Wadl Bil shah, 15 knis south-east of Khamlis Mushayt, 
and 44 kms from - Abha , 
Cf. Ibn C Ayy-1-ish, "', 'adinat 
Jura sh al-Ath-iri y-yah ", 2130. 
to the province of al-Ma cýTf ir , now al-Hu jarlyyah, in the 
south. This division contained many of the Yemeni provinces, 
most of them occupied by the influential tribes. 
2. the coastal plain., known traditionally as 
Tihamat al-Yaman. This area extends from B-ab al-Mandab 
in the south to cAththar, 40 km north of Jazan, in the 
north. It runs parallel to the Red Sea on the west and 
the mountainous area on the east. Two main provinces make 
up Tih7amah : OAkk in the north and al-AshEcir in the south. 
3. Al-Jawf and the Ma*3ýrib area. This extends 
from Najran in the north to the boundary of Uaqramawt, 
Mafazat Hadramawt, in the south, and from the Empty Quarter 
in the east to the mountainous region in the west. 
4. Iýalramawt, which includes Mahrah and al-cAbr 
makes up the fourth division. 
(44) 
iii Distribution of local power 
On the eve of Islam there existed no central gov- 
ernment in the Yemen which could have spread its political 
influence over the whole of the country. At that time, 
the Yemen was distinguished by the existence of many 
powerful and influential tribal groups, each one dominating 
its own particular province (mikhlaf). Beside these, the 
Persian community had also emerged as an influential power 
in several Yemeritowns. What follows is a brief illustration 
of the distribution of local power throughout the country, 
with greater attention focused on the more influential groups. 
(44) For the divisions of the Yemen, see Map 
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'l. The Persians 
The Persian community in the Yemen-was made up of the 
descendants of the Persian troops sent by Chosroes i, the 
Persian Emperor, to the Yemen in A. D. 575 to assist Sayf 
b. Dhi Yazan, a Himyarl chief., in his struggle against 
the Abyssinian occupation. 
(45) 
These people were tradit- 
ionally known as the Abna'l, "the Sons. " 
(46) 
Shortly before the spread of Islam in the Yemen., the 
Abn-a :) were scattered throughout the country, figuring Z: > 
strongly in Aden and Sanca-3. 
(47) 
the latter of ývhich served 
as the centre for their rule in the country. 
Enjoying no tribal solidarity as such, the Abna :) 
were known by their own family name. These families appeared 
as aristocratic groups in the Yemen, such as the Badhan 
family, who were prominent landowners in Sanca3 and 
Dhamar. (48) In ýanca: ' other families such as B. Sarduwayh, 
B. Mihruwayh, B. Zanjuwayh, B. Barduwayh, B. Janduwayh and 
B. Buzurj also enjoyed a certain importance. 
(49) 
The B. . 
Khurrah were settled in Najran,, whilst the B. Layf appeared 
in Sanc: io and Rada:. 
(50) 
The Abna3 also figured 
(45) Cf. 5 above. 
(46) Ibn Iýabib, Muýiabbar, 266; al-Razi, Tarikh, 298; al-Isfahani, 
Aghani, XVII, 313; al-Samca-ni, AnsýLb., I, 1 22. 
(47) Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, 266, says that the A bna 
D dominated 
the commerce of both Aden and San Caa 
(48) Ba-dhan was the Persian governor in Sanca-' , and he 
had 
properties in both ýanca 3 and Dhamar: cf. al-Razi, 89f, " 133. See also al-Had'ith'i, 85; Serjeant " C- I San a the 
39. Protected" , 
(49) Al-Hamdani, Jawharatayn, 145f. 
(50) For Khurrah, cf. al-Hamdani, Iklil 1 530- for 
B. Layf, see Sifat, 1,2,34. 
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prominently in some of the Yemeni villages, especiallý- in 
(51) the Bawn. In al-Radrad the Abna were well known as 
investors in its silver mines. 
(52) 
Apart from the Abna3, several tribal groups dominated 
the Yemeni provinces., with four of them constituting the 
main influential tribal powers of the country. These vvere 
Himyar, Hamdan, Madhhij and Kindah. 
Ijimyar 
It is an historical fact that out of all the Yemeni 
tribes it was Himyar who enjoyed the most power in the Yemen 
on the eve of Islam. Their influence spread throughout 
most of the Yemeni provinces through both their own clans 
and their allies. 
(53) 
The tribe's main stronghold was its 
ovm territory, IqlTm Himyar, which extended from Sanca 
in the north to Aden in the south, and from Shabwah in the 
east to the coastal plain in the west. 
(54) There, each 
of the Himyari tribes inhabited its own province, with their 
chiefs enjoying independent rule. 
(55) 
(51) Al-Hamdani., Sifat, I, ill. 
(52) Al-Hamdan-1. Jawharatayn, 145. 
(53) E. g. some of 
and settled 
al-Kalac 
with them 
joined the Yursam confederation 
in Sacdah and al-cAwasuj in 
Jurash; see 
also al-Hadli 
al-Hamdan-1 
thl, Ahl, , 
Sifat, I, 114Y 117. See 
45. ' 
(54) Cf . Map 2. 
(55) Such as Dhu .0 1-Kala', Dhu Ru 
C ayn and Dliu Yazan, 
Cf. Map 2. 
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Hamda-n 
Muslim genealogists def ine the relationships of the 
Hamdani tribes on a genealogical tree which shows Hamdan 
as the ancestor of these tribal confederations named after 
(56) - (57) him. Al-Hamdani defines the borders of Hamdan 
territory as extending from the lowland (al-gha D it) of the 
east to Tihamah in the west, and from S. anca3 in the south to 
c ýa dah in the north. Within this area, the Hamdani tribes 
enjoyed much influence and power. These were composed of 
both nomad and semi-nomad groupings. 
(58) 
Certain elements 
of Hamdan were also to be found outside Hamdan territory, 
C- 
such as Dhu Murran., who had settled in al-Ma afir alongside 
(59) (60) Himyar, and al-Mahayil in Hadramawt. 
4. Madhhij 
Although the tribe was suffering from political 
weakness at that time., the confederation of Madhhij 
appeared in al-Jawf area. The elements of this confederation 
were mainly of Madhhij tribes and those Yemeni tribes who 
lived with them in al-Jawf such as al-Azd and Khawlan. 
(61) 
The Madhýaij tribes, however, dominated the eastern part of 
al-Jawf, the lowland country, which extends from ', Najran 
(56) Wilson, "Al-Hamdani 95f. 
(57) ýifat, 1,109. See also Wilson, "Al-Hamdani", 97. 
(58) Al-Hamdan-1, Sifat, 1,99. See also al-Hadithi, 48,67f. 
(59) Al-liamdan-ii, Sifat, 1,67,190. 
i 
(60) A-L-Hamdani, ýifat, 1,85. 
Cf. Al-Razi, Tarlkh, 37, who mentions some elements of 
these tribes in Aladhhij confederation. 
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in the north to the boundary of Hadramawt (Maf azat 
Hadramawt) in the south. 
(62) 
In Najran B. al-Harith 
b. Kacb a tribe of Madhhij, figured strongly. 
Kindah 
The tribe appeared as an influential power in 
Hadramawt, settling in the upper areas and in the western 
part of Wadi 1ýaqramawt. 
(63) 
On the eve of Islam they were 
in political control of most of the Hadram-i provinces, 
having challenged other tribal groups in the country. 
(64) 
Two main Kindah tribes shared this region, the most 
influential of which was B. Mucawiyah. 
(65) 
c. The political situation on the eve of the advent of Islain 
At that time the Yemen was in the throes of a pol- 
itical split. This split immediately followed the murder 
of Sayf b. Dhi Yazan, who had almost succeeded in unifying 
the country under his rule. Subsequently the Yemen was 
divided amongst the local chiefs, each one having est- 
ablished his political influence in his own province. 
This situation is described by one of the historians as 
(62) Cf . Maps 1,2. 
(63) Cf . Map 2. 
(64) This challenge obviously appears during the meeting 
of their chiefs with the Prophet in Medina, 
see 88 below. 
(65) The most influential Kindah chiefs v, -ere from this 
branch, such as al-Ash C ath b. Qays and the Kings of 
B. Walicah, al-Hai-ndani, Sif. -A, I, 88f; Ibn flaý--m, -C Jamharat . 425-9; 
Ibn Khald'ý, n, I ba rI15, )6 f 
For their nasab, cf. table 3. 
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one of petty kings (muluk al-tawa if). 
(66) 
Followina- 
t> 
this political split amongst the local power, the Persian 
Emperor sent troops to the country in order to protect 
I 
his authority there. Then they entered the Yemen, con- 
solidating their authority in ýanca 13 
(67) 
Naturally the emergence of various leaderships in 
the area inevitably meant a power struggle between them. 
When the Prophet had founded his administration in Medina 
and had begun to spread his message, the power struggle 
amongst some of the Yemeni groups had reached its zenith. 
It is obvious, however., that the most important event in 
the Yemen at that time was the tribal struggle and the 
formation of alliances between various local powers. To 
illustrate this situation we will give a brief description 
of the area, mentioning the alliances formed at that time. 
The most important tribal group emerged in Himyar 
territory. In their own provinces, the Himyari chiefs 
kept their sovereignty with independent rule. These rulers 
usually had a title, which began with Dhu ("master of 
such as Dhu 
31-Kalac, Dhu Rucayn and Dhu Yazan. 
(68) Others 
had the title qayl ("ruler"), such as Banu 
cAbd Kalal. 
(69) 
Several Himyar'l groups succeeded in forming 
alliances amongst themselves, each group coming under the 
leadership of one of the ýimyari chiefs. In the territory 
c 
of al-Kala some Himyarl butun gathered under the leader- 
(66) Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Kitab al-T-ijan, 317. 
(67) Cf. al-Mas c udi, Mur5j, 111,176; Anon, Tarilnkh, 
f7 b. 
Cf. also 
(68) A! -Hamdan-L, iklil, II, passim; 
Ibn :,,, anzur, Lis aii, 'XV, 
457; al-Mubarrad, Kamil, II, 373f. 
(69) Al-Hamdan-1, IklTl, 11,362-4; Ibn Mianzur, XI, 
-380. 
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ship of al-Sumayfac b. Yucfir b. Naku-r who took the title 
of Dhu " 1-Kalac. 
(70) 
In al-Macafir Banu c Abd Kalal 
figured strongly 
I 
as rulers (aqyal) of this region. 
(71) 
The relations between 4imyar and other local powers 
are vao-ue in our sources yet it is clear that these 
Uimyarl chiefs kept themselves aloof from the power struggle 
which was taking place amongst some local tribes at that 
t ime. Even ýIimyari-Persian (Abna3 ) relations are not clear 
in our sources. Such lack of information leads one to 
believe that each Himyari group was satisfied with its lot 
and, consequently, abstained from interfering in the affairs 
of others. Thus when the AbnV were attacked by Madhhij 
(72) in 11/632, the Ulmyari- chiefs adopted a neutral stance. 
Our sources mention two confederations which arose 
in the central highland area and al-Jawf : the f irst was 
represented by the Abna and Hamdan; the second consisted 
of several tribes in the Jawf and Najran area., especially 
those of Madhýij . The sources record that 
the reason behind 
the establishment of the Abna -Hamdan confederation was to 'I 
oppose an internal movement by the Madhhij and their allies 
against Persian rule in SanOa3. 
(73) 
When the news of 
Madhhij intentions reached the court of Badhan, the Persian 
governor in San ca he assembled his army and duly moved 
(70) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, II, 265f. 
(71) Al -Hamdani, Iklil, II, 363f. 
(72) Cf 59,8if below. 
(73) Cf. al-Ra-zi, Ta-rikh, 37; al-Janadi, Suluk, f36b; 
al-Ahdal, Tutifat, f 32b. 
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northwards to meet his enemy. He went via Hamdan territory. 
There, the leaders of Hamdan met him and suggested est- 
ablishing a confederation. Badhan accepted the offer and 
both sides signed an agreement. 
(74) 
If the Abn-a: ) signed this agreement in order to benef it 
from the power of Hamdan in their opposition to the Madhhij 
attack, our sources do not illustrate the reason. -> I whick led 
all Hamdan to involve themselves in such a confederation. 
There is no indication except for the fact that Hamdan 
might have intended to extend its influence over the area 
which was under the control of Madhhij in the upper part of 
al-Jawf. Another reason may have been to demolish the 
confederation of Madhýij and their allies which, without 
any doubt, was threatening its interests in the area. 
Therefore Hamda. n exploited its alliance with the Abnao by 
attacking Madhh-ij in al-Razm in al-Jawf in 2/622; the latter 
were decisively defeated and some of their chiefs were 
killed. (75) 
In the area of Nairan, the Christian power figured 
prominently. Najran, therefore, was the central point of 
Christianity in south Arabia. 
(76) The Christians there 
were led by the three most important men of the community 
the C Aqib; the Sayyid shared the civil governorship; and 
the bishop of Najran. 
(77) 
(74) Ibid. 
(75) Cf. al-Hamdani, Sifat, I, 108; IklTl, _II, 
461f; al-Bakri, 
Mu 'jam, 11,649. 'See also al-Isfahani, Aghani, XV, 210; 
Yaqut, Mu7jam, 111,42; al-ýVaysi, al-Yaman, 169, who 
says it was on the same day as the battle of Badr, 
17 Ramadan A. H. 2. 
(76) Cf. above; 30 below. 
(77) Watt, 127; Trimingham, 306. 
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-I Other Najrani leaders were to be seen among the leaders 
of the Madhhij alliance. These elements were namely the 
B. c Abd al-Madan., of B. al-Harith b. Kacb of Madhh. ij. 
(78) 
In the battle of al-Razm four chiefs of B. cAbd al-Mad-an 
were killed. 
(79) 
On the eve of the advent of Islam in 1ýaýramawt . the 
region was also in a state of political disturbance due to 
the tribal struggles. This political unrest, however., 
(80) reflected on the security of the area. Ibn Habib 
comments upon this by saying "No body can travel in the 
area unless he has the protection (khafarah), of its people, 
because it [ýaqramawt] is not controlled by any one ruler. " 
Although some tribal groups had settled in Hadramawt 
the real domination of the area lay with Kindah (and to a 
lesser degree with the tribe of Hadramawt), in particular 
B, Mucawiyah whose foothold in the region went back to 
A. D, 570. (81 ) Thus, B. Mucawiyah wa s prominent in the area, 
having waged war on the rest of the ýajrami tribes. Even 
their own kinsmen of B. Ashras were not on good terms with 
them. (82) 
(78) See al-Razli., Tarikh, 37, who records the name_of al- 
Ilusayn b. QannEn, 'Shihab b. al-Husayn and Yazid b. C Abd 0-0. ý al-Madan. 
(79) Namely the four sons of Dhu al-Ghussah, 
_cf. 
al-Hamdani, 
Iklil) II) 461f; Sifat, 1,108; al-Bakri, Muciam, JI., 649. 
I -- 
(80) Al-MuDabbar, 266f. 
(81) Al- Asali, "South Arabia", 234. Cf. also al-Hamdani, 
ýifa , 1,85. Kindah migrated 
from Ghamr Dh-1 Kindah to 
ýIaftamawt after Ibn al-Jawn, their king, had been killed 
in the battle of Shicb jabalah. 
T (82) Cf. Ibn al_'al b 1, Na. sab, f 30a, who mentions a battle 
which took place before Islam between al-Sakun (of 
Ashras) and B. Mucawiyah. 
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In Tihamat al-viaman and the northern plateau of the 
highlands, the situation was different from that of other 
regions. Neither influential leaders nor strong confed- 
erations had appeared in both areas. In Tihamah the tribes 
of cAkk and the Ashacir represented the bulk of the 
population. 
(83) 
Khathcam, al-Azd and Bajilah appeared to 
be the powerful tribes in the northern part of the 
highlands. (84) 
It was in this atmosphere of political unrest that 
the Prophet sent letters and envoys to the Yemeni tribes 
calling them to adopt Islam. 
(83) Al-Hamdanly Sifat) I. 53f; Ibn Khaldu-n, c Ibar, II, 529. 
Cf. Map 2. -6 
C 
(84) Cf. al-Hamdani, ýifat, I, 
_'118f; 
al-Bakri, IN'lu jam, I, 
, 
90. At that time Baj_LIah was scattered amongst 5 -B I 
the Arab tribes as a result of their defeat in the 
Battle of al-Fijar. Cf. 119 below. But some 
of them-were refugees with-the Yemeni tribes, cf. 
al-Bakri, 1.58-61. 
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B. The beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations 
We have seen above how the Yemenis were divided 
politically, a fdct which rendered the Yemen as a whole 
incapable of dealing with neighbouring powers. The ýijaz, 
on the other hand, enjoyed stability as a result of the 
spread of Islam and the unification of the main towns 
(i. e. Mecca., Medina and al-Ta3if) in the region. Consequently, 
the Prophet looked forward to spreading his message (dacwah) 
into the other parts of Arabia including the Yemen. 
The real Prophetical call to the Yemeni tribes had 
not occurred before the year of the conquest of Mecca, 
i. e. 8/629. The sources at our disposal do not mention 
any letter or delegation sent by the Prophet to the Yemeni 
tribes before this year, 
(85) 
the only contact being witni 
certain Yemeni groups or individuals who had frequently 
travelled to the Hijaz where the Prophet asked them to adopt 
Islam. The sources describe the Prophet meeting with al- 
Tufayl b. cAmr al-Dawsi, a chief of Azd al-Sarah in Mecca % .11 
before the hijrah; the latter duly accepted Islam. 
(86) 
Al-Hamdan! (87 ) also records a promise of support made to 
the Prophet by Qays b. Namaý al-Hamdani just a year before 
the hijrah. This earlY contact was, of.. course., on an 
individual basis and was not representative of the real 
(85) The only communication was that with Badhan., the 
Persian governor in ýan a, but this communication is 
not a direct one since it was. related to the Prophet's 
letter to the Persian Emperor; cf. Ibn Sa Cd Tabaqat, I, 
260; al-Mascudi, Tanbih, 259. For a full discussion of 
the adoption of Islam by the Persian community in 
ýanc`a) , cf. 
61-3 below. 
(86) Ibn HishHm, Sirat, 1,407-10; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Istlicab, 
II) 757f; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, 111,287- Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 
III, 54f. 
(87) Iklil, X, 220. See also Ibn Sacd, I, 340f (has Namat b. I- 
Al Nuwayri, XVIII, 8; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 
225; Ibn Hajar, V, 264, reads Qays b. Mdlik- 
-24- 
Yemeni-muslim contact at that time. The first full-scale 
contact came when fifty people from the Ashacir, a Yemeni 
c tribe in Tihamah, led by Abu Musa al-Ash arl set sail from 
the Yemen and arrived in the Medina to meet the Prophet 
in 7/628-9. (88) 
The Prophet communicated with the Yemeni tribes., 
starting with Himyar- Detail of these communications is 
beyond the scope of the present study; 
(89) 
our main concern 
is the Prophet Is method of corresponding with these leaders 
and his manner of dealing with them. 
a. The correspondence between the_Prophet 
and the Yemeni leaders 
The Prophet's correspondence with the leaders of 
ýiimyar and other influential Yemeni chiefs was similar 
to that he entered into with the rulers of the great 
empires of that time. In his letters the Prophet recognized 
the political titles and the sovereignty of the various 
rulers over their own lands. 
(90) He also chose his 
delegates from those who held high positions among their 
own tribes. They included : Jar-ir b. cAbd Allah al-Bajali, 
"1- (91) who was sent to Dhii -Kalac al-Ijimyari; al-Aqrac b. 
cAbd 
(88) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, I, 348f; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Ist-icab, 
111., 979; al-Ahdali, Eathr, 83. 
(89) Foiý these communications, cf. Ibn Sacd, 
-264ff; 
al- 
Ya qubi Tarikh., 11., 64-6; See also Hamidullah, 160ff; 
al-Akwa Wathaliq, 83ff. 
(90) Cf. 
-al-Tabar-1,1,1718; C Hamiduliah, Watha iq, 145; al-Akwa , Watha iq., 105.1 107. 
(91) See al-Baladhuri., Ansa . 
11,318; Ibn Scad., Tabaqat, I, 
265f al-Ya cqu-b-1, rl". M-1kh, 11.62; Ibn ýIaj. -ýr 11,182. 
According to al-Waqidi, in al-Tabari, 1,1763, Jarir 
adopted Islam in Medina in Ramýqan 10/November-December, 
631, and the Prophet duly sent him to destroy DhU'ý' 1- 
Khalasah, an idol in Tabalah. Cf. Ibn al-Kalbi, Aparr, 
34-6; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 388; Ibn Sacd, VI, 22; Ibn 
al-Athir., Usd, I, 279f; Ibn ýIajartl, 242. Jarir took 
sides with the Muslim authority during the 111'ar of 
Apostasy and played a major role in the conqticsts, 
cf. ChantersIII, IV, below. 
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Allah, despatched to Dh- M (92) and al-Muh- u lurran; ajir b. Abi 
Umayyah, sent to al-ýIarith b. C Abd Kalýl. (93) a 
The attitude of these leaders towards Islam is 
unclear, the data available being contradictory. There is, 
however., general agreement in the sources that the leaders 
of Himyar sent Malik b. Mararah al-Ruhawi to the Prophet 
in 9/630-1. (94) But these sources do not confirm precisely 
the islamization of these leaders as a whole. Nevertheless., 
the Prophet's reply to these chiefs indicates the 
islamization of some of them. This letter, sent to B. 
Abd Kalal and Zur c ah b. Dhu- Yazan, mentions the adoption of 
Islam by these chiefs. 
(95) There is no mention in this 
letter that these leaders were obliged to take part in 
spreading Islam or protecting the Muslims in their lands. 
This is clear from the fact that they did not defend 
Mucadh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy, and other Muslims 
when cAbhalah declared his uprising. 
(96) Thus it can be 
seen that some., but not all, the Himyarl chiefs might have 
accepted Islam in 9/630-1. Jarir b. cAbd Allah, for 
instance, met DhTj 'ýýl-Kalaac and DHu- cAmr, both Ulmyarl 
chief s, just af ter the Prophet Is death and asked them to 
adopt Islam. 
(97) 
(92) Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isticab, 1,104. 
(93) Al-Ya C qubi, Tarikh, 11,62; al-Suhayll, al-Rawd, Il, 
358; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 422. 
c (94) Cf. Ibn Hisham., 
_Sirat, 
IV, 258; Ibn Sa d, 264f; 
al-Tabarl, 1718f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,198. 
Hamildullah, 144; al-Akwac, Watha3iq, 104f. 
(95) Ibid - 
(96) When cAbhalah moved against 7 ýIusjims f led to Hadramaw t, 
(97) Ibn 4ab4lb, al-Muhabbar, 75; 
182 (the narrative of Jarir 
Watt 
-, 
Medina, 126. 
ýanca% Mucadh and the 
cf. 5ý-) below. 
Ibn Hajar, Isabah, II, 
himself). See af-so 
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It can be concluded from the above discussion that 
the Himyar-1 chiefs, having abstained from taking sides 
either for or against Islam in the area did not all adopt 
Islam in 9/630-1. It is quite possible that they did not 
question their own attitude towards Islam., preferring 
instead to remain neutral. A more definite stance, 
however, appeared in the course of the Muslim-Yemeni dispute 
(98) in the early part of Abu Bakr's Caliphate. It seems 
that these Himyarl chiefs did not oppose the spread of 
Islam amongst their people as long as it did not clash with 
their interests in the region. The Prophet might have 
realized their position and avoided annoying them by 
appointing officials in their provinces, either from their 
kinsmen or from his own Companions. 
(99) 
The Prophet's letters were also distributed amongý, -. 
other Yemeni tribes. It is interesting to note that 
these letters were sent to more than one chief in the 
same tribe. In Hadramawt, for example, he wrote to several 
Kindi and Hadram-1 chief s. These letters also were not 
delivered by prominent people. 
(100) 
The Prophet despatched many campaigns to several C- 
parts of the Arabian Peninsula before the conquest of 
Alecca in 8/629. However he sent no campaign to the tD. 
Yemen, (101) until he had captured this holy city. Howeve 
(98) For their attitude in this dispute, see 81-2 below- 
(99) I. e. political representatives. 
(100) Cf. Ibn Sacd, 1,266; Hamidullah, 168-74., He also 
wrote- to the chiefs c of 
B. al-kl-', irith b. Ka ID and 
Khawlan cf. Ibn Sa d 266-9- 1jamidullah, 10/1-7. 
(101) Cf. al-1', 'aqidi passim; Ibn Hishatyt, Sirat,. 
IV, 280ff; Ibn Saýd, Tabaqat, II, passir,. 
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those campaigns sent to the Yemen were not aimed at the 
influential tribes, such as Himyar or Hamdan, but rather 
at those who were weak due to a political split, in 
particular Madhýij. To the territory inhabited by this 
tribe, three Muslim expeditions were sent shortly after 
the unification of the Hijaz in 8/629-30. Ibn Sacd (102) 
records that as soon as he returned from al-Jucranah, the 
Prophet equ. ipped Qays b. Sacd b. cAbadah, from the Anýar, 
with four- hundred men in order to invade Suda3, a tribe 
of Madhhij. Howeverthe expedition never materialized 
due to the conversion of the tribe in question. The 
second army consisted of four hundred men and was directed 
in Rabi, c I., 10/June-July 631., against B. al-Harith 
b. Kacb, also of Madhhij, in Najran. 
(103) 
The third 
campaign was also directed against certain j', Iadhhijis. 
This was led by c All b. Abi Talib who left 11.1edina in 
Ramadan/December of the same year at the head of three 
hundred men. The sole aim of this expedition was to reach 
Madhhij territory. (104) 
The strategic location of Najran as a stopping place 
between the Yemen and the Hijaz 
(1,05) 
prompted the Prophet 
to gain a foothold in the town. In fact., if the Prophet 
wanted Islam to spread throughout the Yemen, he would have 
to ensure that there was a secure route to the region via 
(102) TabaCEýt, 1,326. Cf. also Ibn cAbd al-Barr, 
"i Ist! "'ab, 11,351; Watt, "edina, 123). 
(103) Led by Khalid b. al-Walid, cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirat, 
262; Ibn Sa C d, 1,339; al-Tabarl, 1,1-124. 
(104) Al-lvaqidl, ýJaghazi, III, 1079f; Ibi,. Sa C dýII) lG9. 
In Cf. also Watt., 12-1. 
(105) Bowen "-Ancient Trade Routes", 39; Beeston, "Soune 
observations", 7- Trizz-ningh, -im, Christianity, 29,1- Y Ili, > 
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Naj ran. This would safeguard his envoys to the Yemeni tribes. 
The Najranis formed two groups, each of which was dealt with 
differently by the Prophet. The first was B. al-Harith b. 
c (106) Ka b. whom he forced to adopt Islam. The second con- 
sisted, of the Christians with whom the Prophet signed a 
peace treaty. 
(107) 
b. The delegations of the Yemeni tribes 
The year . 
9(630-1) is known as the year of delegations 
C- 
am al-Wufud). In this year Medina was inundated by waves 
of tribal delegations which met the Prophet and proclaimed 
their allegiance to Islam. The Yemeni delegations were 
included. It is clear that the Yemeni delegations showed t> 
no unity in their attitude, even single tribes being divided. 
The Prophet's policy towa'rds the 
delegations of the Yemeni tribes 
It is noticeable that the Prophet received the Yemeni 
delegations in different ways, treating some with warmth and 
others quite differently. Our sources do not explain the 
reasons behind the Prophet's attitude, although it may have 
been due to the different attitudes of these delegations 
towards Islam. It seems that. some of them adopted Islam before 
their arrival in Medina, coming there only to prove their 
acceptance of Islam. For instance, the delegate of Tujib, 
a Yemeni tribe of B. Ashras from Kindah, brought alms 
(, sadaq. ah) to Medina in 9/630-1, and in the f ollowing year 
(106) Cf. the expedition of Khalid b. al--V, 'alid ng, -iinst th, --m, 
27 above. 
(107) See 30 below. 
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group of Khawlan met the Prophet, telling him that they 
had adopted Islam and they would destroy their idols, a 
fact which delighted the Prophet. 
(108) 
The Prophet's 
reception of those who adopted Islam only after being 
attacked by the Medinan armies, e. g. the delegates of 
c (109) B. al-Harith b. Ka b., Sudao and Khathc am was different. a0 
This also applied to his reception of the Yemeni chiefs or 
those who represented, them. 
(110) 
The above policy of the Prophet led those delegates 
to take different attitudes toward Islamic authority in 
their provinces. Those who were warmly received by the 
c 
Prophet became supporters of Islam during both Abhalah's 
movement and the War of Apostasy, whereas the others led 
the rebels in these events. 
(111) 
C 
(108) For the delegate of Tujib, 
_cf. 
Ibn Sa d, 1) 323; al- 
Nuwayri, XVIII, 81 al-Ahdali, Nathr, 90f. For Khawlan, see 
Ibn Sacd, 1.324; al-Nuwayr-1, XVIII, 82; al-Ahdal-i. 87f. 
(109) For the reception of the Prophet to these tribes, see 
Ibn Sacd, I, 326f, 339f.? 348; al-Nuwayr-l', XVIII, 83. ff. 
(110) He, 
_for 
instance, warmly received ý, Jalik b. Mararah el- 
Ruhawl, the envoy of the Himyari chiefs, see Ibn Sa d, 
1 356; Wa 3 il b. Hu*r al-Haqrami, see 88 below-' 
.?. 
i- 
and Jar'lr b. cAbd Allah ai-Bajali, cf. Ibn Sacd., I. 
347 and note 91 above. Such a reception was not given 
. 
to some of the Yerýeni chiefs, such as the kings of c 
B. Walicah, al-Ash ath b. 
-Qays, 
both of Kindah, and 
- 
Amr 
b. Ma'd-1 Karib al-Zubaydi, of Maýhýij. For B. Walir--ah, 
cf. Ibn Sacd, 1.350 for al-Ash ath, see Ibn Hisham, 
Sirat,, IV, 254; for Amr, see Ibn Hisham, IV, 252. 
(111) Those who were warmly ) 
received-by the Prophet, C such 
as Tujib, a tribe, Wa il b. Hujr and Jarjr b. Abd 
Allah took sides with the Muslims during the War of 
Apostasy, while those who were not received in 
such. a manner became the opponents of the ýMuslims , TC 
authority in the Yemen, such as Kings of B. Wall ah, C za 
al-Ashcath b. Qays and Amr b. Macdi Karib. For 
the attitude of these Yemenis towards Islamic 
authority in the Yemen, cf, Chapter II, III below. 
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It is worthwhile mentioning that the delegation of 
the Christians of Najran was among the Yemeni delegates 
assembled in Medina in 10/631-2. There were fourteen of 
them in all., including the caqib, the Sayyid and the bishop, 
their leaders. They refused to adopt Islam, instead 
requesting peace (sulh). The Prophet accepted and entered 
into a peace treaty with them. It was agreed that the 
Medinan government would not interfere with the ecclesiastical 
affairs or property of the Christians of Najran, in return 
for which the latter would make an annual payment of two 
thousand garments of stipulated value, and, in the case of 
war., would lend the Muslims 30 suits of mail., 30 horses, and 
30 camels.. The Christians of Najran were to house the 
Prophet's messengers for twenty days or less, but for no 
longer than a month. 
(112) 
It can be seen from the articles of this treaty that 
it guaranteed to the Medinan government the ability to 
communicate with the Yemeni tribes and secure routes for the 
Muslim envoys to use on their way to. the Y(ýmeni regions. 
On the other hand., the treaty enabled. the Christians of 
Najran to keep their religion and protect their land from 
any Muslim attack. 
(112) Cf. Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, I, 
_357f; 
al-Baladhuri, 
Futiih, 755f; al-Ya'qubi, Tarikh, II, 66f, 
Hamidullah, 111f; al-Akwa Watha)iq, 94f. Cf. 
also Watt, 127., 359f; Trimingham, 306. 
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The effect of tribal conflict 
on relations with Medina 
Conflict among the Yemeni tribes became clear when 
they met the Prophet. However, the spirit of underst-,,. iding 
and stability amongst the Himyari chiefs led them to 
authorize Malik b. Mararah al-Ruhawi to deliver their letter 
to the Prophet. (113) Hamdan was represented by one 
delegation for both settled people and bedouins. 
(114) 
Other tribes were represented by a number of delecrations t) > 
which leads us to believe that these tribes were not 
unif ied. The Madhhij, for instance, included the delegations 
of Murad, Sacd al-cAshirah, Zubayd, Sud5? Jucfl and al- 
Nakh c (115) B. Mucawiyah of Kindah was represented by 
-c two delegations : one led by the Kings of B. Wall ah and 
the other under the leadership of al-Ashcath b. Qays. 
(116) 
This situation shows two aspects : firstly the split 
amongst these tribes and the absence of any central authority 
in their regions; and secondly, the power rivalry of the 
local chiefs. This rivalry apparently emerged when they 
met the Prophet. Al-Ashcath b. Qays and Wa I il b. Hujr 
(both influential leaders, the former of Kindah and the 
latter of the tribe of Hadramawt) disputed the ownership 
(113) See 25 above. 
(114) Cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 267-9; Ibn Sacd, I, 340f; 
al-Nuwayri, XVIII, 10f. 
(115) For these delegations, cf. Ibn Sacd, 1,324ff; al- 
Tabari., I, 1732ff; al-Nuwayri, XVIII, 84ff; al- 
Ahdall, Nathr, 92ff. 
(116) For B. 11, "allcah, cf. Ibn Sacd, 349f; a l-Nuwayri, A%T 
III 
114; Ibn al-Husayn, Ant. 3a-1 f4a. For a l-Ash C ath, see 
Ibn Hish-am, ýirat, IV, 254-6; , --bn Sac I d, 0. ý' -, aI- 
Tabari, I, Ibn al-Ath1r, -K-amil, 11,203-2,; L-Nuwayr-1, XVIII, 87f. For their Nasab, cf Table 3. 
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of a Wadi in Hadramawt. The Prophet, after hearing the 
evidence of witnesses (117) 
., 
judged in favour of Wa'il. 
It is noticeable that some Yemeni chiefs had a keen 
desire to obtain a guarantee from the Prophet for their 
estates. The Prophet guaranteed individual ownership for 
those who requested such whether in person or by letter. (118) 
Some of those delegates asked the Prophet to grant them 
certain areas in the Yemen, which he did. 
(119) 
The fact 
that such requests were not forwarded by the Himyarl chiefs 
suggest that they were strong enough to defend their lands 
themselves. However, our sources do not specify why these 
Yemenis sought guarantees from the Prophet. One reason may 
have been the political unrest in their provinces- .9 -for such 
a guarantee would secure their properties. 
c. The Prophet's representatives amon 
the Yemeni tribes 
One of the most complex matters in the history of 
Yemen at the dawn of Yemeni-Muslim relations is the 
identification of the Prophet's representatives there. 
Although the names of many representatives are mentioned in 
the sources., contradiction abounds concerning the posts of 
(117) Cf - al -Akwa 
C. Watha : 1P iq, 117;. Watt, 120. 
(118) E. g. cVa: 
'il b. Hujr al-ýJadramj-, Ibn rAbd al-Barr, 
Isti ab, IV, 1562f; 
_Ibn 
Ll-Athlr. Usd., V,, 81; Ibn 
90- Uajar, VI., 312; Hamidullah, 172; al-Hamid, 0 
al-Akwac, Watha3_. Lq, 1l7. For those to whom the Prophet 
guaranteed the ownership of their estates by letters, cf. 
Ham4idullah., WatM? iq, passim; al-Akwac, Watha 
) iq pas( sim 
(119) E. g. both al-Abyad b. Hammal and Abu Sabrah al-Ju 
C fi 
asked the Prophet to grant certain areas in the Yemen and 
he did. For al-Abyad request, cf. Ibn Sa 
C d, Vý 523; 
Ibn al-Athir, Usd, I , 45f, 
Ibn Hajar, I. 14. J 
Although he 
was a Himyari, he was not one 
ýf the Adhv; a or Aqyal 
and he4was settled in Malrib area. For Abu Sabrah, cf. 
Ibn Saý d, IP 326; Ibn Hazm., Jamharat, 410* 
-33- 
the representatives and their areas of service. 
A brief glance at the names of those appointed by the 
Prophet as his representatives among the Yemeni tribes 
reveals two different groups the first comprising alms- 
collectors, teachers and the second consisting of 
some of the Yemeni chiefs who met the Prophet, who in turn 
recognised their leadership over their tribes, the Muslim 
in particular. Thus it may be concluded that the first 
group specialized in religious affairs and the second in 
military and political matters. This is corroborated by the 
following examples : first when the Prophet appointed 
Farwah b. Musayk al-Muradi, a Madhhij chief, over all 
Madhhij, he sent with him Khalid b. S. cld b. al--! ýýs, one 
of the Companions, as alms-collector (jamic al-ýadaqah); 
(120) 
secondly the Prophet recognized the leadership of Wa 
) il b. 
ýujr, over all the Hadrami tribes, but appointed three of 
his Companions to collect the alms, 
(121) 
thirdly, when 
B. al-Harith b. Kacb adopted Islam, the Prophet designated 
one of their chieýs, Qays b. al-Husayn, and sent him along 
with cAmr b. Hazm al-Ansarl one of his Companions, as 
(122) 
qad i and teacher. 
(120) Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 251; Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, I 
327; al-Tabarl, 1,1736; Ibn "ýAbd al-Barr, Istl'ý_-alb, 
IIJ, 421; al-Nuwayri, Nihayat, XVIII, 85. 
-3 (121) For the Prophet's recognition of Wa il's leadership, 
cf. Ibn Sacd, I, 350f; Ibn al-Ath-ir, Usd, 81; Ib, ýi 
Vajar, VI, 145,312; Hamidullah, 169; al-Akv; Lf 
Wathaoiq, 115,117. For the Prophet's representatives 
there, see Table 1. 
(122) Ibn Hisham, Sira IV, 265; al-Tabari, 1,1727; al- 
Nuwayri, NihAyat, XVIII., 100. 
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It seems that the Prophet intended., through the 
appointment of the local leaders as his representatives, to 
encourage these leaders to work for Islam amongst their own 
tribes and to win them over to his side. However since 
these leaders knew nothing about Islamic regulations, the 
Prophet sent with them individuals with enough knowledge 
to deal with Islamic affairs. Although these representatives 
were chosen from among their own tribes, some proininent 
chiefs, such as cAmr b. Macd, Karib al-Zubayd! (a Madhhiji),, 
kings of B. Walicah and al-Ashcath b. Qays (both Kindi 
chiefs) were neglected. This policy resulted in these chiefs 
opposing the Muslim authority and revolting against it after 
the Prophet's death. (123) 
The Prophet's policy in the territory of Himyar 
was different. He did not interfere in the internal affairs 
of this tribe. No mention is made in the sources at our 
disposal of the Prophet appointing any one, whether from the 
tribe or elsewhere, as political representative. On the 
other hand, the leaders of Himyar did not oppose the Muslims 
for the sake of having religious activities in their own 
provinces. Therefore, the Prophet sent Mucadh b. Jabal al- 
Ansarl as an Islamic teacher in the. Yemen as a whole, and 
ordered him to base himself in al-Janad. 
(124) 
(123) For their opposition to Islamic authority, cf. 
Chapter II, III. 
(124) Ibn Sacd, 111,584; al-Tabar'l, 1,1719; al-R,, --tzi, 
Tarikh, 249, all confirm that he was sent in 9/630-1 
Cf. also al-Baladhuri., Ansab,, I, 529; IjLbn al-Athir, Usd, 
IV) 376-8; al-Janadl, SulUk, f9b; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, 
VI) 106f; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 
1,581. 
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Although al-Janad was chosen as a centre of the 
dacwah, it might have lacked central authority. Some evidence 
confirms that the leadership in the town was held by B. 
al-Aswad, 
(125) 
However, these indications do not mention 
whether the people of al-Janad were united. It is quite 
probable that the 
attitudes towards 
into two groups : 
opposed him. Acc 
Companions in the 
inhabitants of the town had different 
Islam and when Mucadh came they divided 
one supported ý, Jucadh and the other 
rding to ctbayd b. Sakhr, one of Alucadh's 
Yemen., by the time of C Abhalah's control 
over Sanca-3, Mucadh and his supporters were fighting the 
other group to control the town. 
(126) 
In conclusion it may be said that it was during the 
last two years of the Prophet's life (9-10/630-2) that 
relations between the Muslim authorities and the Yemeni 
tribes were established. The Yemeni attitude towards Islam 
differed from one group to another; the Muslims, on the 
other hand, succeeded in establishing themselves in some 
regions, but failed to do so in others. Their success or 
failure became apparent in the events which took place 
shortly before the Prophet's death and in the early period 
of his successor. 
(125) Al-Janadi, SulTulk, f9b; al-Ahdal, Tuýfat, f9a. 
(126) Al-Tabari, I, 1853f. 
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Table 1. The Prophet's representatives in the Yemen 
(9-11/630-2) 
a. For religious affairs 
Muca-dh b. Jabal al- 
Khazrajl,: al-Ansari 
Khalid b. Sa c id. b. al-cAs. 
Amr b. Hazm al-Ansari, 
teacher of Islamic doctrine and 
the leader of the Prophet's 
representatives. 
(') 
an alms-collector with Madhhi, 
(2) 
.i 
qadi and teacher with B. al- 
Harith b. Kacb in Najran. (3) 
c (4) Abu Musa al-Ash arl, a Yemeni., in Ma"rib. 
al-Tahir b. Abi Halah al-Tamimi, an alms-collector with cAkk 
-C* (5) and al-Asha ir in Tihamah 
Ziyad b. Labid al-Ansarl, an alms-collector with the 
tribe of Hadramawt. 
(6) 
(1) He stayed in al-Janad, Cf. 34 above. 
(2) Cf. 33 above. 
(3) Cf. 33 above. 
(4) Al-Tabari, I, 1852, (citing Sayf b. cUmar); Ibn al-Athir, 
Kamill 11,2281 Ibn al-Dayba , 
Qurrat, 1,64; Bughyat, 
23 Ibn Khayy I at, Tarik 97; al-Baladhuri, Ansab, I, 
529; Ibn al-Atýir, Usd, 111,246; Ibn Hajar, IsEbah, C 
all say that he was over Zabid, Rima . 
Aden and the 
coastal area. It is probable that he was over Ala3rib 
for two reasons : firstly he was in Aýla: rib when cAbhalah 
b. Kacb captured Sanca'3, Cf. 55 below; secondly the 
sources which meniion the governorship of al-Tahir b. 
Abli HElah are agreed that he was over Tihamah, cf. 
note 5 below. Cf. also Watt, 122. 
C 
(5) Al-Tabari, 1,1852 (citing Sayf b. Umar); Ibn al-Athl1r, 
Kamil, 11,228; Usd, III, 50f; Ibn al-Daybac, Bughya-,, 
23; Qurrat, 1,64. 
(6) Ibn Hisham, Slrat, IV, 271; Ibn Khayyat, 97; Ibn Sa 
C d, III, 
598; *al-Baladhuri, Ansab, I, 245Y 529; al-Tabari, 1,18, --)2, - 
Ibn cAbd al-Barr, 11,534; Ibn al-Ath-ir, Kamil, 11,2128: 
Usd, 11,217; al-Janadi, Suluk, f20a; Ibn Hajjar, 1, -ý, tbah, III 
20; Ibn al-Dayba C, Qn-r-rat, 1,68f; al-Nuv; a*yrl, XVIII, 169. 
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eUkashah b. Thawr b. Asghar al-Ghawthl, an alms-collector with 
al-Sakasik and al-Sakun), in 
Hadramawt. (7) 
al-Muhajir b. Abi Umayyah al-Makhzumi., an alms-collector with 
B. Mucawiyah of Kindah and al- 
Sadif in Hadramawt. (8) 
(9) Sacid b. al-Qishb al-Azdi, in Jurash. 
b. For military and political affairs 
Farwah b. Musayk al-Muradi-, over all Madhhij 
(10) 
cAmir b. Shahr al-Hamdan-1 over a part of Hamdan 
Qays b. Malik b. Sacd al-Arhabi al-Hamdan-j over Hamdan 
(12) 
C (7) Al-Tabari, 1.1852; Ibn Abd al-Barr, 111,1080; Ibn 
Makula, Ikmal., 1,96; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 2; all 
these sources add B. Mucawiyah of Kindah. We know that 
al-Muhajir b. Abi Umayyah was appointed by the Prophet as 
an alms-collector with B. Mucawiyah and al-ýadif, but he 
did not go there. Cf. 183 below. Since al-Muhajlr 
remained in Medina it is quite possible that the Prophet 
annexed B. Mucawiyah to C Ukashah who held this post until 
the Prophet's death. When AbT1 Bakr became caliph, he 
replaced cUkashah of B. Mucawlyah by Ziyad b. Labid, 
cf. note 64 in Chapter III. 
(8) He remained in Medina until Abu Bakr despatched him at the 
head of his army to suppress the Yemeni rebels. Cf. 101 below- 
(9) Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isticab, 11,626; Ibn al-Athlir, Usd, II, 
315; Ibn Hajar, Isabah 111,101. 
(10) Cf. 33 above. 
(11) Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isti C ab, 11,792; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, C IV, 10 (both citing Sayf b. Umar) say he is one of 
the Prophet's representatives in the Yemen. 
(12) Ibn Sa c d, Tabaqat, 1,341; Ibn 
Ibn ýIajar, Isabah, V, 264, all 
appointed him over all Hamdan. 
reads Qays b. Namat b. Qays b. 
and does not mentiýn this auth 
Sirat, IV, has Malik b. Namat. 
al-Athl-r., Usd, IV, 224; 
say that 
- 
the Prophet 
220, Al-Hamdan-i ikli ) Xjl 
Malik b. Sa d al-Hamdani, 
orization. Ibn Hisham, 
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Qays b. al-Husayn al-Harithi., over B. al-H-arith b. Ka cb 
in Najran. (13) 
Surad b. CAbd Allah al-Dawsi al-Azdi over Jurash. 
(14) 
(15) Mahri b. al-Abyad, over Mahrah. 
(13) Cf. 33 above. 
(14) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, V, 526 (says he settled in Jurash), 
1,338; Ibn Hisham, Sirat, 256; al-Tabarl, I, 1729f; 
Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 111,17. 
(15) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, 1,355. In another account Ibn 
Sacd, ibid. says that Zuhayr b. Qirdim met the Prophet 
and the latter appointed him over his people, 
i. e. Mahrah. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Political Situation in the Yemen during 
theý'last phase of the Prophet's life - The 
movement of cAbhalah b. Kacb 
(DhuOL-Hijjah-Rabicl 10-11/March-June 632) 
Towards the end of the Prophet's life,, in particular 
in Dhu: )l-Hijjah 10/March 632, a movement arose against the 
Islamic state in many parts of the Arabian peninsula. These 
uprisings were led by Arab tribesmen who claimed prophethood 
among their own tribes., such as Musaylimah b. Hablib of 
B. Hanifah in al-Yamamah., Tulayýah b. Khuwaylid of B. Asad 
in Najd and cAbhalah b. Kacb of cAns, a branch of Madhýij, 
in the Yemen. (1) However, cAbhalah's movement was a limited 
one which arose in one district and ended in another. It 
was mainly an internal conflict involving land control and as 
such was merely a continuation of the power struggles before ýD 
Islam among the local powers themselves. However, this 
chapter will cover the movement of cAbhalah and the attitude 
of the locals towards it, showing its aim and its relation 
with Islam. 
A. cAbhalah and the begl'nni g of his movement 
The very first movement was that of cAbhalah in the 
(2) 
Yemen. According to al-Tabarl and Ibn al-Athir, the 
first apostasy in Islam took place in the Yemen during the 
life time of the Prophet and was led by Dhu3I-Khimar 
For these movements, see al-Tabari, I, 1793ff. See also 
Donner, Islamic conquests, 85. 
(2) Al-Tabari, I, 1795f; Ibn al-Athir, Kam-fl, II, 228; see 
alsO Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Istilcab, 111,1266. 
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c Abhalah b. Kacb who rose up after the Farewell Pilgrimage 
-D (Dhu L Hiijah, 10/March, 632). His movement began in the 
north-east of al-Jawf, specifically in Khabban Cave. (3) 
Arab historians consider all the movements which 
arose in the Arabian Peninsula during the last phase of 
the Prophet's life, without any exception, to be movements 
of apostasy. This means that the leaders of these movements 
and their followers were originally Muslims but later 
left Islam for another faith, or at least stopped openly 
practising Islam. According to Islamic teaching, an apostate 
is one born a Muslim or who adopts Islam and leaves it for 
another faith, or who stops practising Islam. 
(4) 
In fact 
this term may include most movements in the Arabian Peninsula, 
since they had originally gone to Medina with their tribes 
and accepted Islam. 
(5) 
cAbhalah b. Kacb himself had never been a Muslim. 
There is no information to confirm his adoption of Islam 
in the sources at our disposal. Furthermore, these sources 
do not supply us with. any historical material about the 
background of his life before his uprising, with the 
exception of the fact that he was a soothsayer (kahin) 
(3) Al'-Tabari, Tarikh, 1.1854; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, -VI, 
. 307. Yaqut, Mu-jam, 11,343, confirms that it's a 3 
villaze near Najran. Cf. also Smith, Ayyubids, II, 
171f; al-Shamahi, 79. See also Map-33- 
1 51-4; SEI "Alurtadd" (4) Cf. al-Mawardi, Ahkam, v 
': fah and Tulayhah of B. Asad. (5) Such as 'Jusaylamah of B. Hani 
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in Khabban. (6) Therefore his being termed an apostate 
(murtadd) isY in my opinion, not acceptable. 
The Arab historians, however., all agree that he made 
claims to Prophecy and they thus all call him the liar 
(kadhdhab). (7) On the other hand, he was not the only one 
in the Arabian Peninsula who claimed the prophethood during 
the last phase of the Prophet's life. Events confirmed that 
the strong revolts which arose at that time were led by 
leaders claiming the prophethood for themselves. 
(8) 
Abhalah's claim to be a prophet might have occurred, 
but it is relevant to ask why he did so? The modern writer, 
al-Duri., says that "we must not forget the Prophet's success 
and the spread of his call,, in addition to the presence of 
tribal solidarity which was responsible for the rise of 'the 
liars in the Arabian Peninsula. " 
(9) 
VvTe find this point of 
view acceptable, especially in the case of eAbhalah's 
movement. 
(6) Shoufani., Al-Riddah,. 91. For this hi 
his life., see al-Tabari, 1,1795; Ibn 
228; al-Diyar-bakri Tarikh, II, 155f. 
FutUh 113 Dhu 11 Dhu I. -Khimar J, y. imar, c also Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Istil ab, III, 
storical material of 
al-Athir., Kýmil, II 
In al-Baladhurl, 
and al-Aswad., see 
1266. 
(7) E. g. Ibn Hisha-m, S-Trat, IV, 271; 
-al-Tabar'l-, 
1,1797; 
l :- Ikl1l, 11,161; al-Razi Týrlkh, 76. Watt, a -Hamdani, 
M. at Medina., 129 says "He does not seem to have made 
a serious claim to be a Prophet. " 
(8) Such as Musaylamah, Tulayhah, Sujah and Dhu I-Taj Laqit 
b. Malik al-Azdi. 
(9) Muqaddimah, 43. He is therefore suggesting thr--Jlt cAbhalah 
argued that, since the Prophet himself was successful 
despite early opposition from many of his own tribe, he 
could himself succeed with ease, having the united 
support of his people. 
-44- 
We know that at the same time as c Abhalah Is movement 
was on the ascendant, Islam was spreading actively in the 
Yemen to the extent that many provinces were dominated by 
Islam. In Hadramawt and Tihamah political authority was 
mostly held by Muslims. In the highlands (N_ajd al-Yaman. ), 
it was absent, except for some alms collectors, and Muslim 
teachers, while political authority remained completely in 
the hands of the tribal and provincial chiefs. 
(10) 
B. The political situation of Madhhij territory 
In the north-east of al-Jawf, in particular in the 
-territory of Madhýij, Islamic activity seems to have been 
limited as a result of the failure of the Medinan repres- 
entative, Farwah b. Musayk al-Muradili, to keep the area under 
his control. It can be assumed that he had insufficlent 
active political influence within his tribe, Madhhij, to form 
a local Islamic force from them. Nor was there strong leader- 
ship within Madhýij, which could play a major role to control 
' ("1 1) the area politically. Ibn al-Ruwayyah, U. the paramount 
chief of Madhhij, played no role in these events and the 
historical sources at our disposal do not mention him as 
being among the Yemeni chiefs - those, for example, who 
met the Prophet in Medina or who had relations with the Islamic 
government through correspondence.. Furthermore he does not 
appear among the important chief s in the Yemen itself during 
-I e -3 c (10) E. g. Badhan over San a 
_then 
his son Shahr, ýmir b. 
Shahr al-Hamdani on Hamdan territory, Chiefs of Himyar 
over their own provinces and B. cAbd al-M, -adan in'Najran. 
See a! -Tabari, 1,1737; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,228; 
Hamidullah, IVatha-iq, 100. 
C (11) Al-Hamdani, ýifat, 1,108; Ibn Rustah, A laq, 113. 
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these events. Some of the Madhhij chiefs had adopted 
different attitudes towards Islam, such as Qays b. cAbd 
Yaghuth al-Muradi and cAmr b. Macdil Karib al-Zubaydi. 
The former refused to go to Medina to adopt Islam, while 
the latter went there but did not obtain the leadership of 
his tribe, while Farwah b. Musayk did. 
(12) 
This feuding among the Madhhij chiefs appeared a 
short time before the rise of cAbhalah's movement., 
(13) 
and caused the unstable situation in their area. In all 
probability some of these Madh4ij. chief s disagreed with the 
Islamic policy concerning the appointment of represent- 
atives in the area. These chiefs perhaps rejected this 
policy by forming an opposition against it. The Prophet 
therefore., paid attention to this area by sending troops 
from time to time to'put pressure on the people, in 
(14) 
particular the Madhh4. Meanwhile he commanded. 
(12) He was appointed on behalf of the Prophet on all Madhh. ij, C Cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 249-54; Ibn Sa d, Tabaqat, I, 327f 
C al-Tabari, Tarikh., I., 1733f; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 1, 40-i. See also Shoufani, 93f; Table 1. 
(13) For the Qays b. C Abd Yaghuth and C Amr b. Macd-1 Karib 
conflict, see Ibn Hisham., Sirat., IV, 252f; Ibn al- 
Athir., Usdi VYC227; al-Ahdall, Nathr, 94. For the 
antagonism of Amr b. Macd-1 Karib to Farwah b. Musayk, 
see the poetry of the former, 48 below. Qays b. 
_ cAbd Yaghu-th al-Muradi, the nisbah after_his tribe Murad., 
of Madhýij. Ibn Sacd, V. 525; al-Tabari, I. 1732ff; C al-Mas udi. L Tanbihp 
277; al-Razi, Tarikh, 80,150; 
Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 227; and al-Kala_i, 153 all 
simply call him Qays b. Makshuh (Makhsuh is his laqab 
for its meaning, cf Ibn 
I 
Manzur, 11) 573; Tabari, 
111) 1365. In al-Hamdani, Iýlil., VIII, 21 and Ibn al-Ath-ir., 
K, Emil, 
_II, 
255, read as Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth b. Makshuh. 
.%Y 
7ff and al-Waqidi, Futuh, I, '. -)ff., call Al-Azdi I 
him 
C 
Qays b. Hubayrah. However, his full name is Qays 
b. Abd Yaghuth al-Muradi. 
_We 
will mention him as 
Qays b. cAbd*Yaghu-th al-Muradi. 
(14) There are three campaigns directed to Madhhij during the 
Prophet's life, the first led by Qays b. Sa*cd b. cAbadah 
and prepared to Suda', branch of Madhhij; the second C led by Khalid b. al-Walid to B. al-ýarith_b. Ka b, also 
C 
of Madhhij; the third led by AlijbnAbi Talib which 
directed to Madhhij territory. For these campaigns, see 
27 above: 'For the buýun of Nladhýiij, see Table 2. 
V 
ýv 
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Farwah b. Musayk, his own representative in MadhPij territ- 
ory, to attack those people whenever he found the 
opportunity right. 
(15) 
Thus the weakness of the Islamic forces in the area, 
the Madhhij territory, the feuding among the leaders them- 
selves, and the absence of strong local leadership which 
created a political vacuum, as well as the spread of the 
news of the Prophet's illness after the Farewell Pilgrimage - 
all of these factors perhaps encouraged cAbhalah b. Kacb 
to announce his movement by claiming the prophethood at 
that particular time. He succeeded initially in declaring 
his movement, easily forming a force which consisted 
mainly of the. inhabitants of the area. 
C. cAblialah's followers 
- (16) AI-Hadithi suggests that 11 cAbhalah's power 
rested upon the old pre-Islamic alliance, which mainly 
consisted of Madhhij and some Yemeni tribes, particularly 
those who lived in al-jawf area. " However, the acceptance 
of the new faith by some members of this alliance certainly 
encouraged an inclination by some of them towards cAbhalah's 
movement. Thus some of -them followed cAbhalah while others, 
such as al-Nakhc and Jucf-i, branches of Madhhij, remained 
(17 
neutral, tý ae smallest number, led by Farwah b. Musayk, the 
Prophet's representative in ýMadhhij was hostile to him, 
(15) AI-Islahani, XV) 210; al-Razi, Tarlikh, 142f; 
Ibn ýajar, Isabah, V, 209. 
4ý 
(16) Ahl, 15. For this alliance, see 19 above. 
(17) H Al-KahlLcIll, T-arllký,, niso 151. See Ll taýble 2. 
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but unable to face up to his power. This latter group, 
therefore., retreated to al-Ahsiyah. 
(18) 
In fact cAbhalah's 
power rested mainly upon his tribe cAns, although eler: ients 
of Zubayd, B. al-Harith, Awd, Musliyah and Hakam, all 
branches of Madhhij, also supported him. (19) 
Abhalah b. Kacb also got support from other Madhh. iJ 
chiefs, particularly those who had lost their high positions 
within their tribes as a result of the advent of Islam in 
the Yemen during the period (9-10/630-32). 
(20) 
These were 
after all chiefs within their own tribes, while the Islamic 
administration appointed others from their tribes, such as 
Farwah b. Musayk. Therefore some of them, such as Qays 
CC b. Abd Yaghuth al-Aluradi, Amr b. M. cd: L Karib al-Zubaydi, 
Mucawiyah b. Qays al-Janb-1 and Yazid b. al-Husayn al-Harithl., 
all Madhhij chiefs, joined C Abhalah's troops. 
(21) 
The 
Kings of B. Walicah., of Kindah in Hadramawt also declared 
their support for cAbhalah's movement, 
(22) 
but could not 
C (18) Al-Tabari, I, 1795f. See also Yaqut, Nlujam, I, 
112; who says that al-Ahsiyah a lace in the Yemen. p 
(19) Al-Kalaci, 151; al-Diyar-bakri, Tarl7kh, 11,156; 
those all being branches of Madh4ij; Some sources 
mention Madhhij only, Cf. al-Tabari, I. 1795f; Ibn al- 
Athir, Kar-iiil, 11., 228; al-Diyarbakri, 11., 155. For 
the nasab of these tribes, see Table 2. 
(20) Such as C Amr b. MacdT Karib al-Zubaydil and Qays C .7 b. Abd Yaghuth al-Muradi, both are Madhhij chiefs. 
(21) Al-Tabari, I, 1854f. See also al-Haditfii, Ahl, 115. 
(22) Al-Tabari, 1,2000; Ibn al-Ath-ir, 'Kamil, 11, '257. These 
Kings also lost their high positions during the appear- ZD 
ance of Islam in Ijaqramawt, especially when the !. Iedinan 
government appointed Ziyad b. Labid al-Ansari. as its 
representative there who succeeded in creating a 
military force consistin,, -- entirely of local tribes. 
.Lý 
join him because the Islamic power in their territory was 
concentrated and strong. 
(23) 
from the scene of events. 
Furthermore, they were far 
In fact the chiefs who joined cAbhalah's movement., 
I 
or those who declared their support, found it convenient 
for solving their own problems. Immediately after joining 
Abhalah's movement, Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth, a strong c Abhalah 
supporter, removed Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's rep- 
resentative of all Madhýij. 
(24) 
The latter, however, 
succeeded in getting back his high position, which he had 
lost during the appearance of Islam in the Yemen. 
(25) c Amr 
C b. Ma di Karib al-Zubaydi also succeeded in winning back 
his high position when c Abhalah appointed him a governor 
of all Madhhij. 
(26) For this reason cAmr satirized 
Farwah b. Musayk as follows - .0 
.w 551-9 L; L-ý-j 
4ý 5 c, LI c-, Ij 13 1 
We found that the 
(he is just like) 
with filth. 
Whenever you meet 
You see the calam 
rule of Farwah at the worst, 
a donkey whose face is covered 
-C Aba Umayr (Farwah), (27) 
ities of the malice and treason. 
(23) For a detailed discussion of the Ziyad and his local 
force challenge chiefs of Kinda, cf. Chapter III, B. below. 
(24) Al-Tabarl, Tarikh, 1., 1796; Ibn al-Athir, Kami II, 
228, Abu-al-Fida'. Tar-i7kh, 1.163. 
(25) Ibid, of course, the existence of Farwah b. M-usayk as a 
governor on behalf of the Prophet had weakened his pos- 
4 therefore, he was appointed Ltion within his tribe, C by Abhalah of ,, i. 11 L'Ile aril 
(26) 1b JL d, 
Iý, ',. Iaf ri (27) tý Sirat. 254 bitl Al-Talbarl., 1.1834. In F)n Hisli )-L- ;12 
instead of biqa, ý-,, hri and in al-Isfahani, Aglianý, V: -,, 211, 
t Výl LL mala ta yadayka inLstiead of 
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D. Extension of cAbhalah's movement 
In Dhu I, -Hijjah, 10/ý. 'Larch, 632, after claiminzc; prophet- 
hood, cAbhalah left Khabban Cave towards Naj*ran with his 
followers at the invitation of certain Najranis. 
(28) He 
entered the town without any objection on the part of its 
inhabitants. (29) It may have been that some people there 
were making plans to facilitate his coming, especially those 
from B. al-Ilarith b. Kacb who were concentrated in the town. 
(30) 
It is not surprising because elements of B. al-Harith b. 
Kacb had been members of the old pre-Islamic Madlihij 
alliance, 
(31) 
as well as the fact that they were a branch 
of Madhhij. 
(32) 
Therefore, they expelled cAmr b. 
Hazm a qadi and teacher of the Medinan government there, 
(34) 
from Najran, 
(33) 
and joined cAbhalah's army. Najran 
-Tabarl,, _I, 
1795f; al-Kala 1, Tarikh, 151; al-Diyar- (28) Al -c- -I 
bakri., Tarikh., 11,156. 
(29) Al-Tabarl, 1,1854; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VI, 307. 
(30) According to al-Hamda-n-i, Sifat, 1,135, the population 
of Najran comprised B. al-Harith b. Kacb and Hamdan. C Cf. also al-Yaqubi Buldan 320 who says Najran belong to 
B. al-Harith b. Ka I? _- b. 
(31) In particular B. al-Ijarith b. Kacb, who were in the 
same alliance with Madhýij, furthermore, they are a 
IT branch of Aadhhij. For the alliance, cf. 19 above. 
(32) Cf. Table 2. 
(33) Al-Tabarl, 
_I, 
1796; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil., 11) 228; 
Abu*al-Fida3, Tarikh, 1., 163. 
(34) cAbhalah left Najran with six hundred men from B. al- 
Harith b. Kacb, see al-Kalaci, Tari-kh, 151; al-Diyar- 
ýakrl, Tari-kh, 11,156. 
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had clearly not been cAbhalah's aim, for he left it a few 
days after his occupation., without any thought of settling 
down there. (35) It seems that he went to Najran only to 
collect his followers., for he left for Sanca3 with six 
hundred men from the town. 
(36) 
On Muýarram., ll/April, 632, after he had Succeeded in 
forming his army in Najran, C Abhalah marched to the south 
via Hamdan territory to ýanca". Historical sources differ 
concerning the identity of the ruler of Sanca3 at that time. 
4 
However, the majority of these sources agree that he was 
Shahr b. Badhan who succeeded his father, Badha-n, as a ruler 
of ýanCa-O . 
(37) 
This view is indeed the most likely since 
at that time the town was a stronghold of the Abna3 , as well 
as the centre of their rule in the Yemen. 
(38) 
In Shacu-b., the northern suburb of Sanca", cAbhalah 
faced the army of the Abna3 , led by their chief, Shahr b. 
Badhan. In this battle Shahr was killed and his army 
defeated. (39) C Abhalah then entered Sanca3 and settled down 
(35) Al-KalacTi, Tar-likh, 151; al-Diyarbakr-l, Tar-ikh, 11,156. 
(36) Ibid. 
(37) Cf. al-Tabari, 1,1854; Ibn al-Ath, r) Kamil, II., 228; Ibn 
Kathir, *Bida: ý7ah, VI, 307; Ibn Samurah, 
-Tabaqat, 
21-3; 
Ibn al-Dayba', Qurrat, 1,64. 
(38) There is a general agreement in the historical sources 
that the Abna, 7' ruled Sanca-: ' at that time : conse uently tLiey C Abhalah and Qays b. Abd Yaghuth. led the opposition against Z-> 
For a detailed discussion of Abna' resistance against C Abhalah and Qays, cf. 60ff below. 
1854, (the account of cU'-, -Lyd 
b. Sakhr); (309) Al-Tabari, I UJ 
Ibn al-Ath-l--r, .,,, amll, 11,228. 
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with his followers without further opposition from the other 
inhabitants or tribal groups. 
(40) 
According to one modern point of view, 
(41) 
It cAbhalah 
moved directly against -'L-I-ePersian rule in Sanca3 af ter 4 .1 
declaring his movement openly, in order to take over the 
town to use it for his struggle against Islamic authority 
in the Yemen. " However, the fact is that C Abhalah avoided 
any quarrel with the local tribes in the Yemen, or with 
any other Islamic power in the Yemeni provinces. The his-t- 
orical sources at our disposal mention no battle taking 
place between cAbhalah's troops and the Islamic forces 
during the time he held sway in Sancal. The only exception 
6 
was the battle of Kushar, in Hamdan territory, which took 
place between some of cAbhalah's followers led by cAmr b. 
Macd! Karib al-Zubaydi and some Muslims led by Khalid b. al- 
Walid and Khalid b. Sac-ld b. al-cAs. 
(42) Yet Islamic 
forces led by al-Tahir b. Abi Halah, the Medinan representative 
(40) Not over Hamdan, who were concentrated in this area and 
through whose territory cAbhalah passed on his way to 
Sancao. For f'Abhalah's route, see Map 3. 
(41) Al-Hadithl, Ahl, 116. 
C 
(42) In al-Isfahani, Aghani, XV, 211 and al-Bakri, Mu jam 
650f boih mention it as a main battle, however, cf. 
al-Tabari,, I., 1984, who regards this as an insignificant 
batile., considering it as a personal conflict between 
C Amr b. Macdi Karib and Khalid b. Sacid makes no 
mention of Khalid b. al-Walid and the place directly. 
For the location of Khushar, cf. Map 3), and beelowP54- 
According to Sayf b. cUmar, cAbhalah wrote to Mucadh 
b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, who was 
in al-Janad addressing him as an intruding outsider 
and ordering him, with his companions, to hand over 
to him whatever he had collected from the Yemen. See 
al-Tabarl, 1.1853f. -See also Shoufani, 92. Hoý,,, (_, ver, 
cAbýalah had never attacked, militarily any Islamic 
centre in the Yenlen. 
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in Tihamah., were in the mountains of cAkk and Sanca) when 
Abhalah was fighting the Abna7. (43) 
Another modern point of view considers cAbhalah's 
movement to be a national uprising against foreign rule in 
the Yemen which was represented mainly by the Persians. (44) 
Abhalah moved directly from Khabban Cave via Najran and 
Hamdan territory without doing battle with any force except 
the army of the Abna 3. This means that his aim was, without 
any doubt., to remove power from the Abn5? . Certainly, 
cAbhalah 
worked to remove the authority from the Persian ruler in 
Sanca-1 but we doubt that he worked against the Persian 
communi yI self. There is no mention in the historical 
sources at our disposal that cAbhalah took action against 
the Persian community, either those who were spread through- t-> 
out towns of the Yemen, or those who were in Sancao. 
(45) 
Furthermore he accepted them as a division of his army, 
even appointing some of their chiefs such as Fayiýuz al- 
(46) Daylaml and Dadhawayh al-Istakhrl- over them. 
cAbhalah's concentration on SancP was probably 
because of the weakness of the Persian rule at that time, 
especially after the death of Badhan, 
(47) 
the governor 
(43) Al-Tabarl, 1 1854; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 228. C-E. Map 3. 
(44) This point of view has been given by some modern Yemeni 
writers, e. g. Nucman, al-Atraf, 86f; Tahir, 1r-Amr b. 
Macdi7' Karibl, ' 50f. 
(45) We know that the Persins were spread throughout the 
Yenieni towns, but their centre was San'a3, cf. 
14 above. 
(46) Al-Tabar-l, 
_I, - 
1855; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VI, 307f. Cf. 
9" also Shoufani, 
r7 Futuh, 113; Cf. Ibn Sacd-, Tabaqat, 1,260; al-Baladhuri, 
al-Tabarl, I, 1571ff; Ibn Hajar, Isabali, 1,176- 
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of the Persian Emperor, in the Yemen. On the other hand, 
the AbnV had no support after the decline of the Persian 
Empire as a result of the assassination of Qubadh II in 
(48) 7/628 by his son Shirawayh. Furthermore, they had 
no tribal support in the Yemen. In addition, on the 
§an a economic side C-ýý was the most fertile area and had that 
advantage over Madhhij territory, from where it will be 
recalled., the majority of cAbhalah's followers came. Lastly, 
C- Z) 
ýan a territory had been the desired object of Madhhij and 
their allies before the spread of Islam there. 
(49) 
E. "The political situation in the Yemen during C Abhalah's 
control over San-cao. 11 
(50) According to al-Tabarl and Ibn al-AthIr when 
C Abhalah took over SancV., he ruled all the Yemen. His 
power extended from Mafazat. Hadramawt 
(51) 
as far as 
-3 al-Ta if,, al-Bahrayn, al-Ahsiyah and Aden. However, it 
is uncertain whether cAbhalah moved from Sanca :ý after his 
settlement there to extend his political authority throughout 
these provinces. It can be assumed that the inhabitants of 
some areas in the Yemen were enthusiastic supporters of his 
movement, but they had not been under his control and did not 
6 join his troops. From some of the historical and the geog- 
raphical sources we can see that some areas were connected in 
(48) Persian Emperor (590-628), see al-Tabari 1 1574. For 2. LI- 
the decline of the Empire, cf. al-Dinawari, Akhbar-, 100ff. 
See also Watt., M. at Medina, 129. 
(49) Cf. 19 above. 
(50) Al-Tabari, 1,1855; Ibn al-Athir, 
_Kamil, 
11,228. 
(51) This Would seem to be the area between I'v"adi If-adramawt 
I, and the Yemen proper, but excluding Vi'adi its611, 
see Map I- 
-b4- 
particular with cAbhalah's movement. Some of these places 
were on the coast of Tihamah, such as C Aththar, (52) al- 
Sharjah, (53) al-Hirdah., 
(54) 
Ghalafiqah, (55) and Aden. 
(56) 
Others were in the highlands, such as Manqal, 
(57) 
Kushar, (58) 
(52) Al-Tabari, 1 1855. Al- C Aq1li al-Mu C jam al-Jughrafi I i58., places it 40 kms north of Jazan. Al-Ghunaym, Jazirat al- C Arab, 126, says that 300 kms south of al- Sirrayn, Cf. also al-Hamdani-, Sifat., 1,120. Al- 
Muqaddasi7,86 and al-cUdhri Manazil f6a both say that the town is the harbour of 
(53) Al-T 
* abari, 
1., 1855; 
124 6, states that 
belongs K. S. A. on 
Hamdani, Sifat, III 
Hakam terri-tory. 
C Yaqut, Mu jam, 111,334. Al-cAq-l: 'l-i, 
its arch-aeologic town on al-Muwassam coast 
its border with Y. A. R. Cf. also al- 
119f, who says that on the coast of 
(54) Al-TabarljcIy 1855; Yaqu-t. 11,240. Both al-Muqaddas-l'., 
86 ýnd al- Udhr-ll f6a, place it on the coast of al- 
oft - Mahjam and al-Kadr-a. Yaqut, 11,240; K, ýaý4alah, 
ýýýhL_afliyat, 289; al-Ghunaym,, 48f. reads al-Hardah. Al- 
Hamdani., Sifat.. 1) 120; al-Yacqu-b-l', Buldan, h9, both 
have al-Hilrdah. 
(55) Al-Tabari 1.1855; Y-aqu-t, 111,334. Al-Muqaddasi, 
86; al-cUd'hri f6a, record that its the harbour of Zablid. 
Al-Hamdani,, ýifat, 1,119, the town is the coast of 
al-Husayb. 
(56) Al-Tabarli 1855. 
(57) YEqdt, Mucjam, V, 216, reads Manqal al-Mustacjilah, and 
says ten miles from Saedah., without giving the direction, 
connected with al-cAn's-ils., i. e. cAbhalah'. movement. 
Cf also Smith, Ayyubids, 11,178. Wilson, "Mapping" 
467, says that it is a site in-al-Zahir to the north of 
, 
Zaf'Er al-Ashraf (ýafdr al-Ashraf a fort close to the ýorth of Dhlibln). Both Smith., Wilson, read al-Manqal. 
It is perhaps ten kms to the east of the main road about 
half way between Khamir and Huth, personal communication 
with Dr. Wilson dated 15 July 1983. 
(58) Kushar or Kashar " according to al-Hamdani, 
ýif at, 
1,182 is in Hamdan territory. Yaqut, Mucjam II, 
649 ýC_ 3 
., says 
there are two places Kushar near 9a a, 
whereas Kashar mountain near Jurash. Cf. aiso al- 
Bakri, Mlucjam., II . 1130; SmithAyyubids, 11,168. 
Al-Akwa', in al-Hamdan'l, Sifat, 335 footnote 1. 
says that Kushar is a mountain in Liwa Hajjah. V, -, ilson 
"Mapping", maintains that it is the name of the moutitain 
and of as ettlemen-IL, on its northern side to ývest of 
SancV, near Bayt Hanbas. In Kuuait map Kushar appears 
in 140 km N. W. ýan-a . 
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Madcar, (59) al-Raýbah, 
(60) 
al-Midmar 
(61) 
and al-Jana--!. 
(62) 
In Hadramawt B. Walleah., a branch of Kindah, declared their 
support for 'Abhalah's movement. 
(63) 
In fact during his 
period of control over San'5,: ' cAbhalah had no governors to 
represent him in these places. Furthermore, he did not have 
a military force in other areas of the Yemen, so his power 
was concentrated only around ýanca-l. 
(64) 
As soon as cAbhalah occupied Sancal , the Muslim 
leaders left the highlands. Mucadh b. Jabal, the Prophet's 
c envoy to the Yemen, went to Abu- Mu-sa al-Ash arl, the 
Medinan representative in Ma3rib, then they both went to 
Hadramawt. (65) The former was a refugee with al-Sakasik, 
a branch of Kindah, and the latter with al-Sakun, again a 
(59) Yiiq5t, MU-c'jam, V, 76. Madar a place some 15 miles 
E. of Raydah, on the edges of al-Jawf, it belontgs 
jointly -to Yam and Bakil, cf. Smith, Ayvubids, 11,176-7 
Wilson, "Mapping", 438. See also al-Hamdani, 
ýifat, 1,112. 
(60) Yaq5t, Mucjam, 111, . 334. See also Smith., Ayyubids, II, 
194, who says that it is a place IV. al-Kharid. 
(61) 1 Yaqut, Mucjam, V. 46 says it is a Himyarl fort, 
C 11 miles from San a) connected with cAbhalah's move- 
in ment. Al-Akwa': * al-Hamdani, Iklil, 11,45) ., footnoot 2. suggest s that it might be the area between 
SancV and Bir al-c Azab. Wilson, "Mapping", 457 
ýelieves that it is a village on -the summit of the 
mountain of Miswar (i. e. Maswar). Maswar is a 
mountain area about 7 miles S. E. of Hajjah, Cf. Smith 
Ayyubids, 11,180. 
(62) Al-Tabarli, 1.1855, For -the locations of these 
places, cf. Map 3. 
(63) Cf . 47above. 
(64) Cf . Map 3. 
65 Al-Tabari, I, 1S55; Ibn al-Athir, 1, -, amil, II 228-, 
Ibn'Kathir, Bidlayah, VI, 307. 
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branch of Kindah. 
(66) 
Khalid b. S. cid b. al-cAý, the 
alms (ý; adaqah) collector of the Medinan government in the 
territory of Madhýij went back to Medina. 
(67) 
Others 
retreated to join al-Tahir b. Abli Halah, the Aledinan 
representative in Tihamah, who was camping with his force in 
the mountains of cAkk and ýanca". 
(68) 
Those who remained 
within Islam from Madhhij returned to join Farwah b. Musayk, 0 
the Prophet's representative of all Madhhij, in al-Ahsiyah. 
(69) 
In all probability the retirement of the Muslim 
leaders from the highlands to other territories was due 
to the weakness of Islamic power there to protect them from 
Abhalah. On the other hand, people who took sides with 
cAbhalah's movement declared their support for cAbhalah 
f reely. As we have already mentioned the spread of Islam 
in the highland provinces had no effect on whom the gov- 
ernors actually were. 
(70) 
Furthermore those who were the 
representatives of the Medinan governmen-l',, such as Khalid 
b. Sacid b. al-cAs, and cAmr b. Hazm al-Ansari, were both alms 
collectors and teachers, the former in the territory of 
Madhýij , the latter in Najran. 
They did not succeed in 
forming a military force from the inhabitants of the area. 
Therefore, these highland provinces were not under the 
control of the Muslims at the time of Abhalah's control 
over SancE 
6,63, Ibid. For al-Sakasik and al-Sakun terri-tory, see Map 2,4. 
(67) Ibid. 
(68) Ibid. 
(69) Al--Tabar-l. I, 1795; ibn al-A-thl-r., Kamil., II, 228; Yaqut, 
Mucjam, 1,122. 
(70) Cf ., 
44 above. 
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In Hadramawt, especially in the territory of al- 
Sakasik and al-Sakun, the Muslim leaders found security. due 
to the existence of the Islamic force in this area. Islamic 
power was supported- by some of the local inhabitants. In 
spite of this protection for the Muslim leaders the pol- 
itical situation was confused and the Muslims worried. 
- (71) Al-Tabarl tellsus that the Muslims in Hadramawt were 
worried that cAbhalah might send troops against them, or that 
some heretic., such as cAbhalah himself., might appear there. 
As. for Tihamah, some people, particularly those from 
Akk, a Yemeni tribe, took sides with the Medinan repres- 
entative, al-Tahir b. Abi Halah, declaring their opposition 
to cAbhalah's movement. 
(72) 
Al-Tahir and some Muslims, there- 
fore, retreated to the mountainous area of their territory. 
(71)) 
In the coastal areas of Tihamah, the political situation was 
different from the highlands of cAkk. People there seem to 
have been less faithful to the Islamic authority. Some of 
their towns., therefore, supported cAbhalah's movement. Also 
we shall later find them among the first rebels against the 
Islamic authority in their area, immediately after the 
Prophet's death. 
(74) 
(71) 15,1796. Cf. also Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,228. 
Al-Tabari, 1,1854. (72) 
(73) Cf . Map 3. 
(74) Cf. al-Tabari, I, 1985f; Ibn al-AthTr, Kamilý 
11., 254. 
For a detailed discussion of the Tihamah rebellion, 
see chapter III, C. below. 
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F. The Prophet's action to put down oAbhalah's regime 
The Prophet first received the news of cAbhalah's 
movement through Farwah b. Musayk, his representative 
with Madhýij, when the former was busy equipping Usamah b. 
Zayd's campaign, which was sent to the north of the 
ýijaz at an early stage of Abu Bakr's caliphate. Further- 
more., he was suffering from the illness of which he finally 
died. However, the Prophet immediately fully understood 
the seriousness of this movement against Islam, especially 
at a time (10/631-2) when the new religion was just 
beginning to take a hold in the Yemen. 
However., this unsettled situation created by cAbhalah's 
movement in the Yemeni provinces caused the Prophet to 
exercise prudence in his policy against it. He was especially 
careful not to send any Islamic troops from Medina, or indeed 
any external Islamic force to the Yemen to fight cAbhalah 
there. It seems that the Prophet believed that the movement 
had to be put down by an internal Yemeni force. He did, 
of course, utilize his authority there through ambassadors 
and correspondence. 
(75) He sent a letter to the Muslim 
leaders in 4aqramawt ordering them to arrange for the 
(76) 
death of cAbhalah in any way possible, but sent no 
letters to the Hadram-11- tribal chiefs. Perhaps the Prophet 
believed that only the help of the tribal chiefs in the 
highlands could succeed in crushing cAbhalah's regime. 
Therefore he directed his letters to those chiefs, urging 
them to oppose %bhalah's movement. He wrote to 
cAmir b. 
C- 
(75) An idea advanced by Brockelmann, Tarikh al-Shu ub, Arabic 
trans. Baclabakki, 89. Cf. also al-Tabari, I, 1856-8; 
Ibn al-Athir 
Ld5 cibar, 11,8-14. 
., 
Kamil, II, 288; Ibn Kha un, 
(76) Al-Tabarl, I, 1855. 
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Shahr al-Hamdan-1, a Hamdan chief., and sent Jarl-r b. cAbd 
Allah al-Bajali a Yemeni chief of Baj7lah and one of the 
companions, to Dhu :) 1-Kalac, Dhu- Murran, Dhu Zulaym, ýimyar 
chiefs, and the people of Najran, both Muslims and 
(77) Christians, .. However these chiefs were careful to avoid 
open conflict with cAbhalah's army. They probably thought 
that cAbhalah's movement and his coming to Sanea3 was only a 
struggle between Madhhij and their allies against the Persian 
o 
authority in the town. Although the Prophet was keen to 
encourage these chiefs to rise against cAbhalah, they were 
not enthusiastic about entering into an armed struggle with 
C Abhalah. cAmir b. Shahr al-Hamdan-l' the only one of these chiefs 
who declared his objection to C Abhalah, 
(78) 
nevert heless 
made no military move against this movement. This attitude 
shown by the Hamdan chief might have been because of the 
53 (79) alliance which existed between Hamdan and the Abn ,. 
To this can be added the bad relations existing between 
Hamdan and Madhýij as a result of their armed conflict over 
territory a short time before the spread of Islam in 
the Yemen. (80) 
In all probability the Prophet's communications with 
these chiefs were not successful in urging them to enter 
C 
into an armed struggle with Abhalah. Some historical sources 
(77) Cf. al-Tabarl, I 1857f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamilyjj) 229; u-_- 
Ibn Katýlr, Bid-ayah, VI, 308. Ibn Khaldun, ibar)II) 
844 adds the Christians of Najran. 
(78) AI-Tabari, 1.7 1853; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isti 
c ab.. 11,792. 
(79) For the alliance, see 19-20 above. 
(80) Specifically in 2/623-4 at the Battle of a]. -Razm, cf.? O 
abov(- 
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mention, however, that the Yemeni chiefs to whom the 
Prophet had written agreed to fight c Abhalah and so they 
met together to prepare themselves. (81) But as far as 
we can ascertain from the strength of the above sources or 
any others at our disposal these chiefs made no military 
campaign against cAbhalah during the period he held sway 
in Sanc-a" (Muharram - Rabl(j, ll/April-June, 632). There 
is also the fact that they did not oppose him when he was 
passing through their territories on his way to ýanca "I . 
(82) 
Furthermore, some of them did not form an attitude towards 
the adoption of Islam until the time of the Prophet's death. 
We know that an envoy of the Prophet to some Himyar chiefs 
to whom the Prophet wrote, Jarir b. cAbd Allah al- 
-3 -C Bajali, was with Dhu L-Kala ,a Himyari leader, at the 
time of the Prophet's death, persuading him to adopt 
Islam. (83) Consequently, the Prophet concentrated on 
communicating with the inhabitants of Sanc-a" mainly the 
-D Abna 
Sanca during the course of cAbhalah's rule, was 
indeed ripe for a revolution against him. There was 
great disaffection in the town on the part of the inhab- 
itants in particular among the AbnaD , who had been ruling 
the town before c Abhalah's arrival. Doubtless the Abna3 
wished to regain their authority or at least their 
(81-) Al-Tabarl, I, 
c 
1857f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,229-, 
Ibn Khaldun., Ibar, 11,844. 
(82) Especially Hanidan and inhabitants of Najran whom 
C Abbalah passed over their own land in his way to 
SancFL: ', as well as some areas in their territory which 
sympathized with C Abhalah's movement. Cf. Map 3. 
(83) Ibri Sacd, Tabaqat I 265-. cL; Ibn Sainitrah, Tabaqat, 19f; 
Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isti c ab, 11.470. 
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self-respect at the first available opportunity. It is 
most likely that the Prophet realized their positions. He 
therefore sent Wabr b. Yuýannis, one of the Abna and one 
of the Companions, to the Abna, 3 urging them to resist 
cAbhalah's rule. 
(84 ) The Prophet then utilized the 
situation by trying to put down cAbhalah's regime through 
the Abna3 whose true belief in Islam was at that time 
doubtful. The reason this suggestion is being put forward 
is because of the obscurity about the exact time of their 
adoption of Islam. In fact there are contradictions in the 
historical sources regarding this question. In al-Tabari, 
(85) 
one account mentions that Badhan, the chief of al-AbnFL 
and his people in ýancV adopted Islam in 7/628-9. Another 
account 
(86) 
records that it was in 10/631-2. In some 
biographical sources, e. g. Ibn Sacd, it is mentioned that 
some of the AbnEo adopted Islam during the Prophet's life- 
time, 
(87) 
but he gives no biographical information about 
Badhan. In Ibn Hajar's IsEbah, 
(88) 
there are two con- 
tradictory accounts. In the first BRdhan became a Muslim 
after the death of Kisra, the Persian Emperor, who was 
killed in 7/628-9. The second mentions that KisrE ordered 
him to negotiate with the Prophet to stop his mission 
(dacwah) and when he was on his way to Medina, he was killed 
by C Abhalah. If it can be assumed that the Abna3 in Sanca 
adopted Islam during the Prophet's life-time, it was probably 
(84) Ibn Saed, 
_jabaqat, 
V, 533, al-Tabar-3,1,1763,1798; al- 
RHz1, Tarikh, 140; Ibn Khaldun, 'Ibar, II, 844; Ibn Hýajar, 
Is5lbah, III, 1205f; Ibn al-Daybac , 
Bughyat, 19. 
(85) Account of Yazild b. Abli Hablib, 1,1.572-5. This account also 
occurs in Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, I, 260. 
(86) That of al-Waqid! in al-Tabari, I, 1763, 
(. 87) See the biographies of Wabr b. Yuýannisjayruz al-DaylaMl aLalt 
Dadhawayh al-Istakhrl, in TabactTit, V, 533-5. 
(88) 1,176, the firýE -account h_a`s__1iýe_en given by Ibn Ishaq, 
C 
Ibn 
Hishilm, al-Waqidl and al-Tabarl. The _cecond by a-1-*Stia bi. 
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not before Dhu L-Hijjah 10/11arch., 632. It is quite probable 
that they accepted Islam during the time when c Abhalah 
-C held sway over Sanca3 (Muharram - Rabi I., ll/April - June, 
632). There is a general agreement in the historial 
sources that Wabr b. Yuhannis was the first ambassador 
from the Prophet to the Abnao in Sanca: ' and he was sent 
to them at the time when cAbhalah occupied Sanc. V. 
(89) 
Another general agreement in the historical sources is that 
the Abna ') in Sanca3 were converted to Islam by Wabr. They 
mention that when he arrived there., Dadhawayh, one of the 
Abna 3 chiefs, received him and housed him in the church 
of Sanca'3, al-Qalls. 
(90) Wabr met Dadhawayhls wife, Umm 
Sacid al-Burzakhiyyah, and recited the Quran to her, so she 
became a Muslim. She was the first Yemeni to adoPt Islam 
in the Yemen followed by Fayruz al-Daylami, Markabudh and 
Wahb b. Munabbih. (91) On the other hand. there is no mention 
in the historical sources at our disposal that the Abna 
:) 
had sent an official delegation to the Prophet in order to 
bring Islam to Sancao, before the appearance of cAbhalah's 
(89) Cf. Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat., V, 533; al-Tabarl, 1,1763,1798; 
al-Razl-, Tarikh, 79f; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Ist-12-cib, IV, 
155, Ibn Khaldun, cIbar, 11., 884; Ibn al-Athir, KEmil, 
11) 229; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, V, 313; Ibn al-Daybac, 
Bughyat, 19. 
(90) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, V, 533; al-Tabar-1,1,1763; al-Razi, 
Taril-kh, 79; Ibn Ffajar, Isabah, VI, 313; Ibn al-Daybac, 
Bughyat, 19. 
(91) Ibid. It is unlikely that she was the first Yemeni 
who adopted Islam in the Yemenj we know that many of 
Yemenis were converted to Islam by the Prophet's envoys 
there. But it is most likely the authors mean the 
first Yemeni of al-AbnE3,3 where those who followed her, 
all of them from the Abna , were considered as the 
earliest Muslims from this community in San'a3. 
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movement., as other Yemenis had done. (92) Nevertheless, the 
first official delegation to Medina from the Abna 1) to 
discuss their becoming Muslim took place after the assass- 
ination of cAbhalah, in the last few days of the Prophet's 
lif e. 
(93) 
The Prophet's concentration on the Abna I in Sanc 
might have-been because he believed that their enthusiasm 
was sufficient to take back control of the town. Therefore, 
his letters to the Abna'I contained promises that the Muslims 
there would help them to put cAbhalah's uprising down. In 
-(94) al-Tabarl we read that the Prophet sent his envoy, 
Wabr b. Yuhannis, to the Abna ) to ask for help from the 
tribes of Tamim and Qays. At the same time he sent some 
companions for the purpose of resisting cAbhalah. 
(95) 
These communications with Sanca3 were., however, taking place 
in great secrecy. 
C-) 
After these communications, the Muslims in San a 
(92) For the Yemeni delegations to the Medina, see Chapter I, B, b. 
(93) They sent a letter for the Prophet telling him of their 
adoption 'of Islam and of the assassination of cAbhalah, 
Cf. al-Raz17, Tar-1kh, 76. 
T (94) Tarikh, 1,1798. Abu I-Fida , _Tarl 
I 163f., says 
some men from Himyar and Hamd-an. We know that the power 
in Sanca 3 lay ýetween al-Abna ) and other Yemeni tribes, 
particularly B. Shihab, see al-Hamdani, ý_Lfat, I, 
124; Iklil, 1) 159. As for Qaysi and Tamimi power. 
perhaps he means here his companions, who had been se., it 
there to work against cAbhalah, such as Yacli b. C--) Umayya, h al-Tamimi who arrived San a v,, ith T, ýiabr,, see 
al-Razi, Tarikh., 79. 
(95) Ibn al-Ath-ir, Kamil, II, 215f. 
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were able to form a secret front which consisted mainly of 
people who wished to put down cAbhalah's rule. Therefore., 
they planned with Shahr b. Badhan 's widow, Azad., to 
assassinate cAbhalah and this they did in a secret oper- 
ation. 
(96) 
There are differences in the historical sources 
C concerning Abhalah's killers. They all agree, however, 
that the murder was carried out by a group consisting of some 
-: I - of the Abna such as Dadhawayh and Fayruz and others f rom 
Abhalah's followers themselves., such as Qays b. cAbd 
(97) Yaghuth al-Muradi. Although the actual assassination is 
not of major importance here., it is of importance nevertheless 
to make clear who was interested in assassinating cAbhalah. 
In fact these people who joined together to destroy C Abhalah 
had been themselves oppressed by his authority in SancV. 
They were the Abna , particularly those who sought to regain 
their rule and respect in the town. 
(98) 
Also there *were 
those from cAbhalah's -followers themselves, such as Qays b. 
c Abd Yaghuth al-Muradi, a strong cAbhalah supporter and the 
commander-in-chief of his army, who had ambitions to keep 
his high position within his tribe. 
(99) 
Also there should be 
(96) Cf. al-Tabarl., 1., 1857-61; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,229. 
(97) For Fayruz al-Daylami, cf. al-Baladhuri, Futu4Y 115; 
Abu 3 1-Fida Tarikh, 1.164. For Fayruz and Qays b. 
b. C Abd Yaghuth, cf. Ibn `_')acdTabaqat, V., 525) 534, with 
the addition of the name of Dadhawayh, cf. also al-Razi, 
Tarikh 80. For Farwah b. Musayk and Qays b. cAbd 
T Yagh-uth, cf. al-Hamdan 
. -Lklil, 
VIII, 21. 
(98) Mainly their leaders, such as Dadhawayh and Fayruz. 
(99) So -that when he realised -that cAbhalah was treating 
him with less than respect. For Qays's ambition see47 
above and Chapter III, A below. 
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added the role of the Muslims who encouraged those people 
to resist C Abhalah, especially after the spread of Islam 
among them. 
In conclusion, therefore, cAbhalah's movement in 
simple terms was an internal conflict consisting of some 
-I of Madhhij and their allies led by cAbhalah b. Kacb al 
c- Ansl- to remove power from the Abna3 in San a, to settle 
there and take over control of the city. He claimed the 
prophethbod so as to gain support for his conflict with 
-3 
the Abna, by introducing a strong religious bias into his 
C -D 
movement. Abhalah's endeavour to control Sanca was 
continued by Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth al-Muradi who declared war 
(100) 
against the Abna immediately af ter the Prophet's death. 
(100) For his struggle with the Abna -) see Ciliapter III, A ZD 
below. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Political situation in the Yemen during the 
early period of AbU Bakrls Caliphate 
(11/632-3) 
The sudden death of the Prophet in Rabi c I. ll/June 
632, was a direct reason for the spread of rebel move- 
ments throughout the Arabian Peninsula against Abu- Bakr's 
government. The new government, however., was supported 
mainly by Medinans, Meccans and the people of al-Ta'lif., in 
addition to some Arabian tribes who maintained their 
loyalty to the caliphate. Therefore they swore allegiance 
(baycah) to the new caliph and supported him against 
the rebels. 
(1) 
Some of these movements had begun during the last 
phase of the Prophet's life, with their leaders claiming 
Prophethood. These were the movements of B. ýanlfah in al- 
Yamamah., led by the "false Prophet" Musaylimah b. Habib; of 
B. Asad in Najd, led by the "false Prophet" Tulayhah b. 
Khuwaylid and that of Madhhij in the, Yemen led bycAbhalah 
b. Kaýb al-'Ansi who also claimed Prophethood. While the 
Prophet succeeded in putting down the latter, he was unable 
to suppress the*others before his death. Most of the 
movements, however, arose after the Prophet's death. 
(2) 
During this period the Yemen witnessed comprehensive 
poli-tical disorder which spread over most of its regions. 
Consequently, the Yemenis were divided into supporters or 
Shoufanl, Al-Riddah, 77f. 
Al-Baladhuri, Futuh , 
97f f al-Tabari, I 1793f f See 
also Donner, Islamic conquests, 85. 
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opponents of the Islamic authority there. Some of them, 
however, remained neutral in their attitude towards the 
Muslim-rebels conflict. 
Three main Yemeni movements have been mentioned in 
our sources during the early period of Abu- Bakr's reign C) .1 
and are worthy of discussion here. The first is that of 
Qays, b. 'Abd Yaghuth al-Murad-1 in San cao The second 
is the rebellion of B. Mucdwiyah of Kindah in Hadramawt. 
The third is the political disorder stirred up by cAkk and 
al-Ashacir in Tihamah. 
The following chapter will deal with these movements 
and their conflict wiýh the Islamic authority there, showing 
the attitude of the Yemeni tribes in this struggle. In 
order to illustrate these movements we will study them 
individually, beginning with the rebellion of Qays b. 'Abd 
Yaghuth al-Muradi. 
The political situation in SancaO 
[Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth's rebellion] 
a. The appearance of Qays b. 
cAbd Yaghuth as a new 
rival to the Abffa? 
In Muharram, ll/Apriij, 632, the balance of power 
in San Ca3 changed as a result of -the invasion and settlement 
of Madh4ij and-their allies there for three months. The 
Abnal , however, tried under cover 
to regain their authority, 
0 
having failed to defend it militarily. Therefore, they 
c 
planned to assassinate Abhalah himself. They believed 
that with his death they would regain power in ýaneV , as 
there was no otlTer strong compe-citor for the position o-. L' 
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ruler from among the indigenous inhabitants. But, the 
assassination of cAbhalah and the expulsion of his follov.; ers 
would not in itself be enough to regain control over SancV. 
This was because Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth al-Muradi had appeared 
as a new competitor to take power there., thus posing a 
real threat to the Abna3 regime. This event confirmed 
C Qays b. Abd Yaghuth's real thirst for power. He had joined 
C Abhalah's revolt only to regain his high position. When 
he realised that cAbhalah was treating him with less than 
respect, he immediately joined the Abna :), although they 
had been his greatest enemies in the area. 
(3) 
This rebellion by Qays b. cAbd. Yaghuth is called 
"Qays's second apostasy" by some of the Arab historians who 
linked this rebel with the Medinan government. 
(4) As 
mentioned above, the area of Sanca was not under Medinan 
control during the Prophet's life time. 
(5) Furthermore 
it had no direct relations with Medina until the Abna3 
officially sent a letter to the Prophet concerning their 
adoption of Islam and the assassination of 
cAbhalah. (6) 
Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth is regarded by some Arab historians 
as an apostate, 
(7) 
though this. is not an exact description 
In spite of the f act that some historians do mention that 
(3) Cf. 64 above. 
(4) Cf. Al-Tabari, 1,1990; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 
255; al'Kalac'll, Tarlikh, 153f. 
(5) Cf. 50 above. 
(6) Al-Razi, Tarikh, 76. For a detailed discussion of the 
Abna' and their adoption of Islam see 61-3 above. 
(7) Al-'L,. bar-L, 1,11-989, Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,255. 
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Qays went to Medina and adopted Islam (8) and some others 
say that he was the Medinan representative in Sanca: ' durinu 
the Prophet's life time, 
(9) 
this is far from being; true. (10) 
The first occasion on which it is said he adopted Islam 
during the Prophet's life time is only mentioned in Ibn 
Sacd. 
(11) 
However, if he really had met the Prophet and 
adopted Islam, he would have been mentioned as one of the 
Yemeni chiefs, or at least his name would have appeared 
among those delegates from his tribe of Madhhij. Ibn 
(12) 
al-Athir believed that Qays's assassination of 
c Abhalah b. Kacb was a proof of the former's adoption of 
Islam during the Prophet's life time. Some sources., however, 
have mentioned that Qays had refused to meet the Prophet - 
Furthermore he became very angry when cAmr b. MacdIT Karib 
(13) 
al-Zubaydi requested him to do so. On the other hand, 
he was the second most important person after cAbhalah, 
(14) 
and Commander of his army. Qays's conspiracy with the 
-3 c Abna against Abhalah had no religious motive as Ibn al- 
Athir says, but he was purely interested in political 
(8) Cf. Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat. 
7 
V) 525. 
(9) It is mentioned in al-Qalqashandi) Ma athir., I, SO. 
(10) Watt, Medina, 
_ 
130. 
(11) Tabaqat, V, 525,,. 
(12) Usd al-Ghabah, IV, 277. 
(13) Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 253f; al-Tabarli, Tarlikh, I, 
1733f, 111,2365. al-Ahdali, Nathr, 94. 
T 
(14) al-Tabaril, Ta-r-j-kh, 1,1855; Ibn al-Ath-17r, Ka-mil, -L. 
228; Ibn Kathirl, Bidayah, VI, 307f. 
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control over ýanca:. 
(15) 
It can be assumed that, if he had 
really worked against cAbhalah on behalf of Islam, he would 
not have involved himself in his movement at all and pursued 
the Abnao 
. trying to kill some of them and pushing others 
out of San'a 
ý) immediately after the Prophet's death. This 
is particularly clear if we bear in mind the fact that the 
Abna3at that time were Muslims, and he would have been 
aware of their political weakness. Also in the meantime the 
Medinan government was more concerned with ii, 3 -- own problems 
after the Prophet's death and was in no position to intervene 
in the affairs of Sane-a". In simple terms, Qays had done all 
that for the sake of assuming power there, following the 
same aim as his predecessor, cAbhalah b. Kacb, and co- 
operating with people who had no relations with Islam 
(16) 
against those who had adopted Islam, i. e. the Abnal. 
As for al-Qalqasliand'i, 
(17) 
he mentions that the 
Prophet appointed Qays b. cAbd Yaqhuth over Sanci). 
The historical sources which record the Medinan rep- 
resentatives of Sancao either during the Prophet's or 
AbTi Bakr's time, however) do not refer to Qays's governor- 
ship at all. 
(18) 
As we mentioned above 
(19) 
Sanc5?., until 
C Abhalah's occupation, was under the control of the Abnao . 
When the latter succeeded in the assassination of cAbhalah, 
(15) Cf. 64 above. 
(16) He co-operated with the-remainder of 
cAbhalah's 
followers, see_al-jabari, 1,1990; al-Mas C udi, Tanblli, 
277, Ibn Khaldun, Ibar, 11,861; Ibn al-Athir, 
Kamil, 11,255. 
3- (17) Ma athir, 1.86. 
(18) See Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, 96f; al-Tabari, 1,1750,1983; 
al-Razj-,, Tarlk&, 140; al-Athir, KamilII, 227; Ibn 
c al-Dayba , Bughyat, 22f; Qurrat, I, 
63ff. 
(19) Cf. 50 above. 
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the town remained without leadership. On the other hand., 
the longest period between the assassination of c Abhalah 
and the Prophet's death recorded in historical sources is 
five days. (20) Therefore there could not have been enough 
time for the ambassador of the Abna3 to reach the Prophet 
before his death so as to appoint either Qays or anyone 
C-. * 
else over San a 
Qays's adoption of Islam during cAbhalah's occup- 
ation over Sanca3 is also doubtful. His relations with the 
Muslims who came from Medina, such as Wabr b. Yuhannis or 
those who adopted Islam from the Abna ID in ýancV such as 
Fayruz al-Daylami and Dadhawayh al-Istakhri revolved 
simply around the question of the planned assassination of 
Abhalah. (21) When the Abna ) contacted him and asked him 
to join them against c Abhalah, he immediately agreed without 
any hesitation because he was angry with him for the way he 
had scorned and discredited him. 
(22) 
So events proved 
that, though Qays had met and co-operated with some of 
the Abna :) to assassinate cAbhalah, it was a temporary sort 
of understanding, while cAbhalah was in Sanca". However, 
after they had succeeded in assassinating cAbhalah in 
RabV: I., ll/June, 632, political differences started to 
flare up in Sanca-I over the question of who was to be in 
power. Actually that rivalry developed gradually from 
secret conflict to open and armed struggle which ended in 
Qays's defeat and the entrance of Muslim troops into 
C-3 
San a for the first time. 
T- (20) Al-Bafadhuri-, Futulh, 115; in al-Tabari, 1,1798; one 
day in another account, I, IS68, 
Abu Bakr received the- 
news about C Abhalah's assassination at the end of Rabi 
CI 
ll/June, 632. 
(21) Al-Tabarl, 1,1856; Ibn al-Athl-r, KamiljI. 288; Ibn Kath-Jr, 
Bidayala, VI, 308. 
(22) Ibid. 
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C-3 b. The inhabitants of San a and their attitude 
towards the rebellion 
The inhabitants of ýancV themselves had nothing 
to do with Qays's movement. As far as we know., they did 
not ref rain f rom, paying the alms (, sadaqah) nor did 
they rebel against Islamic authority, as was the case in 
Hadramawt and Tihamah. We know that the area was free 
from alms collectors, who returned to Medina when cAbhal 
^ 
ah 
moved in. 
(23) 
On the other hand., there was no official 
Islamic authority in Sanca" during that period to justify 
the inhabitants, rebellion. Furthermore the few Muslims 
there, other than the Abna) 
J. played no role 
in these events 
until caliphal troops entered Sanca". It is unlikely that 
the Abna3 committed apostasy because the Medinan government 
was their main supporter in their armed struggle, either 
against c Abhalah's or Qays's rebellion. There is no doubt 
that -they were convinced that the help of the Muslims was 
essential for their existence., especially after cAbhalah's 
attack, when the local Yemeni force deserted them. Perhaps 
they felt that Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th's intention was to 
assume power in Sanca' .a thing which made 
them more strongly 
linked to Medina. Therefore it was with the utmost regret 
(24) 
that they received the news of the Prophet's death. 
The relations between the Islamic government and the 
inhabitants of Sanca: ' other than the Abnal were indeed 
obscure, even as events unfolded themselves. They 
(23) I. e. Khalid b. Sacid b. al-cAs, and 
cA.,, nr b. Hazm, the 
former with Nladhýij and the latt-er in Najran,, cf. Table 1. 
-'ý kr-- likh I 
(24) Al-Diyarb', a i, Tari 11,202. See also al-Akwac 
Watha-'iq, 166. 
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took no part in Qays's rebellion and historical sources do 
not mention -them as a power who played a major role during 
it. In fact those who reported the rebellion in the town 
were C Abhalah's followers themselves; these hailed from 
al-Jawf and Najran and were led by Qays b. cAbd Yag. huth, 
the general commander of cAbhalah's troops. 
(25) 
However, 
there are no grounds for linking their rebellion with the 
inhabitants of Sancao, because cAbhalah's followers were 
not from the indigenous population of the town. That is in 
addition to the fact that they had not directed neither of 
their rebellions against the Islamic authority. 
(26) 
c. The openstruggle between Qays and the Abna ) 
This struggle was contemporary with -the deterioration 
of the political situation in the Arabian Peninsula after 
the Prophet's death Rabi I, ii/June, 632. 
Control of Sanca3 was ostensibly in the hands of the 
Abna3 after cAbhalah's assassination, for the following 
reasons: firstly, they had been in control until cAbhalah's 
entrance into Sanca: ' in Muharram ll/April, 632; secondly, 
they constituted the majority of the inhabitants of Sanca3; 
and thirdly there was no strong rivalry from the indigenous 
population of Sancaa at that time. 
The effect of Qays b. cAbd Yaqhuth's presence in 
Sanca-3 was that the Abna .1 could not appoint any one of 
(25) For the followers of cAbhalah, see Chapter II-C. above. 
(26) Cf. 51 above; 78 below. 
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themselves as leader there to succeed Shahr b. Badhan, their 
(27) former Chief. In all probability they might have 
thought it better to have a governor appointed by the 
Medinan government, especially after they had adopted 
(28) Islam. Al-Dahhak b. Fayruz al-Daylami one of the 
Abna" in ýanca 
. says that "We assassinated 
cAbhalah and 
our affairs in Sanca3 were as before but we sent for 
C- 
Mu adh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador to the Yemen, and 
(29) -Cl (30) agreed upon him". In the account of al-Kala 1., 
Fayruz and Dadhawahy, the most powerful chiefs of the Abna 
gave Qays b. Abd Yaqhuth power and he therefore 
C-: ) 
was named-amir of ýan a. However, it does not mean that 
they accepted Qays as a ruler of the town. It seems that 
he emerged as a chief among the Abnao rivalling their power 
c 
after Abhalah's assassination. Consequently Qays appeared 
as a strong rival, challenging the- Abna :3 for the authority 
there, We do not know exactLy when the open struggle for 
power started between the two sides, Qays and the Abna 
:)) 
but it seems to have begun as a conflict incited by the 
political vacuum which existed in the period after 
cAbhalah's 
assassination. Thus it is most likely that Qays was an 
-3 important figure among the Abna as early as that, and that 
C-3 
they -therefore offered him restricted power over San a 
(27) Who was killed by cAbhalah in Battle of Sh. -, Lcu-b, Cf. 
50 above. 
(28) Immediately after 
c Abhalah's assassination, cf. 63 above. 
(29) See al-Tabari, 1,1739- Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VI, 
(30) Tarikh, 153. 
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albeit shared with themselves. Meanwhile they sent to 
C- Mu adh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador, at that time 
absent in Hadramawt, requesting him to solve the problem 
of the political vacuum left in San'a3 after cAbhalah's 0 
assassination. 
The historical sources differ about the time when 
Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th declared his rebellion against the 
AbnV . Some of them link the time to when the inhabitants 
of Sanc. R3 learned about the news of the Prophet's death, 
(32) 
while others think that his rebellion and enmity towards 
the Abna :) was declared immediately after his assassination 
of Dadhawayh, one of the Abna3 Is chiefs. 
(33) 
We know 
that the AbnV at that time believed that their most im- 
portant supporter was the Medinan government. 
(34) 
Therefore, 
the Prophet's death and the deterioration of the political 
situation in Medina and the Arabian Peninsula undoubtedly 
affected the Abnao position in San'a3. On the other hand 
this situation had indeed encouraged Qays to declare his 
rebellion seriously against the Abna3. 
Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth secretly send word to the remainder 
of cAbhalah's troops, promising them that he would regain 
authority from the Abna :) 
'7 
(35) 
although meanwhile he was 
(31) Al-Dahh-ak b. Fayruz's account, cf. al-Tabari 
' , 
1,1739; 
, Bidayah, VI, Ibn Kýaihlir 
310. 
. 
(32) Tanbih, 277; Al-Mascu-d-i 1989; al-Tabari, 1, Ibn al- . 
, Kamil., 11,225; 
Ib Athir - n Kathir, Bidayah, VI, 331. See 
. also al-Akwac, Watha3iq, 163. 
(33) Al-Tabarli, I, 1989f (citi ný al-Dath-in-1); al- -C- Kala i, 
153; Ibn Khall-du-n, Tar-i-kh Ibar, II, 861. . , 
(34) 1 Cf - 76 above; 175 below. 
(35) They had retreated to the mountains between SancL-t 
3 and 
Najrdn, see al-Tabar-1,1, 
C- 1990; al-%',, a-- udi, T, ---Lnbiii, 2277; 
Ibn al-Ath-irr, Kamil, 11, 
C 255; Ibn Khaldun, Ibar, II,, S61. 
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planning to assassinate the Abnaý' chiefs. He succeeded in 
assassinating Dadhawayh, but failed to destroy others such 
as Fayruz al-Day-lami and Jushaysh who fled to Jabal Khawlan, 
east of SancVY taking refuge with Fayruz's uncles from 
(36) Khawlan. 
When the rest of cAbhalah's followers joined 
h im, Qays declared his rebellion in Sanca" and he increased 
his power. 
(37) 
He could only justify his action by a call 
to get rid of the AbnV and drive them away f rom the Yemen. 
So he sent to the chiefs of Himyar telling them that the 
Abna" constituted a threat in their country and were annoying 
them. "If you leave them", he said, "they will carry on ruling 
you. So, in my opinion, we have to kill their chiefs and 
push them out of t, 
(38) 
our country. We are in no doubt that 
the account mentioned above is true., since it is given in more 
than one source without having been rejected by others. There 
is some doubt I however, concerning the actual truth of Qays's 
message to the Himyar chiefs. The question which must be 
4 
asked is whether Qays, by sending the letter, really meant 
to push the Abn-a :) out of the Yemen as a national leader, 
or just to justify his rebellion towards the local power. 
It seems that the second suggestion is more likely. Qays 
was not originally from Sanca in addition to the fact that 
he co-operated with them, i. e. the Abna" , to assassinate 
(36) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqýt, V, 534f; al-TabarT, I, 1990f; 
Ibn al-Athir Kamil, 11,255. 
(37) See al-Tabarl, I, 1990f; Ibn Khaldan, cIbar, 11,861; 
Ibn al-Athir, KHmil 11,255. 
(38) Al-Tabarý, 1,1990.1; Ibn al-Athir, KILmil, 11) 255. 
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C Abhalah. Also they had been friends until receiving the 
news about the Prophet's death. It can be accepted that if 
Qays had believed the AbnaD were not in conflict with 
him, he would not have killed them. Both al-Tabar-1 and 
Ibn al-Ath7ir. 
(39) 
suggest that when Qays declared his 
rebellion in Sanca3 and failed to assassinate Fayru-z al- 
Daylaml, he made f or the Abn-a: ) and separated them into 
three groups : those who did not oppose him were left in 
Sanc-a" 
. while he separated those who followed Fayruz into 0 
two groups, the first was sent to Aden to be transported 
to Persia by sea, the second were sent home to Persia 
over land. 
The local attitude towards the rebellion 
C-: ) -: D Those people of San a other than the Abna had 
shown neutrality in their attitude towards the rebellions. 
The AbnIO . therefore found themselves facing the rebels 
alone in Sanc`aO Thus during either cAbhalah's movement b 
or Qays's rebellion, the security of the town was always 
dependent upon the power of the Abna3. Therefore neither 
cAbhalah nor Qays had. been able to take over the town until 
they had eradicated the chief of the Abna3. 
(40) It is 
true that it was the duty of the Abna" as a whole to defend 
Sanca" from any attack because of their connection with the 
town. 
(41) 
All that, however, did not contradict in any way 
(39) A! -Tabarl, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 
II, 255. 
(. 40) 'Abhalah entered Sancao after he killed Shahr b. 
Badlian, see 50 above and Qays tried to get rid 
of the Abnao chiefs, cf. 78 abo-ve. 
(41) They were in power, in addition to that, the to-, I,. n %%as 
the main centre of their rule, Cf6,19,50 above. 
-so- 
the fact that the inhabitants, other than the Abna3 
, should 
not stand by the latter's side in the struggle against the 
take-over of their town by Qays, or at least to defend their 
belongings and homes, which the invaders, Qays and his 
followers., had shared with them. 
(42) 
The only justification would appear to be that the 
C- - -3 San anis, other than the Abna and especially those of 
Qahtan, were not pleased with the rule of the Abna 
In spite of this, those historical sources which mention 
the struggle between Qays and the Abna':, say nothing about 
the role of these Qahtanis in this event. Perhaps they 
were sýTnpathetic towards Qays and his followers against the 
Abna a and it is most likely that they took sides with Qays 
after the assassination of 'Abhalah. Therefore Qays 
-3 
was able to challenge the Abna at an early stage, before the 
remnants of 'Abhalah's followers arrived in ýancao. Further- 
more, there are some sources which indicate that Qays was 
supported by some members of the tribes, to the chiefs of 
(43) 
which Abu Bakr had written urging them to do so. 
In fact the struggle was mainly confined to the 
question of assuming power in ýancao- These events proved that 
those of the Abnaý' in power were the only ones who lost and 
suffered from these events, while the rest of the inhabitants, 
Y L, i. e. the Arabs were not 
in any way affected by the occupation. 
(42)Cf. al-Tabarl, 1,1867. 
, 
1991; Ihn al-Athir, lý, imil, II, 255. al-Tabarl, I, 
This explains their non-appearance in the account of the 
events in the sources. Therefore, the local population of 
SancP, Qahtan were not obliged during the rebellion to 
support the Abna3 in order to regain power for them. That 
attitude on the part of Qahtan was undoubtedly the result of 
the disaffection of their members in Sanca a Vis-a--vis the 
rule of the Abna Bad feeling, therefore, developed on 
-3 the part of the Abna towards Qahtan and was to produce contin- 
ual conflict betwe - en them. 
(44) 
On the other hand., Fayruz al-Daylami, the Abna's 
chief at this stage, had had no support from other local 
forces., except from his uncles Khawlan. 
(45) 
Each group, 
Qays and the Abna 
-) 
. concentrated mainly on getting ýimyar 
to its side., so the letters sent by Abu Bakr to muster 
-3 
support f or the Abna and by Qays in support of his own 
cause were sent to their chiefs. Abu Bakr wrote -to the 
-: ) (46) chiefs of Himyar urging them to assist -the Abna 
When Qays heard about Abu Bakr's letter,, he immediately sent 
to these same chiefs. 
(47) They, however, had already formed 
a clear attitude -towards Qays's rebellion which was outlined 
by one of -them, Dhu3L-Kalac, who replied to Qays's previous 
message saying, 
(48) 
"We are not involved here in any 
(44) For the Abna, 3 - Qahta-n struggle in San 
ca see 3063-7,336 
below 
(45) Khawlan al-cAliyah, see al-Tabarl, 1,1991; Ibn al- 
Athir., Kamil, 11,255. 
(46) Al-Tabari, 1,1989; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,255. See 
also al-Akwac, Watha iq-, 163. 
(47) Al-Tabar-1, I, 19S9; Ibn al-Ath-ir, Ksanil, 11,255. 
(48) Al-Tabari, 1,1989. 
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way, they are your friends i. e. the Abna3and you are their 
friend,;. " Such an answer clearly illustrates their att- 
itude which was one of complete non -Cooper at ion. The Himyarl 
chiefs had definitely looked on the struggle between Qays 
and the Abna3 as something which would not affect their 
interests., otherwise they would have had a different 
attitude. On the other hand, these H. imyari chiefs did not 
see that struggle as an assault on the rights of the Abna"J 
who adopted Islam by sending to the Prophet after cAbhalah's 
assassination 
(49) 
so that they could be regarded as Muslims. 
The fact that some of these chiefs had adopted Islam does 
not mean that they were obliged to support or protect any 
Muslim group in the area. 
(50) 
Hamdan, the other power in the area., must have played 
a significant role in -these events for the following reasons : 
firstly, they had been in the same alliance with the Abnao 
(51) 
and the enemies of Madhýij a very short time earlier, 
secondly,, they were the only tribe in the area who opposed 
C Abhalah's attack against Sanca'I by open declaration. 
(52) 
However, during the time Qays declared his enmity 
against the Abna3 in Sancao we cannot discern any role 
played by the Hamdanis in this event. The direct reason for 
(49) See the Abna3 'S adoption of Islam, 61-3 above. 
L (50) The events proved that they had a neutral attitude 
towards the movement of cAbhalah and Qays, cf. ý9,81-2 above. 
(51) For their alliance with Hamdan., see 19-20 above. For 
Madhhij-Hamdan strugcle, see the battle of al-Ram Z: ) 
20 above. 
(52) Cf. 59 above. 
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their non-involvement is unknown. It is obvious, however, 
that the Hamdani. chiefs at that time were heavily involved 
in solving their internal problems. The situation in their 
region was one verging on Civil War amongst their clans., 
due to their attitude towards Islam. (53) Furthermore, the 
spread of the Sanca* crisis to their region was as a result 
of the dispersal of cAbhalah's followers there. (54) 
The attitude of the chiefs of Himyar and Hamdan was 
not to support the Abnao during the rebellion of Qays. The 
Abna'I thus sought help from other tribes in other areas. 
Fayruz al-Daylami, a chief of the Abna**l at this stage, sent 
to B. C Uqayl b. Rabicah and cAkk asking for their help. 
(55) 
These tribes responded immediately to the callY wiping out 
Qays's men and freeing those Abna :) families who had been 
sent by Qays b. cAbd YaghU-th to Persia. (56) Furthermore Z-) 
they went and joined Fayru-z, who was thus strengthened by C. 
them. So Fayruz led them and fought Qays and his followers 
on the. outskirts of Sanca3'.. Qays was defeated and sub- 
sequently withdrew to the mountains., where he joined the 
remaining troops of 
c Abhalah who were led by cAmr b. 
Macd-irKarib al-Zubayd-i'. 
(57) 
(53) In consequence of this situation some of the Hamdani 
chiefs declared their support to Abu Bakr, se al, e 
Hamdani Iklil, X 33f. Cf. also biography of C Abd Allah , , b. Malik al-Arhabi Hamdani chief of Bakil, i n Ibn Hajar, , Isabah IV, 124. 
(54) Cf. al-Tabari , 1990; Ibn 
Khaldu v1 
C n, Ibar,, II,, 86-L; 
. 4 Ibn al-Athir, Kamil., 11,230. 
(55) 
, 1993f; Ibn Khaldun, 
C Al-Tabari I , II, 
861. Ibar 
, , , 
(56) 1 1993-4; Ib Al -Tabari Tnrikh 
C n Khaldun Ib. -r. II, 861. , , , 
(57) Al-Tabarl-, 
- ki '= - 
The political situation in Hadramawt 
In the early period of the spread of Islam in 
Hadramawt in 9-10/630-2, there had been no external invasion 
to challenge the structure of the inhabitants of the 
region, as had happened in Sanca). (58) The inhabitants 
of the area were a mixture of Kindah, who had settled in 
the highlands in the northern part and the west, and 
the 4aqram]'L tribes, who had concentrated in the central 
area. 
(59) 
The advent of Islam in the area, however, 
created a new force, exemplified by the Medinan represent- 
atives, who succeeeded in forming a local army consisting of 
some of the inhabitants of the area. 
(60) 
This force became 
apparent during the time of cAbhalah's revolt, when the 
leading Muslims retreated to Hadramawt. 
(61) 
In spite of the fact that those representatives left 
Medina without any army to assist them in their task, some 
of them managed to form a local force, mainly consisting of 
several local tribes from those areas in the region where 
they were working. In Hadramawt and Tihamah the repres- 
entatives relied upon such armies to suppress those who 
abstained from paying alms (,, ýadaqah) or those who revolted 
against Islam. 
-c 
In Rabi I. ll/Juney 632, the nature of events differed 
(58) See Chapter II, D, it extension of cAbhalah's movement. 
') 
above. 
(59) Cf . Map 
2. 
(60) For "Their role during the struggle becween the Piluslims 
and B. c Anir b. Mucawiyah, cf. 94-7 below. 
C- u (61) When Mu adh and Abu A. irusa retreated to al-, '-'ak n and 
al-Sakasik, cf 55 above. 
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from one area to another. The rebellion which took place in 
Hadramawt was of a different kind from that in Sanca3. In 
simple terms the former was a result of the refusal of 
some Muslims to follow Islamic teachings, while in Sanca: ' 
it was an internal Political struggle, as mentioned 
earlier. 
(62) 
a. The roots of the rebellion 
This rebellion among B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah of Kindah 
which took place in Uaqramawt during the early period of Abu 
Bakr's caliphate has its roots in the last phase of the 
Prophet's life time. It started as a conflict between 
kings of B. Wallicah and the Prophet when the former declared 
their support for cAbhalah's movement. 
(63) 
The open struggle, 0 
however, began gradually as a conflict between some elements 
of B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah and Ziyad b. Labid al-Ansari, who 
represented the Medinan government in Hadramawt. 
(64) 
Our sources give two reasons for the beginning of 
C C- this conflict firstly, B. Amr b. Mu awiyah of Kindah and 
the tribe of Hadramawt disagreed about how the alms (sadaqah), 
(62) For a detailed discussion of Qays's rebellion, 
see A above. 
(63) Cf . 47 above. 
(64) The Prophet sent Ziyad b. Labid al-An§ari to Hadramawt 
in 10/631-2 as an alms-collector (jami C sadaqah5, with 
the tribe of Hadramawt. After the Prophet's-death in 
Rabi"I, ll/June: 632, Abu- Bakr annexed Kindah,, i. e. 
B. Mucawiyah, and al-§adif to Ziyad, see Ibn Hisýam, 
STrat, IV, 271; al-Bal'adhurl. Ansab. I., 529; Futuý, 109; 
Ibn KhayyRt, Tarikh, 97; Ibn Tb--dal-Barr, IsticabII, 533; 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,205; al-Janadi, Suluk, f37a; 
al-Khazrajl', Tirziz, fll2a; Kifayah., 49; See also Shou'Lani, 
Riddah, 90f. 
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which the Prophet ordered, should be distributed., with the 
result that one of the B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah clans, namely 
B. Walicah., accused Ziyad b-Labild of collusion with the 
tribe of Uaqramawt against them; (65) secondly, . Ziyad 
refused to return one of B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah's she-camel 
which he stamped as alms., despite the mediation of one of 
(66) their chiefs, Harithah b. Sura'qah. This refusal, 
however, appears in a line of poetry by this chief: 
-111 1 LIS 
An old man [Ziyad] with grey hair on his cheeks is keeping her [the she-camel] ; (67) hair shining like a garment. 
The above events probably did occur, given the rel- 
ability of the sources that mention them. But, we cannot 
accept them as direct reasons for the rebellion of B. cAmr 
C- b. Mu awiyah against the Muslim authority there. In the 
first account the conflict took place between two local 
tribal groups, so Ziyad was aloof from this strife. However, 
he found himself involved in it when B. Walicah accused him 
of colluding against them with the other part Y. In the 
second., the matter mentioned did not constitute a casus 
belli, if indeed both sides were truly honest in avoiding 
military action. 
On the other hand, we must not forget the relations 
(65) Muhammad b. al-Qasi-m's account., in al-Tabar! )112000f. 5ee also Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II., 257; al-Hamid,. Tarikh, - IY152. 
(66) Kathir b. al-Salt's narrative, in al-Tabar,, I, 2001f. 
See also al-Baladliuri, Futuh, 109f; I6n cAsakir, Tahdhib, c III, 69f; Anon, Tarikh, f22a-b; Ibn Khaldun, lbar, II, 
TI 53.33; Ibn al-Athir, Kaniil, I 257; Ibn I. Iajar, D-2abah , V, 
96f. See also al-Hamid, I, 151f. 
(67) See al-Tabari, 1,2002; Ibn c Asakir, Talidhib, II, 70: Ibn 
Khaldu-n, -H Td, I 132. 
* cIbarII.,, 5jj Cf. also al ami 
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of the chiefs of B. Mucawiyah of Kindah with the Prophet 
when they first met him in Medina. This probablý, leads 
us to believe that their dealings with him then have some 
connection with their role in leading the rebellious 
movement in H. aOramawt. Although these chiefs were enjoying 
the strength of their influence in 4a4ramawt, the Prophet 
did not pay them as much attention as he did with other 
less powerful tribes in the region when he met them in 
Medina. (68) The Prophet rebuked him for their smart 
clothes. 
(69) 
He also refused the claim of al-Ashcath b. 
C- Qays, chief of B. al-Harith b. Muawiyah of Kindah that 
they were the sons of Akil al-Murar and that the Prophet 
was also his son. The Prophet replied that they were 
Ban-U :31 Nadr b. Kinanah on the father's side and that 
the mother's line was unimportant. 
(70) Al-Ashcath was 
far from pleased, Perhaps he was not expecting such a 
reply from the Prophet. He therefore warned his people 
not to mention the reply to anybody and threatened those 
who did with eighty lashes. 
(71) Even the Kings of 
B. Wal'icah did not establish good relations with the Prophet 
when they met him in Medina and they left in total dis- 
agreement with him. 
(72) 
(68) For the tribal delegations to the Medina, see Ibn Sacd 
Tabaqat., I. 291., ff; Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 221ff; 
al-Tabari I 1717f f. See also 28 - 32 above. 
(69) Cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 225; Ibn_Sacd, Tabaqat, I, 
328, al-Tabarl 1 1739; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, I, 97f. 
(70) Ibid. 
(71) Ibid. 
(72) For the B. Walicah delegation, see Ibn Sacd, 
Tabaqat, 1,350. 
The Prophet., however, was on good terms with the 
Chiefs and delegates of other tribes who came from Hadramawt. 
He warmly received the delegation of Tujib and rewarded 
them more than other delegations. (73) When Wa3il b. 
#ujr., the Chief of the tribe of Hadramawt., arrived in 
Medina, the Prophet greeted him by calling for the salah 
C 
jami a, a prayer celebrated on a special occasion, and 
appointed Mucawiyah b. Abi" Sufyan as a special companion 
to him. 
(74) 
Furthermore, Wa- 3 il. was recognised by the 
Prophet as paramount chief over all Hadramawt. 
(75) 
A 
modern scholar 
(76) 
has suggested that Islam attracted bit 
by bit the subordinates among the Arabian tribes. If that 
was the case., the Prophet probably practised it when dealing 
I 
with the powerless people in Hadramawt. 
It is evident from some accounts that the Hadramis 
were unable to regain their lands from some of B. Mucawiyah 
of Kindah. They therefore complained to the Prophet when 
they met him in Medina. Ibn al-Ath-ir 
(77) 
tel]L-, us that 
two persons, a tribesman from Hadramawt tribe and another from 
C- B. Mu awiyah of Kindah, appeared before the Prophet seeking 
his ruling upon a piece of land which each declared to be 
his. Eventually the Prophet ruled that it belonged to the 
(73) Ibn Sacdjabaqat., 1.327; al-Ahdari, Nathr 91. 
See al"3028 above 
(74) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat,, 1,349; al-Ahdal'i Nathr, 108. 
(75) Ibn Sacdjabaqat, 1., 351; Ham-lidullah., Watha :) iq) 132. 
(76) ArnoldL Preaching of Islam, Arabic trans. Uasan, 
cabdrn and 
Nahrawi, ; 13. 
(77) Usd 1,115, in the biography of I mrul al-Qays b. 
cýbis, 
Cf. also the biography of Rabic b. CT-dan, ibid, ii, 170. 
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Hadrami. Even Wa il b. Hujr himself was unable to protect 
his own land from some of the chiefs of Kindah. He 
theref ore asked the Prophet to get it back for him and so 
the Prophet did, promising him that he would guarantee 
its protection. 
(78) 
It is obvious from our sources that the Hadraml 
delegates left Medina with a guarantee from the Prophet 
for the protection of their properties, further confirming 
their acquisition of the lands., while the Kindah returned 
without any such guarantee. It can be assumed that tribal 
power in Hadramawt at that time was centered in Kindah, 
in particular around B. Mucawiyah. 
(79) Thus when Islam 
spread throughout Hadramawt some inhabitants, mainly those 
from less powerful tribes, gathered around Ziyad b. Labid 
to form an Islamic army in the area. This force appeared 
at the beginning of the rebellion as a local power 
beside Ziyad b. Labid., the Medinan representative in 
Hadramawt. (80) Consequently the people of Hadramawt were 
mostly divided into two factions : the first represented 
by B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah and those who followed them from 
Kindah; the second consisting of Muslim officials and 
those who supported them from other tribes in the area 
such as B. Ashras of Kindah and the tribe of Hadramawt. 
(81) 
(78) See 32 above. 
(79) For their nasab, cf. Table 3. 
(80) Cf 90 ff below. 
(81) For bUtun of Kindah7see Table 3. 
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The rebellion was confined to the territory of 
C 
B. Mu awiyah al-Riyad, Mah. jar al-Zurqan, Tarim, and 
al-Nujayr. 
(82) 
There were, besides, minor battles which 
took place in the villages of that territory whose 
occupants followed the rebels. 
(83) 
The fact that these 
took place is itself a proof of their rebellion, while 
other areas were not involved in it. 
b. Development of the conflict to armed struggle 
C 
This conflict between Ziyad b. Labid and B. Amr 
C- . b. Mu awlyah developed gradually. It had begun as a 
personal conflict and ended in armed struggle. Ziyad dis- 
played in this conflict a rigid attitude which B. cAmr b. 
C- Mu awiyah could not accept; the parties therefore, could 
not settle their differences. According to one account 
(84) 
Ziyad had been seen returning a she-camel after it had 
been changed for another one, something which weakened his 
position among his people. So B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah 
explained such rigidity on the part of Ziyad as something 
unacceptable in their own area. Therefore, the owner 
of the she-camel declared loudly, "You B. 
C Amr in al-Riyad, 
I have been unjustly treated and humiliated. The humble 
one is he whose right is denied in his own country. 
(85) 
(82) Cf. al-Tabari, 1,2002-10; Ibn al-Athir, KamilII, 
258f; Yýqu-t, Mucjam, III, 136f; also cf. Map 4. 
(83) Cf. al-Tabarli, 1,2007, ýIamiduj. lah, Watha iq, 
272f. 
(84) Kathir b. al- Salt is account, in al-Tabari, I, 2002. 
(. 85) Al-Tabarl, 1, 2002; Ibn al-Athir, Kými!, II, 258. 
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As far as we can see, Ziyad's inflexibility stems 
from a reason other than that of the she-camel affair. 
Changing the she-camel for another would not itself have 
been serious enough to discredit him. On the contrary it 
would have attracted others to him, as it is something which 
does not contradict the Prophet's teaching and admin- 
istration, (86) especially if it had been given to him by 
mistake., as the owner declared. 
(87) 
It is believed that 
such rigidity on the part of Ziyad had other causes. One 
of these causes might be the disgust which he felt, as indeed 
did all Muslims., towards the Kings of B. Wall ah, of 
c c- B. Amr b. Mu awiyah, as a result of the Prophet's curse 
on them during the last phase of his life time. 
(88) 
Furthermore, Ziyad was feeling strong at the beginning Of 
the conflict, in addition to the fact that he was urged 
by some of the tribes who encouraged him to fight 
c c- 
B. Amr b. Mu awiyah. So with the encouragement of al- 
Sakun, Ziyad invaded B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah immediately after 
the event of the she-camel. 
(89) 
Consequently, the conflict 
between the two sides further developed into open warfare. 
As a result, some of B. Mu c awiyah agreed among themselves 
(86) For the Prophet's instruction to Mu! cadh b. Jabal, 
when he sent him to the Yemen, as a chief of the Iledinan 
representatives there, cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 260; 
al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 83; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 18. 
(87) For the discussion between Ziyad and the owner of the 
she-camel see al-Tabarl, I, 2091f. 
(88) Al-Tabar-17,1,2000; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,257. 
(89) Al-Tabari, 1,2002; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,258. 
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to abstain from paying alms (sadaqah). Others., however., 
such as Shurahb-11 b. al-Simt and Imru3 al-Qays b. c7ibis(90) 
joined Ziyad b. Lablid, the Medinan representative, and 
advised him to invade B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah and their 
followers who had settled in their own pasture-land 
(mahjar). (91) Ziyad duly invaded them by night, directing - op 
his attack on B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah, who represented the 
backbone of the rebels of Kindah. The four Kings, 
-C 
Wali ah, were killed in the attack., as well as their 
sister al-cAmardah, 
(92) 
In spite of the victory of Ziyad and his followers 
over B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah, the pursiiing of armed conflict 
was difficult and terrible for both sides. After this 
battle al-Ashcath b. Qays, Chief of B. al-Harith b. 
Mucawiyah, emerged as the leader of a rebellion among B. 
Mucawiyah themselves. It seems that the direct reason he 
was involved in armed, struggle was to defend his relatives 
from B. cAmr b. Mucawiyah, who had taken refuge after being 
(93) defeated by Ziyad's troops. 
(90) For Shua4bil's attitude, see al-Tabarl7-, I., 2004; Ibn al-Ath-1r, 
Kamil., II, 258f; Ibn KhaldTin, c_Ibar, II, 862. For Imru-1 al- 
Qays, see al-Tabari, I, 2005; Ibn cAsakir, Tahdh'ib, III, 69f; 
Ibn Uazm; Jamharat, 428f; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, I, 115. 
(91) Al-Tabar-i., I, 2004; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 258; Mahjar means 
land owned and protected by powerful chieftains as private 
pasture for their camels and sheep; see al-Tabari, I, 2004; 
Yaqut, Mucjam, III, 136f. See also Landberg' Datinois I a-D )-YI 
360f . 
(92) Al-Baladhuri, Fut-dh,, 109f; al-Yacqubl, Tarikh, II, 111; 
al-Tabari, 1., 2005; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 428; Ibn Khayyat, 
Tarikh., 116; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 259; Ibn Khaldun, 
cIbar, II., 862. 
(9-3) Al-Baladhurr FutUh, 110; al-Tabarl, 1,2005; al-'? acqi1ihI, 7 
Tarikh, 11 6 ill; 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,259; Ibn 
Kh aldun., Ibar. % JI., 
862. For the blood relation between 
them, see Table 3. . 
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Before that al-Ashcath had led the rebels from his 
own people, those who abstained from paying the alms 
(., ýadaqah) to Ziyad. However, al-Ashcath b. Qays was not 
directly involved with Ziyad b. Lablid in the fighting. He 
declared "we will keep our money in our own hands and will 
not Pay it, and will be the last to pay. " 
(94) He also 
refused to give his oath of allegiance to Abu- Bakr saying 
"As for you (Ziyad), we have heard your speech and praise 
for that man (Ab-u Bakr) and if people agree on him we will 
give him our oath of allegiance. " 
(95) 
At this stage al- 
Ashcath was speaking as a powerful man by virtue of his 
being of the Kindah and with strong influence. He shouted 
out against one of his people who called upon them not to 
rebel against Ziyad. 
(96) 
He also replied to one who 
threatened him with Ziyad by saying, "Who said that Ziyad is 
of the same standing as myself? Would it not please Ziyad 
to give him refuge. , 
(97) 
This belief of al-Ashcath was the same as that of 
these others in the Arabian Peninsula. who abstained from 
paying alms during the early period of Abu Bakr's Caliphate. 
They thought that the Medinan government would not be as 
powerful as during the lifetime of the Prophet. 
(98) Perhaps 
(94) Ibn Asakir, Tahdhib, III, 69f. 
(95) Cf. HamidullEh, Watha"iq, 272f, quoting of al-Waqidi. 
(96) See the biography of cAbd Allah b. Yazid in Ibn 
4ajar, I. ýaba-h, V, 96f. 
(97) Ibn cAsakir, Tahdhib, 111,69. 
I% * 
(98) For these events, see al-Baladhuri, Futuý, 103-9; 
al-Tabari, I, 1870ff; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,231-53; 1 al-5iyiirbakrI, II, 201ff. See also ghoi,, fani, Al-Ridclah, 
77ff; Donner, 85-9. 
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the long distance between Hadramawt and Medina might have 
encouraged al-Ashcath to rebel. He proclaimed "All the 
Arabs have returned to what they had been previously 
worshipping and we are in an area distant- from Abu Bakr, so 
he cannot send troops against us. " 
(99) 
In spite of the fact that al-Ashcath abstained from 
paying alms and pledging his own allegiance to Abu- Bakr, he 
(100) did not declare his apostasy openly. On the other 
hand, Ziyad could not force al-Ashcath to pay alms or to 
give his oath of allegiance (baycah) to Abu- Bakr. It is 
most likely that Ziyad was avoiding an armed conflict with 
al-Ash 
c 
ath himself But., Ziyad's invasion of B. cAmr b. 
Muc awiyah inflamed al-Ash c ath, who duly protested against 
that action by urging the Kindah tribes to fight Ziyad 
and his followers. Near Tar-im the armies met; the Muslims 
were defeated and retreated to the town. 
(101) 
c. Ziyad's supporters: 
According to al-Tabarf, 
(102) 
even in this battle 
Ziyad depended entirely upon the local force for support. 
These events took place in Kindah territory, thus explaining 
why members of this tribe had a different attitude towards 
them. While B. Mucawiyah of Kindah were representing the 
rebels, the other branch B. Ashras were mostly representing 
(103) 
the power that supported Ziyad b. Labid. 
16 -- (99) Ibn Asakir., Tahdhib, 111.69. 
(100) Ibn cAsakir, Tahdh-lb, 111,69; al-Kalacl, Tar-lkh, 163. 
(101) Hamidullah. Watha iq, 273; for the location, see Map 4. 
(102) 1) 2006 ( citing Kathir b. al-Salt) 
(103) Cf. Table 
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The latter branch protected the muslim leaders who 
had left the Yemen highland for Hadramawt, as mentioned 
(104) 
above. At the time of the event of the she-camel 
B. Ashras., particularly al-Saku-n,, had stayed on Ziyad's 
side. As their poet said: 
.. e 
-- 1ý 
. ooo 
a-iIJ L-: ý 
I-« L5fr' 
Upon my life - and my life is not often upon it; 
B. cAmr will indeed bring bitterness upon themselves 
because of her (the she-camel); 
You are liars, by the house of God, you will not keep 
her from Ziyad; 
We have arrived at the right time (to support 
(105) Ziyad), 
LL-5 ALL" 
LJI I L4 
We supported the Faith, while our people went astray; 
In their wretchedness and we have declared our support 
-for (Ziyad) ; 
We have sought no reward for (ýsupporting) the right of 
al-Bayaql (Ziyad) 
Piety is my best provision; 
(106) 
(104) Cf . 
55 above. 
(105) Al-Tabari, 1,2004. 
(106). Al-Baladhurl, Futu-h, 109. 
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According to Abu Marzu-q al-Tuj-ib-i 
(107) 
not even one 
man from Tujib, a branch of B. Ashras, abandoned the Faith. 
Al-Kal-acil (108) also mentions that nobody from Qatirah, also 
of, B. Ashras., had abandoned the Faith either. The latter 
tribe was on the side of the Islamic army in the course of 
the armed conflict; therefore they were mentioned in the 
poetry of Kindah as enemies : 
__ __ ;1 
6j 
What an evil morning for B. Qat-irah; 
And for the prince from B. al-Mughirah (al-Muh5ýjir b. 
(109) Abi Umayyah) : 
c 
On the other hand, Ukashah b. Thawr., the Medinan 
(110) 
representative among B. Ashras, al-Sakasik and al-Sakun, 
did not figure iu these events. This leads us to believe 
that these tribes did not rebel against the Islamic authority 
in their territory. Nevertheless, that does not mean that 
these tribes followed Ziyad in his struggle with the rebels 
completely for the simple reason that there are some refer- 
ences to the fact that some of B. Ashras joined B. Muca. wlyah 
p1l) 
(107) Al-Diyarb-akri-, Tarlikh, 11,202; al-Ahdall, Nat-hr, 91. 
(108) T-arlikh, 166. 
(109) Al-Tabarl., 1,2007. 
(110) Al-Tabarif, 1,1999, has C Ukashah b. Mib: ýan which is 
patently wrong, see Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isticab 111,1080; 
Ibn al-Athir, K, ýmil, 11,228; Usd, IV, 2; Ibn Samurah, 
Tabaqat, 22; al-Khazra-ji, Kifdyah, 49; Ibn al-Dayba C 
Qurraf-, 1,54. cf. Table 
Cf. al-Tabarl, 1,2006; Haml-dullah, Watha 
) iq, 273. 
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However, we can confidently say that their areas remained 
relatively uninvolved in the Kindah rebellion, which makes 
us believe that the tribe, generally speaking, did not 
rebel against the Medinan authority. 
I Ziyild b. Labid was also given support from some 
of the Uaqrami elements who had stood by his side at the 
beginning of the conflict. 
(112) 
Their territory was not 
involved in the rebel movement and as a matter of fact, 
their chief generously entertained the Muslim leaders when 
c they passed through their land on their way to B. Mu'awiyah 
territory. 
(113) 
The political situation in Tihamah 
In Dhuz)l-Hijjah, 
were approaching ýanca; 
)., 
representative among cAkk 
camping in the mountains 
10/March, 632, w 
al-Tahir b. Abli 
and al-Ash7icir, 
between Tihamah 
hen cAbhalah's troops 
Halah, the Medinan 
in Tihamah, was 
and the town. 
(114) 
Al-Tdhir succeeded in forming an army from among the 
inhabitants themselves. 
(115) His force was particularly 
concentrated in the highland area, while some of the coastal 
towns sympathised with cAbhalah's revolt. 
(116) 
-C In Rabi I, 11/June, 632, the coastal territory of 
Tihamat al-Yaman was one area rebelling against the newly 
formed government in Medina. This rebellion arose i. -, uned- 
iately after the spread of the news of the Prophet's death. 
IT (112) Al-Tabar-i, I, 2002f; ibn al-Ath-11r, Kamil, -L, 
25Sf. 
(113) Al-Tabar-1, I, 2001. 
(114) Al-Tabarl, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athfr, Ka. mil, II, 228. 
(: LJ5) %lainly from cAkk, they played P, major roie during Lhe 
events either in Tihamah or in Sanca-3, see 83 abo-ve; 99 below. 
(116) Cf . 54,57 above. For the location, see 
Map 33. 
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According to al-Tabari and Ibn al-Athir 
(117) 'ýkk and 0 .1 
al-Ashacir were the first to rebel in Tihamah against Islamic 
authority, the former adding that the people of al-Awzff'. 
a confederacy consisting of some Himyari tribes settled 
in the southern part of Tihýmah joined them. 
We have no further historical material explaining 
the aims and requests of the rebels. This can perhaps be 
attributed to the fact that the rebellion was not led by 
famous local leaders, so the biographers pay no particular 
attention to them. 
However 
I 
It may be the paucity of material in our 
hands which leads us to the general impression that this 
rebellion was not as important as the others in the Yemen, 
which shook Islamic authority there and threatened to 
separate the area from the new government of Abu Bakr, such 
as the rebellion of B. Dlucawiyah, of Kindah, in Hadramawt. 
The absence of regular leadership of the Tihamah 
rebellion and the confusion which it brought about was 
perhaps a direct reason why it-, was put down easily by the 
Medinan representative there, al-Tahir b. Abi Halah, and 
his local force. So without having support from Medina, al- 
Tahir was able to control the area. Thus it can be assumed 
that the historians', silence regarding this rebellion 
indicates that it was weak and unimportant. 
The Tihamah rebellion was limited to al-A clab, the 
area near Suhar on the coast. The rebels gatliered 
L I) 1985f Ibn Lil-Atlti-L 2E4. See also (117) "'i-I-Tabar, Jrj"! Mil' II 
S -1, ficAkkil. 
(118) C-Lr. al-Tabari, 1 1986-, ibn al-Athir, Ka, mil, 11,254; 
c 'A 
I 1ý 11 See also SEC., -Akt, - 
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and proclaimed their rebellion where they controlled the 
coastal road, while the highlands remained under the in- 
fluence of the Islamic authority. 
(119) 
Al-Tahir b. Abi Halah accompanied by his followers 
from cAkk under the leadership of Masru-q al- c Akki, one of 
Akk chiefs, advanced towards the west, where they met 
the rebels in a crucial battle at al-Aclab. Thus the 
Muslims took control of the area, having scattered the 
rebels. 
(120) 
D. The Medinan Army enters the Yemen 
a. The local force, their failure and success 
In both 4aqramawt and Tihamat al-Yaman the Muslim 
forces were obviously supported by some of the local tribes. 
Through the support of the latter., Medinan representatives 
were able to oppose the rebels. The same attitude towards 
the Muslim authority also appeared amongst some of the 
Yemeni tribes in the northern plateau of the country. 
There, elements from Bajilah led by Jarlr b. c Abd Allah al- 
Bajall appeared defending the Islamic authority in the 
region. 
(121) 
After suppressing the rebels of Khathcam, 
Jarlr and his troops moved southwards and made camp in 
NajrEn. (122) 
Cf. Map 4. 
aII, (120) Cf. al-Tabari, 1,1986- Ibn al-Athir, K mil, 254 
ITICI 
\\ -- 
abah, 1 832- SEI Aki,, ý- Ibn Hajar, Lý 
(121) Al-Tabarl, I, 
(122) Al-TabarT, I, 
Jarir to move 
after finishi 
rebels in the 
1988; Ibn al-Athl7r., Kamil, II, 255. 
1988, records that -, "ilbu Bakr commanded to the south and statio,,, in 'Najr(t. 
ng his task., i. e. suppressing the 
region. 
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Najran witnessed no rebellion during the early 
period of Abu- Bakr's Caliphate, so the political situation 
in the town was satisfactory. The Christians had their 
treaty renewed by Ab-U Bakr 
(123) 
and also the Muslims 
adhered to their Faith. (124) Consequently the town was 
chosen as a centre for the assembly of the Islamic troops, 
who arrived in the Yemen to suppress the rebels. 
(125) 
The situation in Hadramawt was., however, different 
despite the existence of the local Islamic force there. The 
Muslims felt that they were not able to face the rebels 
who were increasing in number by collecting their clans 
togethery particularly in B. Mucawiyah of Kindah's 
territory. (126) 
In Sancao Fayru-z al-Daylami, one of the Abna 
3 chiefs, 
had become famous aiid therefore., as some historical 
evidence indicates., Abu Bakr wrote to him and invested 
him with the governorship (wilayah). 
(127) So the Abna: ' 
who were under his l. eadership in SancV appeared as an ally 
to the Medinan government. Fayruz, therefore, sent to Abu 
(128) Bakr asking him for assistance. Abu Bakr immediately 
wrote to the Chiefs of Himyar urging them to support the 
(123) Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, 358; al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 77; al- 4- 13 Tabari., I, 1987f. See also Ham7idullah,, Watha iq, 128f; 
L-Akwac, IVatha-)iq, 160f; Tr'imingham, Christ. ianity, 307. 
(124) Al-Ahdali, Nathr. 97. 
(125) There al-Muhajir b. Abli Umayyah met Farwah b. Musayk al- 
Muradi and Jarir b. cAbd Allah al-Bajali, both were local 
chiefs and allies to the Muslim government, see 101,102 
below. 
(126) See 94 above. 
(127) A! -, I, 
I T); Ibn Khaldu-n -Tabarl 1989, (citing al-Dath: Lni 
'Iba: r, II,, 861. 
C (1,028) Al-Tabari, I., 1990; Ib Khaldun, Ibar, II, 861; Ibn 
al-Athlir, Kamil, 11,255. 
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Abnf. (129) This, however, did not succeed and so the 
Abna sought aid from B. cUqayl and cAkk. 
(130) 
Fayruz 
and his new allies were able to control Sancao after 
defeating Qays b. cAbd Yaqhuth near the town in 11/632-3. 
So the survivors of the troops of Qays left the town for 
i 
the area between Sanc-a3and Najran without setting them- 
selves up in any particular place and creating a danger 
to the Islamic authority in this area. 
(131) 
b. Ab5 Bakrls decision to send troops to the Yemen 
Following the escalation of the threat against the 
Medinan authority in the Yernen and the failure of the 
local Islamic forces to completely control the situation 
there., particularly in Hadramawt and some areas in the 
highlands, Abu- Bakr realised that he had to send an army 
there. The force lie dispatched was led by al-Muhajir 
b. Abi Umayyah who had been ordered to fight the remnants 
of cAbhalah's . 
followers and to support the Abna ý) , and then 
to go to B. Mucawiyah of Kindah in Hadramawt. 
(132) 
(133) 
Al-Muhajir's army was, according to al-Tabarl, 
the last Muslim force sent to fight the apostates (al- 
Murtadddn). When al-Muhajir left Medina in 11/632-3, he 
marched south to the Yemen passing through Najran where 
(129, ý See 81 above. 
(130) See 83 above. 
(1131) Al-Tabari, 1,1993; Ibn al-Athir, Kami'l,, II, 256. 3 
Ibn al-A---' (132) Al-Tabarl, I, 1880 (citing Sayf b. cUmar); '1ýiry 
Usd, IV, 422f; tIamidallah, ýý, Tatha i_q, 260. See also 
al-ZubayrT, Nasa , 
316; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat,, '-: )'5; 
TbncAbd al-Barr, Isticab, IV, 1, -, 
52f; al-F-, -tsl, 
C Ibn al-Husayn P) df4, a . Iqd, VII, 292; 1 
(133) 1,1998. 
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Jarir b. cAbd All-ah and Farwah b. Musayk joined his army. 
(134) 
When Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th and cAmr b. Macd-1 Karib., who were 
camped in the mountains between Sanca and Najran, learned 
of the arrival of al-Muhajir from the north and C Ikrimah b. 
Abi Jahl., (sent from Medina-to Oman) from the south, they 
were afraid of the consequences and submitted unconditionally. 
Al-Muhajir arrested them and delivered them to Medina. (135) 
In 11/632-3, al-Muhajir afterwards marched southward 
to Sane-a-3 where he met the rest of Qayl':. ) a ký 
Sý, - followers in cAj'lb 
where the latter were defeated. Their survivors withdrew to 
Tihamah. There they were met by cAbd Allah b. Umayyah, a 
Muslim general who was sent by al-Muhajir to the area, 
who put them to flight. 
(136) 
Al-MuhRjir entered SancaO in 11/632-3 following the 
rebels of the Yemeni tribes around the town to get rid of 
them. (137) In the meantime cIkrimah b. Abli Jahl was near 
Abyan coming from Oman via Mahrah territory. 
(138) 
When 
al-Muhajir had finished his first task, he marched eastwards 
to Hadramawt, in particular to B. Mucawlya, h, of Kindah, 
territory, to support the Muslims there. c Ikrimah, however, 
found the situation stable in Abyan and therefore moved to 
the north-east following al-Mukhajir. They met each 
(134) Al-Tabarl, 1.1998; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat. 35; Ibn Khaidun, 
cIb, -, -tr, II, 
863f; al-Khazraji, Kifdyah, 52; cAsjad, 14; 
Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 22; Ibn al-Husayn, Ainbd', f4a. 
(135) Al-Tabari, I,, 1998; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 
I, 77. 
(136) Al-Tabar-l, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 35. C Ail-b or 
GhUiat cAj'lb a village between Raydah and Khamir. For 
-the exact locationsee Wilson, "Mapping", 358,390. 
See also Map 4. 
(137) Al-Tabarl, 1,1998; Ibn Khald-un., cIbarII, 864. 
(138) Al-Tabari, I, 1995-f; al-Fasi, cIqd, VI, 121. 
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other at Ma 3 rib. 
139) 
In Ma3rib al-Muh5-jir received a letter from Ziyad 
b. Labld, the Medinan representative in Hadramawt, urging 
him to give his support. He immediately left the rest 
of the army under the leadership of cIkrimah and went to 
Ija4ramawt. (140) Al-MuhRjir met the rebels in Ma4jar al- 
Zurqan and the latter were defeated and retreated to al- 
Nujayr fort. (141) B. Mucawiyah's rebels failed to free 
themselves from the s-iege of the fort. When cIkrimah 
(142) 
rejoined al-Muhajir to press further with the siege, B. 
C- Mu awiyah found themselves in an impossible situation and 
were obliged to stirrender. So al-Ashcath, the leader of 
the rebels signed an agreement with the Muslim leaders to 
open the gate of the fort., provided he and his clan were 
given safe conduct. 
(143) This agreement indeed put an 
end to the rebellion and the muslims gained a foothold in 
the area. Moreover they ended the strongest and most 
dangerous rebellion in the Yemen in that era. In the 
following year, i. e. 12/633-4, Abu Bakr's envoy, Anas 
b. Malik, arrived in the country appealing to the Yemeni 
tribes to join the conquest. 
(139) Al-Tabari 1, 2001; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil., 11,257. , 
(140) Al--Tabarl 1, 2006. For the routes of al-Muhaj ir and , C Ikrimah, cf. Map 4. 
(141) Al-Tabari, 1, 2006; Ya-q-u C. t, Mu jam, III, 136f; Ibn al-Athi7r. 
Kamil., II, 259. 
(142) Al-Tabari, 1, 2007, Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 259. 
(143) Cf. Al-Yac qu-b-i., Tarikh II ill; al-Tabarl, 1,2009; '3 
Ibn al-Ath ir., Kamil, II, iq, 278. 259f; Hamidullah, Wattia- 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Yemenis and the early Islamic conquests 
during the caliphates of Ab-u Bakr and cUmar 
(13-5/633-6) 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter., Abu 
Bakr had fought the rebellious tribes of Arabia, having 
considered that to be his first task. (1) These wars 
against the rebels., the Wars of Apostasy, constituted some 
of the most important events of the early period of the 
Orthodox Caliphs. The other important event mentioned in 
the historical sources is the actual movement which triggered zm-: ý 
off the Islamic conquests in Muharram, 12/March-April, 633. 
In fact the Wars of Apostasy developed in-to conquests 
in which the Medinan government directed its military 
activity into the neighbouring areas of the Persian and 
Byzantine Empires. (2) 
The first Islamic expeditions in this conflict were 
focused on the border with the Persian Empire following the 
Caliph's decision to support B. Shayban and B. cIjl, 
For the Yemen 
other Arabian 
al-Baladhuri, 
al-Tabar-1, I, 
71fi; Donner, 
i rebellions, see Chapter III-above. For 
tribes, cf. Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, lOlff; 
Futuh, 103ff; al-Kufi, 3 
1851ff. See also Shoufani, Al-Riddah, 
Islamic conquests, 85 ff. 
(2) See Ibn 
- 
Khayyaý, 
-117; 
al-Kufi, IY 90; al-Dinawarl, 
al-Akhbar al-liwal, 111; al-Tabari, 1,2016-21; Ibn al- 
Athir, Kamil, III 261f. These sources confirm that 
X11uslim troops were transferred to the Iraqi border 
immediatelv after the end of the Wars of Apostasy. See 
also Lewis, Arabs in History, 52; Sh-acban, Islamic 
Hist_orv., 1,24; Donner, Islamic conquests, 
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(Arabian tribes, both of Rabicah) who were in the neighbour- 
ing provinces of Iraq (at that time under the control of the 
Persian Empire) against the Persian forces. 
In Muýarram, 12/March-April, 633, Abu- Bakr ordered 
Khalid b. al-Walid, one of the key f igures of the Muslim 
army, to move with his troops from al-Yamamah to the Iraqi 
front. (3) At the same time the caliph gave orders to one 
of the Companions, cAyyad b. Ghanm, to advance with his 
troops towards the Iraqi border. (4) 
The first real movement of the conquest on the 
northern front with Syria (al-Sham) started when Abu Bakr 
sent a small force led by Khalid b. Sacid b. ol-cAs. one of 
the Companions, to stay in Tayma on the border of Syria. 
(5) 
We have no exact knowledge of when that expedition was sent; 
What is certain is that its main task was to protect the 
route of the Muslim troops which moved to this front in 
early 13/634. 
(6) 
From the historical sources we know that there were 
two movements that made up the Islamic conquests, both of 
which took place in the first/seventh century. The first 
(3) Ibid. Khalid was camped in al-Yamamah, an area in 
eastern 
C 
Najd which was inhabited by B. Hanifah, a branch 
of Rabi ah, where he had defeated them in the battle C -3 of Aqra a 
(4) Al-Tabarl, 1,2020; Ibn al-Athir, Kainil, II, 261f. 
(5) Al-Tabarl., 
.c- Ibn Asaki 
Mobility", 
see Yaqut. 
Iý 2079f; Ibn al-AthIr, Kamil, II, 261f. 
Madinat Dimashq, I, 451. See also Hill, "The 
169; Donner, 113. For the location of Tayma 
C. Mu jam al-Buldan, 11,67. 
Ibid. 
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was during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61), 
and the second in the time of the Umayyads (41-132/661-7z50). 
The climax of the first series of conquests came in the 
early years of cUmar's caliphate, while the second reached 
C its zenith during the caliphate of al-Walid b. Abd al-Malik, 
the sixth Umayyad ruler, 86-96/705-15. 
(7) 
The Islamic conquests themselves are beyond the scope 
of this study; what we are concerned with is the role of the 
Yemeni tribes and their impact in the early stages 
of the conquests. In this research we shall be concentrating 
on the Yemeni tribes which migrated from their homeland, 
the Yemen., upon the Caliph's request for them to join the 
conquest movement. The Yemeni tribes which already inhabited 
the disputed areas, i. e. Ghassan, Qudacah, Kalb and Judham 
are not included in the present study. 
However, it is not an easy matter to follow all the 
Islamic conquests, explaining the role of the Yemeni tribes 
in each. We shall follow the role of the Yemenis on the 
battle-fronts., both in Iraq and Syria, in the early stage 
of the conflict only. That period (13-5/631])'-6) indeed saw 
the peak of the first movement of the conquests and also 
witnessed the greatest participation by Yemeni tribes. These 
Yemenis indeed played a major role in fighting, commanding C) 
and negotiating in these conquests. 
(7) For the Islamic conquests in this_period, cf. Ibn -- 
Khayyat, 299ff; al-Baladhuri, Futu4,423-7- al-Yacqubi 
I Tdr-Lkh, I!, 35f. See also al-Munajjid, 
189-91; Faysal, Ijarakat al-Yatfi a! -1sla-nd, l1-6ff- 
-110- 
A. The call of the Medinan government to the Yemeni 
tribes to join the conquests 
After one year of war., Abu Bakr succeeded in putting 
down all the rebellious tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. By 
means of that war the caliph re-established the Medinan 
government's control over these tribes throughout Arabia. 
Therefore he appointed governors (wulah) for the important 
provinces of the area, three of which were in the Yemen 
in al-Janad) Sanca" and Hadramawt. Consequently the Yemen, 
and in particular the above mentioned areas, rallied to the 
Islamic state., placing herself under the authority of the 
government in Medina. (8) 
In spite'of the outbreak of fighting on the Iraqi 
front, Abu Bakr's government did not need reinforcements 
from all the Arabs. At the early stages of the conflict 
on that front, the Muslim forces consisted of some of the 
Arabs of the border area such as B. Shayban and B. C Ijl, who 
had been invading the Persian territories from time to 
-time. It was sufficient for the Medinan government, 
however, to send Khalid b. al-Walid and c Ayyaý b. Ghanm 
to support these tribes, thus forming together the Muslim 
forces on that front in the early stages of the conquests. 
(9) 
(8) For the full discussion of the establishment of the 
Islamic authority in these areas, see Chapter VI-A, above. 
(9) These tribes had fought the Persian forces in the very 
early stages-of the conflict, see al-Baladhurl, 
_Futul. 
i, 
242f; al-Kufl, Futuý, I, 88f; al-Dinawari, Akhbar, ll, 
al-Tabari, 1,2018. 
I 
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During 12/633 war officially broke out between the 
Islamic government and the Persian Empire. The Muslims 
were victorious and ultimately captured al-THIrah, capital 
of that territory on the Euphrates. 
(10) 
The Yemeni 
tribes played no part as such in these battles during that 
early stage other than the role which was played by some 
of their chiefs e. g. Jarl: -r b. cAbd All- (11) r> ah al-Bajali. 
- (12) Al-Baladhurl mentions that Abu- Bakr commanded 
Jarir to support Khalid b. al-Walid's troops, which had 
received orders from Medina to move from al-Yamamah to the 
(13) Iraqi front. Ibn al-Athir confirms this, adding that 
Jarir joined Khalid after the occupation of al-Hirah in 
Rablo'IY 12/May-June, 633. 
The historical sources, unfortunately, do not supply 
us with details of the composition of Jarir's army, which 
joined him on the Iraqi front. Al-Azdi 
(14) however., 
records that two hundred warriors from Bajilah, most of 
them from Jarir's clan., Ahmas, *accompanied Khalid b. al- 
(10) For the conflicts of this year, cf. al-Baladhuri., 242ff 
al-Dinawari, 111f; al-Tabari, I, 2037ff; Ibn al-Athir, 
al-Kamil, II, 265f. See also Hill, Termination., 109f; 
Donner, 177ff. 
One of the key Yemeni chiefs who played a major role 
during the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen, as well as 
being one of the Companions. C 
For Jarir's biography, see 
Ibn Sa'ýd, Tabaqat, VI, 22; Ibn 
_Abd 
al-Barr, 
_Istica: 
ýb. I. 
239f; Ibn al-Athir, Usd al-Ghabah, I, 279f; Ibn Hajar, 
lsabahý I. 242f; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 19-21. 
(12) Futuh, 243. 
(13) Kamil., 11,268. 
(14) Futuý, 66. 
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Walid from Iraq to the Syrian front when war broke out 
there in early 13/633. Accordingly, we can assume that 
Jarir was leading his own tribe, Bajilah, when he was 
sent to the Iraqi front. (15) This information, of course, 
leads us to believe that some Yemenis joined the Aluslim 
forces in the early stages of the battles on the Iraqi 
border in 12/633. But that participation was in a limited 
and unofficial capacity. 
In fact there is no mention in the historical sources 
of a Yemeni presence, either on the Iraqi or Syrian front, 
before Safar 13/April-May, 634. The actual participation 
of the Yemeni tribes in these conquests began when Abu 
Bakr wrote to their chief s appealing to them to join the 
Muslim troops encamped in al-Jarf on the outskirts of 
Medina. (16) 
The idea behind Abu Bakr's call to the Yemeni tribes 
was his intention to invade Syria, relying on his govern- 
ment's influence over the Arabian tribes in the Peninsula. 
The caliph realised the value of such influence and worked 
on the unity of the Arab tribes by saying : "The Arabs 
belong to the same father and mother, so I intend to appeal 
(17) 
to them to fight the Byzantines (al-Rum) in Syria. " 
1 (18) Al-Waqidi records that Abu Bakr was intending to ful-IL11 
(15) This supposition is safe, since we know that Jar-ir led 
his own tribe in other military operations, e. g. v. -hen the 
Propliet sent him :) to destroy Dhu 1-Khalasah, . 
idol of 
Khathcam and Baji-lah; in 10/632, the and in follo,, viný-, year 
Abu Balýr ordered him to suppress the rebels in the 
northern plateau of the Yemen, s ee Chapter I, note 91- 
(16) Al-Azdi, ll; al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 116; al-Di yar-bakri, 
Tarikh, 11,223. 
(17) AI-Azdi, 1. 
(18) Futuh, 1 . 
2. 
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the Prophet's wish by conquering Syria. Al-Baladhuril (19) 
mentions that the caliph's decision to invade Syria came 
immediately after the Wars of Apostasy. He thus wrote to 
the people of Mecca, al-Ta: if., the Yemen and all the Arabs 
in Najd and the Hijaz urging them to join the conquests. 
(20) 
Both al-Azdi and Ibn %sakir (21) agree that Abu Bakr 
and his advisers discussed the idea of writing first to the 
Yemeni tribes. This means that the Muslim leaders had put 
the Yemenis at the top of their list when they decided to 
appeal to the Arabian tribes. If this analysis is correct 
it shows how much importance was attached to the Yemeni 
tribes' contribution to the Muslim forces. In fact this is 
not difficult to believe when one compares these with the 
other Arabian tribes at that time, especially in military 
matters. It is known, for example that the people of 
al :3 -Ta if sent some men to Jurash, a Yemeni town, now in 'Asir. 
to be trained in the use of certain weapons, the catapult 
(manianiq ý-,. or 'arradah) and some form of armoured vehicle 
(dabbabah) when they heard that the Muslims had decided to 
invade their town in 8/628. 
(22) 
Futuý, 155. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) Futulý, 5; Ibn cAsakir, Tahdh-i-b, 1,128; Tarikh 2,11adinat 
Dimashq, 1.445. 
(22) Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, 1,312 , says 
cUrwah b. Mascud and 
GhaylEn b. Salamah, both from people of al-T5ý3if were 
training in Jurash in the course of the sie,; --, e of their town. Cf. also al-Diydr-bakrli, 11,110. T he 
' 
Muslims 
also used such weapons when they sieged al-Td3if; theý- 
broug, it them from the Yemen through such Yen. enis as al- ýD 
Tufayl al-Dav; sl; Cf. Ibn His'nain, Slirat, IV, 1228; al- 
Di "The ',, abilit-` 117. NT,! qr_bakr1,11,110. See also Hill, 
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When Abu Bakr and his advisers decided to invade 
Syria, they sent Anas b. Malik to the Yemen, urging the 
Yemeni chiefs to join the Muslim troops with their 
tribes. 
(23) 
This invitation was indeed the first official 
call from the Medinan government to the Yemenis to join 
the conquests. However, that call was directed only to 
those Yemenis in the Yemen who had not rebelled against 
Islamic authority during the period of Apostasy. 
(24) 
We know that during the Wars of Apostasy some Yemeni chiefs, 
such as cAmr b. Macd-i Karib al-Zubayd-1 and al-Ashcath b. 
Qays al-Kindi, appeared as opponents of Islamic authority 
in the Yemen. 
(25) 
The majority of Arab historians, 
however., agree that such people did not appear among the 
Yemeni chiefs who joined the Islamic troops during Abu 
Bakr's Caliphate. (26) 
Anas b. Malik, AbU Bakr's envoy to the Yemen, tells 
us that the Yemenis became enthusiastic when he read the 
caliph's letter to them. 
(27) The Yemeni tribes, therefore., 
(23) Al-Azdl', 5f ; al-Waqidi, Futuý, 1,1; Ibn cAsakir, 
Madinat Dimashq, I, 445f; Ibn Ijajar, 
C- 
Isabah, II, 
187; al-DiyErbakri, 11,222; al-Akwa . Wathi-liq, 169. 
(24) In keeping with Abu Bakr's policy, apostates were not 
accepted in the Muslim armies. Cf. al-Tabari, 1) 2081; 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,262. 
(25) Cf. Chapter II and III above. For the former see in 
particular II C. for the latter III B b-c. 
(26) Both al-Azdi., Futuý, llf and al-1-Yaqidi, Futiih_, I, 
do not mention such people among the first Yemeni 
chiefs who arrived in '. 1edina after Abu Bakr's call; 
Al-Tabari, 1., 22183,2,22-2 mentions their coming to 
. Mediina during 
cUmar's Caliphate, ývhen ti. 1-e latter 
equipped Saed's army. 
(27) Cf. al-Azd-1,6f; al-Vyaqi, 1, T, Futu-ý, I, 2f; al---11ýwa 
C 
Watha 3 iq 169. 
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began to leave for the battle-fronts, 
. participating in the 
early stages of the Islamic conquests. Medina, the centre 
of Islamic government, was their first stop. Uimyar was 
the first Yemeni tribal group to arrive in Medina., led by 
- :) -C Dhu l-Kala al-Himyarl., one of the leading f igures of 
#imyar. Then followed Madhhij, led by Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th 
-7 
al-Muradi., and al-Azd under the leadership of Jandab b. cAmr 
(28) 
al-Dawsi. 
Our historical sources do not give a Precise time 
for the arrival of these tribes in Medina; nevertheless 
they must have arrived before Safar, 13/April-May, 634. 
- (29) C According to al-Azdi., Abu Ubaydah b. al-Jarrah, one 
of the Companions and leader of the Islamic armies on the 
Syrian front during cUmar's caliphate, was waiting with 
his army for the arrival of the tribes, to whose chiefs 
Abu Bakr had written. Some historians confirm that Abu 
c[Jbaydah left Medina for the Syrian front in early ýafar, 
13/April, 634, as soon as the Yemeni tribes arrived in 
(30) C Medina. So MadhIjij, led by Qays b. Abd Yaghuth 
al-MurzTdf, accompanied him to that front. 
(31) 
ýilmyar, the first Yemeni tribe, arrived in Medina 
and appeared among the Muslim troops in the very early 
stages of the conflict on the Syrian front, 
(32) 
Al- 
(28) Al-Azdi, llf; C al-Waqid'I:, Futu-', ' ,., I, 2f; al-Akwa . Watha :) Lq, 169. 
(29) 
_Futuh, 
11. 
(30) Ibn Khayyat, 119; al-Baladhuri, Futuli, 116. 
(31) Al-Azdl, 21. 
(32) Ijeiore L. _', af ar 
C_ 12 -7'akr sent Khalid b. Sa id, , /Apri'L 634, Abu , 
commanding hi m to stay in Tayma' , but the 
latter attac', I-ed 
the Byzantine forces ývllaich were led by Ballan. Klialid waýý 
defeated and then sent to ti-ie CaliL)'-,, as. '-, ing for li, ý-lp. Cf. L 1 al-Tabar 11 276- Cf. also 2079; Ibn al-At. -IT ,I 
a1 a 113. 
-7 
I-v'r_I_)qi_'L1, Futuh, I, and Donner, 
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Tabarl records that Abu Bakr supported Khalid b. Sacid b. 
al- C, Ks by despatching the first Yemeni reinforcements led 
- Z) -C by Dhu 1-Kala al-Hintyari. Thus, the Yemenis participated 
with the Islamic forces in their early conflict with the 
Byzantine forces in Syria. 
Thereafter, the Yemeni tribes joined the Muslim 
forces in Syria, passing through TvIedina on their way to the 
battlefront. A few days after the departure of the Muslim 
armies., more Yemeni tribes arrived in Medina. Ibn DhIl 
31- 
Sahmayn al-Khathcami, a Khathcaml chief, arrived in Medina 
with about one thousand men from Khathcam., seeking to join 
the Muslim forces. (33) Two thousand men from Hamdan led 
by : ýumrah b. Malik al-Hamdani, one of the chiefs of Hamdan, 
also arrived in Medina. 
(34) 
They were both directed to 
the Syrian front; the former joined Yazld b. Abi Sufyan's army 
-C (35) while the latter was placed under Abu Ubaydah's command. 
In fact these Yemeni tribes came to be the most 
important Yemeni reinforcements to join the Islamic forces 
in Syria during the last six months of Abu Bakr's caliphate 
(Muharram-Jumada II, 13/D. larch-September, 634). 
(33). Al-Azdi,, 20. 
(34) AI-Azdl, 31-3. 
(35) For the former, cf. a]--Azdi, 20; for the latter see 
ibid) 33. Abu Bakr equipped four separate armies to 
invade Syria led by four iduslim leaders: Abu 'Ubaydah 
Ibn al-Jarrab, Yazid b. Abi Sufyan, Shurahbil b. 
11asanah and týAmr b. al-'As and he directea them to all 
the Syrian territories; cf. Ibn 11ý-'hayyat, 119; 
al-Baladhuri, Futi! ý, 115f. See also Hill, The 
Termination, 75f; Donner, 114. 
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In Jumada II, 13/Septe, -nber., 634, c Umar b. al-Khattab 
became the second caliph in Islam after Abu- Bakr's death. 
In the early period of the new caliph, conflicts between 
the Muslims and their enemies reached a climax. Accordingly 
the new regime renewed their invitations to the Arab tribes 
to provide military assistance. cUmar succeeded in assembling 
a great number of the warriors from the Arabian -tribes, 
among whom were many Yemenis. - Al-Waqidi (36) explains the 
assembling of Arab tribes by saying that the victories 
which the Muslims gained on the Syrian front after the 
battle of Ajnadaynei3r-ouraged the Arabs to join the Muslim 
troops. We should add cUmar's deliberate policy of 
attracting the Arab tribes in-to the military and this gave 
the opportunity to all Muslims including apostates 
(37) (murtaddun) to join the Muslim forces. 
Al-Waqidi records that when CUmar was attending the 
dawn prayer, six hundred Yemenis from Sadwan., Saba and 
ijadramawt arrived in Medina, plus another four hundred men 
from different Yemeni provinces. 
(38) 
Both groups asked 
(36) It 38. 
(37) We know that Abu Bakr did not permit apostates to join 
the Muslim forces and therefore he ordered his command- 
ers not to recruit them. For Abu Bakr's instructions to 
his commanders on this point, cf. al-Tabari -, 1,2081, 2225; Ibn al--Athir, Kamil, 11,276. ýut cUirnar cancelled 
this instruction as soon as he came in power, cf. al- 
Tabarl, I. 21K5. 
(38) Al-ý'v'aqidi., Futuh, I. 109f) 166. Sadwan; there is no 
mention of this area in tile geographical sourcps at our 
disposal. The author probably means here ýuda 1) , the 
name of a province (mikhlaf) in the Yemen (cf. al- 
Hamdani, ýif. -it, 1) 159; Yaqut, ! Ju . 1,.,, m al--, ),,. ild-an, 
II, 397; 
Smith, ý, -107; or he means Sadi, 7r, a 'he Ayvul. -Iids, 11,2 
",, Tadhhij cf also Sif Lit 89. wadi in SLtUVV' 
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the caliph if they could join the Muslim troops) on the 
Syrian front. It seems that these groups arrived in Medina 
during the first six months of cUmar's caliphate, as they 
were directed to the Syrian front. 
After the battle of the Bridge in Shacban 13/October, C). 2 
634, C Umar decided to escalate the fighting on the northern 
eastern front, Iraq and Persia. 
(39) 
Accordingly reinforce- 
ments had to be sent to this front. The caliph, therefore, 
urged Muslims to go there., but many, especially the Yemeni 
tribes, refused., preferring to join the Muslim forces on 
the Syrian front. (40) So cUmar wrote to his representatives 
amongst the Arab tribes ordering them to send him all their 
able-bodied tribesmen. 
(41) 
Immediately a huge number of 
these tribes converged on Medina seeking to participate in 
the conquests; among them were many Yemenis. 
Thus the Yemeni tribes were now heavily involved at 
this stage. Yet some of them persisted in their desire to 
join the Muslim armies in Syria. C Umar eventually succeeded 
in directing them to the Iraqi front. Some historians 
(42) 
record that a group from al-Azd came to Medina asking to 
join the Muslim armies in Syria, but the caliph ordered 
them to support the 'i'Juslims in the Iraqi border, promising 
(39) Cf. al-Tabarl, 1,2182; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 
In that battle the Muslims had been defeated 
connander., Abu cUbayd al-Thaqafl, was ki'led. 
11,303. 
and their 
(40) Cf. al-Baladhuri, Futulý, 253; al- 
2187Y 2218, Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 
Tabari, I, 2183y 2186. 
iI. 303. Cf. also J27-n, belo 
(41) Al-Tabarl, 1., 2211 
(42) E. g. al-BalaOhuri-, E-_Litiiý, 253-, al 
the latter (cit ing Abu ý-Ii1, -, 'Lln, Rf). 
-ý--C-tbari, I, 2187f 
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them the booty of Chosroos, the Emperor of Persia. Another 
Yemeni group from KhatbGam arrived in Medina and was directed 
to the Iraqi front. 
(43) 
A large Yemeni group from Baillah appeared at that 
stage of the fighting on the Iraqi border. This tribe had 
been of importance but had been scattered among other 01 
(44) Arabian tribes at that time. One of the important 
chief s of this tribe, Jarlr b. cAbd 
I Alla-h, had wanted to 
re-unite his tribe 
., 
the Baj: Llah, and had asked Abu- Bakr 
to do so, but the caliph had not paid much attention to 
Jarir's wishes. 
(45) 
When cUmar came to power, Jarir asked 
him to fulfil this previous request. The caliph agreed 
and duly wrote to his representatives among the Arabian C) 
tribes, ordering them to separate all those who came orig- 
inally from BajTlah and send them to Jarir b. cAbd All. h. 
(46) 
(43) Al-Tabari, 1,2188. 
0 
(44) Al-Tabari, 1,2223; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,303. 
Ibn Ham, Jamharat., 390, says that they were scattered 
afte--ý their defeat by B. Kalb b. Wabarah, the Arabian 
tribe., in the battle of al-Fijar; cf. also al-Nuss, 
al-cA: ý, abiyyah al-Qabaliyyah, 47. 
(45) Al-Tabari, 1,2223; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,303. 
(46) Al-Tabarl-, 1,2183; Ibn Hazm, 387; Ibn al-Athir., 
Kamil, 11,303. 
On this occasion an Arab Poet said praising Jarir; 
L7--a) 
I 
Were it not for Jari'r, BajIlah would have perished; 
T, IT hat af ine youth! What an evil tribe* 
Ibn cAbd al-Darr, 
_Isti'ab, 
I, 
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This was carried out successfully. In this way cUmar 
succeeded in creating a great Yemeni force which supported 
the Muslim army on the Iraqi border at that time. 
All those Yemenis who had been sent to the Iraqi 
front at that stage of the conflict were indeed the first 
of the official Yemeni reinforcements to join the Muslim 
forces there. Their arrival was definitely before the 
battle of al-Buwayb in 14/635, which took place in Iraq 
between the Muslims and the Persian forces, with the latter 
being defeated. (47) 
In this same year after the battle., a new army began 
to assemble near Medina in compliance with the caliph's 
call. CUMar himself, amid popular applause, declared his 
intention of leading it in person, but allowed himself to be 4D 
dissuaded by his principal advisers, who recommended Sacd 
b. Abi Waqqas, cousin of the Prophet and one of the earliest 
converts to Islam, as commander of the new iýeinforcements 
for Iraq. 
(48) 
Al-Tabari records that when tmar wrote to 
the Arabs urging them to join Sa c d's army, he said "By God, 
I will attack the Kings of Persia with the Kings of the 
Arabs. , 
(49) 
(47) The Yemenis 2. ppeared among the Muslim army in_that battle 
CC-- led by Jarir b. Abd Allah, cf. al-Ya qubi, Tarik II, 
121; al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 253-5; al-Tabari, I, 2184ff) 
v- Ibn al-Ath-Ir, Kamil 11 303-5. See also Kamal, 
al Viý 424ff; Faysal, Haraklit 51-3; -Tariq ila IL-Mada in, 
Donner, 200. 
(48) Al-Ku-f-j", Fut-ýh I 172f; al-Baladhur-i, Futýih, 255; 
al-Tabarl, I 2212ff; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, 309f. 0- Cf. also Glubb, Arab Conquests, 189; Kamal, al- 
Qadisi-yyah, 12ff. 
(49) 1,2223, 
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Historical sources mention the Yemeni tribes which 
answered the caliph's call. A group of some two thousand 
three hundred men from some Yemeni tribes, mostly Madhhij, 
(50) 
came to Medina. They were followed by four hundred 
Yemeni warriors from al-Saku-n. a branch of Kindah, led by 
two of their chiefs, al-4u§ayn b. Numayr and Mucawiyah b. 
ýudayj. (51) Sacd b. Ab-i Waqqas left Medina with four 
thousand men, three thousand of whom were from the Yemen. 
(52) 
While he was encamped at Sharaf., a collection of wells in 
Najd, a further one thousand., seven hundred Yemenis joined 
his army. 
(53) 
These Yemenis who joined the Muslim forces during 
the caliphate of Abu- Bakr and cUmar came from most of the 
Yemeni tribes. Later, without exception, they settled down 
permanently in the garrison towns (amsar) of the conquered 
provinces. 
(50) Al-Tabari, I, 
e 
2218f; Ibn al-Athj-r, Kamil, 11., 310; 
Ibn Khaldun, Ibar, 11., 917. 
(51) Al-Tabarli, I, 2220f; Ibn al-Athi-r, Kamil, 11,310. 
(52) Cf. al-Tabari, I, 2222ý Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 
311; Ibn* Khaldu-n, c1ba 11,917; Ibn Kathir, 
Bidayah, VII, 36; cf. Also Glubb, 189. 
(53) Led by al-Ashcath b. Qays al-Kind-1; cf. al-Tabar-i 
IY 2222; Ibn al-Athir, _'Kamily 
lIyc3ll. For the 
location of Sharaf, cf. Yaqut., 
, 
Mu jam, III, 
331; see also Glubb, 191, map ""XIV ('the campaign 
of Qadasiyal). 
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B. The Yemeni groups at the battle fronts 
Medina, the centre of the caliphate, was the first 
station from which volunteers were sent to the battle fronts. 
In 13/634-5, the Medinan government concentrated its military 
activity on the Syrian front. Accordingly, volunteers 
were sent there. 
(54) 
But., when %mar decided to escalate 
the conflict on the Iraqi front after the battle of the 
Bridge, he redirected the reinforcements to that border. 
(55) 
In short it can be said that the role of the Yemeni tribes 
on both fronts cannot be ignored. We shall, therefore, 
discuss their presence on these fronts in detail. 
The Yemenis on the northern front - Svria 
Al-Azdl (56) says that Rabilcah, Tamilm and Asad were 
concentrated on the Iraqi front, since this area was their 
homeland. The Yemenis, however, formed the bulk of the 
Muslim troops in Syria and, therefore, adopted this as their 
homeland. The Yemeni tribes' presence with the Muslim forces 
in Syria has been extensively documented in the historical 
sources. 
(57) 
-c As has already been mentioned, Abu Ubaydah's army, 
the fourth Muslim army to leave Medina for Syria on ýafar 
(54) For their arrival during this period, cf. al-Azdi, llff; 
al-Waqidi, Futuh., 1,3ff; al-Tabari, 1,2082ff 
cf. also 115 ff above 
(55) Cf. al-Tabari, I, 2183ff; Ibn al-Athir, al-KamilII, 
303- 
(56) Futuý, 12. 
(57) Cf. al-Azdi, Fut"ll, 12ff; al-', Iaqidi, Futull, 3ff; 7 
al-Tabarl, 2073ff; Ibn al-Athir, licarail)II2275ff. 
-lzj- 
13/April-ýMay, 6.. )4, was awaiting the arrival of the Arabian 
tribes, including the Yemenis. (58) Some historians (59) 
record that Abu Bakr sent all the Yemeni tribes arriving 2D 
in Medina in answer to his call to the Syrian front 
under the command of his leaders. In fact on this front 
it was rare to find Muslim troops without Yemenis among 
them and consequently many of -Lhe-ni were killed at thL-- 
beginning of the fighting in the early stages of the 
conquests. 
(60) 
The Yemenis took part in all the decisive battles 
on this front. In the battle of Ajnadayn, (Jumada, 
13/July, 634) between the Muslims and Byzantines in 
Palestine in which the latter we're defeated, the Yemeni 
tribes took part, some of their chiefs appearing on the 
battlefield. One of them, cAbd Alla-h b. c Amr b. al- 
Tufayl al-Azdi, was killed 
(61) 
while Dhu-) 1-Kalac al- 
ýIimyaril and Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth al-Muradi appeared amongst 
the Muslim leaders. 
(62) 
At the time of the Muslim siege 
of Damascus, Abu cUbaydah, the commander-in-chief of the 
Muslim forces there, sent one of his armies led by DhU'-'l- 
Kalac , one of -the Yenieni 
leaders, to stand by between Hims 
(58) See 115 above. 
(59) See115-6 above. '. also al-AzdT, 12ff; al-W-aqid-i, Futu-ý., ')'ff; 
al-Tabari, I, 2079ff. 
(60) In Palestine , cf. al-lVaqidi, 
Futuý, 1,11, who describes 
the fighting by saying "The ýJusjims lost maný, of their 
soldiers, most of them from the Yemen. " 
(61) Cf. al-Azdl, 79; al-Kufi, FutLih, 1,147; Ibn 
cAbd al- 
Barr, 111.956; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, IV, 111. 
(62) Al--IVaqidi, Futuh, 1,32. 
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(63) Damascus. The rest of the Yeifienis took part with the 
Muslim armies in the siege of the city. 
(64) 
When one reads of the conquest of Hims, 15/636, 
in the primary sources,, one has no doubt that the city 
was conquered by a purely Yemeni army. According to al- 
- (65) Baladhuri., the Muslim army which conquered Hims was 
under the command of al-Simt b. al-Aswad al-Kindl, one 
of the leading chiefs of Kindah. Al-Tabari 
(663) 
confirms 
the participation of B-Mucawiyah and al-Saku-n, tribes of 
Kindah, amongst the warriors. Al-Waqidi's 
(67) 
account of 
the number of Muslims who were killed in the course of the 
battles for the town of Hims indicates that two hundred 
and thirty-five men were killed, all from Himyar and Hamdan, 
except thirty men from Mecca. Dhu I 1-Kal-a"-ý al-Himyari and 
his troops were surrounding Ijim,, ý when the Muslims arrived 
there. (68) These statements indeed lead us to believe 
that the Yemenis played a major role in conquering Hims. 
-C As a consequence of this role, Abu Ubaydah authorized 
some of their chiefs to divide the land belonging to the 
city amongst the Muslims. 
(69) 
Hims, therefore, became 
a predominately Yemeni city. 
(70) 
(63) Al-Tabarl, 1., 2151. 
(64) For the blcýckade of Damascus, cf. al-Waqidi, Futu-h,, I, 
39ff; Ibn _ Asakir, Madlinat Dimashq, 1,493. 
(65) Futu-h., 137. 
(66) Ij 2392. For the clans of Kindah, cf. Table 3. 
(67) Futuh., 1.96. 
") 4 0. (68) Ibn al-Ath-Ir, Ka-mil, 11,3 
C (69) Al-Baladhuri, Fut-Lih 1.37; YCII. crhut. Mit jam, 11,303. 17> 
CC 
(70) Cf. al-Ya qubi, Buldan, 324f; al-',,,! aydan1, ": ft-IMIL Ij. 
294Y Cf. also Kurd, Khitat, 1,65. 
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Concrete evidence of a Yemeni presence on the Syrian 
front during the course of the battle of al-Yarmuk, a 
decisive struggle in the area of Jordan which took place in 
15/636, is given by al-Azdl., who describes the distribution 
of the Muslim forces at this battle as follows: "The 
Mus ims were gathered around their flags and the Arab 
notables appeared with their own people. A third of the 
army was from al-Azd, but the majority of the people were 
c from Hi-inyar. Also Hamdan, Khawlan., 11[adhhij, Khath am, 
Hadramawt and Kindah were there. So the majority of the 
army was made up of the Yemenis (ahl al-Yaman)'. ' 
(71) Al- 
Waqidi reports the battle too, saying, "The right flank of 
the army consisted of men from al-Azd, Madhhij, Hadramawt 
(72) 
and Khawlan. " Al-Kufi- records the Yemeni presence 
in this battle by saying : "Thus the Yemeni tribes were 
, ly.,, 
(73) 
spread amongst all the divisions of the Mluslim ar,, 
There is probably some exaggeration in this description, 
but it does illustrate the fact that the Yemeai participatiou 
was greater than that of the other Arabian tribes in the 
conquest of Syria. 
After the battle of al-Yarmuk, the Muslims intended 
to conquer Jerusalem. Abu c-Ubaydah, the commander-in-chief 
of the IMuslim army, sent several independent troops, formed 
Futýlh, 195; he also 
C- Ghassan and Amilah 
these tribes fall o- 
already mentioned. 
-C 
mentions Quda ah, Lakhm, Judham, 
amongst the Yemeni tribes, but 
utside our present topic as 
See 109 above. 
(72) Futuh, 1.127. 
-C (73) Futuh, 1,255, he also mentions Quda ah, Lakhm and Judham. 
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mostly from the Yemenis to that city. 
(74) 
According to 
- (75) al-Waqidi, when the Muslim armies dispersed after 
the occupation of Jerusalem., seventeen thousand warriors 
remained with Abu cUbaydah, most of whom were from the 
Yemen. Four thousand men., all of them from cAkk, a Yemeni 
tribe, accompanied eAmr b. one of the key figures 
of the conquests and one of the Companions, when he left 
Syria to conquer Egypt in 19/640. 
(76) 
The accuracy of the actual numbers may be questioned, 
but it can be demonstrated that the Yemeni tribes were in 
the majority. This is presumably why the historians mention 
them more than other Arabian tribes., especially on that front. 
In conclusion, then., it can be said that the Yemeni 
tribes which joined the Muslim forces in Syria played a 
major role in reinforcing the army on this front, and 
constituted the majority. 
I 
b. The Yemeais oft the north-eastern front - Iraq and Persia 
The first indication of a declaration of war against 
the Persian Empire came in Muýarram, 12/March-April, 633, 
c 
when Abu Bakr gave orders to Khalid b, al-Walid and Ayyad 
b. Ghanm to move with their troops to the Iraqi border. 
(77) 
This means that the Muslim forces had moved to the Iraqi 
(74) Cf. al-Waqidi, Futuh, 1,144. 
1 
(75) Al-Waqid-i, Futu-h, 1,155. 
(76) Al-Yacqu-bli, Tarlikh, 11,125; Ibn C Abd al-Hakam, Futuh, 
IIý 56. In af---Kindi: --, al-'vVulah wa'ýl-Quda-h 
8, three tious- 
and, five hundred, a third of them Gllafiq, a 
branch of cAkk. 
(77" Cf. 108 above. 
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f ront at least twelve months bef ore Abu- Bakr 's appeal to 
the Yemeni tribes. (78) When cUmar stepped up the war on 
the Iraqi front after the defeat of the "Juslirn army at the 
battle of the bridge in Shacban, 13/October, 634, the 
official Yemeni reinforcements were directed to this 
front. 
(79) 
Therefore in the following year, 14/635, the 
Yemenis appeared amongst the Muslim army at the Battle of 
al-Buwayb, led by Jarir b. cAbd Allah al-Bajall. 
(80) 
This is indeed the first Yemeni involvement mentioned in 
the historical sources. 
These Yemeni tribes had preferred to join the Muslim 
army in Syria. But because of the critical situation on 
the Iraqi front after the failure of the Muslim forces at 
the battle of the Bridge, CUmar used diplomacy and promise 
of material gain to persuade them to join the Muslim -troops 
on the Iraqi border. Al-Tabari, following the account of 
al-Shaeb-l', 
(81) 
mentions that cUmar ordered Jar-ir b. cAbd 
(78) For the first coming of 
ments, cf. 115 above. 
(79) See 118 above. (79) 
(80) 
the official Yemeni reinforce- 
According to al-Tabari, 1,2184, it was on Ramadan, 13/ 
November, 634. Iýn Khayyat, Tarik 
., 
129; al-Ya C q*u-bi-, 
Tarikh, 11,121 and al-Baiadhuri, Fut-ýih, 254, all 
confirm that it took place in 14/635, 
-with 
the addition 
that the latter says, according to BaJilah's allegation, 
C the_iý. 'Iuslim army was under the command of Jarir b. Abd 
Allah. 
(81) 1,2186; cf. also Ibn Ishaq's statement, ibid, 2200. 
cArfajah was a chief of Bajilah before it was re-united; 
although he was not actually from Bajilah, he was an 
-7 ally from al-Azd. For his biography, cf. Ibn al-Athir C) 
Usd al-Ghabah., 111,401; Ibn Hajar IV, 235, cf. also 
al-Tabari, I. 2186f. 
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I- Allah al-Bajali r and 
C Arfajah b. Harthamah to advance on 
Iraq, promising them that they would be re-united with 
their tribe. However., when Baj-1lah assembled in Medina, 
they refused to go to the Iraqi front, preferring Syria. 
Because of their value as fighters C Umar persuaded them 
by promising them certain privileges if they agreed to 
join the Muslim forces in Iraq. (82) When al-Azd refused 
to advance there, C Umar tried to persuade them with the 
lure of the booty of Kisra himself. 
(83) 
When they rejected 
to move to the Iraqi front the caliph divided al-Nakh r- 
into two divisionssending one to Syria, while the second 
agreed eventually to join the Muslims in Iraq. 
(84) 
One of the Arab commentators 
(85) 
puts forward the 
suggestion that the refusal was a result of the pessimistic 
outlook of the Arabs on that front, who believed that 
the Persian forces were superior in strength. In fact 
there was no difficulty in directing the other Arabian 
tribes, particularly Rablcah, to the north-eastern front. 
They were the first contingent of Muslim troops to fight C) 
(82) In al-Tabarl, 1.2183, Ibn al-Athir., Kamil, II, 303. L 
one quarter of the fifth (al-khums). In al-Baladhuri, 
Futj 21 ) ýhý 53 one quarter of the total spoils, but al- ShacbjL says 'cUmar promised to give them one third of the 
spoils after the usual fifth had been taken. cf. Abu 
ctbayd, AmwEl, 79; al-Baladhuri, 
_Futuh, 
254. For the 
distribution of booty, see Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, 
18, al-Mawardi, ahkam, 126-37. 
(83) Cf. 118-119 above. 
(84) Al-Tabari, 1,2218. 
(85) A-11--Tabari, 1,2159. See also Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,297. 
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against the Persian forces in the very early stages of the 
conflict on the Iraqi border. (86) But the refusal to 
move there came mainly from the Yemeni tribes who preferred 
the northern front, as is mentioned above. 
(87) 
Some Arab 
historians justify that refusal by saying that they might 
well have wanted to join their kinsmen in Syria. Al-Tabarl 
tells us that the Yemenis wanted to move to Syria, while the 
Mudaris pref erred Iraq. Therefore cUmar said, "Your 4 
i. e. the Yemenis' ] blood bonds are much stronger. Why 
do the Mudaris not remember their kinsmen in Syria? " 
(88) 
This historian's views seem to be an acceptable explanation 
of the desire of the Yemenis to go to Syria. 
In 14/636 cUmar equipped Sacd b. Abil lVaqqas and his 
volunteers from the Arabian tribes, including three thousand 
Yemenis. 
(89) 
When Sacd encamped on the Iraq border, the 
Muslim troops joined him there. This force consisted of 
(86) Cf. al-Kufi, FutTill 1 88-90; al-Dii-nawarl Akhba 
111; al-Baladhurijutuh, 242f; al-Tabari, I, 2016ff. 
(87) Cf. 127 above. 
(88) 1,2222. Both Bajilah and al-Azd declared openly their 
wishes to join their kinsmen in 
- 
Syria, when they 
., 
cf. al-Baladhuri, Futuý, 25.3f; assembled in Medina 3 
al-Tabari, I., 2186f; Ibn al-Athir, Kami , II, _3033.. As far as I know the Yemeni tribes, i. e. Qahtani, the 
only Abab tribes who settled in Syria before Islam. 
However, it is most likely that C Umar-meant these 
Mulrarls, from Qurayshand other Hijazi tribes, who 
joined the early Muslim armies to this front. 
(89) C-E. al-Taba-r-i,, 1,2222; Ibn al-Athir, 
-j,:, 
amil, II, 311; 
Ibn Khaidudn, Iba , 11) 
917; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VII, 
36; cf. also Glubb, Arabs Conquessts,, 189. 
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eighty thousand warriors, two thousand of whom were from 
the Yemen led by Jarir b. cAbd Allah al-Bajali. 
(90) 
In 
the following year, 15/637, Sacd faced the Persian forces 
at al-Qadisiyyah, where the Persians were decisively defeated 
by the Muslim army. 
In this battle Arab historians differ as to the 
total size of the Muslim army. Ibn Abli Hazim (of Bajilah 
0 
- (91) and an eye witness in this battle) in al-Tabarl says a 
that six or seven thousand Muslim warriors were at al- 
(92) Qadisiyyah, while al-Baladhurl states that therewere 
- (93) nine or ten thousand. Another account in al-Tabari 
0 
gives more than thirty thousand. Al-Kuf-l reports an even 
higher number as follows: "The Muslims numbered 'forty 
thousand, and twenty thousand came from Syria, making sixty 
thousand altogether at al-Qddisiyyah. 11 
(94) While one of 
the modern scholars 
(95) 
believes that no exact result can 
be obtained concerning the total size -of the Muslim warriors 
in this battle another suggests between 6,000 to 12,000. 
(96) 
As a result of these uncertain accounts, it is dif f icult to settle 
for an actual number. 
(97 
However, from the total number of 
(90) Al-Tabarl, 1,2221. These were the Yemenis who took part 
with the Muslim army in the battle of al-Buwayb, but most 
4 J-1, of them were from BaJL <: L. L,, cf. 127, above. 
(91) Iý 2356. 
(92) Futu-h, 256 (citing al-Waqid-i). 
(93) 1,2222. 
(94) Futuh, 1.201'. 
(95) Hill, "The T1.1obility", 122j. 
(96) Donner, Islamic conquests, 208,221. 
(07) It should perhaps be maJe clear that the verly lar(--; e numb, --r 
of troops quoted in the early 1.1, -is-Lories can I-)e taken otily, 
with extreme caution. , Iany are undoubtedly exaggera, tr-d Z-), t> 
and -Che real point the present writer tries to w. a'.; -- is 
that the Yemenis formed a very high percentage Of the 
whole of the Isla-mic armies in this front. 
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the Yemeni reinforcements joining Sacdls army before al- 
Qadisiyyah, confirmed above., it can be satisfactorily 
concluded that the total size of the Yemeni warriors was 
about seven thousand in this battle. (98) Within two 
years this number increased to twelve thousand Yemenis in 
Kufa alone. 
(99). 
C. Yemeni participation in the command of the Muslim troops 
and in the negotiations at the battle'fronts 
The Yemeni tribes' involvement was without doubt 
simultaneous with the movement of the conquests in their 
early stages and they contributed to the struggle at the C> 
battle fronts. Some of their tribal chiefs- took part in 
the command of the Islamic armies and in negotiations with C> 
the enemy. A few Yemeni chiefs had had the opportunity of 
assuming command during Abu Bakr's caliphate. These were 
mainly Companions such as Jarir b. cAbd Allah al- 
-. (100) Bajali, or those who had supported Islamic authority 
in the Yemen during the Wars of Apostasy, such as al-Simt 
b. al-Aswad al-lKindi and I., nru3 al-Qays b. '2ýbis, both from 
Kindah; 
(101) 
or -those who were neutral in these wars, such 
(98) We know that Sald b. Abli Waqqas left idedina with four 
thousand men., of whom three thousand were Yernenis; and 
one thousand, seven hundred., also Yemenis., joined him 
in Sharaf, cf. 121 above. Add to this two thousand 
who were already at the front., see130 above; 
as well as some Yemenis who came from the Syrian front 
reinforcing the Muslims in Iraq, cf - al-Tabarl"J, 2367f 
(99) This number appears at the early establishment of 
Kufa, see 151 below. 
(100) For the biography of Jarir, cf. Chapter I, note 91. 
(101) For their role, cf, 92 above, Chapter III, B. c. 'The political 
situation in Hadramawt ( Ziyad suppoý_-- 0 ters)' 
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as Dhu :) 1-Jýala c al-Himyarl. 
(102) 
0 
When cUmar b. al-Khattab came to power, the Medinan 
government changed its Policy towards apostates. 
(103) 
The new caliph gave them the opportunity to join the Muslim 
armies, as well as his permission for them to lead troops 
provided that it was not more than one hundred men. 
(104) 
Consequently many Yemeni chiefs appeared among the Muslim 
commanders and the negotiations in the course of the con- 
f licts in Syria and Iraq. 
a. Yemeni participation in the Islamic command 
The Yemeni tribes who arrived in Medina are recorded 
in the historical sources as being separate tribal groups 
led by their own chiefs. 
(105) 
Those chiefs submitted to 
the general command as soon as their people joined the 
Muslim troops in Medina. 
(106) 
The Yemeni chiefs, therefore, 
had no chance to lead any of the Muslim armies from Medina 
to the battle fronts with the single exception of Jarjr .1 Z-> 
c b. Abd Allah al-Bajali. His name appears among the Muslim 
commanders, when Abu Bakr sent him with troops to reinforce 
the Muslim forces, in Iraq in early Muharram, 12/March, 
(107) 633. In Iraq Jarir took part in some of the military 
(102) For the Himyarilisl chiefs attitude in these wars, 
cf. Chapter II F, "The Prophet's action to put do-; in 
Abhalah's regime". And Chapter III,, A. d, -- 
"The local attitude towards the rebellion__? i, i. e. the rebellion 
of Qays b. Abd Yaghuth. 
(103) Cf. 117 above. 
(104) Al-Tabari, 1,2165. 
(105) See A. above "The call of the ýJedinan government in 
the Yemeni tribes to join 
t1A. 
- conquests. " 
(106) Ibid. 
(107) Al-BaR-Idhurli, Futu-4,243; Ibn al-. "JL, 'hir, Kamil, II, 238. 
-133- 
operations and led the Muslim troops which successfully in- 
(108) vaded Baniqya, a town near Kufa. Nevertheless Jarir 
was not mentioned in the historical sources as a Yemeni 
chief in command of a specific Yemeni group; rather he was 
leading a general Islamic contingent. C> 
As has already been mentioned, when cUmar came to 
power many of the Arabs hurried to Medina seeking to partic- 
ipate in the conquests. 
(109) 
These tribes were generally 
led by their local chiefs. This was true of the Yemenis who 
also appear among these tribes and who were generally under 
the leadership of one of their own chiefs. These had been 
authorised to lead their people by the caliph himself, 
especially cUmar, as soon as they arrived in Medina. 
-(110) C Al-Tabarl records that cUmar appointed Arfajah 
b. Harthamah over al-Azd and Ghalib b. c Abd Allah over 
Kinanah before he directed their tribes to the Iraqi front. 
When Kindah arrived in Medina Shurahba. 1 b. al-8imt., a Kinda. 
chief succeeded to the leadership of his tribe, after a 
(111) -C power struggle with al-Ashcath b. Qays. Jarir b. Abd 
(108) Al-Azd-l,, 57; al-Baladhuri, Rituh 246. For the location of the 
town cf. C 331f. Yaqut., Mu jam al-Buldan, 1,1) 
(109) Especially after he decided to escalate the fighting ZD C> 
on the Iraqi front, see 118 above. 
(110) Cf. I, 218S, who calls ctlirfajah al-Bariali, nisbah 
of his clan Bariq from al-Azd. Also Ghalib was 
from Xinanah itself. 
(111) Al-Shacb-i justifies this by pointing to the former's 
role against the apostates when he too! --.. sides with 
the . 11,1uslim troops in T-ladramawt during the 
1,7ars of 1. ý . CD Apostasy there, cf. al-Tabarl-, 1,2225; Ibn Hajar, 
Isab--i, h, 111,200. 
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Allah disapproved when cUmar intended to appoint another 
(112) 
over Baillah. Therefore., most of the Yemeni chiefs 
who appeared as leaders on the battle fronts were normally 
in command of their own tribes. 
- (113) As for the Syrian front) al-Waqidi tells us 
that at the siege of Damascus in 13/634-5) Khalid b. al- 
Walid, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim forces in Syria 
at that time, appointed Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth al-Muradi over 
his own tribe, Madhhij, and commanded him to protect the 
gate of al-Faraj. After Damascus had been captured, 
- (114) according to al-Tabari Yazld b. Abil Sufyan, one of % .1 
the Muslim commanders in Syria, stayed with the three Yemeni 
leaders to help protect the town. At the conquest of 
Hims in 15/636, B. Mu cawiyah and al-Sakun, branches of Kindah, 
were led by some of their own chiefs. 
(115) 
In the Battle of al-Yarmuk in 15/636, Muslim forces 
were divided into military divisions. 
(116) Some of the 
Yemeni chiefs, such as Dhu- 1-Kala--c al-Himyari-, Mu C awiyah 
b. Hudayj, ýIawshab Dhu Zulaym and al-Simt b. al-Aswad, were 
in command. 
(117) 
These chiefs were the leaders of some of 
(112) Al-Yacqu-bili, Tarlkh, 11., 121; al-Tabarl, 1,2,301. 
(113) Futýi-ý, 1,39. 
(114) 11 2154, those were cAmr b. Shimmar b. Ghaziyyah, Sahm b. 
-CC al-Musafir and Mushafi b. Abd Allah cf. also Ibn Hajar 
IIIY V, 116,171. 
(115) Those were al-Simt b. al-Aswad over B. Mucawiyah and al- 
Ashcath b. Mi-nas'and Imru-' al-Qays b. cAbis over al- 
Sakun; cf. al-Tabari, 1,23.392; see also al-Baladhuri, C 'irm Futuh, 137, and Yaqut, Mu jamII, 303, both con-EL 
-that the first Muslim troops to conquer the town were 
under the command of al-Simt b. al-Asý,, -ad. 
(116) Cf. al-Azdi, 194; al-'ý'oaqidi, Futu-h,, 1,125; a'L-Tabar-LI, 
(117 ) 2092-5. Al-Tabari, 1.2094. Al-VTaqidi, Futuh., 1., 125, mentions 
Qayý b. cAbd Yaghudth as one of the '*Iuslim Commanders. t- _. I 
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these military divisions and it is probable that they were 
in command of their own tribes also. 
(118) 
We know that 
Zubayd, a Yemeni tribe of Madhýij, elected cAmr b. Macd-l* 
Karib al-Zubaydi, one of the chief f igures of the tribe, 
as their leader in this battle. (119) Some of the Yemeni 
chiefs had lost their leadership within their own tribes 
at the battle of Yarmuk. Thus they asked Abu- cUbaydah, 
the commander - in-chi ef of the Musl-im army, to re-appoint 
(120) -C them over their own tribes. Abu Ubaydah promised 
them that he would do so after the battle. 
(121) 
Con- 
sequently one of them., Malik b. al-Ashtar., appeared 
I 
leading his own tribe, al-Nakhc, pursuing the survivors of 
(122) the Byzantine army from al-Yarmuk. 
On the Iraqi front, the Yemeni chiefs also appeared 
in command. As has already been mentioned, some of those 
had been appointed over their own tribe in DJedina by the 
(123) 
caliph himself. One of them, Jarj-r b. cAbd Allah 
al-Bajall- refused to come under the command of al-Muthanna 
b. Harithah, the commander-in-chief of the ýJuslim army 
in Iraq at that time, when the former arrived on the Iraqi 
(118) Cf. al-Tabaril, 2094. 
(119) Al-Waqidi, Futuh, 1.127; al-Kufi, 1,159. 
(120) These are al-Nakhc and Khathcam, cf. al-Azdi, 208-10. 
(121) Ibid. 
(122) Al-Azdl, 214-7. 
(123) Cf. 133 above. 
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border. He declared "You are [i. e. al-Muthanna] a 
commander and I am a commander too. " 
(124) 
Accordiný-, ly, ZD 
the Yemeni reinforcements, which had been directed to Iraqi 
front at that time., appeared in the battle of al-Buwayb 
in 14/635 as a separate Yemeni force under the command of 
Jarlr b. cAbd Alla . h. (125) 
A full record of the Yemeni participation in command 
of the Muslim armies on the Iraqi front is contained in 
the accounts of the battle of al-Qadisiyyah in 15/636, 
when the Persians were decisively defeated. In this battle 
sor-r, e of the Yemeni leaders had been appointed by Sa d b. C 
Abi Waqqaý;, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic forces 
there at that time. According to al-Tabarl- and Ibn al- 
(126) 
Athl"r, Sacd appointed Shurahbil b. al-Simt al-Kindi 
on the left flank of the Muslim army in this battle. Al- 
-- (127) Kuf i- mentions that cAmr b. MacdJ. Karib and Jarir b. 
cAbd Allah, both Yemenis., led the right flank of the Muslim 
army, which consisted of ten thousand men, on behalf of 
Sald b. Abi Waqqas. In spite of the contradictions in these 
statements, what is clear is that the Yemenis did indeed 
participate in positions of command in this decisive battle. 
(124) Al-Tabari, 1, . 
2201 (citing Ibn Ishaq). 
(125) Al-Baladhuri, Futuh., 254; al-Tabari, 1,2188. 
Cf. also note 41 aýove. 
(126) Iy 2225; al:: Kamil, 11., 310. In Ibn Ishaq's account 
in al-Tabari, 1.235,3, Jarir b. cAbd Allah on the 
right ilank and Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th on the left, 
both Yemenis. 
Futuh 1 201. 
%1 31 
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Even those Yemeni chiefs who had no positions of command 
appeared leading and encouracring their own tribes during kD CD 
the battle. 
(128) 
b Yemeni participation in neg . otiations C> 
We have already seen the extent of the Yemeni involve- 
ment in the Islamic command; now we shall discuss their 
role in the negotiations which took place between groups of 
the Muslims themselves or with their enemies on the battle 
fronts. 
In fact the caliphs paid more attention than usual to 
the Yemeni chiefs on their arrival in Medina. 
(129) 
Their 
advice was taken seriously by the Muslim leaders, especially 
(130) 
during Abu Bakr's Caliphate. It was the latter who 
gave chiefs the choice of joining whichever Muslim troops 
they preferred. 
(131) 
(128) Such as Durayd b. Kacb al-Nakhc']- and al-Ashcath 
b. Qays al-Kindi. The former appeared leading his 
own tribe, al-Nakhc; while the latter and other Yemeni 
chiefs were encouraging their own tribes at al- 
Qadisiyyah; cf. al-Tabari, 1,2330-6; Ibn al-Athir, 
Kamil., 11,334-7. 
(129) Al-Waqidi, Futu-h, I. 2f; al-AzdI, 7; both record 
the warm reception of the Yemeni tribes by the Caliph 
of Abu Bakr as soon as they come to Medina. 
(130) Cf. Qays b. C Abd Yaghu-th al-Muradi's suggestion to 
the caliph, when he advised him to send the troops 
quickly to the_battle front; al-Azdi, 7; in 
al-Waqidi, 
-Futub, 
1,3, a group of the Yemeni chiefs 
advised Abu Bakr to do so. 
(131) Cf. al-Azdi, 20,31-33. 
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It seems that the caliphs realised the advantage of 
the Yemeni chiefs' Participation in negotiations. So AbU- 
Bakr ordered Abu cUbaydah, while equipping him in Medina, 
to take seriously the advice and proposals of Qays b. cAbd 
Yaghuth al-Muradi by saying "A great man will accompany 
you and the Muslims must listen to his proposals. , 
(132) 
(133) Ibn al-Athir records that when cUmar b. al-Khattab 
ordered cAmr b. Macd-1 Karib, a Yemeni chief, to move from 
Syria to the Iraqi front., he wrote to Sacd b. Abi Waqqas, 
the commander-in-chief on that front, instructing him to 
consult cAmr in all military affairs. Therefore., some of 
them such as Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th, appeared amongst the 
foremost of the Muslim planners, when they were discussing 
the situation before the battle of al-Yarmak in 15/636 
in Syria. (134) 
Some of the Yemeni chiefs are also mentioned among 
the Islamic delegations which met their enemies on the 
battle fronts. On the Syrian front some of them, e. g. 
Dhu 1-Kalac al-Himyari, and Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth al-Muradi, 
joined Khalid b. al-Walid, the spokesman of the Muslim 
delegation, when he went to meet the commander-in-chief of 
the Byzantine armies, Bahan, before the battle of al- 
(135) YarmUk. Also some of them, such as al-Ashcath b. 
0 
(132) 21. Al-Azdi , 
(133) Usdy IVY133. 
(134) Ile appeared among the Muslim leaders givin-- his own 
ideas., cf. al-Waqidi, Futulý, 1,99; al-Azdi, 168. 
133 5 ýi, 1, Al-Waqidi, Futi-i 113), adds Jarir 
c b. Abd Allali, al- 
_ Bajali to that delega tion. This, ho wever, unlikely 
because lie was on the Iraqi front at that time, cf-11.9,1-28ý: ý 
above. 
-1 0ý1- 
Qays al-Kindi and cAmr b. ý, Iacdll Karib al-Zubaydi, appeared 
among those who were sent to negotiate with the Persian 
Emperor before the battle of al-Qadisiyyah. 
(136) 
In conclusion, this historical information leads 
us to believe that the Yemeni reinforcements played a 
major role in the victory of the Muslim armies in the 
early period of the Islamic conquests, especially on the 
Syrian front. Also, through these waves of migration, the 
Yemenis began direct contact with the Islamic government. 
They settled down with the Muslim troops in the conquered 
areas, even forming a majority in some of these towns. 
(137) 
(136) Al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 258; al-Tabari, 1,2236; Ibn 
al-Athir., Kamil, 11,315. 
(137) Such as Hims and Kufa. For the former, cf. al- C Maj ma nal , Yacqu-bli, Buldan, 32-1 f; ,: Ll-, ýIaydanj_, - 
al-Amt, 
1.2911; Kurd, Khitat, 65; al-Hadithi, 150-9, for the I cf latter cf. al-Bal-adhurl, Futiilý, 276; cf. also :, ýssinon Ex. -ý, a1- Uý i 
ic-ation du Plarr de Kufa" 38f f al-ýIadlithi, 19-1-202. For t, --e 
settlement of the 'Ye. menis in the conquered area--, c" 
C -tpter V "The Yemeni settlement in the conquereCI* hL 
provinces". 
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CHAPTER V 
The Yemeni.. set. tlement in the Conquered Provinces 
A. The Yemenis and the early settlements 
In the previous chapter we saw the spread of the 
Yemeni tribes on the battle fronts., both in Syria and 
Iraq. They formed a high percentage of the Muslim warriors 
on these fronts, especially in Syria. Later on they 
settled down in these provinces and constituted a large 
propor ion of the Arab inhabitants there. 
Some historians describe the movement of the Yemeni 
tribes to the battle fronts. In these descriptions some 
of the Yemenis appear with their families and property, 
leading us to believe that they intended to settle perm- 
anently in the disputed provinces. Himyar, the first Yemeni 
ri e to answer Abu Bakr's call to participate in the 
conquests, appeared with their wives and children in Medina. 
Their leaderl Dhu ýl-Kala c al-Ijimyari is quoted as saying 
on meeting the caliph 
15 
111ýj, myar came to you wýth their wiveý3 and their children 
people of good reputation in the past, and high rank. " 
(2) 
S4 Other Yemeni tribes also arrived with their f amilie I_n 
Medina aLd on the battle fronts. 
(3) 
(1) Cf. Chapter JV, B. 
Al-Waqidil Futuh, 1,2. 
(3) Al-Tabari, 1,2363, says there were one hundred women 
witý Baji7lah and seven hundred with al-TYakhe on the Iraqi 
front. See also al-Azdi, Futu4,20, who records that 
Khathca, m came to iMedin. a with their families. 
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As soon as the Muslim armies gained control of the 
C disputed countries, Umar gave his orders to their 
commanders to keep these conquered provinces under their 
sway by establishing the Muslims there. In this way the 
caliph created a new Islamic community drawn mainly from 
the Arabian tribes who originally formed the Muslim armies 
on these fronts and of whom many were from the Yemen. 
Generally speaking each Yemeni tribe settled in the 
area which it had had a hand in conquering, although some CD 
of them had participated in fighting on more than one front. 
These tribes' intention, of course., was to reinforce the 
Muslim troops on some fronts; however we still find that 
tribal rivalries were behind some of these movements. It 
is well known that al-Saku-n, a Yerneni tribe of Kindah., 
C accompanied Sa d b. Abi Waqqas, the commander-in-chief of 
the Muslim army on the Iraqi front. 
(4) In Iraq they 
were relatively unknown, but when they moved to the Egyptian 
front they became one of the most famous of all the Arabian 
C_ 
tribes. One of their leaders, Mu awiyah b. Hudayj al- 
Sakuni., was one of the Yemeni chief s who divided the land 
amongst the Muslims at the establishment of al-Fustat on 
behalf of cAmr b. al-cAs, the commander-in-chief of the 
Muslim troops there. 
(5 ) Tribal relationships were also 
the motivating force behind the movement of some Yemenis 
f rom one f ront to another: some Madhhij chief s moved f rom 
Syria to the Iraqi front to join their own tribe there, later 
(4) Cf. 121 above. 
(5) Al-',, i,, ). qrlzi, Khitat, 11,76; Ibn Duqmaq, Intiý ar, 3. 
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on becoming one of the most important groups in Kufa. 
(6) 
Al-Simt b. al-Aswad al-Kindi, a chief of Kindah asked 
Umar to re-unite him with his son Shurahbi who was in 
Kufa, by either permitting him to move to Kufa or sending C> 
his son to Hims. The latter subsequently moved to Hims to 
join his relatives. 
(7) 
Umar worked to establish his government's influence 
over the conquered provinces by ordering his commanders, 
particularly those in Iraq and Egypt, to build garrison 
towns to accommodate their troops. In 14/635-6, he sent 
Utbah b. Ghazwan., one of the Companions, to reinforce the 
Muslim troops in the south of Iraq, ordering him to establish 
a military camp which later developed into what is now Basra. 
Three years later, in 17/638-9, Sa cdb. AbI Waqqas, began 
the establishment of Kufa on behalf of the caliph. In-Egypt 
C Umar also gave his order to his commander, cAmr b. al--PTs, 
to build a garrison town: cAmr established al-Fustat in 
21/641-2. 
In Syria the Muslims did not build such garrison towns; 
instead they stayed in local Syrian towns and occupied the 
houses that had been deserted.. 
(8) 
. 
However, they began to 
(6) Such as cAmr b. Macdj-*- Karib al-Zubaydi, Qays b. C Abd C- Yaghuth al-Muradi and Malik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh i. 
C 
For 
their presence on Syrian f roný see 134-5 above. For Amr's 
transfer to Iraq, cf. Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 133; for Qays, 
see al-Baladhuri, Futiiýi, 256. As for Malik, we have no 
account of his transfer there, but he appeared on the 
Syrian front during the early conquests and established 
himself in Kufa. cf. 135 above208ff below. For the 
realisation of Madhhij's power in Kufa, seeChapter VII. 
(7) The former -was in Hims at that time cot-zimand-ing his o,.,, n 
tr 4-be, KLndali, cf. Ta'L-,, -11hib '%TT 299; Ibn Ibn cý'., sal-ir, 
Hajar, Iý3a! -)ah, 111,1609. 
(8) Cf. al-BalcHidhurli, Futu-1j, 155, who s, ý-, ys the A-L-abs occupied 
4-- some houses after the departure of its inhalbitL-, nts in 
Ba-ls and Qasrin, two Syrian towns. See also al-Hadithi, 154. 
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establish new villages on the outskirts of some of these 
Syrian towns. Villages were built to the north and west of 
Damascus where each tribal group occupied a village for 
itself. 
(9) 
The Yemeni tribes were among those who assisted 
in the establishment of these garrison towns in Iraq and 
Egypt and they were also among the f irst Arabian tribes to 
settle in Syrian territories. 
In these new settlements, the Yemeni tribes had their 
homes near to one another. Some of their branches (butu-n), 
especially those with no real tribal power, joined the 
more powerful Yemeni groups in these towns; i. e. B. Shaeban 
bc Amr, a batn of Himyar, joined Hamdan in Kufa and those 
who were in Basra joined al-Azd, while those who were in 
-1 77- -4- 
- 
4- -- T71- -- - 4- ---- 4- --- 4- 1- - -- -- 4- 1- - -1 A -I- 
7C 4- 
(10) 
Al 
a-L-. vu, -5L, UL, -Lil W-Lull 
B. Kurayb, a batn of Himyar, joined al-Nakhc in Kufa. 
So in identifying the tribes in these conquered areas, 
Also 
(11) 
the 
Yemenis were collectively regarded as one group. This Yemeni 
group is traditionally known as the People of the Yemen 
(ahl al-Yaman). 
It is hoped that by mentioning the whereabouts of 
the Yemenis in the conquered provinces we shall be able to 
understand their real effect upon the uprising against 
Uthman and the first Civil War. Some modern scholars 
(9) Ibn cAsakir, Tahdhib, 1.243. 
(10) Al-Hamda-nll-, Ikl-ll, II, 2311f. 
(11) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, 11,150. 
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have studied in detail the settlement of the Arabian tribes 
in the conquered areas. One of them concentrated his 
study on the Yemeni tribes only, while others included them 
with the other Arabian tribes who settled in these conquered 
provinces. 
(12) 
This has made it unnecessary for us to go 
into such details to study their settlement. It is necessary 
only to illustrate briefly their concentration in these 
provinces. To give a clear picture of the proportion of 
Yemenis there, it is preferable to study their presence in 
each region separately, using tables to illustrate their 
branclies. 
a. The Yemeni tribes in Syria 
Because the Yemeni tribes constituted a high prop- ZD 
ortion of the Muslim army which conquered Syria, we find -that 
both early and modern historians confirm that the Yemenis 
formed the basis of the Muslim troops settling in Syria. 
(13) 
This agreement indeed corresponds with the geographical 
indications which mention the spread of the Yemeni tribes 
throughout the Sy. -Iian territories as being so extensive that 
their names are mentioned in most of the villages and towns 
there. 
The Yemenis indeed comprised the majority of the 
(12) For the Yemeni tribes only, see al-1-lad-Ith-J, 145f 1E. For 
the settlement of -the Arab tribes, including the Yemeni, 
. 'Ll 
n gnon Opera minora III see Kurd, Khijj, 63ff; Massi"" I 35ff; al-Barri, al-Qabii"Jl al- 'rabivVa'h_fi Misr, for 
Qahtan (i. e. the Yemenis), see 123ff; al-Janabi, 
TaýýtLt, 41-3. Djait, "Yamanites", 148ff. 
-1 (13) Cf. al-Azdl-, 12; a! -Tabar-1,1,2222. See also Kurd, 
Khija 63-7; al-Nusý, 234- Dixon, The Umayyad 
Caliphate, 84. 
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population. We know that in Hims., for example, they were in 
the majority from one quotation "the weakness of the Qaysl: - 
there' , 
(14) 
i. e. the northern tribes (Qays) were in the 
minority. According to al-Yacqu-b-i., 
(15) 
the majority of 
the population in Damascus were Yemenis. On the outskirts 
of the town the Yemeni tribes began to establish Villages <: > I 
each of which bore the name of its inhabitants. (16) 
In fact the nature of the settlement of the Arabian 
tribes in Syria was different from' that in Iraq and Egypt. C) 
In Iraq and Egypt they confined themselves to the garrison 
towns which they had built such as Basra, Kufa and 
al-Fustat, while in Syria they settled in towns and 
(17) villages throughout various regions (ajnad). 
b. The Yenteni tribes in Iraq 
As the Muslim armies penetrated deep into Iraqi 
territories defeating the Persian forces, the Medinan gov- 
ernment decided to establish garrison towns from which they 
could prepare for their attack on Persia. In 14/635-6, C Umar 
sent cUtbah b. Ghazwan, one of the Companions, to assist the 
Muslim troops on the southern Iraqi border. He also rec- 
ommended him to establish a Muslim presence there. 
(18) 
(14) Al-Maýdani, D, ', aJma c al-Lmthal., 1,294; See also 
al-Ya qUbi, Buldan., 30-4f. 
(15) ', -')ulda-n, 326. 
CC (16) Cj- Ibn Asakir, Tahdhib, 1,243, who records sonle of 
th. --se Yemeni tribal na,:. -, es, such as al-Alvzac, al-Sadif, 
,, Iuqri, Shacban and al-Ashacir (north of the townj; 
Sanc a ') . aI-Hj--! -,, a-, ýýiyyin and Ru 
C ayn (west of the town); ýIee also al-*Hadithi-,, 154. 
(1 41) See Table a, "The Yemeni- tribes in Syria. " 
Ibn Khayyat, Ta-cikh,, 127; al-YaoqU-bl', Tarilkh, 11,121- 
al-D-Inavva-ý-i, 11-6f; al--T., abari T2 ') 77f(citinI-ia 
T 
Lbn al-. At'k, -Lr, Ka-mil, TI, , 38. 
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cUtbah's first. camp was in al-Khuraybah; after he had taken 
control of the area, he set off for al-Dahna 
3 
where he 
built the mosque and laid the foundations of Basra. 
(19) 
Within three years, 14-17/635-39, the Muslims fully 
controlled the rural areas of Iraq (al-Sawad), having 
defeated the Persian forces in three main battles and 
crossed over the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris. 
(20) 
In the 
year 17/638-9, the Caliph ordered Sa cd b. AbT Waqqas, the 
commander-in-chief of the Muslim army on the northern Iraqi 
front, to look for a suitable site for another garrison 
town for the Muslims in Iraq. (21) 
Since the Yemeni tribes had participated in the 
0-1% 
con. quest of Iraq, they were also among the settlers in these 
new towns. In both Basra and Kufa the Yemeni tribes have 
been mentioned as being among the other Arab tribes, but 
they were to be found in Kufa in larger numbers than ýn 
Basra. So we shall deal with the Yemeni tribes in both 
Iraqi towns separately, starting with their presence in Basra. 
Al-Baladhur-ii, 341f; al-Tabar-1, I, 2377f, 
84; see also al-cAl-i, al-Tanzimat, 26. 
(20) These are al-Qadisiyyah, Jalula and_al-, Nlada in, cf 
al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 255 ff; al-Kufi, Futuh, IJ95f. f; 
al-Dinawarl, 119ff; al-Tabari, I, 2419ff. See also 
Donner., 209ff. 
(21) For the establishment of Kufa, see_Ibn Khayyat, 138; 
al-Baladhurl,, Futu4,, 274; al-Tabari, 1,2481-6; cf. also 
Alassignon, Opera mi - nora, III '. 
38-60; al-janabi, 60-7; 
al-Hadithi, 192f; Djait, "Yamanites", 152. 
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The Yemenis in Basra 
The establishment of Basra, 14/635-6, was contem- 
porary with the assembling of the Muslim army led by Sacd 
b. Ab i Waqqas.,, a Companion, and one of the most important 
of the Muslim leaders. These troops were directed towards 
the northern side of the Arab-Persian borders by cUmar b. 
(22) 
6, _ al-Khattab in the early stages of his caliphate. X: LL_j 
has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, most 
of the Yemeni reinforcements that arrived in Medina at that 
time joined this army. 
(23) 
When Kufa was established in 
17/638-9, these Yemeni reinforcements were apparently 
among the earliest settlers who formed the majority of the 
population. 
(24) 
This mat-ter, however, affected the size 
of the Yemeni settlers in Basra, where presumably they 
were less than in other garrison towns. 
(25) 
Five major tribal confederations occupied Basra 
during its early establishment., one of which was a Qahtani 
represented by al-Azd. 
(26) 
Our interest here is to 
investigate the original place of the members of the con- 
federation, in order to ensure that some of them were Yemeni. 
(22) Cf . 118-21 above. 
(23) Cf . 
118-21 above. 
(24) cf. 151 above, see also Table b, ii "The Yemeni tribes 
in Kuf a" 
(25) Such as Kufa and Fustat, see sections on the Yerm enis 
in these garrison towns. 
(26) These are Tamim, B. Bakr, Ahl al-cAliyah, al- Azd and 
C Abg al-Qays, cf. ý, Tzjssignon. pp a, II _ýýra 
minor I, 66-70; 
-Tan supplement 237; "KI! itat , al- All al ;ý imat 
', I 288f f 
' Hasan, al-0aba"il, 93ff. 
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In the primary historical and geographical sources 
at our disposal, there is no confirmation that the Azd 
of Basra, came as a whole from one original place at an 
early stage in its establishment. In modern studies 
there exist two contradictory points of view. The first 
was proposed by Wellhausen who suggested : "It must not 
be thought, however, that all the Azd had come to Basra 
only in the year 60 A. H. There were already Azdites there 
before that, and those certainly belonged, just as much 
as those in Kufa, to the western branch which had its 
home on Mount Sarat to the Daus mostly. " 
(27) sixty-two 
years later a second point of view emerged. This was put 
forward by al-Nuss who commented on the above point of 
view as follows : "Actually we find that -the Azd of Oman 
had come to Basra long before the year 60/679-80. 
Furthermore, we have no evidence other than from the Azd, 
that they settled in Basra before this year. 17(28) Wellhausen 
tends to confirm that the Azd of Basra before 60/679-80 
were from al-Sarah., i. e. Yemenis, while al-Nuss tries to 
establish that they were from Oman. In my opinion, neither 
Wellhausen nor al-Nuss has come to a satisfactory conclusion 
on this question. According to reliable historical evidence, 
the Azd group in Basra before the year 60/679-80 consisted 
of all the branches of the Qahtan tribes, who came from 
both Oman and the Yemen. It is noticeable that long before 
that date both the Azd groups, Yemeni and Omani, were to be 
(27) The Arab Kingrclom, 399. 
c 
-as-, Ibiyya' -qabaliv\-ah, 277. Ile followed Ov A I. _ 
al 
Hasan, al-qab:, Mil, 97. 
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found in Basra. (29) Ibn Isha-q in al-Tabari 
(30) 
tells us 
that in 13/634 cUmar b. al-Khattab sent cArfajah b. Harthamah 0. 
al-Bariqi, one of the chiefs of Azd in al-Sarah., to Basra 
to assist the Muslim -troops there. This leads us to 
believe that the Azd of al-Sarah were amongst the earliest 
Muslim warriors in Basra and that they might have taken 
part in its establishment in 14/635-6. 
Twenty-two years later., when the first civil war 
broke out, all the Qahtani tribes in Basra., coming from 
either Oman or the Yemen., all declared themselves to be 
( 31 )- (32) Yemenis. Sayf b. cUmar in al-Tabarl . records 
that 
during the Battle of the Camel (Jumada II 36/December 656), the 
Azd of Basra were under the leadership of three of their 
own chiefs, while other Yemenis were led by Dhu') 1-Tjarah 
al-Himyarl. The Azd chief s were Sabrah b. Shayman, Mascud 
and Ziyad b. C Amr. Our sources, both primary and modern, 
(29) Massignon, Opera Minora, 111,66, says that the Azd 
of Basra came from cAsir and Oman. 
(30) Tarilkh, 1.2201 cUmar sent cArfajah to Basra when the 
latter_disagreed with Baji'lah in Medina. In al- 
Baladhuri, Futut 337; Ibn al-Athir, Usd 111,401 
and Ibn TjajarIýýabah, IV, 235, the caliph directed him from al-Bahrayn to assist the Muslims in, Basra. 
Ibn 'ýbd al-Barr calls him cz", -Lfajah b. Khuzaymah, 
Isti ab, 111,1062, but this is not correct, his 
name is cArfajah b. Hart hamah_al -Bar lql, a nisbah of his tribe Bariq of Azd al-Sarah., see Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqaq, 
282; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat., 367; al-Hazimi, 22; Ibn al- 
Athir, Usd 111) 401. 
(31) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, 1,47; al-Tabari, 3180-2; 
al -Kuf 1. Futuý ,. I1 299; Ibn al -At hir, Kamil ,II11 125. 
(32) 'Iý 3179f. In al-Dinawarl, Akhbar, 148-LF, Nadhýij, a 
Yemeni tribe, was led by al-Rabic b. Ziyad al- 
. darithi, one of the M,, ---Ldhhiji chiefs in Basra. 
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differ about the place of origin of the former, Sabrah b. 
(33) 
Shayman. Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid says, "During the fitnah, 
of Ibn al-Hadrami in Basra in 38/658-9, Ziyad b. Abihi, 
c Ali b. Abi Talib's governor there, was under the prot- 
ection of Sabrah b. Shayman and his people were from the 
Azd of Oman". Ibn Durayd 
(34) 
confirms that this chief is 
from al-Sarah. 
In all probability, however, both the Yemeni and Omani 
tribes gathered in Basra forming a Qahtan-1 confederation 
in the same manner as the other Arabian tribes had done 
in the garrison towns. 
(35) 
The reason this confederation 
(33) Sharh Nahj al-Bal"FL'ghah, IV, 43f Cf. also al-Nuss, 227, 
who considers all these Azd chiefs as Omanis; Cf. 
also al-Hamdani, Sifat 1 211, and Ibn Hazm, 4- e Jamharat Ansab al- Arab, 384, the former confirms that 
al-Huddan, ýabrah's clan of Azd, is Omani, while the 
latier mentions that indirectly when he confirms that 
al-Huddan were related jo al-Julanda, King of Oman. 
(34) Ishtiqaq, ý99; he also considers him as an Azdi of 
B. al-Huddan. However, he mentions that his place 
of origin is al-Sarah. Cf. also, Wellhausen, The 
Arab Kingdom, 400. 
(35) For the Khitaý of the tribes in Basra, cf. al-cAli 
. 
Khitat al-Basralý, 73 who says "One of the difficulties 
which faces us is that we do not know exactly which 
clans had settled in Basra and whether the place of 
their houses corresponded to their genealogical Z: > 
tree". Usually, however, the branches of each tribe 
gathered in their houses in the garrison itov; ns. "P, or 
a detailed discussion of the TKhitat of Basra see C 
iMassignon, 0-pera ýMinora, 111,61 
ff ýal- All 
'Thitat", 281ff; 4asan, al-0, aba-3_il, 
-, 
93ff. 
_ 
For 
the Khitat of Kufa, see al-Baladhurl, Futuh 9-76; 
al-Tabarl, I, 2489f; Cf. also Massignon, 35ff; 
al-jan, c-tbi. -Ta1z, 
ht1t, 60ff. For al-Fustat see 
Ibn cAbd al-Hakam- , Fut5h, 
III, 91f f Ibn Duqmaq, I. 
2-5; al-Maqri: zi, Khlit-atý- 11 76-80. . 1) 2 
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has been known as al-Azd may be explained by the prepon- 
derance of al-Azd in Basra over other Qahtan-1 tribes. Other 
Qahtani branches, therefore, especially those who had no 
tribal power in the town, came under al-AzdIs protection. 
(36) 
The Yemenis in Kufa 
We have seen previously that -most of the Yemeni tribes 
who arrived in Medina during the early period of cUmar's 
caliphate were directed to the Iraqi front and joined the 
-_ (37) Muslim army led by Sacd b. Abif Waqqas. Those warriors 
represented the first Arab settlers in Kufa. When Sacd 
established Kufa in 17/638-9, however, the Yemenis appeared 
among the other Arab tribes settled there. Since their 
numbers in Sacd's army were large, they constituted a high 
proportion of -the settlers. On this occasion al-Sha%j- 
said "We [Yemenites] were twelve thousand men; the Nizar 
were eight thousand; from which you can easily see that we 
constituted the majority of the settlers Of al-Kufa. 1 
(38) 
Thus when the Arab tribes were divided into seven., four of 
them consisted of Yemeni tribes. 
(39) 
(36) Such as B. Shacbah., A batn of Himyar, cf. al- 
Hamdani., Iklil, 11,235. 
(37) Cf . 
118-21 above. 
(38) Al-Baladhuri, Futuh, 276; see also English tran, 
Hitti) 1,436. 
(39) For the sevenths of Kufa, see al-Baladhuri, Ansab, II, 
235f; al-DI-nawari, 147f; al-Tabari, 1,2495; Cf. also 
T 
, Massic)-non, Opera 11.1inora, ! 1,,, 
39-1-1; al-Had-ith, 195f; 
T'Yat, anites" 153ff Djait2 , (. - 1 
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c. The Yemeni tribes in al-Fustat 
The proposal to invade Egypt came originally from 
Amr b. al-cTlý;,, who was one of the most important of the 
Muslim Commanders in Syria, as well as being one of the 
Companions. He asked the caliph, who was in Syria at 
that time, for permission to march on Egypt. 
(40) 
When 
the caliph gave his permission in 19/640, C Amr marched 
west from Syria crossing the Egyptian border with four 
thousand Yemeni warriors. 
(41) 
These Yemenis formed the 
back-bone of cAmr's army, especially at the beginning of 
the campaign there. 
However., the importance of the Yemeni tribes on this 
front is indicated by the major role they played. Al- 
Waqidi 
(42) 
reports that 
cAmr 
gave his command to the 
people of the Yemen (ahl al-Yaman) and those Arabs who 
accompanied them to lay sie,; e to QaIyub an Egyptian town. 
Further proof of their importance in this army is mention 
of them in the poetry of cAmr himself, who encouraged hJs 
army in the course of the battle of Babylon, near the 
present site of Cairo, as follows: 
0- 
- 
LJ L) L> I, L3 
One day for Hamdan and another for al-ýadif [ both 
Yemeni tribes] . 
(40) Cf. al-Baladhuri, 214; al-Tabar-T, 1,2579; 
al-YacqUbli, T,, -irlikh, ILI, . 
125. 
(41) Al-Yacq-ub--*L, T, -', Lrl-'-h, 11,125. In Ibn cAbd al-T-,,, tl-ýam 
Futiih III" bo) all of them f roiii c ý, k,,., a Yemeni 
tribe, while in another account three thousand five 
hundred. In al-iKindi, V, 'ulah, 8, three thousand 
f -1, hundred, a third from Ghafiq, a tribe of 
(42) Futuh, 11,31. 
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While the catapult 
[tribe of Quýacah ]. 
(43) 
(manjaniq) goes around Ball) 
Thanks to their importance in this army, the Yemenis 
were no doubt mentioned in these events more than any other 
of the Arab tribes. This importance, however, led cAmr b. 
al- C As to authorize four Yemeni chiefs to divide the land 
of al-Fustat amongst the Arab tribes in 21/641-2. 
(44) 
Al-Fustat was the third of the garrison towns 
established by the Muslims in the conquered countries. 
Historical and geographical sources discussing the estab- 
lishment of this new garrison town give much data about the 
Arab tribes who settled there, including the Yemeni migrants 
whose tribes were situated near each other and were in 
control of most lands (khitat) of the town. 
(45) 
(43) Ibn cAbd al-17jak am, Futu-h, 111,62. Balli is one of the 
Yemeni tribeý, which . settled in Syria before the conquest, 
therefore., it is of no concern -to us here. 
(44) These Yemeni chiefs are Mucawiyah b. Hudayj al-Tujibi 
(of Kindah), Shurayk b. Summy al-Ghuýa*yfil al-11/luradi, of 
Madhhij, cAmr b. Qahzam al-Khawlani and 4aywil_b. 
Nashj: Lrah al-Macafiril (of 7Himyar), see Ibn Duqmaq, _Intisar, 1,3; Maqrlzi, 
- 
Khitat, 11; 76. In Ibn Taghrj--Bardi, 
al-Nujum al-Zahirah, 1,74, Jibril b. Bashirah al- 
Macafiri. Al-Haditfii in his book ahl al-Yaman f-1 )C_ Sadr al-Isl-am , 168, comments u'Oon 
Amr1s authorization 
to those chiefs as follows 'IcAýr avoided involvement 
in the affairs of these tribes., or he intended to 
let them choose their houses according to their 
desires and these [chiefs] were more understanding in 
the matters of settlement. " 
(45) Cf. Ibn cAbd al-kIakam, Futuh) III., 188ff; Ibn Duqmaq, 
Iy 4f; al-Maqrlzl, 
' 
Khitat, 11, '77-9. Cf. also Table c 
"The Yemeni tribes in al-Fustat". 
0. 
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B. The branches (butun) of the Yemeni tribes in the 
conquered provinces* 
a. Syria 
(46) 
butun Himyar 
(47) Al-Ahamis, in Hims 
Al-Awza C, north of Damascus 
(48) 
Bahil, batn of al-Kalac, in Hims 
(49) 
Dhi Tarkhain, in Hims (50) 
(51) Dhi Yazan, in Hims 
c (52) Uannah, baln of AI-Sawadah b. Amr, in Hims 
Haraz 
(53) 
Hawzan -C(54) 
., 
batn of al-IK'ala, 
(46) Since the Arab tribes were scattered throughout Syrian 
regions, settling in all its towns and villages, the 
definition of the settlement of each tribe becomes 
difficult. Although some Muslim genealogists and hist- 
orians have tried to assign specific towns to some of 
these tribes, they ignore others and mention only their 
settlement in Syria. Therefore in this - 
table we shall 
Lt mention the Yemeni tribal branches Qu-tut) in Syria, 
giving some of their specific areas according to what 
we have found in our sources. 
(47) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, IT, 240. 
c (48) Ibn Asakir, Tahdhib, 1,243. 
il, % IT) lf. (49) A'-A-: -IIam. dani, Ikl 
cc 
(50) AI-Hazimi, Ujjalat, 30. Al-Sam ani, Ansab, 11,40) 
reaas al-Tardkhumah. 
(51) Al-Hamdani, IkIll, 11,263. 
(52) Al-Hamdani, IkIll, 11,244. 
C_ 
7 al-Ha. z' -IS; al-Sam ani, (53) It u Ikmal, 
11 441 imi I bn IM, kla 
VI) 92. 
(54) 3 `13 I I'l /, im 1,123; See al so Ibn Ha, -, m, Jamharat, 
, \T 7 Names are listed in 
English alphabetical or0er. 
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Juba, batn of Al-Sawadah 
(55) 
Jubayr, baýn of Al-Saivadah 
(56) 
Jublan, in Him$ 
(57) 
Al-Kalac, a large tribe - most of them in Hims 
(58) 
B. al-Khaba 
:) ir, batn of al-Kalac . 
(59) 
B. Kurayb, in Shahrazawr, Damascus and al-Ramlah 
(60) 
(61) Muqrl, north of Damascus 
Nucaymah, batn of Al-Sawadah 
(62) 
B. Ru C ayn, a large tribe, west Damascus 
(63) 
Al-SadifJ, north of Damascus 
(64) 
Shac'ban, north of Damascus 
(65) 
Sulaf, batn of al-Kalac 
(66) 
Wuhazah (67) 
(68) 
Wusab, in Hims 
(55) Al-Hamdani, Ikl-ll, 111 244)281. 
(56) Ibid. 
C- - (57) Ibn Maku-1a, 11,176; al-Sam ani, 111., 187. 
(58) Al-Samcanl, _X., 
514. 
(59) Al-Vazimi 53. 
(60) Al-Hamda-ni, Iklil , II > 
150f 2 some of 
the Abrahiyyln 
joined them. 
(61) Ibn cAsakir, Tahdhib, 1,243. 
(62) Al-Hamdani, i'Klll,, III 244f) 281. 
(63) Ibn cAsakir, Tahdhib, 1., 243. 
(64) Ibid. 
(65) 1 bid - 
(66) Al-Haziml, 75. 
(67) Al--ýlaz-Lml, 120. 
(68) Ibn Makula, 11,176; al-Samcan-1, III, 1S7. 
Al-l.. "azlml, 
121 reads Wassab, which is absolutely v,, rong, 
see 
caskel ,I 
al-Hamdani, Ikl il, II, 105 'ýle 297AI; Ta 
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Yahsub, in al-Ladhiqiyyah (69) 
Zunjac, batn of al-Kalac., in Hims (70) 
(71) 2. butun Kindah 
E (72) B. Al-Arqam, in al-Ruha 
(73) B. Maloaqah, batn of Akil al-Marar 
Al-Sakasik, a large tribe (74) 
B. Wahb b. al-Harith 
(75) 
butun Madhhij 
c Ans, a large tribe 
(76) 
Hawt (77) 
Ruhao (78) 
Zubayd, a large tribe in al-Ladhiqiyyah 
(79) 
(69) AI-Yacqu-bli, Buldan, 324f. 
(70) Al-Ilamdani, Iklil, II, lf. 
(71) Unfortunately the sources do not give in detail the 
butun of Kindah in Syria as they do for Kufa and 
al-Fustat. 
(72) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 426. 
(73) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f28a. 
(74) Al-Sam C ani, VII., 97, says that they settled in Wadi al- 
Sakasik in Jordan, and they were of al-Azd. This tribe 
is one of the two main sections of B. Ashras of Kindah, 
See Caskel, I, table 233,43- Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqd 221; 
Ibn Hazm, 429,31f; al-Himyari, Shams, 50; al-Hazimi, 72; 
Ibn kasu-1 Turfat 34 Ibn al-Athir, LubabI 5-19; and 
see also table 3. 
(75) Ibn al-Kalbi., Nasab, f2 3b. 
(76) C- Ibn Makula, VI, 355; al-Sam ani, 79. 
(77) Al-H, --Lzimi, 51. 
(78) Al-Hazimi, 66. 
(79) Al-YaCqUbL, BuIO,. ý-in, 321-If givim, the place. 
See also 
al-Ilazirni, (3, "). 
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butu-n Hamdan 
(80) ýaj ur 
B. Madrak b. cUdhar (81) 
B. Malik b. cUdhar (82) 
Al-Macyu-f, in Damascus (83) 
5. Other Yemeni tribes 
Al-Ashacir (84) 
Khawlan (85) 
(80) Ibn al-Kalbili., Nasab, f68b. 
(81) Al-Hamdanl Iklil, X) 61. 
(82) Ibid. 
(83) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f68b. See also al-Mascudi, 
Muruj, V, 197, who says that those Hamdan-is who joined 
Mucawiyah's army at Siffin were still living in a 
village called Tharmah in Damascus, i. e. on the out- 
skirts of the city. Al-Yacq7ubi, Buldan, 324f, records 
that some Hamdanis were living in ýIims, and the 
inhabitants of Jabalah, a Syrian town, were from 
Hamdan. 
f ter (84) They f irst settled in Tiberias then moved, LI 
Siffin, to al-Thaniyyah. and Hawran, both are_Syrian 
Lties, see al-YacqTjb: L, Buldan, 324f; al-I\ufi, Futula, 
IIIY 221. Cf. also a! -Hadithi, 158. 
(85) Al-Hazimi, 56. 
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Iraq 
i- Basra 
B. Ancam, batn of al-Azd 
(86) 
Al-Badda batn of B. Mu c awiyah of Kindah 
(87) 
B. Buhayr, baýn of Khawlan 
(88) 
B. Duhn, batn of Baj-ilah 
(89) 
B. Al-Harith, batn of Nladhhlj 
(90) 
B. Khayar., batn of Khawlan 
(91) 
B. Malik b. Salamah, batn of Akil al-Marar of Kindah 
(92) 
B. Sha c ban b. c Amr, batn of Himyar 
(93) 
(94) B. Shibabah, baýn of al-Azd 
Al-Tanacim, batn of Khawlan 
(95) 
Zacbab, batn of Nladhhij 
(96) 
Zahran, a large tribe of al-Azd 
(97) 
(86) Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqaq, 299. 
(87) Ibn al-Kalb'l ,, Nasab., f 
29a. 
(88) Al-Hamdani, Ikl-i'l., 1) 445. 
(89) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 389. 
(90) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 40b. 
(91) Al-Hamdani, Iklill, 1,445. 
(92) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 28a. 
(93) Al-Hamdani, Ikl-ll, TI, 234f. 
(94) Ibn 4azm, Jamharat., 380. 
(95) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, 1., 445. 
(96) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 40b. 
(97) Al-Hazimi, 59. 
-159- 
ii. Kuf a 
butUn Hamdan 
B. Dalan, batn of Bakil 
(98) 
Al-Fubbi 
(99) 
-3 (100) Fa ish 
(101) Al-Habbab, batn of Bakil 
(102) Kharif, batn of Hashid 
(103) B. Marhabah, batn of Bak-il 
Al-Mujalid, batn of Ijashid 
(104) 
B. Na c it, batn of Hashid 
(105) 
Al-Sabic, batn of Hashid 
(106) 
Shibam, batn of Hashid 
(107) 
Yam, batn of Hashid 
(108) 
c-- 
(98) Ibn Maku-1a., 111,306; al-Sam ani, V, 265f. 
(99) Al-Samcanl, IX, 237. 
(100) Al-Tabarl, 1., 3348. 
(101) Al-Hamd,, -i-nl,, Ikl-Ll, X. 195f. 
(102) Ibn Makula, 111., 235; al-Samcani, V, 14; al-Hazimi, 53. 
(103) Al-Hamdani, Ikl-ll, X) 145. 
(104) Al-Hamdanl, Ikl-il, X, 35. 
(105) Al-Tabar-1,1,3348. 
(106) Ibn Durayd, 2,54; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 390; al-Samcani, 
VII2 35; al-Hazimi, 7ý. Al-Himyari, Shams, 29; c 
al-Waysi, 166, both add al-Huthan batn of al-Sabi 
in Kufa. 
(107) Al-Hazlml, 78; Yaqut, Mu cj am, 111,318. 
(108) A-'L-Hazimi, 124. 
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2. buýun Madhhij 
c (109) B. Abd Allah 
B, c Amir (110) 
Awd (111) 
Al-HaddE batn of Sacd al-cAsh-Ji-rah 
(112) 
B. Harithah (113) 
c (114) Al-Jada, batn of Sa d al-cAshi-rah 
B. Jadhimah, batn of al-Nakhc 
(115) 
Jamal b. Kinanah, batn of Murad 
(116) 
JucfT., a large tribe 
(117) 
Musliyah, a batn of cAmr b. cUlah 
(118) 
Nýashirah (119) 
B. Qays, batn of al-Nakh c 
(120) 
B. Salman, batn of Murad 
(109) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 44a. 
(110) Ibid, 
(111) Ibn HazmJamharat, 411. 
(112) Ibn Maku-1a, 11,407; al-ýIazimi, 47. 
(113) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 44a, 
(114) Ibn Habib, Mukhtalif, 32. 
See Caskel, (115) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab f 44a., reads Jadimah. 
I. table 264; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 414, who give a 
correct name. 
Al-Hazimi, 41f. 
(117) Ibn Durayd, 244. 
(118) Ibn al-KalbTL, Nasah, f 43b. 
ashirah is a batn of (119) Cf. al-Hazimi., 116) who says N 
tently vironcr see Hamdan, This assumption is paL. 
Caskel, I, table 269, who referred it to 
(120) Ibn al-Kalbt, TNTasab, f 
Al-ijazima" 
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B. Suhban., batn of al-Nakh 
c(122) 
B. Wahbil, batn of al--N-akhc 
(123) 
Zubayd, a large tribe 
(124) 
3. butun Kindah 
B. Al- c Ada (125) 
B. Al-Arqam (126) 
B. Badda (127) 
B. Dhuhd b. Mucawiyah (128) 
B. Hujr b. Wahb (129) 
-c (130) B. Imru al-Qays b. Rabi ah 
B. Jabalah b. cAdi (131) 
B, Malik b. al-Harith 
(132) 
-C (133) B. Malik b. al-Rabi ah 
- (134) B. Masruq 
(122) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 44a. 
(123) Ibid., reads Wahsal. For the correct name, see Caskel, I, 
Table 264; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 414; Ibn al-Athir, 
lubab, 11,281. 
(124) Al-Sam'anil VI, 248. 
(125) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab., f 29b. 
(126) Ibn al-Kalb-1, Nasab, f 25a. We know that some of them 
left Kufa when they disagreed with cAli b. Abli Talib 
before Siffin and they moved to Syria where they settled 
in al-Ruha , see Ibn 
Hazm, Jamharat, 426; cf. also 
Table a, 2 above. 
(127) Al-Sam'an-i, 11,111, who refemthis baýn to Himyar. it 
is clear from our sources that this baýn is from Kindah 
not Himyar, see Caskel, I, table 233; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 
425., Ibn al-Athir, lubab, 1,104. 
(128) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 23b. 
(129) ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 24a. 
( 130) Ibn al-Kal-b-1, Nasab, f 23b. 
(131) Ibid. 
(132) Ibid. 
(133)) Ibid. 
1 Ibn al-K, 'CLU1, ', ",, -, asab, f 28a. 
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B. Murrah (135) 
B. Nahd (136) 
B. Al-Ra 'D ish (137) 
B. Salamah (138) 
B. Al-Shajarah (139) 
B. Zayd b. al-ýfarith 
(140) 
B. Zimman (141) 
4. butun Himyar 
Al-AhmaUs (142) 
Hadramawt, a large tribe 
(143) 
oI 
B. Kurayb (144) 
Mahrah 
(145) 
B. Sha c ban 
(146) 
(135) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 24a. 
(136) Ibn al-Kalbi., Nasab, f 23b. 
(137) VI Al-Samcani 202, 62. Al-Hadithli,, says that B. al- , ., Ra3ish was one o _ f brancýes (butun) of Kindah who 
settled in Kufa, quoting Ibn 4azm and Ibn Durayd. 
However, none of these sources confir m this. The former 
does not record such a statement and the latter says 
that Shurayý al- Qad-i was the only one from this batn 
in Kufa, see Ibn HazmJamharat, 425; Ibn Durayd, 218. 
(138) Ibn al-Kalbi, Na sab, f 26a. 
(139) Ibn Durayd, 220. 
(140) Ibn al-Kalb-1, Nasab, f 23b. 
(141) Ibn al-Kalb-1, Nasab, f 31b. 
(142) Al-Hamdanli, Ikl-ll, 11,240. 
(143) Al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 11,235; al-Hazimll, 49. 0 
(144) Al-Hanidani, Ikl il 150, theý7 joined al-'.,, -akhc, of V, -. adhhij 
(145) Al-Baladliuri, Ansab, 11,235. 
1 
(146) Al-H., amdan-J Iklil, II, they 
joined Hamdan. 
-163- 
5. Other Yemeni tribes 
(147) Ahmas, batn of Bajilah 
Al-Ashacir (148) 
B. al-Harith b. cAmirj, batn from Zahran of 
al-Azd 
(149) 
Khathcam, a large Yemeni tribe 
(150) 
B. M-azin, batn of al-Azd 
(151) 
B. Zarah., batn of al-Azd 
(152) 
(147) Al-Samcani, 1,146. For Bajilah, 
c see also al- Baladhuri, Ansab, 11., 236; al-Sam ani, 11,85. 
(148) Al-Baladhur: 'ý, Ansab, 11,235. 
(149) Ibn al-Kalbi,. Nasab, f 68b, they were from 
al-Sarah. 
(150) Al-Bala-dhur-1, Ansa-b, 11,236; Ibn Hazm, 
Jamharat, 391. 
(151) Ibn Durayd, 289f, they were from al-Sarah. 
(152) Ibn Durayd, 288, says in al-Sarah. Ibn Hazmý 
Jambarat, 376 mentions that they were from the 
Hijaz. 
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c. Al-Fustat 
butun Himyar 
B. c Abal, baýn of Rucayn 
(153) 
c Abs b. Zawf (154) 
Al Akhmur, batn of al-Ma c afir 
(155) 
Al-Ahjur, batn of al-Ma c afir 
(156) 
c (157) Al-Amluk, batn of Ru ayn 
Asbah (158) 
(159) Al-Ashba*, batn of Hadramawt 
Dhubhan 
, batn of Ru 
c ayn 
(160) 
B. Hajr, batn of Ru c ayn 
(161) 
C- (162) Al-Jabza, batn of al-Ma afir 
C- (163) Al-Janad, batn of al-Ma afir 
Jayshan, batn of Ru c ayn 
(164) 
(153) AI-Haziml, 90. 
(154) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h, 111., 126. 
(155) Al-Sam C ani, 1,155. See also al-Akwac, 
C- 
"Af ult'. 715. 
C- -z- (156) Al-Sam ani I, 390f. Cf. also al-AkA if U111 51 a) 
Af 3,26. 
(157) Ibn OAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h, 111,128; see also 
al-Akwac, VfAf 'ullt 1 25. 
(158) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh, 111,129. 
(159) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h., 111,123. They arrived 
during cUthman's reicrn. t> 
(160) Al-Hazimll, 62. 
(161) Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh., 111,129; al-ilazimi, 45. 
(162) Ibn Maku-l. -t, 11,177. 
(1633) Al-Hazimi, 112. 
(16/11) Al-Hazimi, 44. 
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Al-Kala ca large tribe (165) 
B. Khadid, batn of Yahsub 
(166) 
Al-Macafir, a large tribe 
(167) 
Mahrah, a large tribe 
(168) 
B. Mawhab, batn of al-Macafir 
(169) 
Nacimah, batn of al-Kalac 
(170) 
Qaraf ah., batn of al-Macaf ir 
(171) 
Qitaban, batn of Ru c ayn 
(172) 
Radman, batn of Ru c ayn 
(173) 
Rucayn, a large tribe 
(174) 
Saba 
,a large tribe 
(175) 
Al-Sadif, a large tribe 
(176) 
(165) al-Maqr-l'z-l, Khitat, 11,79. 
(166) Ibn Maku-1a, 111,117. 
(167) Ibn cAbd al-Hakaml FutU4,111,102; al-Hazimi, 114; 
Ibn Duqmaq, 5; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, 11,79. 
(168) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam., III, 118ff; al-Hazimi, 115; 
al-Maqr'lzl, khiýaý, 11,77. 
(169) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam., Futuh, 111,126. 
(170) Al-Hazimll. 117. 
(171) Al-Samcani, X, 86; al-Hazimi, 103. 
(172) Al-Hazlm-i*, 102. 
(173) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh., 111,128; al-H-azimi, 65. 
(174) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h, 111,126; al-Samcan-1, VI, 
139; Ibn cAba al-Barr, Isti-ab., IV, 1455; al-I ' 
lazimi , 
66; 
Ibn Duqmaq, 1,5; al-Maqrlzl, Khitat, 11,79. 
(175) Ibn Maku-la IV, 532f Ibn cAbd al-Hakani, Fujuh, III, 
126 
al-Sam C ani VII 23; al-Hazimi, 72; Ibn 
Duqm aq, I, 
5; al-, Nlaqrlzl, Khitat, 11,79. 
(176) Ibn cAbd al-Hakarn, Futuh) III 122ff; a'-. -Samcc'-Ln--'-, 
%III, 
43; al-Haziml, 80; Ibn Duqmaq, 1,5; 
Khitatl, 78. 
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Al-Sama c 
(177) 
Sayban, batn of Mahrah 
(178) 
B. Shacban b. cAmr (179) 
Al-Sulaf (180) 
Al- cUtaqa3 (181) 
Yaf ic batn of Rucayn 
(182) 
Yahsub, a large tribe 
(183) 
Zawf, a batn of Hadramawt 
(184) 
Zayad,, a batn of al-Kala c 
(185) 
2. buýun Madhýij 
c (186) B. Abs, batn of Murad 
q 
B. Badi c ah 
(187) 
Ghutayf, batn of Murad 
(188) 
(177) Al-Hazimi., 75. 
c (178) Ibn Abd al-Hakam, Futuh, 111,121. 
(179) Al-Hamdal"ll, Iklil, 11,2. '33-5, they joined al-Ashacir. 
(180) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h., 111,126. 
(181) Al-H-azim-i, 90 
(182) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h., 111., 126; al-Haziml, 124. 
(183) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam., Futuh, 111,123; al-liazimi, 124; 
Ibn Duqmaq, I, '5; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, 11,79. 
(184) Al-Fl-azimi, 69. 
(185) Al-Hazim-li, 68. 
(186) Al-Hazim-1,89. 
(187) 
-Tbn 
cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh, 111., 126. 
(188) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh, I255f; al-H, --. zi-mi, 99; 
Ibn Duqmaq, 1,5; al-iNlaq . rizi, Khitat, II, 78f. 
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Janb, a large tribe 
(189) 
(190) 
Nashira 
Silhim, batn of Sacd al-cAsh-irah 
(191) 
wi c lHn, batn of MurEd 
(192) 
Al-Zacafir, batn of Sacd al-cAsh-irah 
(193) 
Zawf, baýn of MurEd 
(194) 
3. butun Kindah 
1 (195) This tribe was mainly represented by butun of TuJjb 
Abdhi (196) 
B. Amir (197) 
Al-AydacEn (198) 
c Ibad (199) 
Al-KhalEwah (200) 
B. Sacd (201) 
Sawm (202) 
(189) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Fut5h, 111,126. 
(190) Al-Haziml-, 116. 
(191) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f49b; Ibn OAbd al-Hakam, Kjjýu IIIy 
123ff. They both consider this batn from Mur5d, but in 
Caskel, I, table 266; Ibn Durayd, 242 and Ibn Hazm, I Jamharat, 408, is a batn from Sacd al-cAsh-irah. 
(192) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam Futuh, III, 125f- Ibn Duqmaq, I, 5; 
al-Maqrizi, Khitat, II, 78f. 
(193) Al-Hazimi, 68. 
(194) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab f50a; al-Hazimi, 69. 
(195) See Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh, 111,125; al-SamcEni, III, 
24f; Ibn Duqmaq, . 1,4; Ibn Hazm, 429; al-Hazimi, 30; 
al-Maqrlzi, Xhitat, II, 77. 
(196) Al-Hazimi, 9. 
(197) Ibn cAbd al-Ilakam, Futu-h, 111,125. 
(198) Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h, 111,122. 
(199) Al-Sa-mcan-i, VIII, 340; al-Hazim-J, go. 
aZ4 200ý Al-H Lmi, 57. ý201 
Ibn'cAbd al-Illakam, FutUý, 111,122. 
(202) Ibn MI-9. kiilil-t, ft, 5SI; al-Hý-I-zimi, 76. 
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4. buýun Khawlan 
203), Furudh, baýn of B. Rabi ah b. Saed 
A -Judaydah.. batn of j-)- -- 
(204) Razih b. "., 'Lalik 
Rushayyah (205) 
5. butUn eAkk 
(206) This tribe was mainly represented by buýun of Ghafiq 
Dihnah (207) 
Al-Ghumr (208) 
Hadhran 
(209) 
b 
Hamd 
(210) 
(211) 
Al-Qiyan 
(212) Al-Rubbaniyyin 
Tayam 
(213) 
(203) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, 1,369. 
(204) Al-Samca-nl-., 111,198. 
(205) 72. Ibn Makula, IV, For Khawlah, in general, see Ibn 
_ C Abd al-Hakam, Futuh., I II, 125f; al-Maqrizi, Khitat, 11,78. 
(206) See Al-Kindi, Wulah, 
- 
8; Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh IIIJ, 
119ff; Ibn Duqmaq, 1 7Z , 5; al-Hazimi, 
97; al-, NIaqrlzl., 
Khitat, 11,78. The Musl im genealogists differ about the 
nasab of cAkk, some of t hem refer this tribe tocAdnan, 
others claim that it is Qahtani from al-Azd, see Ibn i Durayd, 287; Caskel, I, e 176 219f Ibn Hazm taýl 
328,375; Jamharat Ibn al-Athir, lubab, 11) 147; , 
af-Sam ani T; ý',. 34; - Jý' al-H azimi, 
93. It is not our aim 
to define the nasab of t he tribe in the present study, 
as long as the tribe had migrated from the Yemen. For the 
territory of cAkk in the Yemen, see 1.1, ap 1, and-also 
see 22 above. 
(207) Al-Hazimi, 59. 
(208) Al-Ha-zim-L, 99. 
(209) Ibn c Abd al-Hakam, Fu', u-h, 111,121. Ccas'-el, 
I, Table 
220,, rea(!, -,, Hidran. 
10 2 Ibn cAbýll al-Hakarn, FutLth, 111,121; al-H a- z 1,., 
-1 
j 
(211) A1-S c w-n a135. %ý -le 22 Caz; -I'- - -1 
t ab 20 rea6L -, i -- t 'y 
(212) 1 lo n da1- ani, 
caI, - Alý Futu i, 
Is! 'l )1 1- k-le 
2"0 
l oban. reads Ra 
2 13' ! 'il -S am 
c ani, 111,11 5. 
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Other Yemeni tribes 
(214) 
AI-Abna . 
-C -C. (215) Al-Aknu batn of al-Asha ir 
Daws, a large tribe of al-Azd in al-Sarah 
(216) 
Hamdan 
(217) 
B. Suray c, baýn of al-Ashacir 
(218) 
(214) In Ibn Duqmaq, 
_I, 
5 and al-NiTaqrizi, Khilat., II, 78: 
"They [the Abna ] were the remainder of Badhan's 
[the Persian governor in the Yemen] armyclho adopted 
Islam in Syria and moved withcAmr b. al- As to 
Egypt. However, we know that the Abna ) were 
descendants of the Persian troops sent to the Yemen 
in AD 575, adopting Islam during cAbhalah's sway C -') over San a see 14 above. It is quite possible that 
some of them migrated to the battle fronts with the 
Yemeni tribes taking part in the fighting with the 
Muslim armies and settling with them in the new 
garrison towns, see Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futuh, 
111) 129. 
Ibn cAbd al-Hakam, Futu-h, 111,126. 
c _T' (216) Ibn Duqinaq, 1,3. Ibn Abd al flakam Futuh 111,120) 
mentions Shababah one 
- 
of its butun, vvho some of 
them were from al-Sarah, see Ibn Hazm, Jamliarat., 
380. 
(217) Ibn CAbd al-Hakam, futjýLh, 111,128, they settled in 
al-J-Lzah, outskirts of al-Fustat. 
(218) Ibn al-Kalbi, Nasab, f 50b. 
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In conclusion., however, the settlement of such a 
high number of the Yemenis in these conquered provinces 
obviously reflects on the political situation of the Yemen. 
one of the most important factors was the migration of 
the Yemeni chiefs, accompanied by their own tribes, who 
appeared on the scene of the events during the Wars of 
Apostasy. Their departure on the one hand left the Muslim 
governors in full control over some of the Yemeni regions, 
and, on the other, the Yemen was transformed politically 
from a troublesome to a quiet country. This result, however, 
will be seen in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Political situation and Yeme - -ný 
relations 
with the Islamic government during the period 
Of the first three Orthodox Cali-phs 
(11-35/632-56) 
Chapter three indicated the success of the Islamic 
forces and their Yemeni allies in putting down the rebellious 
tribes in the Yemen in the f irst year of Abu- Bakr's Caliphate, 
11/632-3. (l) Following this victory, Islamic authority 
apparently emerged in three of the Yemeni towns : ýanca7., 
al-Janad and one of the Vaýrami towns. For well over 200 
11 
years (11-233/633-847), Muslim governors were appointed by 
the caliphate over these towns, Sanca 0 and al-Janad in 
particular. 
(2) 
On the other hand., some provinces of the 
Yemen(makhalif) remained under the political control of their 
local chiefs. These provinces belonged to some of the 
influential tribes of the Yemen, such as ýiimyar and Hamdan. 
This chapter, however, will cover the political situation 
in the Yemen and its relations with the medinan government 
from the end of the War of Apostasy until the murder of 
c Uthman b. cAffan (11-35/632-56). 
A. The transfer of authority from the local powers to 
the Medinan governors in these three towns 
C-3 
Our sources unanimously agree on 9an a, al-Janad -t-.,. cl 
one of the Hadraml towns as being the headquarters of 
the I 
Islamic governors in the Yemen. From these 
towns, z", rab 
(1) For a detailed dii-gcussion of this e,, -ent, cf. 
Chapter 
III above. 
Cf. Table of governors- 
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historians believe that these governors had ruled the 
Yemen as a whole. This exaggerated assumption., however, 
is still followed by some modern writers. 
(3) 
This naive assertion by both primary and recent 
sources., however, is not acceptable. It is likely that 
politically, Islamic domination over the Yemen was con- 
centrated in some Yemeni regions only. Such domination 
over all the Yemeni provinces however is indeed suspect, 
especially considering the actual internal situation of 
that period. There is no doubt that Islam as a religion 
became the first faith in the Yemen, (4) while some areas 
remained under the political control of their local chiefs. 
This phenomenon clearly appeared in the provinces of 
influential tribes'. such as Himyar and Hamdan. These local 
powers and their relations with Medina will be discussed 
later. 
C-0 
The political submission of San a. al-Janad and 
one of the Hadraml towns to the Medinan administration 
certainly did occur. The succession of Islamic governors 
in these towns is material proof of this political domin- 
at ion. It is relevant, however to assess the main 
(3) Especially the Yemenis, i. e. see Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 
.1CC 14f; al-Khazraji, Asj_ad, 13f; Ibn al-Dayba 
Qurra 1,67-71. Cf also Ibn Khurdadhibah, Masalik.. 
144; al-Muqaddasi, Ahsan, 105, who both say that the 
Yemen was divided into three divisions (a 
C mal), al-Jana,, I, 
--I- 
ters, cf. Sanca" and Hadramawt. For the modern wriý 
ýI-Hadda-d Tarikh 150; ýalih, Tarlikh, 101; al-Hadithi, 
Ahl al-Yaman, 125. 
For full discussion of the spread of Islam iii the Yemen, 
see Chapter I. B above. 
(5) See192 Belo\-ý-. 
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factors that helped the concentration of Islamic political 
power in these Yemeni towns. 
The constant flow of Yemeni migrants into the con- 
quered provinces throughout the period of the first three 
Orthodox Caliphs caused a serious political vacuum in 
the Yemen. (6) This resulted from the fact that most of 
the influential tribal chiefs, those who came to power 
during the Wars of Apostasy, either for or against the 
Medinan authority, had left the country and settled in 
the conquered areas. 
(7) 
After their departure, the Yemen 
entered a new phase of her history which was to be dist- 
inguished by a political lull. As for the rest of the 
chiefs remaining in the Yemen, it seems that they contended 
among themselves for sovereignty over their own regions. 
(8) 
(6) For a detailed discussion of the Yemeni migrations to the 
conquered areas during the caliphate of Abu Bakr and the 
early stages of his successor's reign, see Chapter IV 
above. Of course, these migrants were not the last 
Yemenis who travelled to the conquered areas, since the 
migratory movements continued throughout this period from 
the Yemen to -the conquered provinces, these migrants 
have been known as rawadif., those who came after the 
conclusion of the conquest (A. H. 17/A. D. 638), see Donner, 
Islam ic Conquest, 231f f- 
(7) Such as al- 1, Shurahbil b. al-Simt cAsh ath b. Qays al-Kind 
al-Kindi, Jarir b. cAbd Allah al-Bajali, Qays b. - 
C Abd 
Yaghuth al-Muradi, C Amr b. Macdil Karib al-Zubaydi and 
Dh_ " 1-Kalac al-Hii-, iyari. For their role durino- the Wars u ZD 
of Apostasy, see Chapter II-III, above, and for their 
role in the conquests, ef Chapter IV above. See also 
their role in the Civil War in Chapter VIIbelow. 
C 
(8) Especially those of Himyar and Hamdan, such as Dhu Rti ayn, 
C-I These chiefs Dhu Yazan B. Abd Kalal and Dhu ,; urran. 
enjoý-ed full power over their tribes on the eve of 
Islam in the 'Yemen and did not migrite to the conquered 
provinces. However, it cannot be accepted that tlaose 
chiefs lost their influence over their own tribes bý- the 
spread of Islam in the region. 
-174- 
In such a political atmosphere, the Medinan governors in 
the Yemen were able to rule freely in their headquarters, 
without any rivalry from such tribal leaders. 
However', there is no mention of the direct reasons 
for the selection of these towns by the Medinan government 
as centres of its authority in the Yemen. This choice 
might have been the -result of the armed struggle which 
these areas witnessed during the last phase of the 
Prophet's life and the early stages of AbTi Bakr's Cal- 
iphate, (9) since this hostility gave an excuse to the 
Muslims to interfere politically in these areas. 
In order to support the Muslims in these areas, 
the, Medi-nan government sent re-inforcements there. 
Following their victories, the Muslims gained a foothold 
in these regions, filling the Political vacuum. This 
happened particularly during the first year of Abu- Bakr's 
Caliphate, 11/632-3. 
As has already been mentioned, the Abna in Sanca., 
either during their hostility against cAbhalah b. Kacb or 
against Qays b, cAbd Yaghu-th al-Murad-1., had been looking 
for help from the Medinan government. 
(10) In order to 
lend support to the Abna3 during their campaign against 
the Madhýij in ýancV, the Islamic troops entered the town 
and established their authority. Thereafter) political 
(9) For these hostilities, see Chapter II-III above. 
(10) For the communications of the Abn-ao with the Mediný,, n 
government during this hostility, cf. Chapter II 
and III above. 
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c -: ) affairs in ýan a were transferred from the Persian 
community, the Abna to the Islamic authority. 
Thus after the arrival of al-Muhajir b. Abli 
Umayyah's army in ýanca3 in 11/632-3. the Abna-3 were all 
debarred from any official posts, though their influence 
as a local power continued in the town. (11) It is 
noticeable that none of the Abna: ' was designated over the 
town throughout the period of the Orthodox caliphs 
11-40/632-56; despite this., their hostility against Madhhij 
was mainly to stay on an official level. 
(12) 
In fact the sources at our disposal do not record 
any objections or complaints from the Abna3 as a reaction 
to the Medinan policy. It is probable that as a result 
of their sufferings during the local hostilities, the 
-I Abna might have averted their eyes from political affairs 
in ýanca" 
. especially as long as it remained under the 
control of a neutral authority. Their invitation to 
C- Mu adh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy in the Yemen, offering 
him leadership over Sanca 3 is clear proof of the Abna s 
wish for a neutral regime in the town. 
(13) 
C_ ZD (11) For -the arrival of al-Muhajir's army in San a, ef . 1-0.2 
above, They appeared as the great local power in 
San ca-, in 40/656, see 254below. 
I 
(1'9ýj) However, when Mucawiyah b. Ab'i Sufyan became caliph 
they apparently emerged in power when the former 
appointed some of -them . to- of-j[ice of 
Sanca: ' and 
al-Janad. See271below and Table 6. 
(13) When the Abna3 realized that Qays b. cAbd Yaghu-th 
intended to remove authority from them in SancV after 
the Prophet's death, they immediately sent to 1, ii-i adh 
offering him the office of the leader of the towa, 
see 77 above. 
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The year long hostilities between the Abna: ý and 
Madhhij over the question of control over Sanc-1 a must have 
created a political vacuum in the town. (14) It appears 
that the Aledinan government realized that the leadership 
of ýancV had to be removed from the hands of these con- 
flicting groups. Consequently Fayruz al-Daylami, a leader 
of the Abn-a'3 in ýan ca3. was removed from the leadership 
when al-Muhajir's army entered the town, 11/632-33, though 
(15) the former had officially been appointed by Abu Bakr. 
Through such a policy the Medinan government was able to 
eliminate the local struggle in SancV and at the same 
time gain a foothold in the town. Thus throughout the 
period of the first three Orthodox caliphs, 11-35/633-56 
the governors were successively sent from Medina to ýanca .3 
None of them was from the inhabitants of the town. 
(16) 
Al-Janad was the second Yemeni town chosen by the 
Medinan government as a centre for its representatives in 
the southern area of the highlands and Tihamah since Abu 
Bakr confirmed his authority there by appointing a governor 
over the town in 11/632-3. However, this choice was made 
long before that date, when the Prophet sent his ambassador, 
I. -Luca-dh b. Jabal., to the Yemen in 9/630-1. 
(17) 
After 
(14) For a detailed discussion of the hostility of the 
Abna-1 against Mladhhij , cf - Chapter II III above. , 
(15) Cf . 100 above. 
(16) Cf. Table 4. 
(17) Because of al-Janad's suit able geographical location 
ai: l, d the acceptance of some of its inhabitants to 
Jm envoys, protect the '. 'Lisl, the Prophet directed 
Mucadh to the town to take it as a centre of his 
mission in the Yemen. See 34 above. 
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'Abhalah's occupation of Sanca-" in Muharram ll/April 632 
Mucadh b, Jabal feared the spread of the rebellion and 
went to Hadramawt. 
(18) 
When the political situation f. 
settled down in the Yemen during the early period of Abu 
Bakr's reign, Mucadh returned to al-Janad, establishing 
Islamic authority permanently in this Yemeni town. (19) 
In fact without the support of some of the local 
tribes, the III-edinan government would not have been able 
to establish its authority in Hadramawt. When the rebels 
.9 
had been decisively defeated at al-Nujayr, 11/632-3, the 
ýIedinan government gained a strong foothold in Hadramawt 
and was able to appoint a series of governors over the 
area. 
(20) 
Unfortunately, our sources do not indicate the 
precise headquarters of lhe Medinan governors in '. 'Iadramawt. 
Al-Hamdani- himself does not define these headquarters, 
although Hadraml towns are described in his geographical 
(21) 
work. But, in his description of Shibam, al-Hamdani 
says that it is the town of all people, i. e. the 
(22) (23) Hadramis. Quoting the previous statement, Serjeant 
(18) Cf. 55 above. 
(19) He appeared again in -the town after the termination of 
the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen during the f irst year of 
Ab5 Bakr's caliphate, cf. Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, . 36f; Ibn 
107; Iýabah VI kIajar Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1.68-71. , , 
(20) For the battle of al-Nujayr, cf. 103 above. For the 
Medinan governors at that time, see Table 4. 
21 Cf. Sifat, 1,85-8. This lack of in-terest, however, 
is followed by other Arab writers, both geographý_--rs 
and historians. 
(22) Sifat, 1,86. 
(23) Saiyids, 9. 
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suggests that Shibam was probably the capital of the region. 
During the Umayyad-Ibad'i struggle in 129-30/746-7, it can be 
seen how Shibam was important since each group worked to 
keep the town under their influence. 
(24) 
However, despite 
these indications it can not be stated categorically that 
the- town was the headquarters of the Medinan governors. 
In all probability this failure to mention the 
centre of the Muslim governors in ý, aqramawt might be due 
to the isolation of the area from the scene of events 
throughout the first three centuries of Islam. 
(25) 
This 
could be the main reason f or the neglect of the area in 
our sources. Therefore, the succession of Muslim governors 
in 4aqramawt was not recorded regularly in these sources. 
(26) 
At any rate it is hoped that more work can be done to 
pinpoint the centre of the Muslim governors in ýIaýramawt- 
B. The foundation of the Islamic governorship 
It is noticeable that after suppressing the reb- 
ellious tribes in 11/632-3, the Islamic government was 
able to appoint its own governors (wulat) over three 
Yemeni towns. Following this policy the position of 
these officials changed from that of Medinan represent- 
atives with some Yemeni tribes, as teachers and alms coll- 
94-31f; al-Harithi, (24) See al-Isfahani, Aghani, XXVII, T 
C Uqud, 227. The latter reads Sanam. 
(25) With -the exception of the revolution of Talib al- 
Vaqq in Vadramaift in 129/745-46, -ý;, -hich spread throughout 
the Yemen Lnd the Vijaz, cf . 2S4-92below. 
C _. ) San a who recorded (26) In contrast ý, -, -ith the governors oL 
regularly, though the town had also been isolated f rooý Z_D 
the scene Of the events of most of this period, 
see the tables of governors. 
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ectors, to governors (wulat). 
(27) 
Thereupon their number 
was reduced to three official governors in the Yemen. (28) 
Our sources do not illustrate the movements of 
these officials; moreover they do not give specific dates 
for the foundation of the Islamic governorship in the 
Yemeni towns. However., according to the historical facts 
the replacement of Muslim officials took place during- the 
period of Abu Bakr's caliphate, to be specific., before the 
first of the official Yemeni re-inforcements who joined 
the Islamic armies for the conquests on the Syrian front in 
the early 13/633. 
(29) 
The first indication of Muslim governorship in 
San ca .3 comes in the course of the rebellion of Qays b. 
C Abd Yaghuth al-Muradi during the early stages of Abu 
Bakr's reign. Fayruz al-Daylami, a leader of the Abna in 
San ca3 was appointed to this office by Abu Bakr. 
(30) 
However, this governorship expired with the termination of 
hostilities in the town.. This sudden replacement leads 
us to believe that some military purpose lay behind the 
appointment of Fayruz in Sanca 3 during the hostilities. 
It is known that Abu Bakr appointed Fayruz and sent a letter 
(27) During the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early 
period of his successor Medinan officials were known as 
'ummal or representatives of the Islamic government for 
p articular post. For a full discussion of the Medinan 
representatives during the last phase of the Prophet's 
life, see chapter I, B above. 
(28) For the representatives of the Prophet amongst the Z-71 
Yemeni tribesY see Table 1. 
(29) Cf. 115above. 
(30) Cf . 100 above. 
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to some Yemeni chief s requesting them to support Fayru-z 
and the Abna against Qays b. C Abd Yaghuth. (31) Thereupon 
the local power and the Muslim forces recognized Fayru-z as 
a leader of the resistance in Sanca3 against Qays and 0 
his followers. This recognition, however, was temporary, 
since Aban b. Sacid b. al-cAs, one of the Companions appeared 
in 11/633-4 in Sanca7' as a governor on behalf of Abu- Bakr. 
C- Some historians record that Aban b. Sa id was 
appointed over Sanca3 by the Prophet, 
(32) 
while others 
- (33) state that his appointment was made by Abu Bakr. 
Nevertheless, these historians give neither an exact date 
for this governorship, nor do they discuss it in detail. 
C- In all probability Aban b. Sa id was appointed over 
Sanca: ) by Abu- Bakr during the early stages of his caliphate. 
Several reasons make this point of view more plausible. 
The fact is that Aban. is not mentioned in the sources at 
our disposal as being among the Prophet's representatives tDp 
in the Yeme .n during the period of cAbhalah's movement. 
(34) 
The second reason is that it is well known that he was the 
Medinan representative in al-Bahrayn until the death of the 
Ic (35) Prophet in Rabi I., 11/June, 632. Thirdly, Aban 
(31) See 81- above. 
('02) Al-Razi, Tarikh 76 (citing al-Walid b. Yazid); Ibn I Z-> 
al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 67f. 
(33) AI-RLýtzTi, 150; Ibn Hajar, IsEbah, 1,11, both citill"-, 
al-Nu c man b. Buzurj, See - also Ibn al-Athir, Usd, I) 
36f, who says that he was appointed by Abu Bakr 
somlewhere in the Yemen. 
(34) For 'the Prophet's representatives at -that time, see Ta, )Ie 
(35) AI-BaladhurL, Ansýb, 1,5-5-29; Ibn cAbd LtL-Bai, r, IstLcLtb, 
-I 1,62; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 1,36. 
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appeared for the first time in Sanca3 as a Muslim official 
after the termination of the rebellion of Qays, since it 
was he who began to investigate the murder of Dadhawayh 
al-Istakhri., 
(36) 
one of the leaders of the Abna 1) in 
ýancV who was murdered by Qays b. cAbd Yaghuth. That 
was the apparent start of the Islamic authority in Sanca". 
Again our sources do not indicate the period of 
c -Z) Aban b. Sa id 's governorship in San a. However., it can 
be deduc-, ed from the fact that Aban had joined the early 
invasion of the Islamic armies on the Syrian front in 
13/634-5. (37) This fact is clear proof that Aban was not 
in Sanca'I at that time. The governorship of the town was 
transferred to Yacli b. Umayyah al-Tamimi who occupied the 
(38) 
post at some time during the period of Abu Bakr's reign. 
One can confidently assume that Yaclii- came into office as 
C- an immediate successor of Aban b. Sa id when the latter 
(39) 
rece. ived permission from Abu Bakr to return to Medina. 
(36) Al-Razlli., Tarlikh, 150; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, I, 11, 
(both citing al-Nucman b. Buzuri). -* 
(37) Where he was killed in the battle_of Ainadayn, 
-Jumada I. 13/July, 634, 
csee al-Azdi) 
Futuh, 76f; al-Kufi, 
Futuh., 147; Ibn Abd al-Barr, I, 63f; Ibn al-Athir, 
.11,37. 
In Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, 120, it is Usd 
suggested that he was killed in the battle of Tdarj 
al-Suffar, ýafar, 13/April, 634. According to al- 
Tabýri, 1 2101 he was killed-in al-Yarmuk., in 13/634. &yy 
C 
(38) Cf. al-Razi, Tarikh, 160,163; Ibn_ Abd al-Majid, Bahjat, 
15. According to Ibn Khayyat, Tarik 123; and al- 
Tabarl 1,2136, Ya C 11 was Abu Bakr's governor in 
a-YZ: 
-> 
Khawlan (Khawlan al-". ýliyah). However, it is quite 
likely in the early stages of Abu Bakr's reign that 
C Y'a 11 represented Medina among Khawlan and when CD of San 
Ca3 AbAn resigned from his post as a gov 
-the former replaced hini in this office for the rest of 
Abu Bakr's Caliphate. 
(39) Idris, Kanz, f172b. 
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The replacement of the Islamic officials in al-Janad 
is indeed clearer than that in ýancV. There is a general 
agreement in our sources that Mucadh b. Jabal., the 
Prophet's envoy to the Yemen., occupied that post during 
the early stages of Abu- Bakr's Caliphate. Sayf b. C Umar 
in al-Tabar'l 
(40) 
records that he left the Yemen in 
11/632-3. His successor in that post was C Abd Allah b. 
Abi Rabi c ah al-Makhzumi., designated by Mu c adh himself. 
(41) 
Our sources unanimously agree that the Prophet's 
representatives in Hadramawt were Ziyad b. Labid al-Ansari, 
cUkashah b. Thawr and al-Muhajir b. Ab-I Umayyah. 
(42) 
Some of these sources, however, confirm that although he 
was appointed by the Prophet with some Hadraml tribes, 
al-Muhajir remained in Medina until the early period of 
(43) (44) Abu Bakr's Caliphate. Al-RdzI says that the 
(40) 1,2015. 
(41) Ibn Samurah., Tabaqat, 36f; Idris, Kanz, f172b. There is 
contradiction in the sources about the date when cAbd 
All: ih held this post. Wýilst Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Istilc9b., 
IIIY 897., and'Ibn al-Athir., Usd., 111,155, maintain 
that he was appointed by the Prophet, others confirm that 
his post authorized by cUmar, see al-Zubayri, nasab., 
317; al-Yacqu-b-i, Tarlkh, 11,139; Ibn al-Athir., Usd,. III, 
155., different account; Ibn Ijajar, IsJtbah, IV, 65. How- 
ever, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal. 
for Mucýldhls successor in this post other than cAbd 
Allah b. Ab! Rableah. On the other hand, there is 
confirmation in our reliable sources that MucEdh had 
joined the Islamic armies in the Syrian front during the an 
last year of Ab-ff Bakr's caliphate 13/634, cf. al- 
Azd: F, FutUý, 76-8; al-Wffqidi, Futih, 1,36. However, 
by their assumption these historians, who claim that 
'Abd All;! h was appointed over al-Janad by-'Umar, 
are intending to suggest that the office of the town 
was unoccupied during the last two years of Abd Bakr's 
reign, which is unlikely. 
(42) See Table 1. 
(43) At that time he was sent by AbJ Bakr to reinforc(ý the 
Muslims in the. Yemen, see 101 above 
(44) Tarikh, 145. 
-183- 
Prophet sent al-Muhajir b. Abi Umayyah to the territory of 
Hadramawt to fight Kindah and the tribe of Hadramawt, where 
he remained until the Prophet's death. This narrative is 
repeated by Ibn cAbd al-Barr, al-Fas-1 and Ibn Vajar with 
few differences. (45) A contradictory statement appears 
in al-TabarTi and is repeated by Ibn al-Ath'ir and Ibn 
(46) 
al-ýIusayn. They record that al-11uhajir was appointed 
as an alms collector (camil al-. sadaqah) with the tribes of 
Kindah and al-Sadif both in Hadramawt., by the Prophet, but 
that he remained in Medina until Abu Bakr despatched him 
to fight the rebels in the Yemen. 
In fact three reasons lead us to accept the second 
statement i. e. that al-Muhajir remained in Medina dur-ing 
the last phase of the Prophet5 life ý4ýd was sent to the Yemen 
by Abu Bakr. The first of these reasons is that al-Muhajir 
had no role in the first stages of the hostility in 
Hadramawt between the Muslims and the rebels during- the 
early period of Abu Bakr. 
(47) The second reason is that 
al-Muhajir was one of the Muslim leaders equipped by Abu 
Bakr and sent from Medina to fight the apostates. 
(48) 
The third of these reasons is the role of al-Muhajir in 
pursuing the survivors of cAbhalah's troops, who weree 
concentrated in the highlands, when he was on his way to 
(45) Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isti C ab, IV, 1452f; al-Fasi, 
C Iqd, 
VIIý 292; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, VI, 1,1ý4f- 
(46) 1,1880, Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 42.3; Ibn al-flusayn, 
AnbV, f4a. 
(47) See chapter III, B above. 
(48) AI- Zýjub a ý7r I masab, 316; al-Tabari f 199S- 
Ibn 
a, y. C) I 
Samurah T, -ibaqat, 35-, Ibn KhaldQn, bal,, II, 
863f. 
) &- -u 
I-- 
See also 101 above. 
-184- 
his post in Hadramawt. 
(49) 
However by the time of al- 
Muhajir's arrival in Hadramawt, three official muslim 
representatives assumed power in the region, all of whom 
had been originally appointed by the Prophet. (50) 
Our sources are vague about the replacement of the 
Medinan representatives and the development of those 
offices to that of governorship in Hadramawt. The only 
exception is that al-Muhajir b. AbIl' Umayyah returned to 
Medina., having appointed cIkrimah b. Abli Jahl in his 
post. 
(51) 
This replacement was definity before ýIuharram, 
13/March-April 634, as CIkrimah joined the ýIuslim armies 
on the Syrian front, designating Ubaydah b. Sacd as his 
successor. 
(52) 
This designation, however, was recognized 
(53) by Abu Bakr. 
The other two Muslim representatives in Hadramawt, 
Ziyad b. Labid al-An,, ýarl and cUkash b. Thawr , are com- 
pletely ignored by the historians. Consequently we have 
no knowledge of the period of thier holding these posts. 
This lack of information has indeed brought about total 
ignorance of the Political history of Hadrama-wt during the 
(49) Al-Zubayr-i, 316; al-Tabari., 1,1998; Ibn Samurah, 135; Ibn Khaldun, II, 863f. 
(50) There are al-Muhajir b. Abi Umayyah, Ziyad b. Labid 
al-Ansari and cUkastian b. Thaivr, see Table 1. I 
(51) Ibn cAbd al--Majid, Bahjat, 15. 
5-2 See al-Baladhurl-, Ansab, I, 363.2_ who says that he 
was killed in the battle of Ajnadayn, Ibn Khayý, aý., 
Tar'ikh, 120, however, in the battle of Marj al-ýýffar, 
though both battles took place in 13/634. See also 
a. - I-Tabari, 1,20S22,2093,2098) 
2101; Ibn al-Athir, 
KftLM-Ll, 11'. 276; Usd, IV, 6. 
533 Al-Tabar-1,1,20133; Ibn Hajar, Isabal'i, IV 210. 
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(54) last year of Abu Bakr's reign. The first sole gov- 
ernor of the caliphate in Hadramawt to be mentioned was 
C Adi b. Nawfal, who suddenly emerged as the Medinan gov- 
ernor during the period of cUmar b. al-Khattab's reign 
(13-23/634-44). (55) The replacement seems to have been 
sudden but the historians give no indication of the 
predecessor of the new governor. 
Seemingly, Ziyad b. Labid . 
cUkashah b. Thawr and 
c Ubaydah b. Sacd remained. as Medinan representatives with 
the Hadrami tribes until the arrival of cAd'I b. Nawfal. 
Thereafter, the Medinan government reduced its rePresentatives 
in Iýaýramawt to one governor who had already been appointed 
in the region. 
(56) 
The sphere of the Muslim governors and local tribes 
of influence in the Yemen 
Three Muslim governors had been appointed successively 
in the Yemen during the period of the f irst three Orthodox 
Caliphs (11-35/632-56). (57) These governors gained a 
political foothold in three Yemeni towns : Sanea .0, al-Janad 
and one of the ýIaqraml towns, using them as centres of 
their administration. 
(54) Our sources are unanimously silent about the replacements C -3 of these governors, whilst they mention those of San a 
and al-Janad. 
(55) Al-I-ýfahani, ) XVI 
74; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Ist-licab, 
1061; Ibn al-Athilr, Usd, 111,398; Ibn Hajar, 
Isabah IV 232. See also al-Hamid Tarikh 1,163. 
(56) Thereafter the sources at our disposal do not indicate 
that there was more than one ýJuslim governor in fiadramav,. -t 
(57) See Table 4. 
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Unfortunately, neither our general nor local sources 
have preserved much data about the political life of these 
areas under the authority of the Muslim regime at that time. 
However., we are more fortunate in having some information 
concerning the activities of the Muslim governor of Sanca3, 
particularly for the period of C Umar's Caliphate. Nevertheless., 
this small amount of data gives a reasonable picture of the 
political situation in these towns and their relations with 
Medina during that period. Some of these indications 
might suggest the Muslim governors wielded real power in 
the centres of their rule in the Yemen, whilst other evidence 
suggests that in other areas such authority was not generally 
recognized. So an attempt will be made to illustrate the 
sphere of influence of these Muslim governors and the 
influential tribes in the Yemen., beginning with the governors 
themselves. 
The real Muslim authority in the Yemen 
It is noticeable that Arabia in general and the Yemen 
in particular were not concerned with Medinan policy during 
the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, except 
the period of the War of Apostasy. Throughout -this period 
(12-35/633-56) the policy of the caliphate was in the 
main concentrated on the conquests and the affairs of the 
conquered provinces. These specific interests on the part 
of the Medinan administration, however, caused the early 
Arab historians to pay no further attention to the affairs 
of Arabia, including the Yemen. On the other hand, the 
Yemen itsel f may not have witnessed any important political 
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events during that period. The few events preserved in 
the sources about the Yemen are, indeed, less important in 
comparison with other political events at that time., 
such as the conquests, 
Although specific information about the political 
authority of the Muslim governors in the Yemen is lacking, 
the real power of these offices did exist. The non-existence 
of tribal chief s in the centres of the Muslim governors 
in the Yemen made the latter seem influential as rulers. 
At the same time the inhabitants of these towns set 
themselves up in business, leaving political affairs to 
the Medinan governors. In some of these centres these 
governors succeeded in forming a small army consisting 
mainly of those who came with them., together with some of 
the local population. 
(58) 
But the political influence 
of these governors was l'imited t6 the centres of their 
rule. Throughout that period, some of these governors 
evidently pursued their political activities in their 
official seats., bearing in mind the instructions of the 
caliphs. 
The political isolation of the Yemen apparently 
began in the second year of Abu Bakr's reign, 12/633-4. 
(58) In particular in ýanca3and al-Janad. Yacli b. 
Umayyah, the governor of Sanc`a-ý) -35/634-56), for (12 
example, brought some followers with him cf. al-Razli, 
Tarikh,. 79; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isti C ab, 111,1267; 
Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 185- Ibn Hajar, Isabah, V, 1218., 
and cAbd Allah b. Abli Rabi ah, the governor of al-Janad 
(11-35/632-56) who was able to prepare himself with an 
army to support the caliph 
cUthman b. cAffan in 
35/656, see al-Bal-f-Whurli, Ansab, V, 87; Ist'iLab, III, 
897; Usd, 111,155. 
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The cessation of political unrest in the Yemen and the 
beginning of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered provinces 
created a political vacuum in the region. Consequently, 
the country was transformed, politically speaking, from a 
troublesome to a quiet area. Therefore our knowledge about 
the political situation of the Yemen during the second 
half of Abu Bakr's caliphate is very scanty. Neither the 
caliph's communications with the Yemeni tribes nor his 
governors activities are clear in our sources. Yet some 
important Yemeni events have been ignored in these sources. 
For example, the renewal of the peace treaty between the 
Medinan government and the Christians of Nairan is reported 
in only a few words. 
(59) 
Furthermore, Abu Bakr's 
communications with both the Yemenis and his governors are 
also mentioned only briefly in these sources. 
(60) 
During the period of cUmar's caliphate (13-23/6.34-44), 
the real domination of the Medinan government apparently 
emerged in the Yemen, particularly in Sanca'). In the light 
of some of the events which took place in the -town, it can 
be said that Sancao was totally under the control of the 
Muslim regime. Of course, other centres of the Iledinan 
governors., i. e. al-Janad and Hadramawt, were also controlled 
by such officials, but their activities in these areas have 
not been described in our sources. 
, Tabaqat, 
1.358; al-Baladhurý, Futuý, 77; 59 Cf. Ibn Sacd 
al-Tabari, 1.1987; a"j--Nu,,, vayri, Nahayat, -XVIII, 1,36., 
a 1, a See also Hamidullah, Watha: '1q, 128f; al-Akivac, 
160f. -- 
(60) For Ijis communication_with-his gov, -ý-rnor ab, -), Ltt the people 
1-,, - -1 of Hufash, see al-Baiadhuri, FutuJI, 85, v. i-) record. - it 
in a few \,, r(-)rds. 
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However., the events of San 
CaI 
clearly illustrate the 
real influence of the Medinan regime in this town. For 
example, the Sancanis lodged complaints against their 
governor, Yacli b. Umayyah. 
(61) 
As a result Yacli was 
summoned three times by cUmar to Medina for investigation. (62) 
Another example of the domination of the Muslim authority 
over Sanca"' comes through cUmar's attitude towards the 
murder of one of the local population, where the caliph 
ordered his governor in the strongest terms to execute all 
the murderers. Ibn Rustah and al-Razil tell us that in his 
letter to his governor in SancV., cUmar insisted on the 
execution of all the accused., even if the whole of the pop- 
ulation of Sanca'I were involved., saying "Kill them all 
[the murderers]; even if all of the inhabitants of Sanca- 
are involved., I will execute them. " 
(63) 
Throughoaut the period of c Uthm-an's reign (23-35/644- 
56) the political isolation of the Yemen was at a peak. 
During that period the Yemen as a whole was isolated from 
the politica1 life of the Islamic state. The historians 
are unanimously silent about Yemeni affairs and our sources 
do not preserve such information which might help to 
illustrate what was happening in the area or concerning its 
political relations with the caliphate at that time. When 
some of these sources mention important events, they are 
very brief. 
(61) See al-Ra-zi- Ta-r-ikh 163-5; Idris, T"anz, f172b; Ibn 
tlajar, Isabah, VI, 353; al-Khazrajil, cA sjad, 17-9; 
Ibn al-Husayn, Ghayat, I, 83ý85. 
(62) Ibid. 
(63) Ibn Rustah, Aclaq, 110; al-Razli, Tar-lkh, 30,16111452. 
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Part of the reason for this political isolation 
was that the caliphate paid no more attention to Yemeni 
affairs. This policy begins to emerge, it would seem, 
when cUthman reappointed Yacl-1 b. Umayyah, the governor 
of Sanca . in 23/644, ignoring the complaints of the 
Sanca-n-1s, against him. 
(64) 
As a result of this isolation 
the inhabitants of the Yemeni provinces were relatively 
secluded from the social and the political life of the 
other Muslim communities throughout the Islamic state. 
This gene . ral feeling of disinterest on the part of the 
Medinese administration and its officials is confirmed 
by cUthman b. cAffan al-Thaqafi, the caliph's envoy to the 
Yemen. In a report he expressed his dissatisfaction 
toward the Yemen., saying "I met a people who gave what 
they were asked, whether truth or untruth. 11(65 This 
description leads us to believe that the isolation of the 
Yemen was at its greatest during cUthman's reign 
(23-35/644-56) 
. 'though political events of great importance 
were happening elsewhere. Indeed the fact that the cal- 
iphate and its armies were so heavily engaged at this time 
in the conquests must also to some extent have served to 
increase this isolation. 
(66) 
(64) Cf. al-Razi, Týrlkh, 165; al-Khazraji, C Asjad, 19; 
Ibn al-Husayn, Ghayat, 1,85. 
(65) Ibn Samurah, Tabaqdt, 40: Ra ) aytu qawman ma su :ý ilU-actaw 
Kana haqqan aw batilan. The full implications of this 
statement do not appear clearly from the literal 
-translation. It is evident, however, from the full 
context that the Yemenis were regarded by the caliph's 
envoy as being completely isolated, politically 
weak and ignorant of Islam. 
(66) For -the conqýiests during cUthman's caliphate, see Ibn 
Kh, ayyat., Tarikla., 157-68-, al-Tabarl, 1,2802 ff 
al-Kufl, II, 108ff. 
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It seems that the ability of the Medinan governors 
to rule the centres of their offices effectively ývas 
dependent on the central power of the caliphate. If the 
caliph was strong and firm in following up the actions of 
his governors, then these governors were loyal and 
faithful to Islamic principles. If however the caliph 
was not, then the governors tended to separate themselves 
within their areas, exploiting the fact of their being 
remote from the centre of the caliphate and the absence of 
strong local leadership in order to feather their own 
nests. Therefore, as a result of the weakness of the 
Medinan administration during the period of 
c Uthman 
(23-35/644-56) the governor of SancV, Yacl-1 b. Umayyah, 
was able to amass a great fortune for himself. 
(67) 
Since 
Yacli- had never joined the conquests and was not wealthy 
before he was appointed in Sanca- -D 
(68) 
these reasons lead 
us to believe that this wealth came to him during the 
period of cUthmEn's caliphate. 
(69) 
(67) See al-Baladhuri, Ansab Il 221; al-Tabari, I, 
3089) 3099; al-Kufi, 11,279; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, V, 128. 
(68) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal 
that Yacli ei-L-Iher had joined the conquests or he was 
wealthy before he was authorized over Sancao. 
(69) He tried, however, to exploit his authority in ýancP, 
as a governor on behalf of Medina, for his own interests 
during cUmar's reign. The latter, however, immectiate-Ty 
opposed him in this, see al-Razi, T, ýrlkh, 161; Ibn 
tiajar, Isabah, IV, 303; al-Khazraji, - As. jad, 18f; 
Ibn al-Husayn, Ghayat, 1,85. 
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b. The influential tribes of the Yemen and their 
relations with the 
_. 
Sý. ý: lip Lhate 
By influential tribes we mean those which figured 
strongly in their own provinces., such as the tribes of 
Himyar and Hamdan, during the last phase of the Prophet's 
life and the period of his successor. According to their 
strength, both the Prophet and Abu Bakr had recognized 
the authority of these tribes in their own provinces on 
several occasions. 
(70) 
Although there is little information in the sources 
about the actual control of the influential tribes over 
their own territories, a few indications preserved in some 
sources may conf irm that some Yemeni tribes evidently 
emerged witb independent autbority in their provihces. 
(71) 
There actual political authority remained in the hands of 
the tribal chiefs who exercised control over their own 
people. However, in addition to the fact that these few 
indications do not illustrate the actual political life 
of these territories, they also do not make clear the 
real relationship with the central Muslim authority, either 
with the governors in the Yemen or the caliphate itself. 
Nevertheless from these indications it can be assumed 
that in addition to maintaining control of their own 
provinces, some influential tribal chiefs had direct 
(70) For the Prophet's communications with the leader of 
these tribes, see 214 above. For Abu Bakr's 
communications with them., cf. 193 below. 
(71) They come in the main through al-Hamdani's works, in 
particular his IklIl, as well as one or two of the 
primary sources. Precise references are given below 
in the appropriate place. 
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communications with the caliphate, whilst their contact 
with the Medinan governors in the Yemen was in all prob- 
ability extremely rare. 
i. The caliphate and the major Muslim tribes in the Yemen 
We know that when Abu- Bakr decided to appeal to the 
Yemeni tribes to join the Muslim armies at the early stages 
of the conquest., he sent Anas b. Malik to the chief s of their 
more important representatives. Anas went directly to meet 
these chiefs. 
(72) 
Ibn Samurah (73 ) alone provides a 
contradictory account, saying that the caliph authorized 
3 Yacl'i b. Umayyah, the governor of Sanca to appeal 
directly to these tribes. On the one hand., however., all 
our other primary sources agree that Anas was the only 
one officially authorised by Abu Bakr to carry out this 
mission; on the other hand, these sources do not assign 
any role to Yao'lli b. Umayyah in this appeal to the 
tribes. (74) Therefore it can be said with reasonable 
surety that there existed direct communications between 
the caliph and the tribal leaders. This fact., however, 
leads us to believe that the real authority in these 
influential provinces belonged to the tribal chiefs, 
their influence over the inhabitants being clearly 
(72) For the journey of Anas to these chiefs, seell4above. 
(73) Tabaqat, 38.. This statement, as will be seen, is 
here considered unacceptable. All our sources 
contradict it and it should be recalled that Ibn 
Samurah is relatively late (6th/12th century) and 
he does not quote his sources for such a statement. 
(74) See al-Azdi , Fut-uh, 
5f; al-lVaqidi, Futuý, 1.1; 
ibn cAsakir, Tahdhib., I, 445f. Cf also al-Akwac, 
WathE3iq, 169. 
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greater than that of the Medinan governors. Thus, in such 
political matters, the Muslim governors there were being 
ignored, both by the tribal chiefs and the caliphate itself. 
Without any doubt, if these governors had had influence 
over the powerful tribes., Abu- Bakr would have ordered them 
to exercise their control over these tribes and recruit 
them to the conquests. 
Even during the caliphate of C Umar(13-23/634-44) the 
full authority of the influential tribes over their own 
territories-was apparent in the Yemen. Although there were 
a number of internal political crises in the provinces 
belonging to influential tribes, the Medinan administration 
was clearly powerless to stop them. 
Unfortunately, all our sources are vague and lacking 
in detail of these crises, yet al-Hamdani preserves brief 
indications of* them in his works, though it is true they 
concern only the territory of'Hamdan. 
-I Two indications come to us accidentally in al-Hamdani 
which might help us to visualize the real authority of the 
C 
Hamdan chiefs over their provinces during Umar Is Caliphate. 
(755) 
In the first of -these al-Hamdani tells us about the 
corif lict which took place between two Hamdan chiefs, each 
from a different branch, where both claimed possession of 
c al-Bawn, the plain lying to the north of San a. Consequent 1 
one of -them., Sacid b. Qays, travelled to Medina complainilig 
about the aggression of his kinsman. Despite the fact that 
(75) 1k 
--L il , 
X, 115 - 
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the caliph attempted to exercise his caliphal. influence 
to end this crisis., the other chief ý Azlam b. al-Nu 
C man 
paid no attention to the caliph's mediation. Therefore, 
Sacid b. Qays stayed in Medina until he had been sent by 
Umar to appeal to his tribe to support the Muslim forces 
in NihRwand where a battle took place between the Muslim 
and the Persian f orces in 21/642. 
(76) 
In the second indication, cUmar clearly tried to 
avoid involving himself politically in the internal affairs 
I-- (77) of these influential tribes. Ibn al-Kalbi- and al-Hamdani 
illustrate cUmar's attitude towards these matters, showing 
the caliph's caution when he was compelled to involve 
himself in the case of revenge which took place within 
Hamd5. n though one of the warring chiefs, Asnad b. Malik '? ZD 
took refuge with him. To gratify Hamdan and to end the 
crisis., cUmar paid the blood-money (diyah) instead of 
Asnad and appointed him as his official in al-Rabadhah, 
a place three days distant from Medina, thereby removing 
(76) Ibid. Salih, Tarikh, 200, who comments upon the fact 
that tArough his envoy, Ziydd b. Abihi, to these 
quarrelling. chiefs, cUmar succeeded in establishing 
peace between them. ýalih, however, quotes from Ibn 
Abi 31-Hadild. Nahj, IV, 226. In fact neither Nahj 
nor-any of the primary sources at our disposal mentions 
Ziyad's role. in this particular conflict, except Ibn 
'Abd al-Barr, Isticab, 11,525, who hints about cUmar's 
authorization to Ziyad to bring an end to the corruption 
which existed-in the Yemen, but what sort of corruption 
precisely has not been illustrated. For the partic- 
ipation -of Hamddn led by Sacid b. Qays in NAhawand, 
see al-Tabarl., 1,2619; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 111,4. 
See also Donner, 433. 
(77) Nasab, f70a; Ikl'll, X, 219. Cf. also Ibn Ham 
Jarnharat, 396. fie is known by Abu Salamah. 
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him from contact with the opposing branch of Hamdan. (78) 
In the other tribal areas of the Yemen, however., 
there is no clear picture of the political life and the 
relationship of the tribes with Medina. Despite this 
vagueness, however, we cannot accept that the descendents 
of the pre-Islamic Yemeni chiefs., such as those of the 
Himyar Kings, did not have some influence over their own 
people. It is true that some of them migrated to the 
conquered provinces, but others remained in their provinces 
exercising authority there, such as B. Manakh and 
B. Hiwal. 
(79) 
It is possible therefore, that the absence 
of important events within Himyar and the continuation of 
the tribal migrations into the conquered areas 
(80) 
might 
have led to the political obscurity in this influential 
territory. 
In all probability the first three Orthodox Caliphs 
were following the Prophet's policy towards the influential 
tribes in the Yemen. They avoided putting -themselves in 
direct involvement in the internal affairs of these tribes. 
Moreover, to gain the loyalty of influential chiefs, the 
caliphs recognized their authority over their own regions 
by au-Chorising some of them to bLecome the of f icial Medinan 
(78) Ibid. For the location of al-Rabadhah, see Yaqut, 
Mucjam, 111,24; Khaýýalahp 35-9. 
(79) The descendents of those who remained in their provinces 
emerged in the (3rd/9th century) challenging the 
caliphal regime in the area, such as B. Manakh and 
B. Uiwal (i. e. B. Yu C fir), cf. Chapter XI. F-. above. 
(80) In the early states of the conquests, Himyar officially 
participated in one group led by Dhu "'i-Kalac, but lat. -r 
their number increased amongst the new settlers of 
the conquered provinces which leads us to believe that 
their migrations continued throuc:; -hout the period of 
the Orthodox Caliphs. For early participation, see 
above. For the branches of Himyar in the conquered 
oniintries. cf. Chapter V. B. ' 
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representative there. It is noticeable that the aulhor- 
ization came from the caliph direct to these chiefs. This 
leads us to believe that the caliphs were seeking to 
gratify these influential tribes in the same way as the 
prophet had done. Therefore., Kacb b. Malik, a Hamdan 
chief., was appointed by 
C Umar as Medinan representative 
over the district which he and his people inhabited. 
(81) 
ii. c Umar an*d the Christians of Najran 
Up to the early period of cUmar's caliphate, Jumada 
II, 13/August, 6r. 34, the Christians of Najran represented 
one of the important local powers in the Yemen. The majority 
C of their power lay with B. al-Harith b. Ka b, a tribe of 
Madhhij. 
(82) 
During the last phase. of the Prophet's life 
and the early period of ' his successor, a peace treaty between 
them and the Medinan government was iIn existence. 
(83) 
Through that treaty the Christians of Najran were, to a 
certain degree, recognized as an autonomo: us group in the 
area. Therefore the unstable situation in the. Yemen,, after 
the Prophet's death in RabI7cI, ll/June, 632, 'induced AbU 
(84) Bakr to renew. the Prophet's treaty with them. Under 
(81) Al-Hamdani., Iklil, X. 1 
220Y says he has been appointecl 
-- C- over the rab' by Umar Th-e rabc is the homeland or 
I VTII group of people', cf. Ib-n Man:: -ur lisan, 120; Y 
al-Fayruz-abadi, Qamu 111,241. 
(82) For the nasab of B. al-Hariich b. Kacb, see Table 2. v 
(83) For their treaty with the Prophet, see abo-,; --,. 
For the renewal of this treaty by Abu Bakr, cf Ilb n 
Sacd, 
_TabaqHt, 
1,358; al-jI: )aladIIuI'iY Futu-h, 77; al- 
Tabari, I, 1937-f; al-iNtzv: a7, ýee also Ii, -uiJ_dulIz_ih, _, v`i', atLI- i C1 I 
160. 
(84) Ibid. 
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the terms of the treaty, NajrHn became a point of concen- 
tration for Muslim troops en route for the Yemen in the 
(85) first year of Abu Bakr's reign. 
In Jumida II, 13/August, 634, however, the peace 
treaty, between the Medinan government and the Christians 
of Najran broke down as a result of CUmar's decision 
towards them. This termination led to the eviction of the 
Christians of Najran from the area. Three different just- 
ifications have been preserved in our primary sources for 
that decision. The first-of these justifications comes 
from Abu cUbayd, al-Baladhur-1 and al-Tabarl, 
(86) 
who say 0 
that cUmar was intending to fulfil the Prophet's and AbU- 
Bakr's instructions that Islam as a religion must be unique 
in the Arabian Peninsula, which meant that those of other 
religions must leave. The second is given by another 
narrative in al-Baladhuri which reads, "One of the terms 
stipulated against the people of Najran [i.. e. the Christians] 
was not to practise usury; but when they did practise it, 
cUmar decreed that they be expelled. " 
(87) 
Therefore cUmar 
expelled them. The third of these justifications is 
-c preserved in Abu Ubayd and al-Bakri who ý--onsider them as 
c 
apostates (murtaddun). Therefore Umar wrote to them the 
(85) For the concentration of the Muslim troops in Najran at 
that time,,,:; ee 99,101 above. The treaty allowed for the 
free passage of Muslim troops through Najran, also 
imposed upon the Christians there the supply of 
weapons and horses to the ý,, Iuslim armies, see 30 above. 
(86) Abu cUbayd, Amwýl, 129; al-Baladhuri., Lutu4,77; al- 
Tabarl, 1,2162 (citing Sayf b. C Umar). See also 
I-Z: > Yaqut, Mucjam, V. 269. 
C (87) Futuh, 1,240., Eng. Tra. See also Ibn Sa d, Tabaqat, I, 
358; al-Baladhuri, Futuýi, 160. 
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following statement., " You [ the Christians of Najran] asserted 
that you were Muslims., then you became apostates. So those 
who stay in Islam and became faithful will not suffer 
because of their previous apostasy; but as for those who 
refuse [to return to Islam] and insist on Christianity, 
my protection (dhimmah) will be withdrawn from time after the 
twentieth of Ramadan. " 
(88) 
However., some of these justifications might have been 
put forward by the caliph himself, since they came to us 
through our usually reliable primary sources. Moreover., there 
is no further information in the sources at our disposal 
0 
which could illustrate the real intention of c Umar's 
decision. These justifications,, however, cannot be accepted 
as a direct reason for the eviction of the Christians of 
Najran, since they do not correspond with the nature of 
a 
the relationship of the Medinan government with those 
C (89) Christians throughout the period of Umar's predecessors. 
Furthermore these statements are in direct contradiction 
to some of the historical facts. In the following pages 
these justif ications will. be discussed individually 
beginning with the first one. 
(88) Abu cUbayd, Amwal, 130; al-Bakri, Mu C jam, 11,660. 
Theymention that cUmar directed his order to the 
people of Ruc-a-sh, one of the villages of Najran 
which was fully controlled by the Christians at 
that time. For its location., cf. al-Hamdani, ýifat, 
1,199; al-Bakri, Mu C jam, 11., 660. See also C-J Hamidullah, Watha_l_q, 130; al-Akwa , Watha 
iq, 173. 
(89) There is no indication, in the sources at our disposal 
about violation on the part of the Christians of 
Najran of their covenant ývith the Medinan government 
during the period of the Prophet and Abu Bakr. 
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Since the articles of the peace treaty between the 
Medinan government and the Christians of Najran was respected 
by both sides during the period of the Prophet and AbU- 
Bakr., the first justification is not acceptable. According 
to Sayf b. cUmar, 
(90) C Umar b. al-Khattab declared three 
important decisions at a very early stage of his caliphate, 
one of them being the eviction of the Christians of 
Najran. By that sudden decision cUmar meant only the 
Christians of Najran, whilst other free non-Muslims 
(ahl, al-dhimmah) who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula were 
not included. According to historical fact some of those 
non-Muslims remained for some years of cbmar's caliphate 
and were evicted for different reasons. 
(91) 
The second of these justifications is also 
unacceptable. Two reasons makes us doubt that the practising 
of usury was behind 'Umar's decision. The first is the 
general agreement in the sources about the good relationship 
between Abil Bakr and the Christians of Najr', -ý-n which 
leads 
us to believe the latter did not breach the treaty during 
that time. (92) The second of these reasons is the time 
(90) See al-Tabarl"', I, ý162,2165, this account is repeated 
by Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 11,298. 
(91) Such as the 
- 
Jews 
I 
of Khaybar, see Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, 
50f; al-Baladhuri, Futuý, 36,38,39,41, Al-lVa-qidi in 
al-Tabarl, 1., 2594, confirms their eviction in 20/641. 
(9-2) They 
- 
respected the treaty, therefore, their town, 
Najran, was the central assembly point of the 'Muslim 
troops during the Wars of Apostasy, from where they 
entered the Yerden, see 99,101 aboveas well as they never 
differed with Abu Bakr. 
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when cUmar declared his action against them, since that 
does not correspond with the historical facts. (93) 
For the third justification, it is enough to say 
that there is no mention in our sources of the adoption 
by the Christians of Najran as a whole of Islam., whilst 
these sources all agree that they remained Christians 
and they were evicted and lived in exile as Christians. 
(94) 
Together the appearance of the military power of the 
Christians of Najran and the escalation of the Yemeni 
the Muslims] migrations to the conquests might have 
led 'ýUmar to take a decision concerning them, i. e. the 0 
(95) Christians of Nairan, quickly. Al-Husayn b. 
(96) 
al-Aswad tells us that the people of Najran [i. e. the 
Christians] grew to forty thousand during 
C Umar's Caliphate. C> 
Ab-u YU-suf 
(97) 
records also that they collected weapons 
(93) As has already been mentioned C Umar declared his 
decision in the very early stages of his caliphate which 
means that he could not receive and investigate those 
who practised usury during these few days. 
(94) They made their treaty with the Prophet and Abu Bakr in 
order to protect their faith and C Umar evicted them 
because they wereChristians. In their new home in al- 
Najraniyyah, in Iraq, they remained Christians. For 
their new settlement., see Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, 73f; al- 
Baladhuri., Futuh, 77-9; Ibn Sa C d, Tabaq"nt, 1)358; 
Yaqut, MuCiam, V., 269f. See also Watt, M. at Medina, 128. 
(95) Cf, al-Akwac , IVath-aDiq, 
181. In July 1981, Prof. M. al- 
Ghul presented a paper at the seminar for Arabian 
Studies in which he discussed in detail the eviction 
of -the Christians of Najran by ': Umar. However, I 
have not yet managed to locate a copy of this paper. 
(96) In al-Baladhur-* Futuh, 78. Al-Tabari, 1,1987, gives 
the same number of Najranis at the time, when th, - 
Prophet died. 
(97) Kharaj, 74. 
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and horses. It. is obvious that a political reason was 
behind the caliph's decision. 
Since the location of Najran represented the northern 
gateway to the Yemeni highlands 
(98) (Najd al-Yaman) any 
opposing power which emerged there could detach the highland 
provinces from the Hijaz. This advantage was clearly 
understood by the Prophet who guaranteed the passage and 
supplies of his envoys to the Yemen by the treaty which 
(99) he made with the Christians of Najran. . It can be 
assumed that continuation of Yemeni migrations, the military 
strength of these Christians, their tribal solidarity and 
the strategic location of their town led 'ýJmar to pAy more 
attention to them than to other free non-Muslims in Arabia. 
Therefore., his eviction of them was one of the important 
decisions he made during the very early stages of his 
caliphate. 
(100) 
c In all probability, however, Umar was'not worried 
by the area possessed by these Christip-ns during the early 
years of his caliphate, since the majority of the Yemeni 
Muslim tribes were still to be found in their homeland at 
that time. It is true that officially the Yemenis joined 
the Muslim armies during Ab-u Bakr's Caliphate, but the 
intensive migrations of Yemenis to the battle fronts began 
(101) during the period of cUmar's reign. This means that 
(98) Cf . 
27 above. 
(99) See the contents-of the treaty in Ibn Sacd., abaqat, I, 
358- a! -Bala-dhuri, Futiih, 7.6. See also 
Hamildullah, 
Watha3lq, 111f; Watt, at Medina, 359f; al-Akwa'ý, 
ýVaihý,, Oiq, 94f. 
(100) Cf. 200 above. 
(101) For these migrations, see Chapter IV, -A, 
B, abo%, e. 
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at the early stages of cUmar's Caliphate, the Medinan 
regime still had supporters in the Yemen, namely the Aluslim 
tribes there, whom he could use to put down any uprising 
against his authority in the area. From the narrative of 
(102) Abu Bakr al-Hudhall it can be seen that the Yemen 
represented a major source of Muslim combatants on the 
battle fronts during the period of cUmar's Caliphate. 
To conclude, however, it can be said that by his 
eviction of the Christians of Najran at the very stages of 
his caliphate., cUmar was looking carefully ahead to the 
future of Islam in the Yemen, especially when the area 
was to become 'drained of Muslim supporters in consequence 
of the continuation of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered 
countries as they expanded. 
L, - Y The twen-, -four year period starting with the 
migration of the first Yemeni group -b the conquests in 
12/633-4 and ending with the murder of cUthman b. cAffan 
-j Dhu 1-ýijjah 35/June 656, marks the beginning of a political 
lull in the Yemeni history. The political life of the Yemenis 
was obscure and Islamic-Yemeni relations remained vague. The 
real participation of the Yemenis in the political life of 
the state emerged outside of the Yemen, their homeland, 
namely, in the copquered provinces. There they became directly 
involved in this life playing a major role in the political 
c 
events,, i. e. the murder of Uthman and the first Civil War. 
(102) In al-Tabarli, 1., 2612. Repeated in al-Baladhurll, Futudh 
300; al-DInawarl, Akhbar., 134f; Ibn al-Athir, Xamil 
111,3. They record that when the Persian forces 
gathered at Nih-awand, in northern Persia, in 21/642, 
Uthman b. cAffan advised cUmar to write to the Syrians 
to move from Syria and the Yemenis to advance from the 
Yemen. 
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CHAPTER VII 
The role of the Yemeni migrants in the uprising 
against cUthman and the Civil War 
(35-40/656-661) 
During the last phase of cUthman's caliphate, some 
of the Muslims, mainly those garrisoned in the towns 
(a-msar) of the conquered provinces, rejected his policies, 
particularly the one regarding the appointment of governors. 
This rejection developed into an uprising against the 
-0 caliph which ended in his assassination in Dhu 1-Hijjah 
35/June 656. 
Immediately after the murder of cUthman the real 
first civil war began as a result of some of the Companions 
revolting against the newly elected caliph, C All. b. Abli 
Talib. It is true that in the battles of the civil war of 
that period both sides were led by some of the Companions, 
yet the major part of their armies consisted of the 
inhabitants of the conquered provinces, which formed the 
real military power of the state. 
The Muslims, therefore, were divided into three 
factions: the first supported the new caliph; the second 
follo, wed his opponents; and some of them, especially those 
from among the Companions, were neutral. In f act two 
battles worthy of mention here are the battles of the Camel 
and of Siffin. Both of them were between 
cAll and his 
opp(---nen-'[1 s. In the first battle he fought Talhal,, b. 
c Ubayd 
Allah and al-Zuba-v-r b. al-cAwv,,, I-,, M, who had been supported 
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by the inhabitants of Basra; in the second he faced the people 
of Syria, who were led by their governor, Mucýawiyah b. Ab-1 
Sufyan, who had refused to give his oath of allegiance to 
him. The latter conflict lasted until the renunciation by 
al-Hasan b. All of the caliphate in Rabi c II., 41/August, 661. 
In fact neither the murder of OUthman nor the civil 
war is our main topic in this Chapter, the major emphasis 
of which is the role of the Yemenis (who migrated from the 
Yemen and were living in the conquered provinces at that 
time) in that uprising and the civil war. 
To illustrate the role of these Yemeni migrants in 
each event., we will study the events separately, dividing 
this chapter into two main headings: the first will Consider 
their role in the uprising against 'Uthman; the second 
will cover the role and the influence of the Yemeni chiefs 
during the time of the battles of the civil war, especially 
Sif f in. 
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A. The effect of the Yemenis on the uprising against cUthman 
I 
The uprising of the people of the garrison towns 
(Basra, Kufa and al-Fustat) against cUthman which led to 
0. 
his murder, was one of the most important events in the 
history of the Islamic caliphate. It has, therefore., 
become known traditionally as the "Great Civil War" 
(al-fitnah al-kubra). This uprising started when some of 
the inhabitants of. the garrison towns expressed openly 
their opposition to cUthmTin's policy in the last few years 
of his reign. 
(1) 
a. The Yemeni role in incitin 
. against cUthman 
In these garrison towns, where the military and 
financial power of the caliphate was cent,. red, the inhab- 
itants originated from the Muslim armies of the conquests. 
There most of the Yemeni tribes were totally opposed to 
the caliph's policy of making important appointments from 
the members of his own family. In Iraq the majority of 
them, especially the Kufans, were against it, while in 
al-Fustat the Yemenis were split into two factions, one for 
the caliph's policy, one against. In Syria the Arabs, 
including the Yemenis, all followed Mucawiyah b. Abi Sufyan, 
the governor of Syria and a relative of the caliph; hence 
they were in agreement with 
cUthmanis Policy. 
One modern scholar 
(2) 
has suggested that "The 
(1) For a detailed discussion of the uprising agalnst -cUtbman., 
see Ibn Khayyat, Ta-r'lkh,, 168ff; al-Baladhurl, AnsabIV, 
512ff; al-Tabari, I, 290ff; Ibn Abi Bakr, Tamhid 33ff. 
Cf. also Muir The Caliphate, 215ff; Salim, Tarikh 
al--dawlah al-barabiyyah, II, 26Yff; Sha 
C ban., Islamic 
history, 1,67-71. 
(2) Al-Nuss al-cAsabiyyah al-qabaliyyah, 198. 
joy 
hostilit 
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ve , emani party had started to exert its influence on political 
events since the uprising against 'Utlunan, because the 
majority of his opponents and the leaders of the revolution 
were from the Yemen. " It can be assumed that there is 
some truth in the above point of view, since the Yemeni's 
constituted the majority of the rebels. However we should 
also note that many non-Yemenis were also involved and., of 
course, some of the Yemenis were against the uprising. 
(3) 
It is probable that a large number of Yemenis participated 
in te revolution, and the appearance of a number of their 
chiefs in command of it is the reason for the above view, 
arguing that the Yemeni party had declared its own national 
solidarity openly at that time. However, there is no 
evidence in the sources at our disposal to prove that any 
Yemeni leader did in fact claim the revolt to be specif- 
ically a Yemeni uprising. 
Although many Yemenis were involved in this uprising, 
many were against it. In Egypt some of their leaders, such 
as Mucawiyah b. Hudayj al-Tujl-bl-* and al-Husayn b. Numayr 
al-Sakuni, both Kindah chiefs, took sides with cAbd Allah 
b. Sacd b. Abil -3I-Sarh C t:: ) ., 
the governor of Uthman in Egypt. 
These chiefs were later to become the leaders of cUthMan's 
party (al-cUthmaniyyah) in Egypt. 
(4) 
The Yemenis in 
(3) There were many non-Yemenis who declared their opposition 
to the caliph's policX: Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, Muhammad 
b. Abi Hudhayf ah and Arnmaý b. Yasir all of them Companions. 
(4) Cf. Ibn Muzahim, Siffin, 128. For Mucaiviyah b. Hudayj, 
see al-BaladLri, Ansab, 11,398; al-Tabaril, 1, '3392, 
98fy 3404; Ibn Katlair, Bidayah., VII 188; Ibn Ham, 
435; Ibn AbIL Bakr, Tamhld, 209,221f.. 
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Basra, it seems did not involve themselves in this event, 
for none of their leaders joined the Basrans who had gone 
to Medina to state their case. 
(5) 
Therefore, when the 
rebels tightened up their siege on the caliph's house, 
one of his relatives advised him to go to Basra to remain 
under the proection of al-Azd. 
(6) 
The Yemenis in Syria 
played no part in the uprising against cUthman and supported 
totally his governor there who had indeed sent re-inforcements 
to the caliph. These re-inforcements were led by Yazid b. 
Usayd al-Bajali, one of the Yemeni leaders in Syria, whom 
Mu'awiyah ordered to fight those laying siege to the 
caliph's house. 
(7) 
There is no doubt that most of the Yemeni rebels were 
from Kufa and al-Fustat. In all probability, however, 
the degree of influence of the Yemeni tribes in these towns 
encouraged their chiefs to challenge the caliph's governors 
and -to declare their opposition to his regime. In Kufa when 
Sa'11d b. the caliph's governor there, declared that 
he considered the rural area of Iraq (al-Sawad), to be the 
garden of the Qurashis, some of Kufan chiefs, led by Malik 
b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhcl, a Madhhiji, challenged his claim 
/0\ by attacking the police chief (ý; ahib al-shurtah . According 
(9) c to Abu Mikhnaf in al-Baladhur: ý* Amr b. Zurarah and 
(5) For the delegation-of Basra in Medina cf. al-Tabarl, 
-L 1 2955; Ibn c Abd Rabbih, al- cIqd al-Farid, XVII 69; Ibn 
1; Ibn Abi Bakr, Tamhid, 103. Bidayah, VII, 1ý3-L Kathir 
(6) Al-Kufi, Futuh, 11,227. 
Al-Baladhuril, Ansab, V, 72; Ibn al-Athii-, Kamil, 111,85. 
Al-Baladhurlli, Ansab, V., 40; al-Kufi, Futuh, II, 171i-. 
Ansab, V, 30; see also Ibn Hazm, Jan-iliarat, -11-4. 
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Kumayl b. Ziyad, both Yemenis from al-Nakhc, were the first 
Kufans to make public their wish to depose (khalc ) the 
caliph. Thus the governor was unable to confront these 
people and he wrote to the caliph asking him to expel 
them from Kufa. Accordingly, the Caliph ordered his gov- 
ernor there to deport the rebels to Syria to put them 
under the control of his strong relative IMu 
C awlyah b. 
(10) Abi Sufyan. 
Of course, if these Yemenis had not been adequately 
protected by their tribes., they wouldnot have dared to 
declare openly their objection to the caliph's policy. 
Even when they arrived in Syria they challenged Mucawlyah 
there threatening his position with opposition from their 
own clans. - Al-Kufl 
(11) 
records that when Mucawlyah. 
threatened Malik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhcl by jailing him, one 
of the Yemenis said to Mucawiyah, I'Mu c awiyah, if you jail 
him., you must know that he belongs to an innumerable clan. 
It can be very dangerous for those who challenge it. " 
As soon as Malik b. al-Ashtar and others came back 
to Kufa, opposition to cUthman increased. 
(12) 
At this 
stage the rebels of Kufa, led by two Yemeni leaders, Malik 
b. al-Ashtar and Yazid b. Qays al-Arhab-i,, left the town., 
thus preventing Saold b. al-cAs, the governor of cUthman, 
who was unacceptable to the Kufan rebels, froin entering the t) 
(10) Al-Bala-dhuri, AnsýbIV, 532; al-Kufl, Futuh., ii, 
173-5; Ibn al-Athir., Kamil, 111,70. 
FUtuh, 11,177. 
(12) Cf. al-Balzitdhurl, Ansýb, V, 44;. 'al-l, '-u-fl-, Futu-1j, II, 
190-3; al-Tabari, 1,2930. 
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town. Submitting to their pressure, the caliph replaced 
c (13) Sacid by Ab-u M-usa, al-Ash ari, a Yemeni and a Companion. 
Al-Fustat was the other town inhabited by many 
Yemenis who revolted against cUthman. Although the leader- 
ship was in the hand of such Companions as Muýammad b. 
Abi. Tjudhayf ah and Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, the bulk of the 
support came from the mainly Yemeni tribesmen. In 35/655-6, 
after he had expelled C Uthman's governor, C Abd All-ah b. 
1 -1) Abi 1-Sarh, Muhammad b. Abl Hudhayfah came to power in Egypt. 
He formed an Egyptian force, consisting of those tribesmen 
in al-Fuslat, and ordered them to move to Medina to put 
their case. The majority of this force was Yemeni. 
(14) 
In spite of their different attitudes 'towards the 
uprising against the caliphate, the Yemenis in al-Fusýaý 
supported each other on occasions, motivated by consider- 
1 (15) mentions that ations. of clan solidarity. Al-Kind' 
Kinanah b. Bishr defended Mucawiyah b. Hudayj (both of 
them from Tujib, a Yemeni tribe of Kindah, though the 
former was against cUthman and the latter one of his 
supporters) when Mucawiyah was held prisoner. 
(13) The rebels forced the caliph to appoint Abu Musa instead 
of Saclid, see al-Baladhuri,, 
-Ansd , 
Vý 44-7; al-Tabari 
1) 2930; Ibn , ",, bi Bakr Tamhid, 62f; ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 
II b ý=- - 74f. See also Sha ban, Islamic History, 1,68. 
(14) Al-Kindi, WulEh., 18; Ibn Abi Bakr, 102. See also 211 below. 
(15) Wulah, 18. Cf. also al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 11,403; 
al-Tabari, 1,3405., who report the clan solidaritý 
of iilucav; iyah b. Hudayj when he declared openly his 
att, itude towards the murder of Kinanah b. Bishr 
after the battle of ýiffin. 
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b. The Yemeni role in the murder of cUthman 
In Shawwal, 35/April, 656, when the rebels marched 
from the garrison towns Basra Kufa and al-Fustat to 
Medina, most of their leaders were Yemenis. One thousand 
men came to Medina from Kufa led by Malik b. al-Ashtar 
al-Nakh c i., a Yemeni. 
(16) 
At the same time the Egyptian 
contingent arrived there led by five leaders, four of 
whom were Yemenis, 
(17) 
whereas the leadership of the 
Basrans contained no Yemenis at all. 
(18) 
The rebels., however, took over Medina and surrounded 
the caliph's house. Although some of the Companions were 
amongst them, real control was in the hands of the leading 
rebels, especially the Yemenis. Ibn Qutaybah 
(19) 
confirms 
the role of Malik b. al-Ashtar, a Yemeni leader., as leader 
(16) Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, 1,31. In al-Tabari, 1,2954 
and Ibn Abil Bakr, 103., four leaderso among whom was 
Malik b. al-Ashtar. Ibn al-Athir, Kamil., 111,79, gives 
a different account in which he considers Malik b. 
al-Ashtar one of the four Kufan leaders who were all 
under the leadership of OAbd Allah b. al-Aýamrr/al-cAmirlii. 
(17) See al-Tabari, 1,2954; Ibn Abi-Bakr, 102; Ibn al-Athir 
Kamil, III, 
- 
79; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VII, 173, who all_ 
mention Kinanah b. Bishr al-Laythi instead of al-Tujibi. 
See al-Kindi, Wulah 17; Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqag, 222; 
al-Mascadi, . IV) 
282; al-Baladhuri, Ansa V, 
98; al-Kufl, Futuh, 11,236, who all confirm that it 
was al-Tujibi, not al-Laythi. 
(18) For the contingent of Basra, cf. Ibn cAbd Rabbih, 
cýqd, XVII, 69; al-Tabarli, 1. '2955; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, 
VII, 173f. 
Imbnah, 1,29. 
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of the rebels in Medina; when some Companions asked him to 
stop the attack on the caliph, he shoutecL to them, "When 
we arrived you came crying for him [the caliph]; by God, 
we shall not leave until we kill him. " Other Yemenis 
stood by, abusing and criticising the caliph as he was making 
a speech to the rebels in Medina. 
(20) 
-3 In Dhu 1-Hijjah 35/June, 656) the caliph was murdered 
after his house had been broken into by some of the rebels., 
the majority of whom were Yemenis. In this whole operation 
the Yemenis had played a major role. Although historical 
sources differ about the identity of the man who was actually 
involved in murdering cUthman, they agree that four Yemenis 
were the chief culprits. 
(21) 
One of them., Kinanah b. Bishr 
al-Tujibi, was mentioned in an elegy of cUthman as follows 
or- 
Oh! the best of people after three [others] (The 
c Prophet, Abu Bakr and Umar), 
(22) 
was killed by al-Tujibi who came from Egypt. 2: 3. 
(20) Al-Bal-adhuri, Ansab, V, 89, quoting an anonymous member 
of Tujib. 
(21) These are Kinanah b. Bishr al-Tujibi, Sudan b. 11ýumran al- 
Murad'i., al-Ghafiq-i b. Harb al-cAkki and Qutayrah al- 
Sakuni. Although the fifth of those involved is Yemeni, 
lie was not one of those who migrated from the Yemen 
during the conquests. See Ibn Sacd, Tabaqat, III, 73; al- 
Baladliuri, AnsHb. 
_IV, 
574; al-Ku-fi, 1!, 236; al-'Iabarl, I,, 
3017-22; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, VII, 188. 
(22) Thi. -, verse was composed by al-Walid b. cUqbah b. Abi 
Mu C it one of the relatives of cUthman. Cf. al- 
Baladhuri-, 
_Ansab, 
V, 98; IV 591; Ibi- Durayd, 222; al- 
Tttbari, 1,306-1; Tbn Abi Ba'=ý, '209. Al -:, 11, -Ls'iFdTi b Muruj , 
IV, 283) say. -, that this verse -. ý-as - -Miposed b. y U1. hma-n Is 
xife Na il-iiý bint al--F, -)-ra-1 -sah. 
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Thus the Yemenis in the garrison towns exercised a 
major influence in the uprising against the caliph. There 
is no doubt that this influence gave sufficient authority 
to their leaders to attain important positions in the course 
of the uprising. One of them, al-Ghafiql b. Uarb al-cAkk-,. 
administered Medinan affairs for five days after the murder 
of cUthman. 
(23) 
Throughout the days which followed, the 
rebels tried to persuade some of the Companions to accept 
the office of caliph. When they met with no success, - they 
turned to cAli b. Ab-1 Talib., putting pressure upon him to 
accept the post. In the negotiations between the rebels 
and some of the Companions about their acceptance of the cal- 
iphate, certain Yemeni leaders had a major influence. Malik 
al-Ashtar al-Nakhc'i strongly argued with cAl-1 that if he 
refused to shoulder this responsibility, the Muslim state 
would disintegrate. Consequently cAll' accepted and the 
first man to pledge his oath of allegiance (. baycah) was 
(24) Malik b. al-Ashtar. Because of the central role played 
(23) Al-Tabari, 1., 3073 (citing Sayf b. eUmar); see also al-DiLna- i. - wari., Akhbar', 142, who says three days only, however, 
confirming al-Ghafiql's role. Ibn Abi Bakr, Tamh1d 147, 
records that al-Ghafiqi was the prayer leader and 
Kinanah b. Bishr (al-Tujib-1) was his deputy. 
(24) Al:: Tabari, I, ý, 075 (citing al-Shaýbli); Ibn Qutaybah, 
Imamah, 1., 38. Cf. also al-Baladhuri,, Ansab, II, 
215f; Ibn Kathir, BidaVah, VII, 226, who both confirm 
this role of Ibn al-Asttar with slight differences. 
Of course, such a remarkable suggestion would be 
totally rejected by the Shicah, for e, -, ýample, al-Yacqu-b-i, 
al-Kufi and al-Isfahani. but there is no objection to, 
or comment on the above suggestion. 
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during this uprising by the Yemenis., one of the historians 
(23 
considers them in particular as those who gave oath of 
allegiance to cAli It is known that none of the rebels 
had actually declared his tribal affinity, but the fact was 
that the Yemenis were very numerous and had. been largely 
responsible for leading the uprising. This role might have 
led some of the historians to consider that they alone from 
among the Arabs gave their oath of allegiance to cAli b. 
(26) Abi Talib. 
B. The role of the Yemenis in the Civil War 
The murder of cUthman b. cAffan in Dhu ') 1-Hijjah, 
35/June, 656 marked the actual beginning of the first 
civil war in the Islamic state. 
(27) 
At that point large 
regional groups in conflict with the caliph and led by 
some of the prominent Companions came into existence. The 
first stage of this war was concentrated in Iraq, where 
the inhabitants of the country were divided into two 
factions. The Kufans took sides with the newly elected 
caliph, c Alli b. AbIl Talib, Meanwhile the Basrans followed 
(25) Al-Diyarbakr-j*-, TE-trilkh, 11,275 (citing Abu cUmar). 
(2r; ) Ibid. For the arrival of the Yemeni tribes from 
the 
C 
Yemen; in Niedina to give their oath of allegiance 
-to Ali when he was elected caliph, see 236-8 below. 
(27) Two civil wars took place during the first/seventh 
century: The firs-t between cAli b. AbT Talib and his 
opponents; the second when cAbd Allah b' al-Zubayr 
opposed B. TMarwan. For a detailed discussion of these 
wars see, Ibn Khayyaý, 
_Tarikh, 
180'Lf; al-Dinawar'l, Aklabar, 
C-I Iff; al-Tabari, 1,3087ff; 145ff; al-Ya qubi, Tarikh, II, 15-L 
ibn al-Athir, Kýmil, III, 105ff. Cf. also VIellhausen, 
The Arab Kii 75ff; Shacban j, slamic History, I, 71ff; 
YýLS4 NTya Surur, al-Fa-vat al. -Si h 68ff; Dixon, 'Uma,: yad 
Caliphate, 121ff. 
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Talhah b. cUbayd Allah and al-Zubayr b. al- c Aivivam both 
prominent Companions (the latter was also the Prophet's 
cousin), who revolted against the new caliph and were 
backed by the Prophet's widow, cA 3 ishah. The second stage 
took place mainly between the new caliph who had been 
supported by the Iaqis, both the Kufans and Basrans, and 
Mu c awiyah b. Abi Sufyan, governor of Syria and a relative 
of 'Uthman, who had been totally supported by the Syrians. 
Although the Egyptians made no direct contribution to the 
battles ofthese two stages, there is evidence that some 
of them joined the Syrian troops. Their absence from the 
confrontation can probably be attributed to their remoteness 
from the central area of conflict. 
(28) 
In spite of the fact that the oath of allegiance 
7 
had been given to cAlll b. Abli Talib in Medina in the presence I 
of the An-ý; ar and MuHajlru-n and those who came from other 
regions, the result was not a caliphate which was capable 
of unifying the people, for the factions were divided in 
their attitude towards it. In such an atmosphere of conflict, 
the caliph was faced by a strong rebellion that he could not 
hope to put down. The rebellion against the new caliph 
continued to produce military confrontations until the renun- 
clation by al-Hasan b. C Ali b. Abi Talib of the caliphate In 
Rab iC II 41/AUgLISt, 66j Mucawiyah b. Abi Sufyan succeeded him. 
This abdication, however, brought the first civil ý%,., -, r 
to an end. 
(29) 
(28) The centre of the confrontation was in Iraq. The battlo 
of the Camel, the first battle of this took pla-. ýe in 
B, isra and the second maii battle, Si-ffin, too, ýý place mi 
the north bank of the Euphrates River in Iraq. 
(29) For th-is evený, cf. II)n Khayyat, Tar-t. L-. -h, 203; al- 
Dinawari, 220; al-YDcql,, bi, Tarikh, 11,192; see also 
, SlaýLcban, Tslar-nic I llisfory, 1,77,18. 
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Two battles worthy of mention here theseare the 
battle of the Camel and the battle of Siff-in. It is not 
our aim, however, to provide a detailed study of this civil 
war, but rather to assess in particular the role of the 
Yemeni migrants in it. 
a. The loyalty of the-Yemenis to the leaders of 
antagonists 
In the battle of the Camel in Jumada II, 36/December, 
656, the Yemeni tribes living in Kufa constituted the majority 
of cAlils army. Abu Mikhnaf 
(30) 
tells us that ten thousand 
c 
warriors from the tribes oT Kufa joined Ali, most of whom 
were Yemenis. On the other hand, the Azd and other Yemenis 
in Basra supported his opponents., Talhah and al-Zubayr, 
in this battle. (31) Actually, the most important evidence 
concerning the role of the Yemeni tribes played comes in 
relation to the battle of Siffin (Dhu-3 1-Hijjah, 36-Safar, 
37/May-July, 657) between those Iraqis led by the caliph 
C- and those Syrians who supported their governor, Mu awiyah 
b. Abi Sufyan. In this battle the Yemenis formed the bulk 
of the fighting forces in both the Iraqi and the Syrian 
armies. 
(32) 
The strong influence of the Yemeni tribes in this 
war is apparent from a study of the role played by some of 
their chiefs at the time. These chiefs had the strongest 
influence on how the battles were conducted. So extensive 
was th-is influence that they came on occasions to be 
(30) In al-BaladLiuri, Ansýb, II, 235f.. Cf. Also al-D-inawarl, 
147f. Both confirm that seven tribal bgroups joined 
cAL1, 
of whom Tour were Yemenis. 
(31) Al-B., al. adhuri, Ansab II 137t; al-D-inaw-li-i 148. y 51 
(32) For a detailed discussion of their role in this battle, 
'Iff; al-Bal-dhur, Arls- see Ibn ', Muzahim, ýiffi 1.3 a1. ab, II 
29Sff; al-D1i,, -iwar1, l56ff; al-i\ý--ufT, Fut7. ', i, II, 48, ýýff. t 
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instrumental in decision-making at the highest level. Again, 
of course., the strength of the influence of the Yemeni chiefs 
was obtained from their tribal support. 
(33) 
This power 
wielded by the Yemeni tribes was the main reason why the 
rebel leaders were always striving to obtain the support 
of their chiefs. This is clearly illustrated. by a message 
sent by al-Zubayr b. al-cAwwam, one of c All's opponents, ' 
before the battle of the Camel to Kacb b. Su-r, the Azd-ii 
chief in Basra, addressin. (y him as 'Lord of al-Azd' C) 
(Sayyid al-Azd), and requesting him to be on his side. 
(34) 
Whe .n Ka cb showed his neutral attitude 
cT :5 
.91 -ishah., 
the 
Prophet's widow, . realized Kacb's position and had to cro 
personally to persuade him. She was successful in persuading 
(35)- him to join their army. The Azd in Basra., therefore., 
C 
became the most important supporters of All's opponents 
(36) 
in the battle of the Camel in Jumada II, 36/December, 656. 
As has already been mentioned, the Yemeni tribes in 
Kufa, especially Madhhij and Hamdan, were keen supporters 
(37) 
of cAli b. Abi Talib. According to al-Kufi ten thousand 
c Madhhijis were in All's army at the battle of Siffin 
(33) Especially in these regions in conflict where they 
constituted a high proportion of the Arab inhabitants. 
For their settlement in Syria and Kufa, see Chapter V, B, 
Tal-ýý, es a, b. ii. 
(34) Ibn Qutaybah, Imarnah, I. 47f. 
(35) 1, Al-Bala-dhur- -b> Ansa 11, 238. 
(36) Al--Baladhurl, Ansab, II, 237f; Al-binawari 148. 
(37) Futuh, 111,295'. 
I 
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(Dhu-3 1-Hijjah, 36-Safar, 37/May-July, 657). As for Hamdan, o 
because of their importance and their loyalty to the new 
caliph, they became closely aligned with cAli himself., 
to such a degree that Mucawiyah b. Abi Sufyan described 
them as., "The sword of cAl-1.11 
(38) 
As for their role in 
supporting cAll in the battle of Siffin, Mucawiyah expressed 
his bitterness when, after he had become caliph, he addressed 
a Hamdgni woman, Su-dah bint 'Umarah, saying "I have never 
suffered from any Arab as much as I have suffered from 
your people. [i. e. Hamdan]". 
(39) 
It may be said that 
Hamd5-n greatly impressed cAli. This can be seen when he 
addressed them at Siffln saying, "You are my shield, my 
spear, my sword and my protection. By God, if I had a 
paradise I would allot it to you alone, you people of - 
Hamdan. " 
(40) 
He even expressed his feeling towards them in- 
his verse, 
-19 -19 
iZ 
-1 
ft "". t jI 'D 
I L-4. tj L--. -W- 4--4->- t- 
L Jx- 
If I were a door keeper of paradise, 
I would say to Haindan, "Enter in peace. " 
In Syria, however, the Yemeni tribes were also an 
important part of Mu C awlyah's force and, as can be witnessed 
from a study of his troops at Siffin, they were in the 
(38) Al-Kufi, 11,488. 
(39) Al-Ku-fl 
, Futu-h,, 111,89-93. 
(40) Ibn Muzahim, 437; al-Kufi, 111,43. 
(41) Ibn PIuzaliim, 437; al-Ilimyari, Shams, 110. See ', I-lso al- 
1,. ts, ', 'tjid San a 12. 
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C- majority. The most prominent Yemeni tribes with awlyah 
were Himyar, Kindah and C Akk. 
(42) 
Muc av., iyah, therefore., 
considered that the fundamental strength of the Syrian 
f orces lay in the Yemeni tribes, and so he declared war 
against C Ali relying on their support. This is very clear 
from his poetry : 
11 
--i 
L: 
-J 
I 
ir- e -: I- 
1 L14J i 
If Syria gives [me] Yemeni obedience, 
of the sort that is described by their chiefs in their meetings 
If they do, I will attack cAll with a -11'ront., 
I 
which will devastate him completely ( literally; everything 
fresh and dry] 
(43) 
For this reason Mucawiyah delayed his reply to cA-11-T whe, n 
the latter asked him to clarify his position. He must 
either give an oath of allegiance or be prepared to fight, 
'All said. In fact the reason is that Mu c awiyah was trying 
to discover the view of the Syrians and of the' senior Yemeni 
leaders. 
(42) Also some of Khathcam, Hamdan and al-Azd were in 
his army, but they were in the minority. 
43) Cf. Ibn Muzahim., 33; al-Mubarrad, Kamil, I., 190f. See 
also al-Shamahi,, al-Yaman, 81. In al-Kufi, Futuh, 
11) 379, Wabilll-Shaml Oind-i (usbatun YamanlyVatuTi. 
In al-Baladhuri, 
-Ansab, 
11,289) Wa-q? ýd manahatn-C' 
I-Sha, mu afdaJa taatin, instea of Ini-'l-ShaTnu a'tat 
tdý-atan Yamanivvatan- 
a-- 11 
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b. The influence of the Yemeni chiefs in the war 
In all probability cAll-, by sending one of the Yemeni 
leaders who supported his cause, Jar-ir b. cAbd Allah al- 
Bajali, to Muc awiyah, intended to give this responsibility 
to a man who had influence among the Syrians, especially those 
of Yemeni origin. Therefore, when cAl-I nominated Jar-lr for 
this mission, he addressed him saying, "as you see, I have 
many Companions of the Muhajirun and the Ansar who are 
qualified for this mission, but I have chosen you in part- 
icular because the Prophet described you as the best of 
11(44) the Yemenis. "And Jar--.; Lr, accepting the mission, said 
to cAll, "I will ask the Syrians to obey you and recognize 
you as a caliph; for most of them are my people, my clan 
and my citizens. " 
(45) 
So., when Ivlu'cawiyah received Jarlr, he was in a very 
difficult position because of the influence of Jarir upon 
the Syrians, especially those of Yemeni origin. Mucawiyah 
immediately consulted cAmr b. al-cAs, one of the Companions 
and his special military consultant. The latter agreed that, 
it was too dangerous to withhold the oath of allegiance to ZD 
C Ali as suggested by Jarir, whom cAmr had described as the ZD 
(46) C C- best Iraqi envoy. So Amr b. al- As suggested that ZD 
the best -thing was to convince Shurahbil b. al-Simt a! -Kiindii, 
a Yemeni chief in Syria who played a major role in the war, 
(44) Ibn Muzahim, 28; al-ýMubarrad, Ka-mil, 1,190; al-Ku-f -L: -, 
IT, 374. 
(45) Ibn Muzahiln, 27f; al-l-ý'Ufl, IT, 373. 
.c (46) Ibn ýMluzzahim, 44; al-Dinav; ari, 161; al-, ý, -ufi 
11,397. 
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to support Mucawiyah by persuading a few influential people 
to say that cAli had killed cUthman. Then Alu C awiYah could 
s11 retain the loyalty of the Syrians when he rejected 
the request to grant an oath of allegiance to cAli. 
(47) 
Mu'awiyah agreed to cAmr's idea and when Jarlr urged 
him to give his reply, he answered him saying, "By God I 
am not waiting for anybody's opinion except that of 
Shurahbil, for he is an important Syrian chief. I do not 
want to make a decision without him, so when he comes I 
will consult him and give you my final decision at our 
(48) 
first meeting. " When. Shurahbil met the Syrian leaders 
in Damascus he was totally convinced by them that cAli 
had killed cUthman. In this context Shurahbil pressed 
C- Mu'awiyah not to obey cAll, saying, "Mu awlyah., it has 
become clear to me on the basis of just witnesses that cAli 
killed cUthman unjustly, and by God, if you give him your 
oath of allegiance, we will drive you out of Syria. So 
send that man [ Jarlir, cAll's envoy] back to the one who 
I sent him. For by God, the only thing we have for cAll .V t> 
is the sword. tj 
(49 
Accordiný?: to Ibn Muzahim, 
(50) 
(47) Ibid. It seems that C Amr intended to nominate Shuraýbil 
in particular to face Jarir because of the enmity of 
Shurahbil for Jar1r. Al-Najashl, the poet of the 
Iraqi army, says; 
Shurahbil, it was not for the faith that you left us, 
but because of your hatred for Jarir al-ýIaliki. * 
See Ibn Muzahim, 51: al-Kufi, 11, -102. 
(48) Al-Kufi, 11,292. 
161; al-T\-ufi, II, -,, 01,, 10- Qi im, 4 7; aI ('19) Cf. Ibn MuzL-l 
(50) Siffln, 47. 
I- 
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that was the time when TMucawiyah realized that Shuraýbil 
had reached a decision to fight the Iraqis and that all 
the Syrians would follow him. 
In fact the decision of Shurahbil came to be a 
declaration of war against cAll. Mucffwiyah immediately 
sent back cAll's envoy saying to him, "Go back to your 
leader and tell him what you have heard from the people 
of Syria. " 
(51 ) 
Thereafter, the Yemeni leaders in Syria 
evidently appeared to be supporting Mucawiyah. Three of 
them played a major role in recruiting for Mucawiyah's 
cause. The first was Shurahbil b. al-Simt al-Kindi, who 
went throughout Syria, persuading people to follow 
Mucawiyah and was, as such, extremely successful. 
(52) 
The second was Abu Muslim al-Khawlani, who wandered around 
the Syrian towns taking cUthman's blood-stained garment 
53) 
and asking people -to join him in retalia-tion. ( The third 
was Malik b. Hubayrah, of Kindah, who was the first to give 
his oath of allegiance to Mucawiyah. 
(54) 
It is noticeable that, just as the Yemenis had had 
a strong role in the declaration of war, they also had the 
same influence on its termination. So in the battle of 
Siffin when Mu C awiyah realized the superior strength of 
the Iraqi army he began negotiations to cease hostilities. ZD 
(51) Al-Ku-fl-, 11,404; al-Dinawari, 162. 
(52) Al-Ku-fi-, II, 406f; al-Dinawri., 161f; Ibn Muza-him, 50f. 
I 
(53) Al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 11,291. 
(54) Ibn Vnizahim, 80f. 
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Again Mu-cawiyah thought of persuadinzo,: > some of the Iraqi 
tribal chiefs to put pressure on their commander., cAll., to 
accept peaceful negotiations. He decided to contact 
al-Ashoath b. Qays al-Kindi, one of the Yemeni leaders in 
the Iraqi army, to use his position to enforce his opinion 
in the decision making. Mucawiyah, therefore., selected 
Mu awiyah b. Hudayj al-Tujibi, one of the Kindah chiefs in 
the Syrian army, to fulfil this mission of persuading al- 
Ash cath to stop fighting and to deliver up the murderers 
of cUthman. 
(55) 
Wh en Ibn Hudayj failed in his mission., 
Mu'awiyah b. Abi Sufyan repQated the attempt through his 
brother, cUtbah, saying to him, "Speak softly to al-Ash c ath, 
because if he is able to bring peace, people will accept 
it.?, 
(56) 
Although cUtbah tried hard to change al-Ashcath's 
mind and always described him respectfully as the head 
of the Iraqis and the Lord of the Yemenis (Sayyid ahl al- 
Yaman), he failed and thus fighting continued. 
(57) 
The military confrontations during the battle of 
Siff in (Dhu -1 1-Hijjah, 36-Safar, 37/May-July, 657) did not 
stop until the Syrians finally raised their Qurans on their 
spears. That., together with the pressure exerted by some 
of the 'Yemeni leaders in -the Iraqi army, was eventually 
sufficient. Some of the Yemeni chiefs in the Iraqi army 
were very influential in exercising pressure upon cAli 
to accept the arbitration (tahk-l'm) threatening the use of 
(55) Al-Kufi, II, 273f. 
(56) Ibn Qutaybah, Imamalli, 1,87; Ibn llluzahim, 408. 
(57) Tbn Outayb, ih, Iniamah, 1,88; Ibn Muzahim, 408. 
Al-Kuf 1,111) 27 7, reads Sayyid qaba7'll Kindah. 
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their tribal influence if he did not accept. One of those 
powerful Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, al-Ashcath b. 
Qays al-Kindi, who was accompanied by a number of Yemenis, 
asked C Ali to accept the arbitration. When cAl-1 hesitated, 
he threatened him saying "Accept the people's call for 
consulting the Quran, or otherwise, by God, none of the 
Yemenis will fight for you with an arrow, sword or 
spear. " 
(58) 
So under this pressure cAl-1 agreed to stop 
fighting and accept the arbitration. 
(59) 
Both sides in the conflict, during this war, always 
had to take account of the positions and opinions of the 
Yemeni chiefs, especially during the fighting between cAli 
and Mucawiyah. The two conflictinggroups worked to win 
over the opposing Yemeni leaders to their own side, using 
their Yemeni supporters for these missions. In this context 
Sacid b. Qays al-Hamdani., a chief of Hamdan in the Iraqi 
army, had been authorized by cAl-I to write to Shurahb-il b. 
al-Simt al-Kindi, a chief of Kindah on the Syrian side, to 
warn him not to support Mucawiyah b. Abil Sufyan. 
(60) 
-I (58) Ibn Qutaybah, 
' 
Imamahl 1,95; al-Yacqubi, 
-Týrlkh, 
II, 
165; al-Kuf-l, 111,307. Cf. also Ibn Muzahim ýiff 
483f who records the verses of the Syrians which confirm 
that the decision makers on the Iraqi side are three, 
all of them are Yemenis. 
(59) However., we do not intend to confirm here that Lhe Yemenis 
alone exercised pressure on cAl-1 to accept arbitration. 
On one hand, we agree with these sources, both the 
primary and-) the modern research, which confirm the role 
of al-qurra- on the Iraqi side, to stop fighting, 
such as Abi Mikhnaf in al-Tabari, 1,33330; Ibn 'iý, Iuzahim, 
489f. Cf. also Surur, al-Hayat al-Siy2,. ýKýjh, 77; Lewis, 
Arabs in History, 63; Shacban, Islamic Hist 1 75 
the latter confirms the role of al-Ash ath in addition 
to the role of urra by saying "M'ost of the Q,, -trr; l 
accepted arbitration, but the decisive factor in--c-All's 
-- the action of al-A-Slicath b. Qays- "on the acceptance wal-7) I 
other hand, we again confirm the role of the Yemenis 
represented by some of -their Chiefs ývlio exercised pressur(-- 
on 
ý411 to stop fightinz C, 
(60" Cf. K11fi, 11,109-11. 
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Mucawiyah was so concerned about the doubts of Dhu-ýl-Kalac 
al-Himyarl, a chief of Himyar in the Syrian army, about 
fighting cAll and was never at rest until Dhu- :) l-Kalac 
was killed. Mucawiyah, therefore., expressed his concern 
-C 
saying "If Dhu I-Kala were alive he would have gone over 
to cAll with half of our people. 
After the battle of Sifflin,, Muc-awiyah's followers 
controlled Egypt and, of course, it was only natural that 
his party flourished there, having gained its support from 
influential Yemeni chiefs such as Mucawiyah b. ýIudayj 
(62) 
al-Tujibi and al-Iýuý; ayn b.. Numayr, both of Kindah. 
All soon realised the weakness of his representative in 
Egypt, Muhammad b. AbIl' Bakr. The latter failed to control 
the country and to confront such Yemeni leaders as those. 
By endeavouring to retake Egypt, C All replaced Aluh. ammad 
b. Abi Bakr with a strong Yemeni leader, Malik b. al-Ashtar 
al-Nakh c 1. 
(63) 
ýIuc awiyah b. Abi Sufyan, therefore, was 
very disturbed when he learnt of the appointment of this 
Yemeni chief who was capable of influencing the other 
Yemenis in Egypt. As it happened, when the new governor 
reached al-Qulzum he was given poisoned honey to drink and 
died instantly- (64) On this occasion Mucawiyah was 
(61) Cf. Ibn Muzahim., 341; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 11,143. 
c- (62) Cf. Ibn Muzahim, 128. For the role of Mu awlyah b. 
Hudayj, see ibn Hazm, JCamharat, 435; Ibn Hajar, Isabah V 111. 
63 Al-Yacqu-bi, Tarlikh, 11,170; al-Baladhuri, Ansab, II, 398, - 
al-Tabari, 1) 3392. 
(64) Al-Yacqubl, Tarikh 11,170; al-Baladhuri Ansab II 298f; 
al-Tabari, 1,3393; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil,, III, 17u'; all 
coniirm that Mu'oawiyali -xas involved in this operation. 
Al. -Kindil Wulah, 29,33-6; and al-, %Iaqrlzl, Kliitat 
11 82, both 
do not mention this involvement. 
-226- 
delighted and said, 'IcAli had two right supporting arms, 
one of them was cut of f at Sif f in and the other was cut 
of 
.f today [meaning the death of Malik b. al-Ashtar] 
"(65) 
c. The appearance of Yemeni solidarity during the conflict 
It is noticeable that during the first civil war the 
Yemeni tribes were not unified on any one side, but even 
within one tribe there was a division of loyalties. So in 
the battle of Carriel in Jumada II, 36/December, 656, the 
Yemenis of Basra were fighting the Yemenis of Kufa. 
(66) 
-3 Furthermore, at the battle of Siff-in (Dhu 1-Hijjah, 
36-ýafar 37/May-July 657), cAli b. Abll Talib directed every 
Yemeni tribe in his army to confront its relatives on the 
Syrian side. 
(67) 
From this it became clear that the Yemenis 
appeared to be the central force in all the conflicting 
armies in that period. 
It is very curious that these Yerneni tribes never 
forgot their tribal solidarity, though they had differing 
attitudes towards that conflict. This was displayed by one 
of their chiefs in the Syrian army, Shuraýbil b. al-Simt 
al-Kindi., replying to Sacid b. Qays al-Hamdanj, chief of 
Hamdan on the Iraqi side, when the latter urged him not to 
C- 
support Mu awiyah, saying, "By God, I am affiliated neit'i-Ier 
to Iraq nor to Syria, I am simply a man from the Yemen. " 
(68) 
Ibn (65) Al-Baladhuri, Ansab 11 399; al-Tabarl, 1,339--',; 
al-Athir, K, -amil, 111,178. 
(66) Al-Tlabari, 1,2182: al-Kufl, 11,141. 
(67) Ibn Muzahim, Siffin, 257; al-Kuf-, L, I7L, 299. 
(68) Al-Kufi, 11,411. 
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Another example is when Subrah b. Shayman al-Haddanli, 1 chief 
of al-Azd in Basra, decided to take the side of cAl-i's 
opponents in the battle of Camel. Kacb b. Sur, another 
Azdi chief there, advised him against it saying, "listen 
to me and depart with your people and leave these who are 
-C descended from Mudar and Rabi ah., for they are brothers; 
if they are reconciled to each other, all will be well; 
but if they fight each other we will be their ruler C) I 
tomorrow. " 
(69) 
A third example of Yemeni tribal solid- 
arity is when the Azd of Iraq were directed to fight 
their relatives in the Syrian army at the battle of 
Siffin. On this occasion Mikhnaf b. Sulayman al-Azdi., I 
their leader in the Iraqi army said, "It is ironic that 
we are directed to fight our people and they are urged 
to fight us. By God these are surely our own arms, which 
we shall cut with our own arms and our wings; we shall 
eliminate them by means of our swords. , 
(70) 
Yemeni solidarity appeared also through the rivalry 
in the leadership of the troops in both the Iraqi and 
the Syrian army. it Is well known that all through these 
battles of the first civil war, the tribes were led by 
their own chiefs., with ultimate leadership resting with the 
two original opponents themselves. It sometimes happened 
that more than one tribe was grouped under one mants 
leadership, and these were mostly the tribes which were 
rela ýed to each other. This fact is exemplified by the 
(69) Al-Baladliur-L, Ansab, 11, -937; al-Tabarl, 1, I 
3178. 
(TO) Ibn Aluzahim, ýiffin, 262; al-Tabari, I, oJ03- 
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grouping of Himyar and Hamdan in the Iraqi army under the 
leadership of the latter's tribal chief. 
(71) 
But, 
sometimes such a grouping occurred between non-related 
tribes., i. e. a Qabtani and an cAdnan-l: - tribe under a leader 
selected for his personal leadership qualities or military 
experience. It is noticeable here that none of the Yemeni 
tribes from either side that joined the war, especially 
during the battle of Siff-in, agreed easily to fight under 
non-Yemeni leaders. On this occasion we shall give two 
examples on both sides, the Iraqi and Syrian, showing 
the rejection of those Yemenis who objected to the leader- 
ship of a non-Yemeni. The first is briefly as follows. 
When an Iraqi army left Kufa for ýiffin, the leadership of 
Kindah and Rabi c ah (the former a Yemeni tribe, the latter 
c Adnani) was given to al-Ashcath b. Qays al-Kindl. As cAll 
was dissatisfied with this arrangement, he replaced 
al-Ashcath with Hassan b. Makhduj al-Hanafi, a chief of 
Rablcah. (72) This action of cAll angered the Yemenis in 
his army to such an extent that fighting was about to break 
7C 
out between the Yemenis and Rabi ah. The crisis was not 
defused until Uassan went to al-Ashcath and offered him the 
leadership of Kindah, 
(73) 
moreover, c All appointed al-Ashcath 
as a general leader of the right wing of the IraqJL armies 
in order to satisfy the Yemeni tribes. 
(74) The second 
example was on the side of the Syrian army. During the C) 
(71) AI-Baladhurli-, Ansab, Ii, 235f. 
_ (72) Ibn ýMuzahim, Siffin, 137; al-Kufi, 111,105- 
2. 
(73) Ibn Muz-ahim, 138f; al-K'u-f'T, 111., 105. 
(74) Ibn Muzahim, 140. 
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battle of Siffin, Alucawiyah divided the leadership of his 
troops between some of the Mudaris, ignoring the Yemenis. 
Consequently, the latter appeared most reluctant to be led 
by a man from other than their own tribes, especially since 
they felt that they were the majority of this army. Duly 
they protested to Mucawiyah and one of their chiefs., cAbd 
Allah b. al-Harith al-, Sakuni expressed their objection in 
verses; 
ý-J L, 
L: J I L-ý-5 ,0 
Mu'awiyah, you envoked our old hatred, 
you invented in Syria what was not known. 
You promoted Busr and his friends [Mularis] , 
while the only people' around you are Yemenis. 
(75) 
yet again the Yemenis in the Syrian army were not satisfied 
until Mucawiyah brought them closer to himself. 
(76) 
In Safary 37/July 657, when the Iraqi and Syrian 
armies stopped fighting at ýiffin on the basis of accepting 
arbitration, each side nominated its representative. 
NIU c awiyah nominted c Amr b. alcA, ý. But, when 
'-Ali wanted 
to select his representative, he was compelled to satisfy 
the ambition of the Yemeni chiefs. The latter totally 
refused to accept a situation in which the two sides' 
representatives were both to be mudarls. Being motivated 
(75) Ibn ýjuz. -, jýiim, 424f; al-Kufi 1 , III, 
15f. 
,---III) (76) Ibn Aluzahirn,,, l 25; al-Ku-Fi, 
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by tribal solidarity the Yemenis compelled cAlli to appoint 
C- one of them Ab- u INIusa al-Ash ari. Although cAll did not 
trust Abu Musa, he found no way of refusing their demarid. (77) 
(78) Shacban in his book t-nds to confirm that it was the 
-7- 
qurra alone who imposed on cAli the choice of Abu- Musa, 
ignoring the pressure of the Yemenis. Two historical facts 
lead us to believe that tribal solidarity was a main factor 
of this choice. The first is that cAll had already chosen 
one of the qurra ) when he nominated cAbd Allah b. cAbbas to 
this mission. 
(79) 
The second is the strong rejection by 
the Yemenis in the Iraqi army to Ali's initial nomination 
of cAbdAllah b. cAbbas. This rejection was expressed 
by al-Ashcath b. Qays al-Kind-l' who protested, saying 
"No., by God, two Muqaris will never make the decision, but 
select a man from the Yemeni people, if your opponents 
(8 . 0) 
select a Mudari. " Moreover) the Yemenis ignored the 
(77) See, al-Ya C qubi, Tarikh, 11,165; Ibn Muzahim ýiffin, 
17 C --); ibn 6 Abd al- 500 (citing Abi Ja far Mu4ammad b. cAll 
Barr, IsticabjV, 1764 (quoting-al-Waqid-i). In 
I 
al- 
Baladhuri, Ansa I 111 
333; al-Dinawari, 195; Abi 
Mikhnaf in al-Tabari, 1.3333; al-Kufi, IV, 3, cAll 
imposed by botft al-Ash C ath b. Qays and the qurra - In 
al-jahid , al-Bayan waýl-Tab"'yIn 
1) 183, '6-y-the 
Iraqis. 
(78) Islamic History, 1,75. Al-qurra Reciters of the 
Quran, see Ibn ManH 6 ur, lisan al- Arab, 1,130; 
al-Zabldi, Týj al- Arus, 1,364. 
(79) Cf. al-Tabarl, I, 3333; 
_Ibn 
Muzahim, 499; Ibn al- 
Jazari, Tabaqat al-qurra IY 42ýf. 
(80) Al-Yacqu-b-i, Tarlikh, 11,165; Ibn Muzahim, 500., al- 
Kufi, IV, 3. See also al-Durli, Muqadjimah, 59. 
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f act that cAl 11" had told them that their man - Abu- Miu-sa 
might be deceived by cAmr b. al-cAs. Al- Ashcath b. 
Qays replied to cAli- saying, "By God, if they [The 
arbitrators] decide what we dislike and one of them is a 
Yemeni, that will be better for us than if two Muýariis 
decide what we like. " 
(81) 
Thus., to conclude, the Yemeni migrants played a 
major role in the uprising against CUthman and the Civil 
War. In the first event they formed the majority of the 
rebels, while the Yemeni chiefs apparently emerged in 
inciting hostility against cUthman and his murder. The 
strong influence of these Yemeni tribes also appeared 
in the course of the Civil War, since their chief s became 
decision-makers in both the declaration of war and its 
termination. However, the role of these Yemeni chiefs in 
these events extended to -their homeland, -the Yemen, where 
their support to the antagonistic leaders reflected on the 
political situation of the country throughout this period. 
Consequently the Yemen was politically affected by the war, 
which spread throughout its provinces, as will be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
(81)Ibn Muzahim, 500- al-Kufi, IV, 3,4; See also al-Du-r 1,59; 
al-Nuss '. al-cAsabiyyah, 
199. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
The Political situation in the Yemen at the 
time of the Civil War 
(35-40/656-61) 
After the murder of cUthman b. cAffan, the third 
Orthodox. Caliph, in Dhu- ýl-Hijjah 35/May 656, both the inhab- 
itants of Medina and those responsible for his death agreed 
c 
upon All b. Abi Ta 
former was that the 
new Caliph also had 
immediately- ordered 
lib as Caliph. The main request of the 
governors of cUthman be changed; the 
the same thought in mind. Thus he 
the governors of cUthman to leave 
their offices. -In the Yemen, 
cAll appointed two 
ccc-3 
governors Ubayd Allah b. al- Abbas in San a and Sacid b. 
I 
Sacd b. cAbadah in al-Janad. 
(2) 
However, there is no 
mention in the sources at our disposal of cAli's governor 
in Hadramawt. 
With the assumption of the Caliphate by cAll and the 
resulting Civil War between his followers and those of 
C Uthman b. cAffan (al-cUthmaniyyah), the repercussions of 
this struggle were felt in the Yemen. 
(3) This situation 
c Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, 37 ff; al-Ya qubi, Tarikh, I I, 
154 ff; al-Tabarl, I. 3066ff. 
(2) Ibn Samurah, Tabaqa-L, 42f; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 61; 
c Asjad, 19; Ibn al- aybac, Qjjrrat,, 1,82-4; Bughyat, 211); 
Ab-u Makhramah, Ta-cikh, 11,91. For c Ubayd Alldh only, 
see al-Tabari, 1,3089, al-Yacqubi., Tarikh, 11,155; 
al- Razi Tarikh, 172; Ibn c Abd al-Barr, Isticab, III, 
1009; Ibn al-Athir, LJ: ýd, 111., 340. For Sa=id, see 
Ibn Hajar, Isabah., IV, 97Y i%, ho says over the Yemen. 
(3) Smith, "History of San Ca3 5'-) . 
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led the historians to pay more attention to the political 
situation in the Yemen, especially after the arbitration of 
C 
ýiffin in Rabi I 38/August 658. This chapter will 
cover the effect of the civil war on the political 
situation in the Yemen during the period of the fourth 
Orthodox Caliph, c All b. AbT Talib (35-40/656-61). 
In fact throughout the first two years of cAli's 
Caliphate, Dhu 0 1- Hijjah, 35-RabicI, 38/May 656 - August 658, 2-: 0 
the Yemen passed through a quiet and stable political 
period, as it had during the period of his predecessors. 
Our sources are all silent on the question of the political 
situation in the Yemen during these two years. This 
silence is a result of their concentration on the stage 
on which the events of the Civil war were being played 
out. This stage included both Iraq and Syria, and at 
times, Egypt. 
(4) 
Consequently, the rest of the Islamic 
provinces, including the Yemen, were mentioned only incid- 
entally during these two years. 
However, when the diplomatic conflict began between 
c C- 
Ali and Mu awiyah after the arbitration of ýiffin in 
there emerged in the Yemen sudden RabicI, 38/Auoust 658,, 
activities both on the part of the supporters of 
cAll and 
C- 
also those of Mu awiyah. Each of these two groups took 
(4) Whereas the battles which took place during the civil 
war wer'e concentrated on these territories, such as 
the battle of the Camel and Siffin, cf. Chapter VII, B 
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sides with one of the opposing leaders. By those actions 
the Yemenis became divided into three factions. Two of 
them involved themselves with hostilities, whilst the 
third faction remained neutral. Thereupon, two parties 
were established in the area. The first comprised the 
supporters of cAll b. Ablii Talib who were traditionally 
known as "the party of cAlli" (Shl C at cAll). The second 
was made up of those who sympathised with Mucawiyah b. 
Abi Sufyan who later became known as the supporters of the 
Umayyads (Ansar BanL-t Umayyah). 
The members of the latter were originally the 
followers of cUthman (al- c Uthmaniyyah) 
(5) 
who had been 
angered by his murder and who now gathered under the leader- 
ship of Mucawiyah, the governor of Syria at that time and a 
C 
relative of cUthman. Mucawiyah accused Ali of being a part 
of the conspiracy to murder cUthman and of protecting the 
murderers. 
(6) 
By that claim, Mucawiyah succeeded in 
gaining the supporters of cUth'man on his side in his con- 
flict with cAl-l., bringing the Umayyad party into existence. 
Subsequently, Mucawiyah was able to oppose the fourth 
Orthodox Caliph both politically and militarily and his 
followers spread throughout the Islamic provinces, including 
the Yemen. 
To illustrate the political situation in the Yemen 
during the. period of the fourth Orthodox Caliph, 
(5) For a detailed discussion of al- C Uthmaniyyaln, 
cf. al-Jalaiz al- C Uthmanlyyah, passim. 
(6) Forthe MUrder of cUthman, cf. 212 above. 
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(35-40/656-661) we shall divide this chapter into two sections. 
In the first we will study the political situation in the 
Yemen during the first two years of cAll"s caliphate.? 
- Z) -C Dhu I-Hijjah, 35-Rabi I 38/May, 656-August 658. The second 
section will cover the political scene in the Yemen after 
the arbitration of Siffin and the appearance of political 
parties, showing relations of the Yemenis with the Alids' 
and the Umayyads' two leaders in the struggle, cAli in Kufa 
and Mucawlyah in Damascus., through to the murder of the former 
in Ramadan 40/May 661. 
A. The political situation in the Yemen before the 
arbitration of Siffin 
The sudden upsurge of activity in the political conflict 
between the supporters of cAl-l and those. of Mu'awiyah in the 
Yemen af -ter the arbitration of Sif f in, Rabic I 38/August, . 658, 
was a continuation of the previous squabbles between members 
of the two parties in the area which had taken place during 
the first two years of cAll's reign. The presence of cAll's 
governors in -the Yemen, as well as his military success 
in the battles of the Camel and Siffin might well 
have led. the supporters of Alucawiyah in the area to 
practise their activities secretly during these two years. t> 
They were particularly careful in what they did in the 
centres of cAl-i's governors in the Yemen, namely in Sanca 
and al-Janad. Yet certain influential Yemeni tribes 
participated openly in the civil war on both sides, since 
they had been sent as re-inforcements to both arinies in 
t he c on fIic ILI n, 1 
(7) 
g the f irst t%,. -o years of cAli's caliphate. 
(7) Foý-- the Yemeni role durin, T this period, cf. Ch, ýpter VII, B. 
above 
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Of course., the establishment of both the Alid and 
Umayyad parties in the Yemen must have been backed by exper- 
ienced people in the area with a great deal of knowledge of 
local tribes. It is quite logical that Yemeni tribal 
chiefs., who had settled in the conquered areas and joined 
one of the two opposing leaders, together with some Medinan 
officials who had occupied posts in the Yemen during the 
period of OUthman's reign, had taken part in forming these 
two parties. So. in order to illustrate how these parties 
were established., let us study each party individually. 
a. The establishment of the Alid party 
As has already been seen, some of those Yemeni chiefs 
who had settled in the conquered provinces played a, major 
role in leading the uprising against cUthman and in sup- C> 
porting cAl-I's caliphate. 
(8 
That role, however, has led 
some of our historians to confirm that the oath of allegiance 
given to cAli came mainly from the Yemenis. 
(9) Their part 
in events did not stop at this stage, but they extended 
their activities throughout the regions of their homeland 
appealing to the Yemeni tribes to support 
cAll's. caliphate. 
As a result of the activities of these Yemeni 
chief, s delegations of their tribes, who had been in the 
Yemen at that time, came to Medina to give the. oath of alleg- 
iance to the new Caliph on behalf of their people. 
(10') 
For the role of these chiefs, cf. Chapter VII, B. b. above. 
-c The account of Abu Amr in al-Diyar-bakri, Tarikli, II, 276. 
(10) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal 
that such Yemeni deleiations gave their oath of 
allegiance to either Umar or 
cUthm-, -tn. 
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Al-Kufl describes the arrival of these Yemeni delegates 
in Medina and explains their coming by saying, "When the 
Yemenis were informed that cAli became Caliph, they vol- 
untarily gave their oath of allegiance then they came to C> J, 
congratulate him in Medina. One of these delegates was 
-C -3 Rif a ah b. Wa il al-Hamdani who expressed the loyalty of 
the other delegates to cAlT, by saying : 
ji 
We march to join cAli, the supreme; in a 
best group of noblemen and generous. 
(12) 
Al-Kufl (13) intends to confirm that the Yemeni 
tribes were the only ones who sent delegations to 
Ali, omitting the other Arab tribes. Of course other 
non-Yemeni tribes must have sent delegates to give their 
oath of allegiance to cAlli, since tribal. leaders other than 
the Yemenis had been involved in the murder of cUthman 
and had supported cAli's caliphate. 
(14) 
However, two 
facts lead us to realize why al-Kufi recorded only the 
Yemeni delegations to Medina. The first is the dominant 
role of the YEmOnis in the uprising against cUthman and in the 
Medinan affairs after the murder of the Caliph. 
(15) 
The 
Futuh, 11,252. 
(12) Ibid. 
Futuh, 11., 252-6. 
(14) Cf. 212-14 above. 
Cf. 213-4. above. 
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second is the enthusiasm of those Yemeni chiefs, who were 
C amongst the rebels in Medina in choosing Ali for the 
Caliphate. (16) That great enthusiasm might have led 
these chiefs to intensify their activities in urging 
their relatives in the Yemen to give the oath of alleg- 
iance to cAll. Therefore, Malik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh c 1. * 
one of the Yemeni chiefs who led the rebels against cUthman 
and supported cAli, happily appeared in Medina with the 
arrival of the Yemeni delegations. That willingness on the 
part of Malik b. al-Ashtar leads us to believe that cAll 
might have received a promise from some of these Yemenis., who 
were on his side, to keep their own tribes loyal to him. 
Therefore., when the Yemeni delegations reached Medina., 
Malik b. al-Ashtar accompanied them and approached cAl--L. 
saying loudly: 
- 
A, 
-o S- 
-- ____ I 
A group of the best people have come to you, 
Yemenis., both settled peoples and bedouins. 
Because Hamdan was one of the most loyal of the 
Arab tribes which supported cAlll against his opponents, 
their relationship with the new Caliph was not restricted 
to those Hamdanis who were settled in Iraq, but extended 
also to their territory in the Yemen. 
(18) 
It can be 
assumed that the Hamdan chiefs in Iraq were responsible 
for -the increased loyalty among their fellow tribesmen 
Cf. 213-4. above 
(17) Al-Ku-f-li, Futu-Ii, 11,254. 
Cf. . -, 18ff below. 
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in their homeland towards cAll b. Abli Talib. An indication 
of that support was the correspondence between their chiefs 
in Kufa, encouraging their people in the Yemen to hold a 
similar position towards cAll. An example of that was the 
role of Yazid b. Qays alm-Arhabli. a Hamdan chief in Kufa, 
who appealed to his people to support cAll's authority in 
the Yemen. 
( 19) 
Resultina, from the role of such Hamdan C> 
chiefs, the tribe became distinguished in the Yemen as the 
supporters of cAli (Shicah Li-cAll). Al-Hamdani 
(20) 
comments upon this f act, saying, "The predecessors of the 
[present day] Abna3 were Shi C ah because of their intimate 
c 
relationship with Hamdan who supported All The Alids 
also existed in other Yemeni provinces, such as Najran, 
C (21) San a Jayshan and Hadramawt, but their activities 
seem to have been on a lower level than those of Hamdan. 
The establishment of the Umayyad party 
One of -the main reasons for the uprising against 
Uthman was the failure of his governors in their various 
territories to gain the confidence and loyalty of the 
rebels. However, -those other governors who did succeed 
in this respect, led -their people in a respectful relation- 
C 
shiip ývith Uthman'S Caliphate. Consequently those regions, Z-> 
(19) Cf. 248 below 
(20) Iklil, VIII, 102f. 
(21) Cf - Map 5. 
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such as Syria and the Yemen, did not get involved in the 
uprising against cUthman. Hence the Syrians became the 
majority of the c Uthmaniyyah, whilst some Yemenisq espec- 
ially the inhabitants of the centres of the Islamic gov- 
ernors, also emerged on cUthman's side. 
In all probability the roots of the cUthmaniyyala 
in the Yemen go back to the presence of the Medinan gov- 
ernors during the period of cUthman's own Caliphate, 
especially those in ýanca3 and al-Janad. In Sancý a it is 
possible that Yacl-i b. Umayyah, who occupied this office 
for approximately twenty-four years (12-35/633-656), had 
participated in establishing this party. In addition to 
the fact that he was one of C Uthma-nls governors who had 
been dismissed by cAli, he was also one of those companions 
who strongly accused cAl-I of sharing in the conspiracy 
to muder the Caliph, 
(22) 
Moreover, because of the long period of his govern- 
orship in Sanea-3 and his relationship through marriage with 
-') (23) the leader of the Abna, Yacli was able to gain the con- 
fidence and loyalty of -the leaders of the locals who were., in 
the main, Abnao.. Several reasons lead us to believe that 
Yacli b. Umayyah successfully gained the loyalty of the 
Sancanirs in favour of cUthman's administration. The first 
(22) He gave financial support to Talhah and al-Zubayr, 
the opponents of cAlli, and offere'd to equip anybody 
who joined them. Cf. al-Baladhuri, Ansýb, 11,222; 
al-Kufi, 11,279; al-Tabarl, 1,3100,3102,3104; 
Ibn al-Athir., Usd, Vý 128; Idri's, Kanz f 72b. 
For the period of his governorship in San a, see 
Table 4. 
(23) He was married to Umm al-Kiram, daughter of Fayruz 
al-Daylami; Cf. Al-Razi, Tarikh, 159. 
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C- of these is that the inhabitants of San a did not take 
part in the uprising against cUthman. 
(24) 
The second 
is that Yacli left ýanca 3 peacefully in the early 36/May - 
June 656 with a great fortune, most of it collected 
from alms-tax. 
(25) 
The third is the refusal by the 
Sancan-is to sup'port cUbayd Allah b. al- C Abbas, C Ali's 
governor there, against the Umayyad troops in 40/660. 
(26) 
One of the most effective forces in establishing 
the cUthmaniyyah in the Yemen was cAbd Allah b. Abi Rabi C ah 
al-MakhzUmi the governor of al-Janad during the period of 
the first three Orthodox Caliphs (12-35/633-656). In addition 
to experience gained through such long service in the area, 
C Abd Allah had also become thoroughly acquainted on a personal 
level with al-Janad and its people. 
(27) Therefore, these 
two factors made cAbd Allah b. Abi Rabi C ah the strongest 
Islamic governor in the Yemen. This fact attracted the 
attention of cUmar b. al-Khattab who expressed his feelings 
in the following words, "Do not differ [addressing the 
members of the council (Sh-dra) who were respons: 1, ble for 
choosing his successor] ; if you do, Mucawiyah will come to 
(24) Either, in fact, for or against him. 
(25) Al-Tabari, 1.3089. 
(26) Cf . 
254 below. 
(27) He occupied the office 
tiventy four years from 
al. -Barr, Isti 
C ab, III, 
Ibn Samurah, 
_Tabaqat, see al-Isfani, Aghani, 
of al-Janad for approximately 
12-35/633-656, cf. Ibn cAbd 
897; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 111,155; 
37) 40. For his experience, 
IY 64-6. Cf. also table 4. 
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you from Syria and cAbd Allah b. Abl Rab-1 C ah from the 
Yemen to take control ". 
(28) 
Of course, the strength 
of 
cAbd Allah b. Abli Rab-1 C ah was a result of the confidence 
and the loyalty of the local population towards him. 
Through the support of those loyal people, he was able to 
equip himself with a local force with which to defend 
the Caliph from the rebels. 
(29) 
Doubtless., without the 
obedience of the inhabitants of al-janad, he would not 
C have convinced them to support Uthman. The sympathy of 
C -C Abd Allah b. Abi Rabi ah and his followers for the Caliph, 
therefore, led to the creation of the cUthmaniyyah in 
al-Janad. This faction evidentl'y emerged after the arbit- 
ration of Siffin in Rabic I 38/August 658, revolting 
against Alid's authority in al-Janad and paving the way 
for the Umayyad seizure of the town. 
(30) 
Although sympathy towards both antagonists existed 
amongst those N 
Yemenis who were actually in the Yemen 
during the first two years of cAli's caliphate, it 
apparently did not flourish. While the governors of 
All were in a position of dominance over the centres of 
their rule in the Yemen, the cU-thmaniyyah might have 
frozen their activities in these towns. But these gov- 
ernors could not stop the activities of certain influential 
(28) Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 111,155; Ibn Hajar, I§. tbah, IV, 65. 
(29) 11, Then the Caliph was sieged by the rebels in his house. 
c Cf. al-Baladhurj-., Ansab, V, 87; Ibn Abd al-Barr, 
- c- al-isti ab, 111,897; Ibn Hajar, If: ý:,, ibali, IV, 65; 
Ibn al-Athir, Usd, III., 15ý. 
(30) Cf. 249 be-ILOW. 
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tribes who sent as re-inforcements their tribal relatives 
to join the Syrian side. It is noticeable that during 
these f irst two years of cAl-l's reign, both the Alids 
and the cUthmaniyyah in the Yemen ceased their activ- 
ities within the country. However, during this period 
both political and military activity increased on 
both sides on the battle fields, especially at Siffin. 
Some evidence is included in our sources which indicates 
the involvement of the Yemeni tribes in reinforcing 
their tribal relatives in both conflicting armies at 
ýif f in. 
As a result of the special loyalty of the Hamdan and 
C (31) Madhhij chiefs towards Ali b. Abi Talib, the involvement 
of their tribal supporters, who were still in the Yemen, was 
remarkable during the battle of Sif. f in. Although the sources 
at our disposal do not indicate the arrival of Madhhij re- 
inforcements in support of 
cAl-1 in the course oý that battle, 
the high number of Madhhij guides leads us to believe that 
some of them came from the Yemen to support their own 
tribe. 
(32) 
As for the reinforcements of HamdantocAll, 
this is clearly confirmed in our s ources, Al-Alascu-dli, 
(31) Those who were on his side during the civil war, such 
as Yazid b. Qays al-Arýabi_, Sacilid b. Qays, both are 7 
11a-mdani and Malik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhcl, of Madhhij. 
(32) According to al-Kufl, Futuý, 111,295, more_than ten 
thousand Madhhij joined cAlls army at Siffin. 
-244- 
al-Kufi and Ibn cAsakir 
(33) 
tell us indirectly about these 
reinforcements when they mention that Busr b. Abl- Artah 
sent by Mucawiyah to the Yemen, fought in 40/660-1 those 
C Hamdanis who had participated on Ali's side at ýifflin 
and who had returned to the Yemen. 
Yemeni reinforcements were forthcoming for the Syrian 
side also. Because Ijimyar and Kindah represented the 
majority of the Yemeni tribes in the Syrian army, 
(34) 
Yemeni reinforcements to Mucawiyah came in the main from 
the provinces inhabited by these tribes in the Yemen. 
This indication comes to us through a Yemeni who indicates 
in verse the direction of these reinforcements as 
follows: 
----- 
1 ___ jI J_i '- 
o_ -"- 
u) --L 
1 __ - 
______ 
I 
J-i ii I 
-19 L; 
Our reinforcements came to you, pouring Z=ý 
across the open land from Aden. 
They came to you from, 
Sarw Himyar, ýadramawt and Dhj Yazan, 
They swarmed to you like locusts, (35) 
On the backs of untamed and tamed camels. 
(33) 
c 
Al-D,. Iuscu-dl*-, '... 'ý,, 'Luriij, V, 57; al-Ku-f-l, 111,90,91; Ibn 
Asakir, Tahdhib., 111,222. 
(34) Cf - Chapter V, B, a, above. 
(35) Cf. al-Kuf-i, 111,146. These provinces belonged to 
ýimyar and Kindah in the Yemen. See MaP2 - 
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B The political situation in the Yemen a_fter the 
arbitration of ýiffln 
When the arbitrators declared their judgement in the 
conflict between cAlli and Mucawiyah in RablcI, 38/August 658, 
the struggle between the two antagonists became political 
rather than military. Consequently, the supporters of both 
leaders emerged throughout the Islamic provinces, diplom- 
atically active in support of their cause. In the Yemen 
both parties were also involved in such activities. 
Because CA111 was engaged militarily in fighting the 
Kharij is, 
(36) 
Mucawiyah increased his political activities 
throughout the Islamic provinces by sending his envoys 
to these countries. 
(37) 
In doing so, he was able to 
oppose cAll- politically. These areas included the Yemen. 
There the supporters of Mucawiyah were able to declare openly 
their sympathy for the first time during cAll's Caliphate. 
In the early stages of the political conflict, 
Mlu C awiyah took advantage of the Yemeni tribal chiefs who 
sympathized with him to increase his political activities in 
the Yemen. He also benefitted from the support of certain 
Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side who had already actively 
sympathized with OUthman. Two examples are preserved in 
our sources which help to illustrate how Mucawiyah benef itted 
_7 (36) For a detailed discussion of the war between cAll and 
the Kharijis, Cf. 
-Ibn 
Khayyaý, Tar. 1-kh, 
-192,197 
f; 
al-Baladhuri, Ansab, II, 362ff; al-Kufl, 
-IV 
97ff; 
al-Tabari, II 3360ff; al-Din-awari, Akhba. -, 204-15. 
See*also, Surur, 79-86; Sha C ban, History, 1,77. ' 
(37) For the political activities of Alucavviyah after Siff in, 
in particular when he-sent his envoy to Basra Ibn al- 
Hadr, arril, Cf. al-Tabarl, 1.:, 041-1; Ibn Abi al-Hadid. ýqahj, 
IVý 34f; 1bn Miayyat, 196f; Ibn Hajar, Is,;, ibah, I, 
228; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, 1,263. 
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from the loyalty of such Yemeni chiefs who increased his 
influence in the Yemen. The first of these examples is 
given by al-Hamdan-1. 
(38) 
who tells us how Mucawiyah 
benefitted from the loyalty of Abu Macbad, a chief of 
Hamdan, who supported his force in the Yemen. The second 
example comes through the narrative of Ibn Mascu-d in 
- (39) al-Baladhurl who tells us of the role of Wa il Ibn 
Uujr, a Hadrami chief in supporting Mucawiyah's troops in 
(40) Hadramawt, though Wa il was in fact settled in Kufa- 
As a consequence of the activities of Mucawiyah's followers 
in the Yemen., the Umayyad party appeared strongly to challenge 
the authority of cAli there. 
The sudden appearance of the Umayyad party in the Yemen 
has led some historians to accuse cAl-i's governors there of 
disloyalty and sympathy with Mucawiyah. 
(41) It is true that 
these governors did not seriously oppose the supporters of 
C- Mu. awiyah, however, it cannot be asserted that they sympathised 
with Mucawiyah. In fact the energy of Mu C awiyah's supporters 
and the disappointment of those of cAli at the sudden emerg- 
ence of a strong Umayyad party promoted advancement of that t3 
party in the Yemen at this stage in the conflict. 
(38) Iklil) X, 66f; VIII, 102. Cf. also Ibn al-Husayn, Anba 
who gives a different name saying ýumrah b. Sa id al- 
Yamani, whilst in Gh*ayat, I, 96 Hamzah b. Macbad al-Yamani. 
(39) Ansab., 11,458. 
(40) See al- Baladhuri Ansab, V, 250-4; Ibn Sa 
c d, Tabaqat, VI, 
26; Ibn , al-Athir, Usd, V) 81; Ibn Hajar, Isabah, VI, 312. 
(41) Cf. al- Baladhuri Ans, -, tb,, 11,453. , 
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With the increase in the political conflict between the 
supporters of both antagonists, the Yemen became Politically 
unstable. In Sanca and al-Janad the supporters of 
Mucawiyah revolted strongly against the governors of 
c All. 
Two different points of view comment upon this uprising. 
The first is given by al-Baladhur-l' 
(42) 
who justified the 
uprising by the harsh treatment of cAlTlils governors 
of the local population, in particular the cUthmanlyyah. 
-- (43) The second comes through al-Kufl who simply accuses 
Uthman's supporters of revolting against the authority 
of the Caliphate. Despite the contradiction of these two 
historians in their accounts of the specific reasons for 
the uprising against cAli's authority in these Yemeni towns, 
the whole episode serves to confirm the real role of the 
C- . supporters of Mu awlyah in opposing their opponents there. 
As a result of the development of the political 
struggle between the supporters of Mucawiyah and the governors 
of cAli in the Yemen, armed conflict flared up in the area. 
Thereupon, each group asked for reinforcements from their 
headquarters, the Alids in Kufa and the cUthmaniyyah in 
Damascus. 
cUbayd Allah b. al- c Abbas thus wrote to cAlli 
informing him of the uprising of the Umayyad party and tlý tD 
asking for reinforcements. 
(44) 
Consulting some influential 
(42) Ansab, 11,453. 
(43) Futu-h,, IV, 53f. When cUbayd Allah imprisoned some of 
them, the "-UthmaniýTyah wrote to him threatening a 
c ''s Cal- ur brothers revolt against A1.4 iphate; "Free o. 
whom you imprisoned, or we shall not obey you and 
the Caliph. 
(4,1) Al-Ku-fi, Futu-h, IV, 5--1; al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 11,433. 
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Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, cAli met Yazld b. Qays al- 
Arhab-17., a Hamdan-ii, to discuss with him the letter of 
C Ubayd Allah. (45) Al-Ku-f-1 (46) records the dialoo-ue of CDP 
C 
All and Yazid about the Yemeni uprising against the former 
regime, in which cAll says, "Have. -you [Yazid] seen what your 
people have done in the Yemen and their revolt against me 
and my governors". Yazi-d replies "By God, I believe that 
my people are still loyal to you, but if you wish me to 
prepare myself and go there, or write to them and see what 
their answer is., so that they return to your loyalty, all 
well and good; otherwise, I will move to the Yemen and 
protect you from them. " Yazlid b. Qays prepared a letter to 
his people in the Yemen urging them to support cAll's 
authority there. He also authorised al-ýurr b. Nawf, 
one of his own followers, to deliver his letter personally 
to his people in the Yemen. 
(47) 
The mediation of Yaz-ld b. Qays with the Yemeni rebels 
leads us to belive that some of the Hamdan might have been in- 1: -: p 
volved in the uprising. However, it is quite logical that some 
Hamdan chiefs on Mucawiyah's side, such as Abu Macbad and 
had formed an opposition group from among Humrah b, Malik, Z: > 
(48) their own people to counter Ali's authority in the Yemen. 
(45) Al-Kufl, Futuý, IV, 54. 
(46) Ibid. 
(47) IV 55. Al-Xu-f-i See also al-Baladhuri, Ansab, II, 453, , ., who records that 'All authorised Jabr b. Nawf to this 
mission, but he made no mention to Yazid's letter. 
(48) Both of-' them wer e of Hashid. The role of the former in the 
Yemen has alread y been discussed, cf. 246above. However., 
the latter's rol e in the Yemen is not clear in our sources. 
Nevertheless he played a major role in supporting , 
Mucawiyah during, since he was one of the the civil war, 
important tribal chiefs on Mu cawi -, -ah's side; see Ibn 
Siffin Muzahim who uses tae 196ý 207,2279,507, 44 , , 
name Hamzah, not 
) - Humrah; al-Hamdani, Iklil, X, 61; ý-III, 
102; ibn Hajar 65. 11 Iýaballi , , , 
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One reason for cAli's attempt to engage the services of 
Yazid to mediate amongst his people [i. e. Hamdan] in 
Sanca" area, was the neutrality of the Abnaý' there in the 
C All - Mucawiyah conflict. This would mean that Yazid would 
be able to take advantage and rally support for cAl-1. (49) 
(50) Al-Kufils account is far from clear when he describes 
the route of al-Hurr b. Nawf to the Yemen. He confirms 
however, that Yazid's envoy met the people of two Yemeni 
towns and presented the letters of his chief to the people. 
The first of these towns has not been specified by al-Ku-fl, 
whilst the second has been confirmed., as al-Janad. 
(51) 
The 
sources at our disposal, however, do not mention the first 
stopping place of al-ýiurr b. Nawf. In all probability it was 
C-0 ýan a since the majority of the rebels and the appeal of 
C- Ali's governors had come mainly from this town. 
(52) 
The arrival of al-ýiurr b. Nawf in the Yemen without 
any reinforcements affected the position of cAlils governors 
and promoted increasing support I-or Mucawiyah's followers 
in the area. Therefore, the Umayyad supporters sent an 
immediate letter to Damascus urging Mucawiyah to send a 
representative to take their oath of allegiance (bay C ah) 
(53) 
(49) Especially those in Sanca" who had good relations with 
Hamdan 
, Cf - J9-20 above 
(50) Futuý, IV, 55. 
(51) Ibid. 
(52) Cf. al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 
(53) al-Baladhuri-, Ansab., II, 
453; al-KU-fl, IV, 53. 
453-, al-Kufi, IV, b5b. 
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In order to push MuPawiyah into sending reinforcements 
quickly, his followers included in their letter some verses 
threatening him that they would give their pledge of 
allegiance to his opponents : 
L; LJ I 
b- J. -J L x--.. L.. a Ls 
Mucawiyah, unless you move to us quickly, 
we will give the oath of allegiance to C Ali or Yazid, the Yemeni 
If you have need of us, 
then send a governor who will not be 
remiss in his work. (5)4) 
When Mucawiyah received the letter, he realized that 
his supporters had succeeded in facilitating his invasion 
of the Yemen. Thus he equipped and despatched 
Busr b. Abi Artah al-cAmir-i", one of his commanders., with 
three thousand cavalry with the words, 110 Busr, Egypt has 
already been conquered, so our followers have become dominant 
and our enemies humiliated. Carry on in the name of God, 
pass Medina frightening and terrorizing its inhabitants till I 
they think that you are going to kill them; then leave them 
alone and move on to Mecca, but do not harm anybody there. 
Then advance to Sanca :) where we have supporters from whom I 
have received a letter. Strengthen them and recruit them 
for your attacks on cAl-i's governors and followers. Kill 
anybody following cAli if he refuses to give the oath of 
allegiance to us, and confiscate all his properties. " 
(55) 
(54) Cf. al-Baladhuri, Ansýb, 
Nasab, f 70a; al-liamdani, 
Isabah, VI, 360. 
11.453. See also Ibn al-Kalbi 
Jklilý X) 173, Ibn ýajar, 
(55) al-Baladhuri, Ansab, II, 
_-153f. 
Cf. also al-Kufl, 
IV, 55f; al-Ya c qLLbi, Tarikb., 1!, 173. 
Futh. 
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In Muharram., 40/May 660, Busr left Syria with his 
army, stopping in the Hijazi towns of Medina, Mecca 
(56) 
and al-Ta if. From there Busr marched on south, seeking 
the seizure of certain Yemeni towns. By following the route 
of Busr's expedition to the Yemen we are able to give an Z-) 
approximate location of the centres of the followers of cAlli 
and those of Mu c awiyah. 
(57) 
Our sources are unanimously silent about the route 
of this expedition in the northern part of the Yemen. The 
attitudes of the locals there towards the two parties, 
therefore, remains obscure. The position of the Najra-n-l:, s 
is, however., illustrated in the sources. This town was the 
first to be invaded by the Umayyad force. Although 
the town was controlled by cAll's followers, there 
were Umayyad supporters there also. (58) Howeverlong 
before the arrival of Busr there, cAbd Allah b. c Abd 
al-Madan al-Iýarithi represented cUbayd Allah b. al- c Abbas., 
(56) IbncKhayyaý, Tarikh, 198; al-Tabari, 1,3450 and al- 
Mas udi, V, 56 confirm that he was sent in 40/660. C Ibn_ Abd al-Barr, Is icab, 1,159, al-Khazraji, 
Tiraz., f. 93a and Abu Makhramah., Tarikh, 11,26 say that 
he was sent after Siffin. In Ibn ir, Tahdhib, III, 
222) 39/659 is given. Ibn Hajar, Isabah, 1,153, 
C says that Alu awiyah sent Busr to the Yet, -. ien and the 
Hijaz early in 40/660. 
(57) Cf . Map 5. 
C 
(58) For the pursuit of Jarivah b. Qudamah by the Uthmaniyyali 
In Najran, cf. al-Tabari, 1,3452. 
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All's governor in San ca in Najran. 
(59) 
As soon as he 
entered Najran, Busr arrested c Abd Allah b. c Abd al-i, l'ad-an 
and his son, Malik. Having killed them, he hunted down the 
rest of cAll-'s followers in the town. 
(60) 
When he had 
seized Najran, Busr called for a general meeting and gave a 
tough speech, warning the Najranis against supporting 
All , you people of Najran, brothers of the Jews and the 
Christians., by God, if I ever hear of anything resembling 
support for cAli b. Ab-I Talib, I will return to the attack 
against you with both cavalry and infantry, killing as many 
as 11 ike; so think about this matter and be warned. " 
(61) 
From Najran, Busr and his army marched on towards 
the south-west to the north-western part of Hamdan territ- 
ory (Balad al-Ahnu-m wa'l-Maghrib). When he arrived, AbU 
Macbad, a Hamdan chief, joined him. 
(62) Al-Hamdani 
(63) 
tells us that Abu NIa C bad was the most loyal supporter of 
(59) Al-Ku-f-l,, 5, IVY 
62f; Ibn Ab-i al-Hadid, 11,15. C :. --- Cf. also al-Tabari, 1,3452; al-Ya c qubi, 
Tarikh, 11,175; 
al-Baladhuri., Ansab, 11,455; Ibn Asakir, Tahdhib, III, 
223; al-Mascud--! Muruj, V, 58; Ibn cAbd al-Barr, 
Isti'ab., 162f, who suggest that al-Harithi was appointed 
over all the Yemen after c Ubayd Allah's departure. 
(60) Ibid. 
(61) Al-Ku-fi, Futuh, IV 11,175-, 
-v 
al-Yacqu-b-1, Tar 
Ibn Abli al-Hadid, 11,15. 
I 
(62) Al-Hamd-an-i, Iklil, VIII, 102; X, 66. See also Ibn al- 
Uusayn, Anba-.: ),, f 10b; Ghayat, 1,96. Al-Ahnum is a 
large mountain formation between Wadi Mawr and its 
principal tributary, Akhraf. Cf. Wilson, "Miapping'', 
184. See also al-Waysi, 107f; al-4ajrl, Buldan, I, 
119-27. Cf. also Map 5. 
(63) lkl-11,66. 
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Busr, since he guided the Umayyad forces through Hamdan 
territory. In that area, Busr pursued with resolution 
the followers of cAli b. Abi Talib. Abu C Amr al-Shaybani 
in Ibn cAbd al-Barr 
(64) 
says that Busr invaded Hamdan, 
killing and capturing their women. Both al-MascU-d-l and 
Ibn cAsakir 
(65) 
confirm that in al-Jawf Busr killed more 
than two hundred men from those Hamdanis who had joined 
Ali's army in Siffin. Then he advanced into Arhab, the 
area where Yazid b. Qays' tribe lived. He attacked their 
bedouins (badiy ah) and killed their chief, Aba Karib 
C (66) who had declared his sympathy for All b. Abi Talib. 
Continuing with his march in Hamdan territory, Busr 
C-3 
advanced on San a ., passing the southern part of the territ- 
(67) 
ory of Bakil who had retreated to Shibam (Kawkaban). 
The concentration of Busr's operations on Hamdan, 
particularly those of Bakil who inhabited al-Jawf, lead us 
to believe that the majority of cAlli's supporters were from 
Bakil. The members of the other branch of Hamdan, Hashid., 
in particular those who were settled in the north-western 
part of Hamdan territory, might have sympathised with 
Muca-wiyah since they were not attacked by the Umayyad 
forces. 
(68) 
The evidence is not sufficiently strong to 
(64) al-Istfab, 1,161. 
(65) Al-MascUdl, Muru-j, V, 58; Ibn Asakir)T, -, -t, dhib 
1111222. 
(66) Al-Kýufli, Fut5h, IV, 63; Ibn Abi al-ýIadid, 11,15. 
(67) Idris, Kanz, f 173a; al-Kazraji, 'Kifayah, 
62; 
Ibn al-Dayba'Y Qurrat, 1,87. 
(6S) Fo r the location of Hamdan territory, see 
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confirm this as truth, but if the Hashid chiefs were 
enthusiastic in supporting Mucawiyah they must have 
played a major role in appealing to their own tribes to 
follow him. (69) 
In SancV at that time the overall political feeling 
was one of support f or Mu %7wiyah. Theref ore Busr entered 
the town in 40/660-1 without any resistance on the part of 
-71 (70) All s governor. Both the activities of ýIucawjyah's 
supporters and also the refusal of the Sancanis to support 
c Ubayd Allah b. al- c Abbas, the governor of cAll in sanca 
facilitated the entry of the Umayyad forces into the town. 
Of course, without the sympathy of the Sancanis for 
IMucawiyah, Busr would not have easily entered the town. 
An example of support for Mucawiyaiii was the refusal 
by the AbnE :ý to take sides with cUbayd Allah b. al- c Abbas, when 
the latter asked them to help against Busr's invitation. 
(71) 
Therefore, the refusal of Fayruz al-Daylami, the chief of 
(69) Such as Abu- Macbad and Humrah b. 
(70) For the entry of Busr to SancV, 
Ansýb, II. 1 4,56f; a! -Kufi, Futu4, 
al-Hadid, 11,15; Ibn al-Husayn, 
al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 6., --, f; Abu M Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 24. 
Malik. 
Cf. al-B 
IV, 63f; 
Anbd) f 
akhramah, 
al adhur 1 
Ibn Abi 
11a; 
II)26 
(71) The refusal came from their leader (Fayruz) who 
replied to cUbayd Allah, "Protect yourself, - 
we are 
not going to fight". Cf. Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 
48f; al-Janadi, Suluk., f 40b; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
621 Tiraz, f 93a; Ibn al-Husayn, Anba- f lla; 
Abu Alakhra-m. -ýih, 11,26. 
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C-5 
the Abnf in San a. was enough to break the resistance of 
CC Ali's governor, Ubayd Allah, who fled from the town, 
designating cAmr b. Abli (72) C: > 1 Arakah al-Thaqaf-1 in his post. 
Although most SancHni's sympathized with MIucawiyah, others 
did emerge on cAl-i's side, albeit in a minority and without 
influence. Thus Busr entered San ca3 with ease, rounding 
up C All's followers. There he killed cAmr b. Abli Arakah 
and seventy-two from the Abna 3 who had declared their sympathy 
with cAll- b. Abi Talib. (73) T 
Continuing his march into the rest of the Yemeni Prov- 
inces, Busr left Sanca -) moving with his army southwards and 
attacked Jayshan. In this town he clashed with some of 
(74) All's followers who were decisively defeated. Pursuing 
the rest of cAlli's supporters in the Yemen, Busr led his 
troops right down into the south., imposing Umayyad authority 
on Aden . 
(75) during the year, 40/660-1. From there he 
continued with his march eastwards where he attacked the 
supporters of cAIT in Hadramawt. 
(76) 
(72) Al-Khazraji, 11--ifayah, 62; Ibn_al-ljusayn Anba , flla; Ab7u Makhramah, 11,26; al-Baladhuri, Ansab, 11,456; 
al-Kufi, Futuý, IV, 633f; Ibn Abi al-lýadid, 11,15. 
(73) Al-Hamdani, Iklil., VIII, 10'31; X, 66; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqa 
50; al-Khazraji, Kif yah 63; Tiraz, f93a; Ibn al-Dayba ka 
Bug, rhyat, 24; Abu Makhramah, 11., 26. Ibn al-4usayn, C_ Anbal, f lla; Ghayat, 1,97 estimates seventy. al-Alas udi YLI Muruj, V, 58; ! bH____cAsakir, Tahdh-lb, 111,222 gi-1.7e no 
specific number. 
(74) Cf. al-Yacqu-b-i Tar-ikh, 11,175; al-Ku-f'i, Futu-h,, -IV, 
63; Ibn 
Ab'1 al-Hadid Nahj, II, 16. According -to al-ýiajri Buldýn, I, 
-)t: ' C 296, Jayshan is a town near Qactabah; and al-_'ý111: ýwa 6 in 
al-HamdD-n-L, Sifat, 219, note 1, adds that it is in Uz 1 at 
:, 'La p 5. al-Acsli7ur, north of Qactabali. See also 
a,, -a, -i,, U'3; AbTi 1,1akhramah,. Cj (75) Al-Khazraji, Tirqz, f130a; Kif- 126. 
t. le,, rouL(- (76) Cf. al-Kufi, Futuh) IV. 6zdf who - 
does not i 
of Busr to Hadramaývt. But al-Razi, Tarikli, 170, confirms 
that Busr reached al-Shilýr, yet lie gives neither the route 
nor the achievements of his campaign in this 
Hadi-ami port. 
It is quite probable that Busr moved from Aden to 
ýa4riif-, %vt 
via the coast,, 11 area, since it is easier 
for him, anUl v., hen 
lie finished 1,, is task in al-Shihr lie ad,,. -anced to t', e ril-)rth 
where he aftacker-1 thc, Alicls. 
ýee "ýap z_j. 
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Thanks to Busr's expedition into the Yemeni 
provinces, Mucawiyah was able to gain a foothold in the 
country removing the Alid authority there. Therefore, 
the Umayyad victory in the Yemen had the greatest effect 
on C All b. Ab-i Talib, who commented upon it to his 
followers in Kufa, saying : "Busr b. Abi Artah has 
already conquered the Yemen, By God, these people are 
going to dominate what you are now holding. They would 
not have done so except through their obedience to 
C- . (77) Mu awlyah and your disobedience to me. " 
Despite the fact that the Arab historians agree that 
Ali b. Abi Talib despatched an army led by Jariyah b. 
Qudamah al-Sacdi, a Tamiml chief and one of cAll's 
supporters, to pursue -the Umayyad troops in the Yemen, 
they differ about both the route the expedition took 
and its achievements whilst there. Moreover., they do 
not all give the exact date for the arriVaL Of this Iraqi 
army in the Yemen. 
The first of these statements comes mainly from some 
of the Yemeni historians who confirm the entry of Jariyah into 
the Yemen. Nevertheless, they do not give a clear picture 
of his --. ý<Pedition's route. 
(78) 
In the second statement 
some historians assert the achievements of Jariyah's force 
V, '27. Cf. also al-K f, Futuh (77) Al-Mascu-di, U- -ii- 
IVý 65-67; al-Baladhuri, -Ansab., 
11,455. 
c 
(78) Cf. al-Khazraji, _Kifayah) c 
63; Asjad, 20; al-Janadi, 
Suliik, f Ila; Ibn al-Dayba Ourrat ,I, 
87f ; Bu, 
_&Ijvat , 
24. 
See also al-Balaclhuri, Ansab, 11,458. 
-2 bY - 
in pursuing the Umayyad supporters throughout the Yemen. (79) 
The third group of our historians conf irm that Najran was the 
only Yemeni town invaded by the Iraqi troops. (80) However, 
according to al-Razl., 
(81) 
Busr b. Abli Artah occupied 
the office of Umayyad governor of the Yemen for one year. 
This statement is confirmed by al-Ku-f-l'. 
(82) 
If these 
statements are correct, it would support the third group 
above which considers the achievement of the Iraqi troops 
to be the invasion of Najran only. 
(83) 
It may be said, therefore., that the role of the Alids 
in the Yemen was destroyed once and for all by Busr's army. On 
- (84) this occasion Ibn Khayyat gives a contradictory state- 
-CC ment when he records that, Ubayd Allah b. al- Abbas re-occupied 
the office of governor of the Yemen after Busr had fled from 
there, and ruled the country until the murder of cAli in 
(79) Ibn Abli al-Had-id., 11,16, says he pursued Busr 4 throughout the Yemen until the latter fled from the 
area which had belonged to cAl-1 b. Abili Talib. 
(80) Cf. al-Tabarl, 1,3452; al-Yacqubi, Tarikh, 11,175; 
Ibn al-ftusayn, Ghayat, 1,97-98. 
(81) Tarlikh, 170. 
(82) 
_Futu-h, 
111,91, who mentions the existence of Busr in 
the Yemen as the military leader of ýMulnwiyah after the 
latter had become Caliph. 
(83) As for Busr and his army, they might have remained 
in the Yemen until the office of the Caliphate 
fell to Aticaývjyah. 
(84) T-arlikh 198. Repeatea by Ibn cAbd a. -L-Barr, - 
icab, If I) Ist 
1009. ibn Samurah, jabagat 42f, says both cUbayd Allah 
b. al-cAbbas and Sauld b. Saud_b. Abadah remained in 
office until the murder of cAli. 
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Ramaýan 40/January 661. According to reliable sources, 
however., cUbayd Allah b. al- c Abbas did not return to his 
office in the Yemen since he had fled to Kufa. Moreover 
these sources do not mention any successor for him 
representing cAlll in this post. 
(85) 
To conclude, in the armed struggle in the Yemen 
during the year 40/660-61, neither cAli's nor Mucawiyah's 
troops had complete success in controlling the Yemen. 
Thus, the centres of Islamic authority there - i. e. 
Sanca-ý', al-Janad and Hadramawt - experienced a political 
vacuum which lasted until the office of the Caliphate fell 
to Mucawiyah b. Abi Sufyan in Rabi c II, 41/August 661. 
The latter thereupon sent his governors to the Yemen, which 
came officially under Umayyad sovereignty. 
(85) al-Tabar-1,1,3474 says he occupied the office of 
governor of the Yernen un'llil Busr's invasion. 
-259- 
Table 4 The governors of the Yemen in the time of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61) 
c In San a 
Aban b. Sa c id b. al- 
c As 
(1) 11-12/632-3 
c- 
Ya li 
- 
b. Umayyah al- 
c 
Tamimi 
Ubayd Allah b. al- Abbas 
12-35/633-56 
36-40/656-60 
In al-Janad 
C- 
Mu adh b. Jabal al- 
Khazraji al-Ansari 
c Abd Allah b. Abi Rabi ah 
al-Makhzumi 
Sacl: "d b. Sacd b. cAbadah 
al-Khazraji 
In Hadramawt 
Ziyad b. Labid al- 
al-Ansari 
Ukashah b. Thawr b. Asghar 
al-Ghawthi 
al-Muhajir b. Abi 
Umayyah -. Ll-Makhzumi 
Ikrimah b. Abi Jahl 
Ubayd Allah b. Thawr. b. Asghar 
al-Ghawthi 
Adi b. 
-Nawfal 
al- 
Qurashi (2) 
(1) Zambaur., I-Januel, 113., omits. 
with the tribe of 
Hadramawt 
amongst al'-Sakasik 
and al-Saku-n 
amongst B. Muc: 1wiyah 
of Kindah and al-Sadif 
successor of above 
(2) He replaced all the Medinan representatives amongst the 
Hadrami tribes and became the sole T'Juslim governor in ihe region i. e. Hadramawt, throughout the period of C Umar and 
6 Uthman. For full information of the Muslini 
governors in the Yemen during the period of the firs-. three 
Orthodox Caliphs, see Chapter VI, B. For those of C All b. Abi Talib, see 232 above, 
11/632-3 
12-35/633-56 
36-40/656-60 
-2'3O- 
z 
Ld 
'15- 
LLI 
uj 
T- 
z 
LLI 
D 
0 
w 
U) 
(I) 
D 
LO 
OL 
C) 9- 
b- U) = ««ee- 
-:, li 
: E* Z ýg me<Z0 
Ilý 'it Z( 60 m 10 m CL E 
«e 20 
3, 
ER& OCL. 
10 
EEE 
m0 cu e 
ui 
U) 
Z 
x 
XX 
U) xx 
c)o-Z2: 2ý . >x< 0 xx 
C, py - -? 
5' xlx 
cl xxxx xx xE 
c3 
CP 
%. 8 elýý> V 
-3 r 0.38 g 
-261- 
THREE 
-262- 
CHAPTER IX 
The Yemen during the period of the 
Umayyad Caliphate 
(41-132/661-750) 
During the period of the Umayyad Caliphate the Yemen 
was isolated from the political life of the Islamic State, 
with the exception thatthe rising of Ibadiyyah. As a 
result, relations between the Umayyads and the Yemen were 
not close, especially during the first/seventh century. Even 
during the political disorder which the State witnessed in 
the course of Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution (64-73/683-692), 
the Yemen remained uninvolved. 
(2) 
So the policy of the 
Umayyads towards Yemeni affairs was obscure. 
Throughout the period of the Umayyad-Caliphate, only 
three political events are mentioned in our sources. The 
0 
first is the separation of the Yemen from Umayyad authority 
during the period of Ibn al-Zubayr's uprising. The second 
and third events are the two internal uprisings which took 
place against the Umayyads during the second/eighth 
century. 
(3) 
However, throughout the period of Umayyad rule, the 
area witnessed two different forms of both political 
life and caliphal policy concerning the appointment of 
governors. The first began with the establishment of the 
Umayyad Caliphate in 41/661 and lasted until the death of 
Vý`hich arose in 129/746 in Hadramawt and was led by 
Abd Allah b. Yahya al-KindT. Cf. 281 below. 
(2) For a detailed discussion of the Yemen during this 
revolution., s(: ýe 2733-5 below. 
--),, -', 1-92 below. (3) 
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C- 
Yazid b. Mu awiyah, the second Umayyad caliph, 64/683. The 
second form of Yemeni political development began when cAbd 
al-Malik b. -Marwan, the f if th Umayyad caliph, became sole 
caliph in 73/692 until the end of Umayyad rule in 132/750. 
In order to illustrat. e politically the Yemen and its 
relations with the central Islamic authority during the period 
of the Umayyad caliphate, the following chapter will be divided 
into two sections: the first deals with the policy of the 
caliphs in appointing their governors and the political sit- 
uation in the Yemen during the period of the first three Umayyad 
caliphs, and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-663, and the second 
covers the rest of the period of Umayyad rule, 73-132/683-750. 
A The Yemen during the caliphate of B. Sufyan and Ibn al-Zubayr 
a. The appointment of governors 
C- As has already been mentioned, both Mu awlyah b. Abi 
Sufy, in and cAl-i b. Ab-i Talib had despatched troops to the 
Yemen in 40/660-1, in order to take control of the territory. 
However, neither enjoyed complete success in controlling the 
area. 
(4) 
. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the political sit- 
uation in the Yemen from the time of the murder of cAli b. 
Abi Talib, Ramadan 40/January 661, until the renunciation of the 
caliphate by al-Ilasan b. 
cAll in -Rabic II 41/August, 661, is 
extremely slight due to lack. of material. However, 41-t is 
unlikely that the hostilities bet, ý, een the -Alids and the 
UmayýT ads during that period went unnoticed in the Yemen. 
(O) 
(4) For a detailed discussion of -the despatch of these troops 
to the area, see Chapter VITT, B. above. 
(5) The hostilities between both parties did not ston J--m. -d-- C iately after the murder o-_L1' All and they continueýl for al, 
least six montns during LA_-Hasan's calij-, hate. For titis 
conflict, see al-K'tif-L, TV., 1-18 ff; aI-Yacq_u1D_L, 
191 f; al-Dinaýý_trl, 218 fl'; al-T-. ba. L-_': ", I!, If' 
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The military activities of the Umayyads in the area shortly 
before this time lead us to believe that ýMlucawiyah exercised 
milj-tary control over the Yemen 
Despite the fact that cUthman b. r- Aff-an al-Thaqafl 
was designated by Mucawiyah as the first governor of the 
Yemen, when the latter became sole caliph in Rablic II 
41/August 661, there is evidence that another Umayyad gov- 
ernor was in the area at that time, and was responsible 
to Mucawiyah for waging war on his opponents. Both al-Ku-fl 
(6) 
and al-Razi confirm that Busr b. Abi Arýah occupied the 
office of Umayyad governor of -the Yemen in the early stages of 
Mu'awiyah's reign, But, on the one hand, these two sources 
do not illustrate the period and the nature of Busr's gov- 
ernorship, and the rest of our sources omit his name from 
the list of Mucawiyah's governors in the Yemen. 
(7) 
It is Probable that during the sixteen month political 
vacuum which the Yemen experienced, Busr b. Abi Artah remained 
there as leader of the Umayyad troops. He is also likely to 
have stayed in the area during the early stages of DAucawiyah's 
caliphate, attacking the Alids. 
(8) 
If this assumption is 
correct, Mucawiyah would have intended to leave the troops led 
by Busr in the Yemen. Thus, Busr's presence in the area 
continued until the first year of Mu C awiyah's reign 41/661. Z: -) 2 
(6) Fu 0ai The former says that Busr tut, 111,91-3; T-r-kh, 170. C 
attacked those of Hamdan who had supported All b. Abi 
Talib in -the course of the civil war, and those HamaHnIs, 
therefore., went to Mu C awiyah in Damascus and asked him to 
stop Busr's invasions. 
(7) See table 6 the governors of tne Yemen appoinLeu 
c- - by ý, Iu awiyah. 
c (8) Cf. al-KUfl, 111,91-3. A-'L-Zullri in Ibn Asakir, TaIldInib, III, 
222, tells us that Busr attacked the Alicis after ýhe 
murder of cAIT b. Abi- T-,, qJib. 
-265- 
But the former's task was a purely military one, for it can 
be assumed that the Yemen might have witnessed political 
unrest in the form of Alid objection to Muc-awiyah on the 
eve of his Caliphate. As a result of the cAlid uprisings 
against the Umayyad rule, Busr appeared in the area and 
attacked the -Alids, especially those of Hamdan. 
(9) 
It is 
this role of Busr that may have led al-Raz-1v 
(10) 
to consider 
him as Mucawiyah's official governor in the Yemen for one year. 
In Rabic II, 41/August, 661, when the office of the 
caliphate fell to Mucawiyah, the latter appointed cUthman b. 
cAffan al-Thaqafi over the Yernen. Accordingly, cUthman 
became the first official governor of the Umayyads in the 
area. 
(11) 
Our sources differ on the question of the successor 
of cUthman in this post. Some Yemeni historians mention that 
CC- Utbah b. Abi Sufyan, the brother of Mu awiyah, replaced 
(12) C cUthman in this office. But Utbah's name does not 
appear in the list of governors of the Yemen in the non-local 
sources at our disposal, though some of them do conf irm his 
governorship over al-TV'if. 
(13) It may be assumed that 
C Utbah was holding the office of the governor of the Yemen and al-Ta3if 
during the early period of Mucawiyah's reign. It is possible, 
c 
Al-Kufi,, 111,91-3; Ibn Asakir, Tahdhib, 111,222. 
(10) Ta-r-lkh, 170. 
(11) Al-Kliazraj-i*, Kifayah., 64; 'Asjad, 21; Ibn al-Daybac, 
Qurrat, 1,91; Abu Nliakhramah., 11,130; Idris, Kanz, 
f 173a,; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, Bahjat, 16. 
(12) Al-Khazraji-, 
-Kifayah, 
64; cAsjad, 21; Tbn al-Daybac, 
Qurrat, 1,91; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 17; Idr-is, f 173a. 
(13) Cf. Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Ist-lc--, -tb, III, 
1.025f; al-Fasi, 
c lqd, VI, 10. 
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therefore, that cUtbah had resided in al-Ta ýif and designated 
a representative in the Yemen. His governorship lasted until 
the death of c Amr b. al-cAs. the governor of Egypt, in 42/662, 
where Utbah succeeded him in this post. 
(14) 
By the replacement of cUtbah in . the Yemeni post and 
as a result of the occupation by three of the Abna' the 
3 
Persian community there, in the governorship of both Sanca3 
and al-Janad during the rest of Mucawiyah' s Caliphate, they 
regained power in the Yemen. The first of these Abna is 
Fayruz al-Daylami who replaced "-Utbah as a governor of the 
Yemen. (15) However, this governorship was limited to Sanca 
(16) -(17) and al-Janad. Both Idr-is and al-Khazraji say that 
Fayruz occupied this post for eight years, while an anonymous 
writer 
(18) 
records that in fact he continued until his death 
in 53/673. Some historians mention that al-Nucman b. Bash-ir 
al-Ansari replaced Fayruz in this office, and, when the former 
was dismissed, Bashir b. Sa cd al-Acraj held the post. 
(19) 
(14) Cf, Ibn cAbd al-Barr, Isticab,, III,, 1025f; al-Fasly c lqd,, VI)10. 
c 
(15) Idrls f 173a; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 64; Asjad; Ibn al- 
Dayba Qurrat, 1,91; Abu- Makhramah, 11,130. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Kanz, f 173a; Kifayah, 64; C Asjad, 21. 
(18) Anon. Tariýh, f 26a See also Kay, Yaman, text 104, trans 
140. Ibn Sa-d U-. - 
.. 
Tabaqat, V, 534; Ibn Abd al-Barr, 111,1265, 
both say that Fayruz died_during C Uthman b. cAffan's 
Caliphate. Ibn Hajar, Isabah, V 214 mentioned tW 
Fayruz died during the tal-lyhate of- UthMan or u awiyah 
However, we cannot accept that Fayruz died during C-I- Uthman s reign for two reasons; the first is that FaN-ruz 
was still alive in 40/660-1, when he himself rejected 
the appeal of cUbayd Allah b. 'Abbas, cAli's governor in 
Sanca; 'at that time, after the latter had asked the 
§ancanis for help against ITmayyad troups, see 254 above 
the second of these reasons is that Fayruz also made a 
journey to Syria to meet Mucaý,., iyah during the LatLer's 
gn, cf. 2267 
below. rei, --, 
(19) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, ), I; C Asjad. 21; Ibn al-Dayba 
C, Qui-rat, l 
91-3; Abu Mal-ýIiraMa, II , 
131. 
-267- 
There seems to be some confusion in our sources con- 
cerning the governors of the Yemeni provinces. According to 
al-Baladhuri, 
(20) 
al-Nu c man b. Bashir al-Ansari held the 
office of Hadramawt and resided there. Since Bash-lir b. Sacd 
replaced al-Nucman in this post, it is possible., therefore, 
that both of them occupied, one after the other, the governor- 
ship of Hadramawt, whilst Sanca and al-Janad were governed 
by the Abna3. 
- ý1 C- In fact relations between the Abna and Mu aNviyah 
were cordial. This was reflected in Mucawiyah's policy of 
appointing governors to the Yemen. The nature of the relation- 
ship can also be seen through descriptions of journeys made by 
- :) C_ the Abna leaders to Mu awiyah in order to gain the governor- 
ship of the Yemen. 
(21) Thus, the Abnaý) monopolised the 
C-1 C_ offices of San a and al-Janad during ýIlu awiyah's caliphate. 
It is most likely that Sa id b. Dadhawayh succeeded Fayruz 
C1 
al-Daylami in the governorships of San a and al-Janad in 
C-3 
53/673, occupying the posts for seven months. After Sa id's 
c 
death, al-Dahhak b. Fayruz al-Daylami occupied the post until 
C- (22) the death of Mu awiyah in 60/680. In fact the advantages I 
accruing to the Abna were a result of their negative attitude 
towards cAll's governor in Sanca- ') in the course of the invasion 
(20) Ansab., IV, 161. 
(21) According to Anon, Tarikh, f 26a, Fayruz al-Daylami 
went to Mu0awiyah who warmly received him and appoinued hi, i) 
. governor of the Yemen., A-IL-Kashwarl tellsus that al- Nucman b. Buzurj, one of the Abna ) leaders in the Yemen, 
%vent to Mucawiyah and asked him to appoint al-'Dahhak 
b. Fayruz al-Daylami over the Yemen; see Ibn Hajar, 
Isabah., 111,1206. 
Cf. Anon, f 26a-b; Idris, - aT-Khazraji, Kifaýa!,,, (22) Tf 173a, 
65; cAsjad, 291; Ibn 
cAbd al-Majid, Bahjat, 16; Ibn al- 
Daybau-Qui, rat, 1,93; Abu Mak'hramah, 11,131. 
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of Umayyad forces to the town in 40/660-1, and also of their 
positive endorsement of the latter. 
(23) 
During the caliphate of Yazi: d b. Nlu'awiyah., 60-4/680-4 
Bahir b. Raysan al-Himyarl replaced the Abna in the governor- 
ships of Sanca > and al-Janad. 
(24) 
Our sources do not mention 
anyone other than Bahir as having governed the territory 
during YazId's reign. Although our sources confine the 
governorship of Bahir to Sancf and al-Janad, they do not 
mention the presence of any Muslim officials in Hadramawt. 
In actual fact, Yazid's policy concerning the appoint- 
ment of governors to the Yemen was quite different from that 
of his father, Mu'awiyah. Even those who came to power after 
him did not practice such a policy in this territory. All 
that Yazi7d did was simply to appoint Bahir over Sanca-"' and 
al-Janad on the condition that the latter provided a certain 
amount of money and slaves each year for the caliphate. 
(25) 
Unfortunately, neither the specific amount to be 
paid, nor Yazild's aims behind this policy have been illustrated 
in our sources. What can be assumed, however, is that it 
was Yazid's f riendship with Bahir that led him to of f er the 
latter such advantages. There are three reasons for this 
assumption : firstly, Bahir occupied the governorship of the 
(210)) Cf . 254 above. 
(24) Idris, f 173a; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 65; c Asjad, 21; Ibn c Abd al-Majid, 16; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,94-7. 
In al-Khazraji, Tiraz, f 92b; al-Alidal, Tuhfat, f 36b) 
he was appointed over the whole of -the Yemen. 
Khazraji (in botn of his books) (2-5) Ibid. Idrl-s, and al- 
Kifayah and a1-cAsj, --td state that Bah-17r had to -, end ninety 
slaý, es to Yazld every year. 
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Yemen as sole Umayyad representative throughout Yaz-ld's 
(26) 
reign; secondly Bahir apparently emerged as an indep- 
endent ruler., since various poets are mentioned as having 
(27) travelled to him seeking money; and finally, Yazid 
decided to visit the Yemen - rather than other more import- 
(28) aýt territories in the last year of his caliphate . 
C- . Following the death of Yazid b. Mu awlyah in 64/683, 
C 
Abd Allah b. al-Zubayr proclaimed himself caliph. At 
the height of his power, he controlled the Hijaz and 
Iraq. (29) As for the Yemen, Ibn al-Zubayr's authority was 
clearly manifest in Sanca Here, nine governors were 
appointed in succession by Ibn al-Zubayr throughout his 
caliphate 64-73/683-92. 
(30) 
In al-Janad, the governorship 
fell to Bahir b. Raysan al-Himyari on behalf of Ibn al- 
Zubayr himself, (31) though the former had been one of the 
(32) 
most prominent Yemeni followers of the Umayyads. The 
historians mention neither the period of this governorship, 
nor do they discuss it in detail. But, when the Kharijis 
entered the Yemen in 68/687-8, Bahir was governor of al- 
Janad. (33) The sources at our disposal remain unanimously 
silent about the governorship of Hadramawt during the 
(26) Cf. Table 6. 
c (27) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 66; al- Asjad, 21. 
(28) Ansab, IV, 287. 
(29) Cf Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah., 13f; al-Yalqubi, Tarikh, 111,2; 
al-Fasi., cIqd, V, 145, See also Dixon, 121. 
(30) See Table 6. The governors of the Yemen during Ibn al- 
Zubayr's caliphate. 
(31) AI-Bala-dhur-L, Ansab, IV, ', 353; Tbn Samurah, Tabaqat 
(32) Cf. al, -Dalaclhuri, _, 
Ansab, I-V, 109 
(33) Ibn Samurah, 
-Tabaqat, 
53. 
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period of the Civil War. The absence of Ibn al-Zubayr's 
authority in this territory can also be seen in the course of 
(34) the Khariji invasion in 68/687-8. 
In fact we have no clear picture of the policy of Ibn 
al-Zubayr concerning the governorship of Sanca" . due again to 
1; ck of material. But the short duration of the governorships 
appointed by him in Sanca3 has led one recent writer to 
comment upon this policy. In his book Tarilkh al-Yaman, Hasan 
- (35) Sulayman writes : "The reason for the short period of 
each Yemeni governor in office is related to the fact that 
the country was not fully controlled by Ibn al-Zubayr. Added 
to that is the ambitions of his followers, those of high 
status aiming to obtain more power and Ibn al-Zubayr being 
interested in having their consent, besides his fears that 
one of his governors, if he maintained more power by his 
being long in office might think of achieving independent 
rule over the Yemen". Although this assumption is not 
supported by clear historical evidence, it may be accepted. 
Thus it seems that Sanla: ý was the only Yemeni town under the 
sway of Ibn al-Zubayr, with al-Janad and Hadramawt remaining 
completely untouched by his political activity. 
The political situation 
Following the -Alid-Umayyad conflict in the Yemen 
during the last year of the first Civil War, 40/660-1, the 
area seemingly enjoyed a political lull, which was to last 
until the early part of the second/eighth century. But, 
(34) Cf - 
27-1-5 below. 
(35) 95. 
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both external and local sources give little information 
concerning the political situation in the Yemen and its 
relations with the Islamic government during the caliphates 
of B. Sufyan and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-92. Thus it may 
be assumed that the area was completely isolated from the 
pQlitical life of the Islamic state throughout this period, 
and specially during the reign of B. Sufyan (41-64/661-84). 
The political historY of the Yemen during the 
caliphate of Mucawiyah b. Abi Sufyan (41-60/661-68) is 
obscure, with little light thrown on it by our sources. Con- 
sequently, our knowledge of the Yemen and its relations with 
the caliphate during this period is slight. 
In San ca 3 and al-Janad, Mucawiyah consolidated his 
-: 3 
authority through the leaders of the Abna , who had success- 
ively occupied the governorships of these two towns during 
his reign. 
(36) Thus, lie was able to maintain political dom- 
ination there, although the political life of these areas 
remains vague. 
As for the other Yemeni provinces, neither the state 
of their relations with the caliphate, nor their political 
situation is clearly illustrated in our sources. There exist 
no indications as to whether the Umayyads had Military forces 
in the area during the caliphate of Mucawlyah; indeed the 
- sources confirm an absence of Umayyad authority in some of 
these provinces. In the area of Ma"rib, for example, despite 
the expulsion of Khawlan by other local tribes there, the 
SC- 36 These officials are Fayruz al-DaylarftJL, a id b. 
Dadhawayla and al-Dahhak b. Fayruz al-Davlami, see 267 
above and Table 6. 
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Umayyad authorities in the Yemen were unable to take any 
action to put an end to such inter-tribal feuds. (37) In 
1ýa4ramawt the isolation of the area from the Islamic state 
N and the weakness of Umayyad authority vis-a-vis the local 
tribes became apparent and was expressed in verse by al- 
Nu man b. Bashir al-Ansarl., the governor of Mucawiyah in 
Hadramawt., as follows: 
I, L I- -- tI- -9 
-9 ge -% 
Aba Khalid [Yaz-ld 1, do not leave me in the land 
of the monkeys, at the time when the fires of 
events are blazing. 
Your father is my friend and I choose you as a 
friend after him of all people, whether 
they, are united or divided. (38) 
The height of the Yemen's political isolation came 
C- . during the caliphate of Yazid b. Mu awlya, h., 60-4/680-4. 
(39) 
Abu Mik hnaf illustrates this isolation in his narration 
of cAbd Allah b. cAbbasy s advice to al-Husayn b. C Al-71 . when 
the latter had decided to reject openly the caliphate of 
Yazid saying, "If you decide definitely to revolt [against 
Yazldl, go to the Yemen where there are forts and mountain 
paths, where the land is extensive, where you will have 
supporters and be isolated from the people. " 
(37) For this eventY see Ibn al-Kalbi, 
c 
, 
Nasab ma add wa-'l- 
Yaman al-Kabir, f 34a; al-Himyarl', Shams al-'UlTtm, 9f. 
(38) Al-Nu'man sent this verse to Yaz-id b. Mucawiyah seeking 
his mediation with his father in order to change his 
post and move to another area; see al-Baladhuri, Ansab, IV, 16i. 
(39) Cf. al-Tabari, 11,275; al-BalRdhuri, Ansab, IV, 109; 
lurtij V, 129; al- al-Dinawari, 244; al-ý, Ias'udii, ALL 
Kufi, Futuh, V. 113; Ibn al-Athir., 111,273. 
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Despite a Alid presence there, the Yemen had not 
experienced political disorder as a consequence of the murder 
of al-Iýusayn b. 'All in Muharram 61/October, 680. (40) Thus 
this state of political isolation can be seen to have extended 
to the time of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate 64-73/684-92, to 
all regions of the Yemen , except Sanc a3 . cut of ff rom the 
caliph's administration in Mecca. 
(41) 
Yet it has been mentioned 
(42) 
that the Yemen fell 
into the sphere of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority following his 
inauguration as caliph in 64/684, with some historians 
(43) 
claiming that the majority of the Yemenis pledged the cust- a 
omary oath of allegiance to him. This indication also con- 
firms the fact that some Yemenis were opposed to Ibn al- 
Zubayr. But the sources identify neither the supporters nor 
the opponents of Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen, except for 
Bahir b. Raysan al-Himyari, who played a major role in encour- 
aging the Yemenis to grant their allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, 
when the latter proclaimed himself caliph. 
(44) With regard 
(40) The consequence of this event was felt throughout the 
Islamic provinces where political disorder arose in many, 
even those in the neighbourhood of the Yemen such as 
the Hijaz. The Yemeni regions, however, did not undergo 
such political disruptions. For these events, see al- 
Baladhuri, Ansab, IV, 304 ff; Ibn Tabataba, al-Fakhri, 
115-7; al-K-dfl, V, 252 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imýlmah, 11,6; 
al-Tabar'l, 11,395 ff; Ibn al-Ath-ir. Kamil, 111,305 ff. 
Cf. also Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of 
Shica Islam, 222 ff. 
(41) Cf 274-5 below. 
(42) Cf. al-Baghd-adi, al-Farq bayn '*'I-Firaq, 31; al-Khazraji, 
-K-if 
ayah, 66, c Asiad, 21,, in al-Dinawari, 260, the people 
of the Hijaz and Tihamah gave their oath of alleggiance 
to him. 
7 
(43) Cf. Ibn cAbd al-llaj-id, Balijat, 16; Ilr JS Kanz, f 17., a. 
(44) Cf. al-Baladhuri, Ans, -ab, IV, 353; Ibn Samuraii, 
Tabaqat, 53. 
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to the succession of governors he appointed to San Ca it 
may be said that Ibn al-Zubayr wielded authority over this 
town, even though he had no military force there. Yet, 
although the extent of his influence in other Yemeni provinces 
is not clear, it is fair to say that his hold over the area 
as a whole was not a particularly strong one. In fact Ibn 
al-Zubayr's actual lack of authority there became clear in 
68/688, when the Kharijis were able to invade the country, 
directing their attack in particular on San"*-a3 and Hadramawt 
(45) and levying alms (, ý, adaqah) from the Yemenis. Some 
historians do not identify the Khariji group which invaded 
Is .- (46) the Yemen, simply referring to them as the Harurlyyah. 
In fact, these Kharijis who overran the Yemeni provinces were 
C- the Najdat, a group of Kharijis led by Najdah b. Amir al- 
Hanafl, and which was concentrated in al-Yamamah at that 
time. 
(47) 
There is no evidence in our sources to confirm any 
control by the Najdat over the Yemen. True enough, the area 
did witness some kind of political disruption in the years 
following the invasion, 
(48) 
but again the sources to hand 
(45) Dixon, 171. See also al-Bal-adhur'l-, Ansab., XI, 136f; 
Ibn Khaldun, al-ýIbar, 111,314; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kiimil, 
IV) 353. 
(46) Especially the Yemeni historians, see Ibn Samu rrah, 
Anon, Tarlikh, f 26a; al-Khazrajt, Tabaqat, 53; Kifayah, 
_ 67f; 'Asjad, 22; Idris, --T-173; Ibn al-Husayn, AnbY f 13a; 
Ghayat, 1 107; Abu Makhramah, 11,100. 
(47) Cf. al-Baghdadl, al-Farq bayn'l-Firaq, 66 ff; al-11jubarrad, 
lilal W91 111 209 f; al-Shahrastani, al-N Kamil, , - C- 187 ff; al-Himyar-1, al-lýu-r al- in, 170; Ibn al 7 -AtFilr, 
Tubab, II, L5. 
(48) AT-Khazraji, KifaN7ah, 68; Asjad, 22; Ibn al-ý usaý-n, Anba. 
f 13a; Ghayat, 1,17J7 (where in the latLer the name of 
Najdah erroneously appears "Haddah, I 
- ' 
C7- tr bn ; -i-nir, 
i 'Mak place nameýýAbt where Hadt, -iah J-s taken ass a 
hramah, -II, 100. 
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mention neither the scope of the disorder nor the specific 
regions affected. Thus, it can be assumed that the iNajdat 
had invaded the Yemen for the purpose of collecting money 
rather than to exercise Political domination over the area. 
Therefore., upon entering Sanca they had to resort to force 
in order to make the people pay some hundred thousand 
(49) 
dinars. Also Abu Fudayk, one of their leaders, was 
sent to Hadramawt for the same purpose. 
(50) 
0. 
Together the weakness of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority 
in the Yemen and the sudden invasions by the Najdat might 
have brotfght about the political vacuum in the area during 
the last five years of Ibn al-Zubayr's reign. Naturally, 
had Ibn al-Zubayr ruled with a stronger hand over the 
Yemen, the Najdat would not have been able to enter the 
country and extort such large amounts of money from the 
populace. 
The thirty-three year period beginning with the cal- 
iphate of Muc'awlyah in Rablic II, 41/August 661, and ending 
with the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in Jumada II, 73/September 
692, represents one of the most obscure periods of Yemeni 
history. Relations between the Yemen and the central 
Islamic authority during this period were virtually non- 
existent. 
. 
ýýad, 22; Idris, f 173a; (49) 'kl-i'\'hazrajl-',, Kifayah, 68; 
Ibn al-Husayv), Ghayat, 1,107. 
(50) Cf . 
27-1 above. 
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B. The Yemen during the calipha-1ý6e of B. Marwan (73-132/692-750) 
From the time of the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in 
Jumada II, 73/September, 692, until the end of Umayyad rule 
0 -3 in Dhu I-Hijjah, 132/July 750, ten caliphs - all of them 
from the B. Marwan branch of the Umayyads - enjoyed successive 
occupation of the caliphate. During their rule the area 
witnessed the second great spate of conquests, which led to 
the domination by the Islamic state over a number of freshly 
captured provinces. 
(51) 
As usual, these caliphs, in turn, 
paid more attention to the newly acquired regions than their 
existing domains, especially the Yemen, which appears to have 
played an extremely unimportant role in caliphal policy at 
(52) that time. 
a. The appointment of governors 
C 
When Abd al-Malik b. Marwan became sole caliph after 
the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr, he appointed al-Hajjaj b. Yu-suf 
(53) al-Thaqafl over the Hijaz, al-Yamamah and the Yemen. 
Al-Hajjaj himself resided in the Hijaz and sent represent- 
atives to the other two regions. To the Yemen he sent 
three of his relatives from the Al Abi c Aqil of Thaqif. 
(54) 
Since that time., this family has been known throughout 
Yemeni history as governors of the B. Marwan there. Throughout C> 
(51) The high-water mark of these conquests came during the 
caliphate of al-Walid b. cAbd al-Malik, the third marwani 
caliph. Therefore, some historians regard this movement 
as the second great wave of conquests. For the ref- 
erences to these conquests, see Chapter IV, note 7 above. 
(52) Cf. 280-1 below. 
854; Ibn ',, Itý, a. ]. dun, (53) Al-Nlasctldli, ýILirt_ij, V, 266; al-Tabari II, 
cIbar, 111,293; ldris, Kanz, 1173b. 
(54) These were Muhammad b. Yusuf over ýan- a, ýVaqid b. Maslam, -h 
over a! -Janad'and al-Hakam b-Ayyub over Hadramaýý17t, ct. C _. . T, ible 6 -For the n'asalb of Al AbT Aqil, see 11)! i 
Durayd, Ishtiqaq, 18o; llo, -, Hazm, Jamharat, 
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almost all of the period of B. Marwan's authority in the 
Yemen (Jumada II, 73-Dhu -)l-Ijýjj ah 132/September 692 
July 750) members of this family were succeýssively designated 
to the post in the area. 
(55) 
It *appears that during al-Hajjaj's governorship of 
the eastern part of the state, the replacement of governors 
of the Yemen was a prerogative enjoyed by al-Hajjaj himself, 
(56) having been fully authorised to do so by the caliph. 
Thus he dismissed the governor of al-Janad and handed the 
region over to his brother, who was already occupying the 
c-D (57) office of San a After the latter's death in 91/709-10, 
al-Hajjaj gave the post to his cousin, Ayyub b. Yaýya 
(58) 
al-Thaqafl. 
In fact B. Marwan's policy concerning the appointment 
of governors to the Yemen was interconnected with the nature 
of their relations with the governors of the eastern part 
c 
of the state. For example, when Sulayman b. Abd al-Malik, 
the se-venthUmayyad caliph, became angry with al-Hajjaj's 
(55) Cf. Table 6. 
(56) Al-Hajjaj clearly appears in our sources to control 
theýe posts for twenty years (75-95/694-714); see al- 
Ya C qubi, Tarikh, 111,18 ff; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, 271 ff) T 
al-Kufi, VII Iff; al-Tabari, 11,863 ff, al-Dinav, -, trl, 
274 ff; Ibn Qu-taybah, 'Imamah, 11,22 ff; Ibn Khaldu-n, 
C Ibar, 111,323 ff. 
(57) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 69; Asjad, 22. 
(58) Al-Khazraji Kifayah, 69. Ibn Khaý7yaý, 311, says that 
the caliph, al-Walid b. 'Abd al-MalL. 'rr., himself 
appointed Ayyub in this post. 
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representatives in that part of the empire, he dismissed 
them all, including the governor of the Yemen. 
(59) 
Since 
C Umar b. cAbd al- cAzl7z., the eighth' Umayyad caliph, opposed 
his predecessor's policy of harsh treatment towards his 
subjects, he refrained from appointing the likes of the 
C (60) Abi Aqil over the Yemen. However., this did not herald 
the end of their governorship in this territory; what it 
signified was that the policy of the state at that time was 
to flush out al-Hajjaj's followers from the high positions 
they occupied throughout the Islamic provinces. However, 
the removal of h Abli C Aq11from the office of governor of 
C the Yemen was temporary, with Yusuf b. Umar., one of this 
family, being designated by Hisham b. cAbd al-Malik, the 
tenth Um,,: tyyad Caliph, to govern the three Yemeni provinces. 
(61) 
When Yusuf was transferred to Iraq in 120/738, his son, 
al-Salt, occupied his post for the rest of Hisham b. 
cAbd 
al-Malik's caliphate. 
(62) 
rl%vo other Thaqafis, from Al Abi 
c 
Aq1l, were appointed over the Yemen by the Umayyads, Marwan 
b. Muhammad b. Yusuf and al-Qasim b. 
cUmar. (63) The latter 
was the last of Al AbT 
cAql7l to occupy the office of the 
governor of the Yemen, his governorship lasting until his 
(59) For the governor of the Yemen, see_Table _6 . 
For 
the other provinces, see Ibn Khayyat., _ 
Tarikh, 318; al- 
Yacqu-bli., Tarikh., III, 38ff; al-Tabarl, IIY 1281 ff; 
Ibn al-Ath-ir., Kamil, IV, 138 ff. 
(60) Cf. Table 6. 
(61) IdrLs, Kanz, f 173b; Ibn cAbd al-ýM ajlid, Bahjat, 17; al- - Khazraj'i, - 70; 'A sjad, 23; -Daybaý, Qurrat, Ibn ai 
107, all of them say over all the Yemeni provinces 
See 
also Ibn KhayyLLt, 357; al -Yacqubi, Tarikh, 111,63. 
(62) T Ibn Khayyat 357 Idr-1s, f173b; Ib C n 
cAbd al-Majid, 17; 
bac Da l al-Khazraji, Kifaya. h, 71; Asjad, , y - 23; Ibn a 
Qurrat, 108. 
(63) Cf Table 6. 
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deafeat by the Ibadiyyah in 129/764-5. (64) 
Given that the main distinguishing mark of this family 
was its harsh treatment towatds its subjects, one may assume 
that unjust methods were effiployed by these Thaqaf Ilis who 
held the p4Dst of governor of the Yemen. In fact, such 
treatment was only usually resorted to in order to suppress 
revolt. However, given the weakness of the local forces and 
the general negligence of the area by the caliphate, the 
Thaqafis found themselves with a free hand to be as oppres- 
sive as they wished. 
(65) 
b. The political situation 
By the end of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate in Jumaaa 
II, 73/September 692, cAbd al-Malik b. IMarwan had been able 
to dominate all the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen. 
Much is known about the Umayyad occupation of all of Ibn 
(66) 
al-Zubayr's territories, except for the Yemen; however; 
the absence of a force loyal to Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen 
must surely account for the easy take-over of the area by 
the Umayyads. Their entry was accomplished without an armed 
struggle. Subsequently, Sanca) was taken without any great 
(67) 
difficulty and Ibn al-Zubayt's governor there arrested. 
(64) See 288 below. 
(65) cf. 280-1 below. 
(66) In fact the Umayyad occupation of Iraq, the Hijaz, Syria 
and Khurasan is illustrated in our SOUrces, while their 
struggle with Ibn al-Zu-bayr's supporters in the Yemen is 
not mentioned in these sources, for thQ Umay-, -ad 
occupation of these regions, Cf, al-Ya qiibi, Tarikh, 
III., 
l, 'I ff; -. tl-Kufl IV, 260ff; al-Tabarl, II, 78.3ff; 
Ibn 
Qtitaybah, Imimah 11,19-22; Ibn al--Athir, Kamil, UY 
9ff. See i. ). lso Dixon, 121ff. 
(67) Ibn Samurah, 57f. The governor Hanash b. 
'Abd 
A- C- - Table 6. . llah al-San ani. 
Cf. 
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i. A political lull 
There is no indication in our sources as to whether 
or not there occurred an uprising against B. Marwan in the 
Yemen during the first/seventh century. However., there 
is evidence to confirm that the Yemeni populace suffered 0 
considerably from the harsh treatment of the governors 
from the Al Abil cAq-11 of Thaqif. Al-Bala-dhur-1 (68) mentions 
"When Muýammad b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi: - occupied the office of the 
governor of the Yemen f rom 73-91 / 692-708 . he oppressed 
the subjects by confiscating their lands. " He also forced 
the Yemenis to pay land tax (kharaj ), despite the fact that 
the Yemen was regarded as ý-ushr land. 
(69) 
The Yemeni 
historians also record that he intended to kill all the 
lepers in the Yemen. 
(70) 
Despite such injustices, the. area did not witness any 
objections to Al Ab-i cAq-11's governorship. This situation 
lasted until the office of caliph fell to cUmar b. cAbd 
al-c'Aziz in 99/717-8, who immediately ordered his governor in 
the Yemen to abolish the knaraj, regarding the area as cuishr 
land. 
(71) 
He also wrote to his governor there warning him 
of the harsh treatment previously suffered by the Yemenis and 
(68) Futu-h, 84. 
(69) Al-Baladhurl Futu-h 84. For a detailed discussion of 
Kharýj and'Uslar, see Yahya b. Adam, Kitab al-Kharaj, 22 ff 0- Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, English translation, Ben 
Shemesh 
' 
78-83; AbU 'Ubayd, Amwal 203-6; SEI, 'Kharaj. 
4C Ushr f. 
(70) This indication_is only mentioned in the Yemeni sources, 
i. e. al-Khazraji, Kifavah, 69; cAsjad, 22; Ibn cAbd 
al-Alajid. 17; Idris, f 1-13b. 
(71) Al-Baladtiuri, Fut 84. 
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demanding that he return the confiscated lands to their 
rightful owners. 
(72) Unfortunately, these communications 
between b Umar b. cAbd al-cAzlz and his governor in the Yemen 
are not clear in our sources, having only been mentioned in 
passing. Lrheir immediate consequences are also vague, as 
is, indeed, this whole period of Yemeni history. This leads 
us to believe that the country was in a state of political 
isolation, although the caliphate paid attention to it from 
time to time. The obscure nature of Yemeni history lasted 
until -the year 107/725.. 26, when the first Yemeni uprising 
against the Islamic government since the accession of 
Mucawiyah (41/661) occurred. 
In fact in the last twenty-five years of Umayyad rule 
(107-132/725-750), the Yemen underwent a political change. 
During this period two revolutions, both of them led by 
Yemenis occurred in the area. 
ii. The uprising of cAbbad al- Rucayn-1 
The first uprising was that of 
cAbVad al-Rucayrd, 
who headed some three hundred Yemenis in a revolt against 
Umayyad authority in 107/725-6. 
(73) Unfortunately, the 
source material at our disposal throws little light on this 
event, clarifying neither the scene of the revolt, nor its 
duration, What is disputed in the sources, however, is the 
lineage (nasab) and the sect of cAbbad al-RuCayni. Al- 
(74) 
Tabarl, al-Ilamdani and Ibn Kathir claim that he was a 
(72) Ib. cAbd al-klakam, S-Irat, 65,126; al-Yaaqubl, TErlkh, 
111,49; Ibn al-JawzI, Sirat, 97. Cf also Safwat, 
Jamtharat, 11,333. 
(73) Al-Tabarli, 11,1487; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, IX, 244; al- 
'As -s, f 173b; Ibn al Khaýraji, KifEy. 70; 23; Ydr-a 
ýusayn, Anba-", f15a-b; Ghayat, I, 119* al-Sham, ý111,85 says thal 
the revolt 'took place in 110/728-9; and 
Sýlih, 109, claims 
that it was in 109/727-8. 
(74) 'ýl-T, -tb-,,. Lri, IT, 1-487;,,, tl-Hýti-nd-an-1, Ikll!, II, 386; Ibn 
Kathir, 
1X, 244. E) *, C 
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Kharij i. -(75) Al-Hamdani adds that cAbbad was one of the 
Juhaf iyyIn who have no kinship with any of the Yemeni 
tribes. Ibn al-Husayn (76) records that cAbbad proclaimed 0 
himself al-Mansu-r, who according to the old narrati-ves, 
was supposed to appear under the title "al-Rucayn-l" at the 
end of time, (a-khir al-zaman). 
Comments concerning cAbbad and his uprising also 
appear - (77) in more recent works. Al- Shamah' for example, a . 1) 
regards cAbbad as one of the Himyari chiefs (clayl) and 
states that his revolution extended to several other 
provinces. Another modern point of view is put forward by 
(78) 
who comments upon cAbbad's supposedly Kharij-1 
origins, saying, "we can say that cAbbad was not a Khariji 
and had no relations with any of their known groups". 
It is difficult to judge 'Abbad and his revolution 
due to lack of information. However, several reasons 
indicate that cAbbad was in fact most probably an Ibad. 11. 
The first reason is the assertion by our primary sources 
- (79) that he was a Khariji. Secondly, the Ibadiyyah had 
existed in the Yemen long before the revolution of cAbbad 
107/725-6. 
(80) 
The third reason is the activities of the 
-11 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
Iklil, 11., 386. 
- 1) Anba f l5a. b.; 
AI-Yaman. 85. 
Tarikh al-Yaman 
Ghayat, 1,119. 
al-Islaml, 109. 
Such as al-TabarlII, 1487; a! -Hamdani, Ikl-tl, II,. 38t3; Ibn 
. 4ý Kath-lr_, Bid-ayah, IX, 244. These historizans do not distinguish 
between Khariiiand Ibadj. 
Al-Baghdadi, al-F, arq bayn I-Firaq, 61, tells us "', 't-llen the 
Kharijis were defeated at al-Nahrawan in 30" [6-, )9]two of 
them fled to the Yemen and establish,, -d ýIfio IbqaqiN, yah in tlýc 
area. "Ibn Hawqal, 37, says that 
cAbd Allah b-IbaJI aL1,1 
c. Abd A111-ah f). Wahb, the former of 1xinom v:, l. s the fou, 
. i6er of 
Ibadiyyah, died in al-Mudh,, iy-khirah, a Yen, eni province- See 
also E. IFI'Ibadiyva"- 
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Ibadiyyah against the Umayyad caliphate in many places within 
the state at that time. 
(81) 
It is unlikely that 
cAbbad was one of the Vimyari 
chiefs, for apart from the fact that he enjoyed no kinship 
with any Yemeni tribe, the uprising put paid to his social 
position. Naturally, if he had been a Himyari chief, he 
would have had the support of thousands of Yemenis. In 
addition, Zhe forts and mountain paths 
(82) in the area 
could have protected him from the Umayyad forces for at 
least several years. 
(83) However, according to historical 
fact, eAbbEd was not a distinguished person and his uprising 
was not a strong one. Therefore., he was supported by no 
more than three hundred men and his movement was easily 
suppressed by Yasuf b. 
cUmar, the Umayyad governor of the 
Yemen at that time. 
(84) 
In conclusion., therefore, it can be said that the 
uprising of 
cAbbiid 
al-Ru 
C 
ayni was quite simple one of the 
more unimportant revolts against the Umayyad caliphate; it 
consisted of various local Kharijis who aimed to put an end 
to Umayyad rule. Its prestigious place in Yemeni history is 
due merely to the fact that it was the very first revolt of 
its kind to be directed against the authority of the 
caliphate in the Yemen. 
(81) After the death of OUmar b. cAbd al- C Azliz (101/720) AbTj 
cUbaydah, the leader of Ibaqiyyah in Basra at that time, 
planned revolts in different provinces, in order to build 
upon the ruins of the Umayyad caliphate a universal 
imamate of the Ibýdiyyah. Cf. E. Iý "Ibýdiyya , S. E. I. 
. "Ibadiyyat 
(82) The province, (mikhlafl Rucayn distinguished by geograph- 
ical comple%ity which could protect him. For the location 
of this province, see I'vlap 2. 
(83) E. G. al-Hay_ý, am b. cAbd al-Samad who revolted against -the 
Abbasid for seven years, retreating to Jibal Maswar; 
see 317-20 below. 
(. 84) Cf al-Tabar-1, II, 1487; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, 
IX, 244; al- 
Khazraji, Kifayah, 70; cAsjad, 23; IbT -al-tlusayn, Anbiý 
f 15a. b. ; CThayat, I, 119. See also al-Sha. n,,, I-th-1,85; SEl. ih,. Iog. 
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The revolt of the IbaLiyyah 
'Ibe most serious of the Yemeni insurrections against 
Umayyad authority occurred during the reign of the dynastý, Is 
last caliph, Marwan b. Muhammad (125-132/74ý3)-750). The 
Ibadiyyah, based in Hadramawt, staged a revolt which within 
a year, enable them to extend their authority over the Yemeni 
provinces and the Hijaz and enjoy supremacy there for more 
than a year. 
It is not within the scope of this work to study the 
origins, doctrine or history of the Ibadiyyah; 
(85) 
our sole 
concern is with the political implications of the revolt and 
0 
subsequent events. The significance of the uprising lies in 
the suddenness with which it appeared, and the fact that it 
did so in an area hitherto politically isolated from other 
Islamic territories. 
In 129/745-6., the Ibadiyyah of both Basra and Hadramawt 
sworean oath of allegiance (baycah) to cAbd Allah b. Yahya al- 
(86) 
Kindi otherwise known as Talib al-Haqq. From Hadramawt, the 
latter proclaimed himself caliph, thus rejecting Umayyad rule. 
The name of cAbd Allah b. Yahya appears for the first 
time in 128/745-6, thus allowing us no insight into his polit- 
-- (87) ical activities. Al-Isfahani reports that he was a 
(85) For a detailed discussion of the Ibadiyyah, Cf. al- 
Shahrastani, Nlilal. I. 212-4; al-Baghdadi, Farq, 82-9 E. Iý 
ITbadiyyaII; ENNAMI, 'Studies in Ibadisml, passim. 
(86) lie was from the most powerful tribe in Hadramawt, namely 
B. al-TJarith al-lValladah of Kindah. For his nasab, see 
Table 5 
(87) XN-%TII 9393. Repeated by Ibn AbT- al-Hadid, 
Nahj, V, 105. 
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a diligent (. mujtahid) and a pious (cabid). He also appears 
as a Qadi of Hadramawt on behalf of its governor, Ibr-ahl-m 
b. Jabalah al-Kindli. 
(88) 
The revolt cannot be convincingly connected with any 
political event in the Yemen for the following reasons; the 
political history of Hadramawt before the uprising is obscure; 
and the nature of relations between the Ibadiyyah in 
Vaqramawt and those in Basra unclear. 
The historians agree that the Ibaqiyyah of Basra 
played a major role in effectuating the success of the 
revolt, yet differ concerning the initial connection with 
C -. (89) Abd Allah b. Yahya. Musa b. Kathir in al-Tabarl mentions 00 
that at the end of 128/746, during the pilgrimage season, 
C Abu Hamzah al-Mukhtar b. Awf al-Azdi an Ibadi leader in 
Basra., met with cAbd Allah b. Yaýya in Mecca and persuaded 
- -(90) him to rise up against the Umayyad caliphate. Al-Isfahani 
confirms that it was cAbd Allan b. Yaýya himself who opened 
communications with the Ibaýiyyah of Basra, consulting them 
about the uprising due to his disaffection from Umayyad rule 
in the Yemen., where the latter wrote to him urging him to revolt. 
'T (88) Al-Harith-i., cUqud, 187. Ibrahim b. Jabalah al-Kindi was 
1- designated by al-Qasim b. cUmar al-Thaqafi, the Umayý-ad 
governor in the Yemen during the caliphate of Marv, -an b. 
Muhammad, to be his representative in Hadramawt. 
Se6 Table 6. .0 
(89) 11) 942 f See also Ibn al-Ath', Tr, Kamil 6 1%71 
297; 
Ibn Khaldun cIbar 111 356 f; al-Harithi, Uqud 189. 
(90) Acrhan-i, XXV11,9393f. Repeated in Ibn Ab-i al-Hadid, 
Nahj, V. 105-7 ; al-Harithi, dy 188. However, the, ý, 
give no specific daie for these communications. 
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Incidentally, the uprising could not have come at a 
worse time for the caliph Marwan b. Muhammad who v, -as already, 
threatened on several fronts. 
(91) 
The opportunity was 
I 
indeed ripe for those who 
, 
desired to revolt against Umayyad 
rule especialli, +, he Yemenis who had lived under the yoke of 
harsh governors for more than half a century. 
(92) 
Abd Allah b. Yahya's followers consisted of men mainly 0 
from Basra and Hadramawt. Ibn Khayyat (93) records that 
Basrans formed the bulk of cAbd Allah b. Yaýyals supporters. 
Undoubtedly there were some Hadramlis involved in the early 
insurrections., since records show that cAbd Allah b. Yahya was 
0 
totally dependent upon them on the eve of his revolution. 
Addressing Abu Hamzah in Mecca he proclaimed his Hadrami 
support by saying "You there, I have heard the fine speech 
from you; I see you calling to what is right, come with me 
[to Vaqramawt], where I enjoy the obedience of my people. " 
(94) 
As a result of Basran and Hadram-ii support for cAbd Allah b. 
Yahy"-, high posts in the armies and administration of the 
revolution were occupied by members of these groups. 
(95) 
(91) For the political situation in the Islamic provinces 
during this time, see al-Tabar-l", II, 1890ff; 
al-Dinawarl. 334 ff; Ibn QAtaybah, al-Imamah, II, 94 ff; 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, IV, 282ff, al-kýufi" VIII. 142 ff; 
al-Yacqubi, Tarikh, III, 76-85. 
(92) During the g overnorship of ýl Abl cAq-1L (Thaq-1if), 73-129,, ý' 
692-746-7 save a short period where others occupied 
this office, Cf. Table 6. 
(93) Ta-r-ikh, 384. 
(94) Al-Tabar-i II 1942f; al-Isfahani, Aggh, ýnl-, XXVII, 9398; Ibn 
Khaldun, Lbar, III, 357; Ibn al-Ath! r,, KdmilIV, 29,. 
C 
(95) Those of Basra are Abu Hamzah and Baij b. Uqbah, as-for 
the Hadramis these are C Abd Allah b. Sacid al-Hadrami 
and Abr*ahah b. Shurahbil b. al-Sabbah al-Sadi"**11, of 
Himyar. See Ibn Khayvat, 3385,391 f; al- Isfahani, 
Aghanli, XXVII, 9394,66-8; al-H, -arithi, 189ff. For nasab of 
Abrahcab, see al-HamdHni, Iklil, 21f. 
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Our sourcesestimate the number of cAbd Allah b. Yah-,, -ats 
troops at the time of his revolt at some two thousand. (96) 
However, a year after his occupation of Sanca), the number 
increased by some thirty thousand. (97) Such a rapid build 
up leads us to believe that many Yemenis had joined cAbd 
Allah b. Yahyals army, and that even the inhabitants of the 
centres of Umayyad administration in the Yemen were enthus- 
iastic to take up arms against the caliphate. Al-Isfahani (98) 
tells us "Before moving from Hadramawt, cAbd Allah b. Yahya 
wrote to his followers in San Ca informing them of his 
coming. " He also mentions 
(99) 
that when cAbd Allah b. Yahya 
occupied Sanca3 many Kharijis from outside joined him. 
Unfortunately, the source material does not indicate 
in which Hadram-1 town cAbd Allah b. Yahya announced his 
revolt. What is known, however, is that his first course 
of action was to proceed to the area's seat of governorship 
(dar al-imarah), where he arrested the Umayyad governor, 
(100) Ibrahim b. Jabalah al-Kindi. In his place he appointed 
one of his own followers, cAbd Allah b. Sa C id al-Hadrami 
C-. ) over Hadramawt and then marched on westwards to San a with 
two thousand of his troops. 
(101) 
(96) Ibn Khayyat, 384; al-Isfahani,, Aghani, XXVII, 9395; Ibn 
Abi Hadid 107; al-aarithi, 189. 
00 
(97) See 289 below 
T (98) Acrh-an-l-., XXVII 9394. See also Ibn Abli al-Had1d 
Nahj 
, 
V, 107. 
(99) Al-Isfahan-i, Agliani, XXVII, 9397; Ibn Abi al-Haclid, V., 101 
-, L c a'. --Harithl,, 
Uqud, 194. 
1Ac, h an 1, XX VI 1 9394; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, V, 107- (100) Al-Isfahani, 
al-Harithi, 188. 
(101) Ibn Kha 38,1; al-Iý7'lfahani , 
Aghani, XXVI if yyat, Tarikh, C7, 
'I 
V) 107; Ibn al-Husayn, Ibn AbT al-*HD, did A 11 f 
al-Hari-thi ) -Ak-wlc* 
V, atha' -io 205. 189. See also al a 
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When al-Qasim b. 
c Umar al-Thaqaf-1, the Umayyad gov- 
ernor of the Yemen, heard of the Ibadiyyah march out of the 
Hadramawt, he left al-Dahhak b. Zumal in charge while he 
himself advanced to the South to oppose the Ibaqiyyah. (102) 
The two armies met in al-jalih, a village of Abyan, the 
Umayyad force was defeated and retreated to Sanoa3. 
(103) 
Following their victory the Ibadiyyah advanced to San'a", 
where they easily defeated the remainder of the Umayyad 
troops and entered the town. 
(104) 
Consequently, Sanca" fell 
totally under the control of cAbd Allah b. Yahya who seized 
the treasure house (bayt al-mal) and gave an aggressive 
speech. 
(105) 
In San ca cAbd Allah b. Yahya was able to build a 
strong army consisting of those Kharijis who joined him 
there, as well as some of the Yemenis. Following their 
occupation there, the Ibadiyyah focussed their attention on 
challenging Umayyad authority in the Hijaz and Syria. 
Accordingly, cAbd Allah b. Yahya despatched Abu Hamzah there 
(102) Ibn Khayyat, 384; al-Isfahani, 
_Aghani, 
XXVII, 9395; 
Ibn_Abi al-4adid, V. 107; al-Harithi, 189; Ibn cAbd al- 
Majid, 18; al-Khazraji, Kifavah, 73; cAsjad, 23; Ibn 
al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,113; Ibn al-Husayn, Anba f 16a. 
(103) Ibn Khayyat 384 giving the place. Seealso al-Isfaliani 
Aghani, XXVII, 9395; al-Harithi 190, followed by al- 
Ijdmid, 1,207, all say tLs battle took place in Lahj, a 
village of Abyan. 
(104) Ibn Khayyat, 385; al-Isfahani, Aghani, XXVII, 9396; Ibn 
Abl' al-Had'Id, V, 107; al-Harithi, 190; al-Khazraji, C Kifayah, 73; Asjad, 23; Ibn al-Husayn, Anb-I't f 16a. 
(105) Aghani ,996ff For this speech, see al-Isfahani, 
Ibn Abi al-Hadid, V, 107f; al-flarithi, 192-1c. See ; -tl. ýo 
1208aI -A kv,; ac ,Wat 
ha 1q al-Hamid 
with one thousand troops, during the pilgrimage season., 
129/746. 
(106) 
Through this expedition, the Ib-adiyyah 
were able to spread their influence over the Hijazi tojvns for 
a couple of months and thus threaten Syria. (107) 
Alarmed by the worsening situation, Marwan b. 
Muhammad decided to send troops, under the command of 
C Abd al-Malik b. cAtiyyah al-Sacd-i, in order to drive out the 
(108) Ibadiyyah rebels from both the Hijaz and the Yemen. After 
his success in re-occupying the Hijaz, C Abd al-Malik b. 
Atiyyah continued southwards to Tabalah in cAslr, where he 
made camp. 
(109) 
When cAbd Allah b. Yahya heard of the 
defeat of his armies in the Hijaz and the subsequent advance 
of the Umayyad forces into the Yemen., he left Sanca: ) with 
thirty thousand troops and marched northwards where he 
C (110) C encamped at Sadah. In 130/747, Abd Allah b. Yahya 
(106) Al-I, ýfahanli, Aghan-1, XXVII, 9397 f; says that 900 or 
1000 men. Repeated in Ibn Abli al-Hadlid, V, 108; al- 
Harithi., 194; E. I? "Ibadiyya". In al-Tabari, 11,1981; 
ibn Khaldiin, cj=bar, 111,37; ' Ibn al-Ath-ir, KamilIV, 307, 
they were 700 troops. Ibn Khayyat, 285, gives unaccept- 
able number when he records that ihere were 10,000 men. 
(107) It is not within the scope of our topic to deal with their 
spread in the Iýijaz; our sole concern here is their_ 
uprising in -the Yemen. For their spread in the Hijaz, see 
Ibn Khayyat, 388 ff; al-Tabarl, II, 1981 ff; al-Isfahani., 
Aghani, XXýii, 9399 ff; ibn AbTi al-Had-ld, V, 108 ff; 
Ibn KhaldUn. cIbar., III, 357 f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, IV, 2 
307 ff; al-Harithi, 194 ff. See also E. I. "Ibadiyya''. 
(108) Ibn Khayyat, 393; 
-al-Tabari, 
11,2012 f; al-Mas C udi, ',! uruj_, 
VI) 66; al Isfahani, Aghan-, XXVII, 9423; Ibn Abi 
al-Hadlid, V '. 
120; Ibn 'Abd al-Maj-1d, 18. 
(109) Ibn Khayyat, 394. 
(110) Ibid. 
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endeavoured to stave off the Umayyad advance near Jurash, a 
town in northern Yemen; however, he was killed and his 
army routed. 
(111) 
The defeat of the Ibadiyyah in the Yemen was not yet 
a total one, for some of them rose up in the South upon the 
arrival of the Umayyad army in SancV. Our main source 
of information here are Ibn Khayyat and al-Isfahan-1; other 
historians, both local and external, unanimously neglect 
the continuation of hostilities in the area between the 
supporters of cAbd Allah b. Yahya and the Umayyad forces. 
At this time, two movements appeared in the Yemen, 
both led by ýIimyarli chiefs, each of which arose in the 
territory occupied by their own particular tribe. The 
first of these uprisings was headed by Yaýya b. c Abd Allah 
(112) 
al-Sabbaq, who succeeded in taking al-Janad. Con- 
sequently, CAbd al-Malik b. C Atiyyah sent a force to the 
area. The Ibadiyyah were defeated and their leader fled 
to Aden. Undeterred by this defeat, Yahya b. cAbd Allah 
al-Sabbaq raised an army of two thousand men. Again this 
army was defeated and its leader killed by the Umayyad forces, 
who were led by cAbd al-Malik b. cAtiyyah himself. 
(113) 
The second uprising was led by Yahya b. Harb., also of Himyar, 
(111) Ibn Khayyat, 394; al-MasciidT , Muruj , 
VI, 67, give t -he 
place. In al-Isfahanl7, Aghani, XXVII, 9430, Kashshah 
(probably-means*Kashar a mountain near Jurash). In 
al-Harithi, 223, Kast. See also al-Tabar,, II, 
2014; 
Ibn Abi al-Uadid, V, 124. 
X 394. Al-Isfahanj, Aghan X., VII 9436 
+ ltý, y -C 
(119) Ibn Khayyat 
7 
(quoting o! al-Alida ini), says from Al Dhd2l-Kala 
See also al-Harithi, 226. 
(113) Ibn Khay57.1-Lt, 394. 
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who revolted in the coastal area. Without delay, eAbd al- 
Malik b. cAtiyyah dispatched an army, this time led by a 
man of Kindah nicknamed Abu Umayyah; in due course, the 
rebellion was suppressed and its leader slain. 
(114) 
Nevertheless, the suppression of the Ibadiyyah in 
the Yemen was not yet complete, for they were still active 
in ýaqramawt under the leadership of cAbd Allah b. Sacid al- 
Hadrami, cAbd Allah b. Yahya's deputy in the region. Again, 
C Abd al-Malik b. cAtiyyah lost no time in advancing to 
Hadramawt to put down the rebels. 
Our sources agree that cAbd al-Malik b. cAtiyyah's 
suppression of the Ibadiyyah in Hadramawt was not total. 
These sources tell us that while Ibn 
C Atiyyah was besieging ZD t> 
the Ibaýiyyah he received a letter from the caliph des-, g- 
nating him as his representative at the pilgrimage; accord- 
ingly, the former called for peace. The Ibadiyyah accepted 
the offer on condition that they choose their governor. 
Duly, Ibn cAtiyyah accepted this condition leaving ýaqramawt 
under the mercy of the Ibaýiyyah. 
(115) The latter, thus, 
remained a threat to caliphal authority in the region until 
tC 
the reign of the second Abbasid caliph, Abu Ja far al- 
(116) Mansur. 
Tg an, XXVII, 9436 and (114) Ibn Khayyat, 394. In al-Isfahanll 
al-Harithi* 226 read- Yahya b. Karib al-Himyarl. 
(115) See Ibn KhayyEaý., 394; al-Isfahani, XXVII, 9-1'-')6f; 
Ibn Ab-1 al-Had-id, V 128; al-Harithl, 227. 
See also 
Y ýv 2ý 
al-Mascudl, *Muruj, VI, 67. Lewicki, EI , "IbaQliyýa'. 
', 
says that "He [Ibn 
cAtiyyah] even agreed to recognize 
their independence. " 
-r -rle in H, L Ibadi- --, Al)b- sce 311-3 (116) For the asid strug( adrama 
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Although our sources offer reasonably adequate des- 
criptions of the Ibadiyyah uprising in the Yemen) they do not 
throw any light on the political situation of the country 
during the course of these events. The question worth 
considering here is to what extent did the rebellion affect 
the security of the Yemen, and how, if at all, did it change 
the feelings'of the caliph concerning his influence in the 
area? 
It is certain that the Yemen underv,, ent much unrest 
during the course of this uprising, given the absence of 
security in general and of strong local rulers in partic- 
ular. Abu: 'l-Zubayr b. cAbd al-Rahman in al-Tabarl 
(117) 
tellsus that cAbd al-Malik b. cAtiyyah's death at the hands of 
local People occurred as a result of their not being able to 
distinguish the governor of the area from a highwayman! 
As far as the caliph was concerned, his intentions toward 
the area are clearfrom the letter he wrote to the Yemenis, 
urging them to remain loyal to the caliphate and not to join 
the rebellion. Such a letter could only have been sent out 
of serious concern about the revolution which by this time 
had spread throughout the Yemeni provinces. 
(118) 
To conclude, then, the Yemen spent the first/seventh 
century politically isolated from the rest of the Islamic world, 
its relations with the Umayyad administration at no 
time clear. 
At the beginning of the second/eighth century, local powei-s 
-? ubayr himself was one. of Ibn 
cAti y', 'T aln's (1-17) IT, 2015 (Abu 1-Z 
Companions on thisjourney) Cf. also Ibn al-ýtliiLr. yKamil. 
IVY 316; Ibn Khaldun, 
c Ibar, TIT, '3'58. 
(118) See this letter, Anon, Tarikh, f. 1': ')9, a, 
Cf. also al-Akv: -. ý c 
ýkvratha'iq, 201-3. 
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began to dispute caliphal authority; thus at the end of Umayyad 
rule, the Yemenis were able to lift the heavy veil of caliphal 
authority from their own country for the first time. Although 
this expulsion was temporary, it represented real opposition 
to the caliphal regime in the Yemen by the locals who gradually 
escalated their conflict with the cAbbasid authority. 
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Table 5* The nasab of Talib al-Haqq 
Kindah 
C-' 
Mu awiyah 
c 
Amr (Mur atti) 
Tha, wr 
Alu c-awiy ah 
-i al-Harith al-Akbar I 
Muo-awiyah 
Amr 
al-Harith (al-1, Valladah) 
I-c 
al-Shaytan ( Abd Allah) 
al-Aswad 
cAmr 
Shurahbil 
Aýr 
Yahya 
.F 
Abd Allah (Talib al-Haqq) 
* After Caskell- table 239; Ibn Hazin, Jainharat, 428. 
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Table 6 The governors of the Yemen in the time of 
the Umayyad Caliphate* (41-132/661-750) 
B. Sufyan 41-64/661-84 appointed by 
Mu awiyah b. Abli Sufyan 
Busr b. Abl, Artah 
c - as a military a1- A, ,mi r-I governor 
c Uthmdn b. cAffan al- 41/660-1 overall the Yemen Thaqafi 
c Utbah b. Abi Sufyan 41-2/660-2 (brother o f c- . 2) Alu awlyah) over all 
the Yemen 
Fayruz al-Daylami 42-53/662-73 Sanca3 and al-Janad 
(3) 
Sa c id b. Dadhawayh 53/673 
al-Istakhri (4) 
al-Dahhak b. Fayruz 54-60/674-80 
aI -ha y 
fam I 
a -Nu man b. Bashir 
al-Ansari 
m 
c 
Bashir b. Sa d 
al- A raj 
(5) 
Bahir b. Raysan al- 
ýimyari (6) 
Including. Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate 
(1) See 264 above. 
(2) Resided in al-Ta3if-cf 266 above'. 9 
Hadramawt 
tI 
Sanca3 and al-Janad, 
appointed by Yazid, I. 
(3) Omitted by Ibn cAbd al-Alajid, Bahjat, 16. 
c -) 11 (4) Omitted by Zambaur, 114. In Smith, "History of San a 
53, reads Sa C id b. Dawud instead of Dadhawayh. He 
remained only seven months, cf . 267 above 
(5) For al-Nucman's and Bashir's governorships, cf . 267 above 
(6) In Ibn cAbd al-, Nlaj-iýt, 16, reads erroneously Bujayr 
b. Zayyan al-ýILmyari Orriiited by Zambaiir, 114. 
See Smith, "History of Sanca"', 53. Cf. 268 above. 
I 
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C Dur. -ing the Caliphate of Abd Allah b. ' al-Zubayr C> 
(64-73/683-92) 
Bah"Ir b. RaySa-n al-Himyari, in al-Janad 
al-Dahhak b. Fayruz al-Daylami. 
(7) 
Sanp-E7) 
C Abd Allah b. cAbd al-Rahman b. 
cAbd Allah b. al-Walld b- 
(8) C-: ) cAbd Shams b. al-Mughirah al-MakhzUmi. ýan a 
C Abd Allah b. al-Muttalib b. Abli Wada 
C 
ah al-Sahm-1 
(9) 
Sanca: ) 
cUbaydah b. al-Zubayr (brother of cAbd Allah) 
(10) 
Qays b. Yazid al-Sacdi al-Tamimi. San ca" 
AbU 11-Nujdd (mawla of'. C UthmýTn b. cAffEn) 
(12) ýan 'a" 
al-Dahhak b. Fayruz al-Daylami (the second governorship 
during Ibn al-Zubayrls reign) ýancf 
al-Sao'ib b. Khallad b. Suwayd al-Khazraji al-Ansarl. 
(13) 
Sanc`, ý-: ' 
(7) See Idris, f 173a; Ibn 16; al-Khazraji, 
cAbd 
. 1-M. jid, 
KifEyah, 66; 'Asja 
, 
21; Ibn al-Daybaý, Qurrat, I, 95; 
Bughyat, 25. 
C (8) In Idris, Kanz, f173a; Ibn Abd al-Majid, 16; al- 
Khazraji, Kifaya 
, 
66; C Asjad, 21; Ibn al-Dayba5 , (_. 3 Qurrat, I, 95f; Bughyat, 25; Smith, "History of San a 
53. 
L all of them re-aýdAbd Allih b. 
C Abd al-Ralýman b. 
Khalid b. al-Walid. According to al-Zubayri, Nasab, 
330-2, Ibn'Hazm, Jamharat, 148 and Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, 
152, ýAbd Ail'5, h is a descendant of anoiher branch of B. 
Makb. 2ý-um and was appointed over the Yemen by Ibn al-Zubayr. 
C (9) See Ibn cAbd al-l, -'iajid, 16f; 
C 
Ibn al-Dayba 
. 
Bughya 25; 
al-Khazraji, Kifaya 66f; Asjad, 22; Smith, 
c"History of Sanc-aý 11,53. In Id-ris, f 173a; Ibn al-Dayba Qurrat, i, 96f, read Ibn Abil Wadicah. 
(10) Ibid. 
C (11) Idris, f173a; al-Khazraj-i, KifHyah, 67; Asjad, 22; 
Ibn al-Daybac Qurra I, 97f. Ibn 'Abd al-Majid, 17. C See also Smith, "History of SancR" , 
53. In Ibn al-Dayba 
Bughyat, 25, reads erroneously C isa b. Yazid. 
(12) Cf. al-Khazraj! ý-: ) 
cAsja 
, 
22; Kifaya , 
67. See also Smith 
History of San a 1.1 53. 
C IL (13) In a! -Khazraji, Asjad, 22, has KhallRd b. al-Sa ib al- 
Ansari. In Kifdya-h, 67, reads as Naj1V instead of 
Khýllad. Smith "History of ýan-ay, 11 53 has omitted 
al-AnsýErl. However, it seems to me these historians place 
Khallad before al-SE-: ib. According to al-Baladburi, 
Ansiib I, 244f; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 363, Khallad b. Suwayd al 
Khazraj! al-An§ar-j ývas killed in Medina (on the day of B. 
Qurayzah) in 5/627, and his son al-SVib was appointed over 
the Yemen by Niuc-awiyuh. it is quite possible that the above 
historians erroneously mention Muc-awiyah instead of Ibn 
a! -Zubayi-. If this assumption is correct, al-Khazraji, then, 
places Khallad before al-Sa"ib- 
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Uanash b. cAbd Allah al-ýan C ani 
(l 4) 
B. Marwan 73-129/692-746 
Muhammad b. Yusuf al- +haqafi- 73-91/692-710 
Waqid b-Maslamah al- 
Thaqafi 
al-Hakam b. Ayyub al- 
Týaqafll 
73-4/692-3 
in ýanc a-"' . 
appointed by cAbd 
al-Malik 
brother of al-Hajjaj, C-3 in an a 
in al-Janad 
in Hadramawt 
Ayyiib b. Yahya al- 91-6/709-15 
(15) 
Thaqaf'l 
c Urwah 
I 
b. MuDammad al- 96-101/715-20 
Sac di 
Mas cU-d_b. cAwf al- 
Xalbi 
YusUf b. cUmar al- 
Thaqafl ' 
appointed by al- 
Walid I. 
appointed by Sulayman and 
reappointed by c Umar b 
cAbdal-cAzi: -z (16) 
101-6/720-5 (17) appointed by Yazld II 
106-20/725-38 appointed by Hisha. m 
al-Salt b. Yusuf 120-5/738-43 Son of above 0 
MarwEn b. Muhammad b. 125-6/743-4 appointed by al-Walild II 
Yusuf al-Thaqafi 
al-Dahliak b. Wasil 126/744 
(1 
. 
8) 
appointed by Yazli-d III 
alLSýksaki 
(14) Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,97. In al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
67 1; CAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 25, all have 
Hasan instead of Hanash. Smith. "History of Sanca" J. 
" 
53., has Mu C tab/Muýsin, and places him after ctbaydah 
b. al-Zubayr. Hanash b. C Abd Allah is a famous 
Yemeni Faqih, see al-Razi, Tarikh, 300; Ibn 
cAsakir Tahdh'ib V 7-9. He was the last of Ibn 
al-Zub4yrls governors and was therefore arrested by 
cAbd al-Malik's troops and sent to Damascus, see 279 above. 
(15). For the appointment of these governors, see276above. 
(16) Cf. Idrlis, f173b; al-Khazraj-i, Kifýlyah, 69; 
c Asja 22; 
Ibn cAbd al-Maj-1d, 17; Ibn al-Dayba', Qurra , 1,103; 
Bughy 26. See also Smith, "History of S-anýV'1.53. 
Omitted by Zambaur, 113. He reappointed ýy cUmar b. 
cAbd al-cAziz. 
Ibid. 
(18) Cf . Idris, f, 173b; 
Ibn cCllbd al-Majld, 17; al-Khazra. 11, 
.17,2.; 
Asjad 23. In Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, I. 111; Ki c 
Bughyat. 27 has Wd il instead of Waýil. Smith, "History 
of San"ýV 53 has F. -Edil. 
-298- 
appointed by Marwan b. Muhammad 
al-Qasim b. cUmar al-Thaqaf i 127-9/744-6 he was expelled by 
the Ibadiyyah 
Ibrahim b. Jabalah b. 
Makhramah al-Kindi, 
Abd al-Malik b. Muhammad 
b. c Atiyyah al-Sacal (20) 
c Yusuf b. UrTvah (21) 
130/747-8 
131-2/748-50 
the governor of 
Hadramawt on 
ýefialf of al- (19) Qasim b. Umar. 
(19) See 287 above. 
(20) Sent at the head of the Umayyad force to suppress 
the Ibadiyyah in the Hijaz and the Yemen and to 
govern the latter. Hýwever, by the end of 130/748 
he received a letter from the caliph in which 
he was ordered to lead the 4ajj ceremony. He 
duly left the Yemen to assume his new task, 
but did not reach the Hijaz., but was murdered 
in the Yemen, cf. 292 above. 
(21) He resided in the Hijaz and sent his brother 
al-Wali'd to the Yemen. Cf. Ibn Khayyat, 407. 
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CHAPTER X 
The Yemen during the early eAbbasid caliphs 
(132-93/750-809) 
With the advent of the cAbbasid caliphate in l. ": 32/750, 
Yemeni relations with the central Islamic authorities took 
on a greater clarity compared with those under previous 
administrations. 
(') During this period political events 
in the Yemen were such that on several occasions governors 
in the area deemed it necessary to ask the caliphate for 
military reinforcements in order to suppress disorder and 
revolt. Regardless of the existence of political activity 
in the Yemen, -the country could not exist separately from 
the central Islamic authority, which alw, --tys succeeded in 
suppressing local revolts there. Nevertheless, despite the 
concern shown for Yemeni affairs by some of these five 
Abbasid caliphs, the area remained mostly in a state of 
political isolation. 
The following chapter will deal with the political 
situation in the Yemen and the area's relations with the 
central Islamic authority during the period of the first 
five cAbbasid caliphs (132-93/750-809). Firstly, we will 
discuss the caliphal policy towards the appointment of 
governors Ito the Yemen and, secondly, the various Yemeni 
c 
uprisiný--s against Abbasid authority and the relations of 
the latter towards them. 
In particular, the Orthodo-,, and Umayyad administra, 
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A. The appointment of governors 
Initially the Abbasids had no specially formed policy 
on appointment of governors to the Yemen; the off icials there 
were appointed by the governor of the Hijaz, the area as a 
whole seeming to have been a relatively unimportant one. 
When Abu 01-cAbbas al-Saffah C the first Abbasid (132-6/ 
750-4), became caliph, he appointed his uncle Dawud b. cAli 
over the Hijaz and the Yemen. The latter took up residence 
in Mecca, sending his representative, C Umar b. cAbd al-Hamid 
al-'t"Umarli, to the NI emen. 
(2) 
This situation lasted until the 
-7 
murder of Dawud b. cAll in the following year 133/751, 
-3C 
whereupon Abu 1- Abbas al-Saffah personally appointed his 
own uncle, Muhammad b. Yazid b. cAbd Allah b. cAbd al-Madan, 
governor of the Yemen. 
(3) 
This blood relationship between 
- :)cc Abu 1- Abbas and B. Abd al-Madan enabled various members 
of the latter to occupy the governorship of the Yemen for some 
ten years. 
(4) 
421; Ibn Khayyat (2) C al-Razi, Tarikh, -2 
c Abd 
c 
al-Majid, Bahjat, 18. See also al 
76; ARs'ad, 24, who says Dawud Ibn cAbd 
c Dayba 
, Qurrat, 119, mentions 
Umar b. 
Tarikh, 
- 
413; Ibn 
-Khazraj 1, Kif ayah, 
al-Majid. Ibn al- 
cAbd al-illadj-ld - 
(3) Ibn Khayyat, 413, has c Ubayd Allah. Ibn c Abd al-Majid, 
19, reads ýuhammad b. Zayd. In al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 76 c-c Nluýammad b. Abd Allah b. Zayd, but in Asjad,, 24, 
writes Mubammad b. Zayd b. cAbd Allah. 'Ibn al-Daybac, 
Qu rrat, 119 f, gives Muhammad b. Yaz-1id al-HarithT. 
Smith, "History of San Ca 53., has Muhammad b. 'Zaý-d. For 
the blood relationsýip, cf al-Zubayr-i, Nasab, 30; Ibn 
Hazm, Jamharat, 416 f. 
See Table 8. 
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C However, Abbasid policy concerning the choice of 
governors to the Yemen did not always centre on the appoint- 
ment of a military man to the post. On some occasions, the 
governors appointed were not distinguished by their military 
experience. One example is Muhammad b. Barmak in(183/799), 
renowned for his generosity - he was known as khayyir 
(beneficent) - he was chosen at a time when the political 
situation there was particularly unsettled. 
(8) 
Yet despite 
his attempts to win over the Yemenis by implementing useful 
social projects and helping the poor, he too was eventually 
unable to control the country and was replaced, after a year, 
by a military man. 
(9) 
As a result of their general failure to find a governor 
capable enough of maintaining order in the Yemen, the ca"Liphs Z: > 
occasionally resorted to dividing the governorship of the area. 
between two officials. In 177/793-4, Harun al-Rashid, the 
C 
fifth Abbasid caliph (170-193/786-809), appointed both al- 
Rab icb. c Abd Allah b. c Abd al-Madan and af-Abbas b. Sa 
cd over 
the Yemen, the former to head the military and lead the 
prayers 
c ala :3 1-ýarb wa 31-salat), and the latter -to super- 
c (10) 
vise the levy of the alms-tax ( ala 1-jibayali). One 
L-- 
modern scholar comments upon this policy "By -uhis 
(8) See al-Razi, Tarikh, 106f, 109; 
-Ibn 
al-,,, Iujawir., Ir, 178f_ 
(different account); al-Janadi, f 45b; al-Khazraji, Kifayali, 
89f; C Asjad, 28f; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,129-31; al- 
Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40a; Abu Nlakhramah, II, 214. 
(9) Cf. al-Razi, Tarikh, 109; al-Janadl, STtliýk, f 45b; Ibn 
cAbd al-Majid, 22; al-Khazraji, Kifdvah, 89f; 
c A, --)j ad, 2ý); 
Ibn al-Daybac, QU rrat, 1.129-31; al-Ahdal, Tuýfat, f 40a; 
Abu Makhrarnah, 11,214. 
(10) Al-Khazraji, Kifaya, h, 87 cAsjad, 28; Fun al-Daybacy 
Qurrat, I, 12S-cl. 
(11) Daghfus, see note 53 in al-IChazraji, Ki-fa,,,,, ah, 87. 
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action., Harun al-Rashid intended to facilitate the duty of 
his governors in the Yemen due to the increase of political 
disorder in the area. " Naturally this division of duties, 
plus his later attempt to double the salary of his governor 
there cAbd Allah b. Mus C ab al-Zubayri, offers clear proof 
of Harun al-Rashid's endeavour to step up the activities of 
his officials in the Yemen. 
(12) 
It is interesting to note that the cAbbasid governors 
)(13) in the Yemen were supported by an army stationed in Sanca., 
a fact which has not been mentioned in the sources of the period 
of the Orthodox caliphate and Umayyad rule. 
(14) 
Thus it may 
be deduced that this army was formed during the cAbbasid 
caliphate. However., since the sources do not throw any light 
on the make-up of the army we cannot be sure whether the 
soldiers were sent by the caliphs in Baghdad or whether they 
were recruited from among the Yemenis. 
It is likely that the army was made up of both assoc- 
iates of the governors and local Yemenis. 
(15) 
What is clear 
(12) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 88; C Asjad, 28; Ibn CAbd al-Majid, 22. 
(13) This indication appe: ars for the first 
I 
time during the 
governorship of Raja b. Raivqal-Judhami, 159/776. Al- 
Khazraji., Kifayah, 83; C Asjad, 27. See also Ibn Khayy: Tt, 
440i, 
) 
Ibn C Abd_al-Majid, 20. In al-Ya C qubi, Tarikh, IIIJ32) 
Raja b. Sallam b. Rawlý. See also table 8. 
(14) The sources at our disposal do not mention such an army 
in the Yemen throughout the period of both the Orthoc'Aox 
caliphs and the Umayyads. 
(15) Some governors, especially those who -were appointed with 
the express purpose of suppressing C rebels,, were 
acconi- 
panied by their own followers. Ma n b. Za idah, for 
example, says that he lost many of his own followers in 
4 cf. al- the course of his governorship _Ln 
the Yemen; 
T, abari, 111,395. 
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is that the force did not officially contain any of the inhab- 
itants of Sanca3 itself; the conflict between the populace 
there and government troops during the caliphate of al- 
Mahdi,, the third C Abbasid caliph (158-69/775-86), may attest 
to this. 
(16) 
However, when this army failed to put down 
an insurrection, reinforcements were sent from Baghdad. 
Likewise, Harun al-Rashid sent troops to Hammad al-Barbari, 
the governor of the Yemen (184-94/800-10), when the latter 
failed to suppress the revolt of al-Hayý; am b. cAbd 
al-Samad. 
(17) 
In actual fact the cAbbasid force in the Yemen was a 
weak one, its main task being to uphold the security of the 
Islamic authorities in the area. Its general failure to do 
so led to the despatch of auxiliaries from Baghdad, a policy 
which began during the reign of Abu Jacfar al-Maný; ur and 
developed into a formal structure under Harun al-Rashid. 
From then onwards the sending of reinforcements to quell 
uprisinus in the Yemen remained a salient feature of 
cAbbasid 
ZD 
policy towards the area. 
(18) 
Thus., contrary to the practices of previous admin-- 
istrations., the c Abbasids began to pay more and more attention 
to the appointment of governors -11-o the Yemen. The reason for 
this, no doubt, was the increase in anti-authority uprisings 
in the area. Despite the success of the cAbbasid admin- 
istration in suppressing the revolts there during the period ZD 0 
c 
Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 83; Asjad, 27. 
(1 71 ) See 319 below. 
(18) Cf Chý,, Lpter XI below. 
- 05) - 
of the first five caliphs, their successors totally failed to 
maintain control over -,, -he area as a whole during the 
third/ninth century. 
(19) 
B. The political situation 
During the period of the first five cAbbasid caliphs 
(132-93/750-809), the Yemen was witness to various uprisings 
which resulted in political disorder in the area. Most of the 
Yemeni tribes, along with certain cAbbasid governors, took 
part in these revolts. Whilst the former rose up against 
C Abbasid authority there, the latter were seeking independence 
from the central cAbbasid administration. It was considerations 
such as these that mostly coloured caliphal policy towards 
the Yemen. At this point, we shall discuss the nature of these 
local revolts and the reaction of the cAbbasid government 
to them. 
a. From Abuol-cAbbas's caliphate to the death of al-Hadi 
During the caliphate of Abu . 1-cAbbas al-Saffah 
(132-36/750-4) the Yemen remained quiet, with no anti- 
caliphate revolt occurring. It is interesting to note that 
C 
during the reign of Abu -')l- Abbas, the caliphate affirmed 
its influence over Aden instead o-L-' al-Janad., by appointing a 
governor over . the former. 
(20) 
This attention paid to the 
coastai areas of the Yemen for the first time since the 
establishment of the Islamic authorities there, leads us to 
believe that the cAbbasid caliphate intended to achieve a 
Cf. Chapter XI below. 
c 
(20) Cf. Ibn Abd al-Majid, 19; al-Khazraji, Kifa. yah, 76; 
c Asjad, 24; Ibn al-Daybac, Qui-rat, 1,120. 
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stronghold over the Yemeni ports, which formed a chain of 
connection between the ports of Iraq and those of East 
Af rica. 
However, the accession of Qahtan to the office of 
governor of Sancajduring the reign of Abu-ýL-cAbbas (132-136/ a 
750-4) heralded a renewal of local conflicts between the 
(22) Abna and their opponents, Qahtan who inhabited Sanca 
We know that the conflict was determined by the arrival of 
Abu Bakr's general, al-Muhajir, and his army to the town in 
11/632, whereupon the conflict came to an end and remained 
dormant until the governorship of cAll b. al-Rabi c b. c Abd 
(23) (24) 
al-Madan in 133/751. A modern writer connects the 
renewal of hostilities to the occupation by the Qahtani 
element of the Sancaý' and justifies this claim by pointing to 
the presence of Mudari elements in this post during the 
previous period, 11-133/632-751. 
(25) 
Consequently, the 
C -C C writer intends to accuse Ali b. al-Rabi b. Abd al-Madan 
of encouraging hostilities. It may well be that the prep- 
onderance of certain Qahtani elements over the authority 
of ýan'a'.. like that of the cAbbasid officials during the 
period of Abu 31-cAbbas al-Saffah, encouraged their relatives 
(21) The cAbbasids paid more attention to the coastal area than 
-the other Yemeni provinces and, therefore, established the 
B. Ziyad dynasty in Tihamat al-Yaman to retain their 
interests in the ports of this region. See Chapter XI, D. 
below. 
(22) In particular B. Shihab, a tribe of Himyar, for their 
nasab, see al-Hamdani, Iklil, 1,529. 
(23) See Table 8, 
(24) Salih, Tarikh, 117. 
(25) However some, Qaht, -tn-7, element--, had occ"Pic'd this post. i!, thi'-z 
a' 1)eriod,, such ,: is B,,,, hj-r lb. Raysan al-Himyarl and al-D, hha -7 
b. VTasil al-Saksaki, see. Table 6. 
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in the town to reaf f irm their enmity towards the Abna3 
there. (26) What it does not signify, ho-wever) is that cAl-l 
b. al-RablIC was behind this, especially since his judgement 
in the affair came down very clearly on the side of the 
(27) 
Abna . 
In actual fact the occurrence of such hostilities in 
Sanca .3 was dependent mainly on the attitude of the governors 
themselves. Had the governor remained indifferent and 
unwilling to take sides, such conflict would never have taken 
place. 
(28) 
Since the Abna3 lacked tribal solidarity in the 
area, they avoided involvement in such hostilities. This 
too accounts for their warm acceptance of Islamic rule in 
(29) 11/632. On the other hand, the Qahtani position in the 
town was different since they enjoyed the support of other 
Yemeni -tribes. Thus these Qahtanis needed only the slightest 
encouragement to provoke the Abna It is most likely,, then, 
that the early Qahtani governors in the Yemen during the 
caliphate of AbU- "I- C Abbas gave the necessary encouragement 
to their clans; by the time that the third Qaýýani governor, 
CC 
Ali b. al-Rabi had come to power, the enmity of Qahtan 
(26) Three Qahtani governors successively appointed over the 
Yemen duHng the caliphate of Abu ýI- C Abbas al-Saffah, 
see Table 8. 
(27) Al- Khazraji, Kifayah, 77 f; C Asjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybac, 
Qurrat, 1.120 f. 
(28) For the aggression of Yaz-ld b. Jar-ir al-Q-asri .7 
Yemeni 
from Bal 
, jilah 
holding the governorship of the Yemen during 
the caliphate of al-MaOmun, against the Abnao , see 
336-7 
(29) Cf. 175 above. 
bel. ow. 
. . 91 
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towards the Abna" became clear. 
(30) 
However, cAl'i b- al- 
Rabic was able to suppress the crisis. 
(31) 
In any case, 
the disorder had not been aimed against the cAbbasid 
authority in the area; it was simply a local conflict to 
which the caliph paid much less attention than did his 
successors to the later Yemeni crises. 
(32) 
During the caliphate of Abu- Jacfar al-Man, ýu-r 
(136-58/753-75) the Yemen again entered a period of political 
turmoil. This time, however., the crisis was not the result 
of any systematic local rebellion against cAbbasid rule, 
since there is no mention in our sources of such a revolt. 
The actual disorder began some six years into the reign of 
Abu Jacfar (142/760), the early period of his caliphate having 
been free of political unrest. 
Thus., our knowledge of the political situation of the 
Yemen during the first six years of Abu Jacf ar al-Mansur's 
regime is little, since the sources at our disposal throw no 
light on the circumstances in which the governors of the 
Yemen were being appointed. Things become clear, however, Z: > 
with the appointment of Macn b. ZVidah al-Shayban-1 to the 
Yemen in 142/760. Although the Yemeni sources remain silent 
(30) Particularly since 
the ownership of a 
plain, cf. Wilson, 
claim to the area, 
25; Ibn al-Dayba', 
Ibid. 
at that time Qahtan in Sanc P demanded 
I-Rahabah, northern part of Sancal 
"Wping", 281. For 'Lhe Qaýtanl 
see al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 7ý1; c Asjad. 
Qurrat, I, 120f. 
(32 For the attitude of Abu Jacfar a'-Nlansur,, Harun al- 
Rashid, al-Ma-ji-nun and al-Muctasim towards the Yemeni 
crises, cl, the followir, -- , --,, cres. , p, C> 
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on the circumstances surrounding his governorship, external 
records offer two different statements concerning it. The 
first account of Ma Cnb. Zajidah's appointment to the office 
of governor of the Yemen has been preserved by al-Yacqu-bi. (33) 
who tells us that In 142 [ 760 1, when Ab-u Jac f ar al-Mans-ur 
set out for the pilgrimage and arrived in Basra, he received 
the news that the Yemenis were in a state of revolt, and 
that his governor there, cAbd All-. h b. al-Rabi c, had fled. 
Thus, he sent Maen b. Za-: 'idah to the Yemen. " The second 
- (34) statement comes to us from al-Tabarl, who records 
that, "In 142J7601 the governor of the Yemen rebelled and 
declared his disobedience., which led the caliph Abu Jacfar 
C al-Mansur to despatch Ma n b. Za idah to the Yemen in order 
to arrest the governor and confiscate his property. " 
The second statement is probably the most accurate. 
Our sources confirm that cAbd Allah b. cAbd al-Madan, 
the governor of the Yemen replaced by Macn b. Za3idah, went 
to Abu Jacfar al-Mansur designating his son to the office of 
governor of the Yemen before the appointment of Macn in 
142/760. 
(35) 
Also cAbd Allah b. cAbd al-Madan fled from the 
Yemen because he had failed to suppress the rebellion. 
(36) 
Since his son succeeded him in his post, it is possible, 
therefore., that the former took part in this rebellion-This 
(37) 
ds that "When assumption is supported by al-Tabarl, who recor 
(33) Tarikh, 111,108. 
(34) 111,393-5, the account of Macn b. Za idah himself. 
See also Salih., Tarlikh, 112. 
(35) Al-Khazraj-i-., Kifayall 78; c Asjad'. 25; Ibn al-Dayb, )c 
Qu-rrat, I, 1ý2; Ibn Abd al-iMajid, Bah, jat, 19. 
, 
l) 11 TIJ, 108. 36) AI-Ya 
c q, b 'Farikh 
(37) 111,395. 
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Macn b. Za*"idah came out from al-MansurTs meeting (Elajlis) 
to discuss the agreement of the governorship (. cahd al-wilayah), 
he met cAbd Allah b. cAbd al-Madan., who used him to take 
care of his son who had rebelled in the Yemen. " If this 
assumption is correct., it may uncover two significant facts 
concerning the political history of the Yemen and its 
relations with the caliphate. The first is the realization by 
the caliphs of the necessity of preserving their influence 
in the Yemen. The second is the birth of various separatist 
movements freeing themselves from central Islamic authority, 
but, paradoxically, led by the officials of this authority 
themselves. (38) 
Although the sources confirm that the Yemen was 
undergoing political disorder on the eve of the governorship 
of Macn b. Za 0 idah, they do not define the rebellious areas, 
except San CaD, whence Macn was sent directly. Once there 
he arrested the rebellious governor and occupied his post. 
(39) 
Without giving any date, our sources throw light on 
insurrections which occurred in the Yemen. which led Macn b. 
Za3idah to use military force. Al-Hamdani 
(40) 
mentions 
briefly a skirmish in the province of Sacdah between Maon b. 
(38) According to our sources it was the first rebellion 
which arose in the Yemen led by the governors of the 
caliphate itself, since the latter confirmed its 
influence in the area in 11/632. 
(39) Al-Tabari., 111,395. 
(40) Iklil, 11,129, records that, "Nluhammad b. Aban., a 
Khawlani chief opposed Macn. b. Za-"idah in Sacdah and 
fought against him where he took revenge for the 
I-1 
17) 1 Tl C murder of cUmar b. Zayd al-GliL-tlibi, %oioý- n had killed 
in al-AL-i. ndL,,, j, an area north of Sacdah. 
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Za: )idah and the leaders of Khawlan. The fact that the struggle 
took place between government officials and extremely influ- 
ential chiefs indicates a political motive behind the incident. 
However, conditions in the southern part of the Yemeni 
highlands and Ilaqramawt were quite different, these areas 
undergoing unrest during the governorship of Macn b. Za)idah 
(142-151/760-769). Again our knowledge of the causes and 
consequences of these events is slight due to the paucity 
of source information. 
The revolt of the southern part of the Yemeni highlands 
took place in the province of al-Janad, and has been recorded 
by Yemeni historians. (41) They all agree that the cause of the 
uprising was the harsh treatment meted out to the inhab- 
itants of the area by the representative of Ma cn there. Vilhen 
they had murdered him, Macn attacked the area) avenging the 
death of his agent by slaughtering two thousand. 
(42) 
Inform- z:: ) 
ation concerning the event in 4a4ramawt during Macn gov- 
ernorship comes only briefly in our sources. Furthermore, 
the causes and consequences are again obscure. What is 
obvious is that this event was of a graver nature than the 
first, chiefly due to the fact that the Ibadiyyah themselves, 
along with other influential chiefs in the area., espoused 
(41) Cf. al-Janadi, Abd al-Majid, 7 Suluk, f 44b; Ibn 
. -r Bahjat, 19f; al-Ahdal, 
, 
Tu 
- 
hfat f39a; al-Khazrall, 
Kif-ayah, 79; 'cAsjad, 25. See also Ibn al-IMujawir.? 
al-Vm-ustab-ý; ir, '11,163 with a little differences. 
(42) Ibid. 
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this rebellion. 
(43) 
Thus Yemeni historians, without attempting thorough 
analysis, indicate that the Hadramis in general revolted 
against the cAbbasid regime. 
(44) 
This assertion, however, 
is a naive one, and clearly not acceptable. It is likely 
that, numerically speaking the Hadramis were inclined 
towards the rebellion., but not enough actually to join it. 
On the other hand, some Hadramis did openly take sides witli 
C 
the Abbasid caliphate, agreeing to act as the latter's 
officials in the area. 
(45) 
The significance of this rebellion lies in theprofound 
effect that the massacre, which Macn and his troops perp- 
etrated in Hadramawt under the pretext of suppressing the 
rebels, had upon Muslims throughout the State. 
(46) 
Two 
(43) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal of the 
specific role of the Ibadiyyah in. this rebellion, být 
according to these sources they were attacked by Ma n b. 
Za-'idah and a large number of their people were killed, an 
event which made the caliph, Abu Jacfar, happy; see al- 
Khazraji, K-ifayah, 80f; cAsjad, 26; Ibn cAbd al-ý,, Iajld, 
Bahjat, 19f. According to al-HaMdani, Iklil, 11,373; 
al-Himyarl, Muluk Himyar, 183, cAmr b. "; Abd Allah b. 
Zayd, an influential Hadrami chief in the area, was killed 
by AIIaCn b. Za'idah. 
(44) See, Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 19f; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 80; 
cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 123. 
(45) See Ibn al-Kalb-11, Nasab Macadd wa-ý11-Yaman, f. 28b, who 
says that Ibrahim b. Jabalah was appointed by Abu Jacfar 
ai-Mansur over Hadramawt, 
_the 
governor who was dismissed 
by cAba Allah b: ýIahya, Talib al-Haqq, from the governor- 
shiT) of Iladramawt wýen the latter 
*announced his revolt, see 
287 abovL-. 
(46) See al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 80; cAsjad, 26; Ibn cAbd al- 
Maj-1d, 20; Ibn al-Dayb, -ý. t', Qurrat, -1,12.3, who all confir. m. 
that fifIteen thousand Hadramis were killed by the 
c Abbasid troops. 
-313- 
motives for this massacre are reported in our sources 
firstly, tribal feuding (al-caýabiyyah al-qabaliyyah) 
(47) between Qahtan and Nizar; and secondly, retaliation 
against the Ibaýiyyah in Hadramawt. (48) What may be 
assumed is that both of these motives led the cAbbasid 
troops to massacre the Hadramis. As a result, Macn b. 
-3 Za idah succeeded in suppressing the rebels in Hadramawt, 
thus bringing about a political lull in the area which was 
to last at least until the second part of the third/ninth 
century. 
(49) 
Generally, speaking, Abu- Ja c far al-Mansu-r's harsh 
treatment of the Yemenis led to his securing a foothold in 
the area. One result of this domination was that he 
succeeded in pursuing those opponents of his who had prev- 
iously sought refuge in the Yemen. Thus, when al--Hasan b. 
Muhammad Dhu ýýl-Nafs al-Zakiyyah took refuge there following 
his father's revolt against Abu Jacfar in 145/762, he was 
easily arrested by the cAbbasid authorities. 
(50) 
Our knowledge of the Yemen's political situation 
during the caliphate of al-Mahdi and al-Hadi., the third 
and the fourth Abbasid caliphs (158-170/775-787), is vague 
due to lack of material. However, the pattern of appointment, 
dismissal and replacement of governors to the Yemen for that. 
(47) It comes mainly through the non-local sources, see al-- 
Ya'qu-b-1, Tarl-kh, 111,119; Ibn Hazm, Jarnharat, 380; al- 
Mas Udi, Muraj, VI, 45f. 
(48) Cf. al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 80f, cAsjad, 26; Ibn CAbd 
al-Majid, 20. 
(4 9 Until A", uhammad b. Yucf ir conquered it in 258/871- 2 
see 372 below. 
(50) Al-A1az: _, O_udTL., Nluruj, V!, 193. 
I 
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period leads us to believe that the area was most likely 
going through a phase of political unrest. 
(51) 
The only information we do have concerning the pol- 
itical situation in the Yemen at that time comes to us via 
several Yemeni historians. Mention of the state of affairs 
C-: ) in ýan a, however, is both limited and unclear. All that 
is related, quite simply, is that a conflict took place in 
the town between the locals and the cAbbasid army, 
(52) 
with neither its cause nor consequence explained. It is 
unlikely that the event was a result of the anti-caliphate 
uprising; more tenable is the suggestion that a clash 
occurred between two factions of the locals themselves, and 
that the army took sides. Such a struggle may possibly 
have taken place between the Abna3 and their Qahtani 
opponents in Sanc-: 
) 
a, the latter enjoying the support of 
government troops. 
(53) 
It appears that this disruption had 
repercussions in other Yemeni provinces which led the caliph 
al-Mahdi to connect the Yemen with the Hijaz by establishing 
postal services between the two territories in 166/782-3. 
(54) 
(51) Ten successive governors occupied the governorship of 
-the Yemen within twelve years, see Table 8. 
C (52) Cf al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 83; As ad, 27; Idris, 
Khanz al-Akhyar, 
_ 
f 174b. 
(53) For the struggle between these two groups in Sanca 
') see 
306 above. We assumed that Qahtan-might have enjoyed the 
support of the troops because iýis conflict took place 
during 
_-the 
governorship of cýbd al-Khaliq al-Shih&blwv_ cf. table 
8, 
note 12 , who. clan B. Shihab, represented 
the head 
of the enemies of -the Abna) in Sanca-' ; see 336 no. 18 below 
(54) Al-Tabari, 111,517. See also Kremer,, 
Orient, 2.33. English trans, Bukhsh. 
I 
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This measure, however, did not put an end to civil disorder, 
which worsened during the caliphate of al-Hadi (169-70/ 
785-6). 
(55) 
b. During the caliphate of Haru-n al-Rashid. 
The overall picture of the history of the Yemen and its 
relations with the central Islamic authority became relatively 
clear with the reign of Harun al-Rashid (170-93/785-808). 
Reasonable information on the Yemeni situation during this 
period is preserved in the sources, with particular attention 
focused on the uprising of al-Haysam b. C Abd al-Samad against 
C (56) Abbasid authority there in 184/800. 
The first fourteen years of Harun al-Rashid's reign 
saw the Yemen in continuous political disorder -a result 
of unabated local agitation and a legacy from the caliphate 
of al-Mansur. Thus Harun al-Rashid's constant pre-occupation 
throughout this period was his search for an able governor 
to control the area. His efforts, not unexpectedly, were 
in vain. 
(57) 
(55) See al-Yacqu-b-i, Tarlikh., 111,137, who says that the 
Yemen witnessed political unrest throughout the 
caliphate of al-Hadi. 
., 
Tarikh, 108; al-Jahshiyari, al-Wuzara C (56) In al-Razi 
wa-31-Kuttýb, ; Idris, Kanz, f. 175a., al-Hayýam b. Abd 
al-Hamid. Al-Tabari, 111,733, reads al-Hayýam za--,. 'amý, ni. 
Ibn'Hab-lb, al-iluhabbar, 488, al-HayE:, am al-Hai-ndan-L. 
However, the correction is given by al--Hamdani, Iklll, II, 
Cý 9C 322; X) .3, has al-Ha sam 
b. Abd al-Samad, of lffiET, --ar, 
See also Ibn al-Dayba 
-Y ; Qurrat, 1,131 and note 4. 
For his nasab, see Table 7. 
(57) Cf - 302-4, above 
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Yet, although the area witnessed political disorder 
throughout this period, our sources fail to pin down the 
root causes of the disruption. Such unrest may have been 
triggered off by the fact that on the eve of Haru-n al- 
Rashid's accession, the Uijaz represented the focal point 
C (58) of the Alid's anti- Abbasid regime, indeed although 
there is no clear evidence of open Alid activity in the 
Yemen at that time, the possibility of underground Alid 
opposition cannot be ruled out. Haru-n al-Rashid knew only 
too well that an Alid presence in the Yemen would pose a 
threat to Abbasid authority there. Thus, when he heard 
of al-Shaff i's intention to incite one of the Alids to 
revolt against the cAbbasids, he immediately ordered his 
governor -there to arrest al-Shafici and send him to 
al-Raqqah, 
(59) 
a town on the Euphrates, where he had caniped. 
It seems that the disruption in the Yemen was 
becoming increasingly clear during the first fourteen years 
of Har5n al-Rashlid's reign (170-83/786-99). In the 
following year, the caliph received a report from his governor 
there, Muhammad b. Barmak, informing him about the insurrection 
of the Yemenis. 
(60) 
Thus Harun al-Rashid replaced the latter 
(61) with one of his military commanders, Hammad al-Barbari. 
(58) For the_ Alid events in the Hijaz during the caliphate 
of al-Hadi b 
169-70/784-1-), in*particular the revolt of al- 
flusayn b. Ali b. al-Hasan, who was killed in Fakhkh 
near Mecca in 169/785-6, cf al-Tabari, 111,550 ff; -al- 
r--C-- Dinawarl, 365; al-Isfahani., Maqatil, 442 ff; al-Ya qubi_,, 
Tarikh, 111,137; Ibn a-, -Athir, K-, amil, V, 74 f. See also 
E12 tyal-jTlusayn b. cAli, Sa4ib al-Fakhkht'; Lassnerl, Shaping, 
'ý65 f., note 65. 
(59) Cf. al-K-ufli VIII, 248; Ibn Samurah, 1138 f; al-Janadi, SulUk., 
f, 15b. al-Khaz-aji, f 111a; a. l--A, -hdal Tuhfat, f" Tir, 71z, 28b. 
(60) T Tý--t: cli kh -Khazraji, 'ýiraz, - Al--Razt, 109; al-JanadT, f 45b; al 
111a; Kifayah, 90; As. -,, ad. 29; Abu- ý, I, -i-khramah, II, 611f, 
--ý11-4-; 
al-Ahdal, Ttilif, -tt, f ý, ba-- 
(61) Ibid. 
a 
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With Hammad's tenure of the governorship (184-94/800-10), 
the political situation in the area became even clearer 
than during the early part of Harun al-Rashid's reign. This 
new period is marked by two internal uprisings against 
caliphal authority in the area : the first is the revolt of 
al-Haysam b. cAbd al-Samad, and the second is the insurr- 
ection of the people of Tihamah. Our sources contain infor- 
mation about the first revolt, but unfortunately have pres- 
erved nothing concerning the second. 
(62) 
The revolt of al-Hay-ýam b. cAbd al-Samad was in actual 
fact, the most serious of all the up-risings that took place 
in the Yemen during the cAbbasid caliphate in second/eighth 
century, shaking the very foundati'ons of, C Abbasid admin- 
istration in Baghdad. He arose in Jibal Maswar extending his 
rebellion throughout the neighbouring areas. 
(63) 
Naturally, the imperial historical. tradition does not 
usually concern itself with minor events in outlying 
provinces, and this uprising is dealt with only summarily by- 
C-- 
the non-local sources.. Of these sources only al-Ya qu i 
mentions it, albeit briefly. Again, it is the local hist- 
orians we must look to for more information. 
(64) 
C (62) See al-Khazraji, Tirýz, f 111a; Kifayah, 90; Asjad, 29; 
al-Janadi, f 45b; al-Ahdal, f, 40a; Ab'U Makhramah, I 1,64, 
all say that -the people of Tihamah revolted against 
Muhammad b. Barmak, the governor of the Yemen 
(18.33-4/799-800). 
(63) Cf . al-Ya 
cqu-bi Tari-kh., II1 144 , who says 
in ýIaraz cUmar b. 
Abi Khalid_al-k1imyar-f declared his support to al-Ilaycýani. 
Al-Razil Tarikh, 108, mentions that al-Hay,, ý, am retreated to 
Jibal al-c-Aj-d(al-Akwac, in al-Hamdan-i, ýifat, 123, foot 
notes, says that al-cAdd from aC mal Shibai-nAqyan). Al-Ifaindani 
Iklil, 11,322, records that al-Ha- ' ý7 sam 
was in Jabal Tays at 
the eve of his revolt. For the loc, ýtion of Jabal Ta,.,, -s, 
see al-Waysi, 64; Wilson, I'Mapping", 200,371. 
This rebellion is preser,, -ed (64) Cf. al-Yacqubi., Tarikh, 111,14-1. 
in several YemeTýi sources, such as a! -11aiTidan'l, IkI. 
171, II, 
' 9; al-Razli, T-1 _* 108-10; IdrLs, Kan-, f 175, a; Ilbý-, A)2_ arikh, 
5T -ali, 91-3; I'i f aý al-Da bac, Qurrat, 1,1,32-5: al-Kh-az-r-,,, _ I CA Ai sjad, 2Sj_ 
There are two different accounts of the uprising. 
One gives the year (179/774-75) as the beginning of the 
revolt. 
(65) 
The other mentions no specific date, merely 
confirming that it began when, followino,,,, the arrival of 
Hammad al-Barbar-1 in the Yemen in 184/800 al-Haysam made 
a stand against the injustices perpetrated by the new 
governor. 
(66) 
This second account is probably the more 
valid one, for two reasons. Firstly, there is no mention 
of the incident in our sources before the governorship of 
Hammad. Secondly, Harun al-Rashid sent Hammad with the 
express purpose of suppressing the Yemeni insurrection, 
whereas neither al-Haysam's name, nor his revolt were 
mentioned in the caliph's instructions. 
(67) 
Again our sources, especially local ones, differ as 
(68) to the cause of this uprising. What is clear is that 
(65) Al-Yacqu-b-i, Tar-i*kh, 111,144. 
(66) This statement is recorded mainly by the Yemeni hist- 
orians, see al-Ilamdani., Iklil, 11,322; al-Khazraji, 
Kifayah, 91; C Asjad, 29; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,139, 
'ýý_bo confirm that al-Hay! ýam opposed the injugýtices of 
Hammad by revolting against him. Al-Razi, Tarikh, 108; 
Idris, Kanz, f 175a, both record that this rebellion took 
place during the governorship of Hammad without giving 
any specific date, except Idris, f 175a, who gives 
181/797-8, as a beginning of the rebellion, which is 
unacceptable. Al-Khazraji, cAsjad, 28, records that 
during th 
'e 
governorship of Ahmad b. Ismallil al-Hashimi, 
though he gives no specific 
date. 
a (67) For the instructions, see al-Razi, 109; al-Jan,. -, i, f 45b7 
al-Khazrail, Kifayah, 90; Tiraz, f Illa; 
C Asjad, 29; 
2- 11 64. al-Ahdah, Tuhfat, f 40a; Abd Makhramah, 
(68) Al-Hamdani., Iklil, I-jy 322, for example, confirms that 
al-H. -: ---yýam rebelled against Hammad 
due to personal conflict. 
Other Yemeni historians record that he stood against 
the hars'l) treatment of HL, mmad toverards the Ye! iienis, see 
al-Kha. -, ýraji, Kifayah, 91; 'Asjad, 29; Ibn al-Da-ybal, 
Qurrat, 1,132. 
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these sources portray Uammad al-Barbar-1- as the oppressor 
and al-Haysam as the one who attempted to stop him. Since 
that is all the information we have it is difficult to offer 
any other judgement. Thus al-Hay, ýamls revolt was either 
the result of personal enmity towards Hammad or of his 
sympathy with the Yemenis and his opposition to the harsh 
treatment that Hammad meted out to them. 
Unfortunately, our sources give no details of the 
battles that took place between the C Abbasid troops and the 
rebels. However, they do confirm that Hammad al-Barbarils 
initial attempt to suppress the revolt was a failure and 
that the governor had to write to the caliph for re- 
inforcements. (69) The strength of the revolt lay in the 
rebels' geographical advantage and the existence of influ- 
ential leadership among the insurgents; consequently, 
Hammad was unable to put down the revolt until he had 
succeeded in . arresting al-Haysam by means of trickery. 
(70) 
As for the Tihamah insurrection we know that as a 
result of the Yemeni rebellion against cAbbasid authority, 
(71) Hammad al-Barbari was despatched to the area. Since 
(69) Al-Razli, T- -*kh, 108; Ibn al-Dayb arl a gurrat, 1.132. 
Idris, Kan f 175a; al-Khazraji , Kifayah, 
91f Asjad, 
29;, all say that the caliph reinforced I-, im by ten 
commanders [ten armed divisions]. 
(70) Al- Hamdani, IkIll, 11., 322. Cf also., al-Razi, 108; al- 
Khazraji, Kifayah, 92f; cAsjad, 29; Idris, Kan z, f l7ba, 
who mention. that "Al-Haysam fled from Hammad to Baysh, 
a village in Tihamah, where he was arrested. " Al- 
V. -L qubi., Tarl 1112 144, - says 
that Hammad despatched i kh 
an army led by ýarad who succeeded in ar-, -esting 
al-Haysam. According to al-Tabar-i, III, 712, al-Hayý; am 
was arrested in 191/806-7. 
(71) Cf. 316 above. 
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the insurgents were mainly from Tihamah, cAbbasid troops 
must have been directed there. Yet, there is no mention 
in the sources at our disposal of a direct confrontation 
between the Tihamah rebels and the caliphal army, nor any 
indication as to the political situation of the region 
during 4ammad's governorship (184-94/800-10). (72) 
On the other hand, our sources confirm that Hammad 
suppressed the rebels and forced them to pay land tax 
(73) (kharaj). Once again our sources give neither the 
identity of the rebels, nor the names of their provinces. 
There is, indeed, a possibility that the revolt of al-Hayýam 
and the Tihamah insurrection were interrelated. Although 
lack of material does not allow judgements of absolute 
certainty, two reasons exist for this assumption : firstly, 
the geographical proximity of the troubled areas, i. e. the 
territory of 'cAkk; in Tihamah , and 
Jibal M. Aswar j and, secondly, the 
failure of the sources to provide information about the 
Tihamah rebellion and its emphasis on al-Hay§am's revolt 
makes us believe the latter rebellion had included the former 
(74) 
under its leadership. Thus, while Hammad al-Barbari 
succeeded in suppressing the uprising of al-Hay, ýam after 
the latter's arrest in 191/806-7 he failed to put a stop 
to rebellion in Tihamah. There, insurrectionist activity 
(72) Except this vague indication which throws a little 
light on the cAbbasid invasions to this region. This 
attack comes to us through messages made by the zzý Yemenis to the caliph al-Amiln and his minister. see 332-3 
C brlow. 73) Al-Janad-1, f 45b; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 90f; Asiad, 
29; Ibn al-Daybd , Qurrat, I, 1. 
')2-; --A6ri - Makhramah, II, 6, --). 
(74) Especially as che latter enjoyed strong leadership. 
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resurfaced within less than ten years. 
(75) 
All in all, Hammad's more successful achievements 
were concentrated in the Yemeni highlands(Najd al-Yaman) 
and especially the area to the north of SancV, where he 
controlled the trade routes which connected San Ca 'j with al- 
(76) Yamamah and Mecca. Undoubtedly, the amount of attention 
paid by our sources to his success there leads us to believe 
that the area was insecure long before Hammad's governorship. 
If this assertion is correct, the nomads of the area may 
-- (77) themselves have been the cause of the unrest. Al-Razi 
C- 
records that Hammad kept the nomads (al-a rab) in check., 
preserving the security of the routes. The Yemeni hist- 
orians 
(78) 
tell us that as a result of Hammad's military 
activity, the Yemen entered a period of economic ease such 
as it had never witnessed before. 
Thus, it may be said that had Hammad not taken such 
a serious stand against the rebels, this part of the Yemen 
would never have become secure. However, such interest 
(75) The insurrection flared up in the area at the beginning 
of the caliphate of al-Ma'mu-n 198/8133-4, see 347-8 below. 
(76) The sources mention only the security of these routes 
which lead us to believe that the cAbbasids succeeded 
in controlling the area. See al-Razi, 110; al-Janadi 
f 45b; 
- 
al-Khazraji, Tiraz, f Illa; Kifayah, 91; 
-Asjad, 29; Abu Makhramah, 11,65; al-Ahdal-, f 4--Ga. 
(77) Tarlikh, 110. 
(78) See, al-Razl, 
_109; 
Idr-is, f 175a; 
_Ibn 
al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 
132; al-JanadiY f 45a; al-Khazraji, Tiraz, f 111a; 
Kifaya 91; C Asjad, 29; Abu Makhramah, II, 6ý5; 
al-Ahdal) f 40a. 
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on the part of the cAbbasid caliph in Yemeni affairs offers 
clear proof of the growth and widespread nature of local 
insurrections against his authority there. On the other 
hand., this emphasis illustrates the fact that the'ý- 
Baghdad administration at that time paid more attention 
towards its interests in the area. By and large, such 
successful expeditions were not to be repeated by the 
C 
Abbasid regime during the period of Harun al-Rashid's 
successors. 
(79) 
(79) See Chapter XI below. 
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Table 7 The nasab of al-Hayýam b. rýAbd al-Samad 
9 
Saba (al-Asghar) 
Zurcah (Himyar al-Asghar) 
I 
Sadad 
Zayd 
Malik 
al-Harith 
Shurahbil 
Murrah (Dhu Khalil) 
Arib 
i 
Nawf 
i 
Kar ib 
I 
Zayd 
Amr 
I 
Bulir 
cI* 
Abd al-Samad 
1 (3) 
al-Hayýam 
(2) 
After al-Harndani, Iklil, 11,321; al-Himyarl, Muluk, 
158. 
(2) One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathaminah) 
who ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. Dhi Yazan. Cf. 
al-RasUli, Turfat, 55; in al-Hamdani, Lklil, II, 29A, 
who ruled the Yemen after Dhu Nuwas., Cf. also al- 
Himyarl'., Muluk, 156f. 
r (3) The leader of the rebellion against the 'Abbasid regime 
in Jibal Maswar during the caliphate of Harun al-Rashid 
-324- 
Table 8 The governors of the Yemen in the time of the early cAbbasid Caliphs (132-93/750-809) 
-3c appointed by Abu 1- Abbas, al-Saffah (132-6/750-4) 
Dawud b. cAll b. cAbd 
Allah b. al-cAbb-as (1) 
cUmar b. cAbd al-Ham-ld 
b. cAbd al-Rahman b, Zayd 
b. al-Khattab 0 al-cAdawl (2) 
Muhammad b. Yazilid b. cAbd Llah lo, cAbd al-Madan 
al-Harith-i (3) 
cAbd Allah b. Malik al- 
Harith-I (4) 
Ali b. al-Rabi c b. 
_cAbd al-Madiin al-Harithi (5) 
Over the Hijaz and the Yemen, he resided in Mecca. 
Cf. 300 above. 
(2) Deputy of above. See 300 above. 
(3) His governorship lasted for five months only, see Ibn 
cAbd al-Aladjid, 19. 
(4) Idr-is, f 174a; Ibn cAbd al-, Viaj-id, 19; al-Khazraji, 
Kifayah, 77; cAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 
120; Bughyat, 2S. His governorship lasted for four 
months. Omitted by Zambaur, Manuel, 113; Bikhazi, 
"Coins". 15. 
(5) Ibn Khayyat, 413, says he was appointed by 
C 
his uncle 
Ziyad b. cýbayd Allah. Idris., f174a; Ibn Abd al- 
Majid, 19; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 77; cA!, ýJjad, 2-5; 
Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,120; Bughyat, 28, all 
of them give four years and some months for the 
period of his governorship, which is not acceptable, 
because this period does not correspond with the 
period of Abu 3 1--cAbbasts reign i. e. four years nine Z: > ) 
months, if we discount the period of cAlli b. al- 
R J- -31- C ab-Ic's predecessors in this post during Abu Abb-as 
Caliphate. Cf. Serjeant, Lewcock Smith and Costa, "Great 
I Illosaue", 32, -,. t, 348, which tells us that in 136/754 the cAbbasid Caliph al-Mahdl (most likely Abu -'l-cAbbas 
al-Saffah who died by the end of this year whose first ' cAbd -1 Er t011 n am es Allah) gave his 
C 
or d his governor 
iii the Ye-,, -iei-,, cAl-I b. al-Rabi to repair the mosques 
of S,, anca-' 
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appointed by Abu Jacfar al-Man§ur (136-59/755,11-75) 
c Abd Allah b. al-Rabicb. cAbd Allah 
b. c Abd al-Madan al-Harithi: - (6) 136-42/753-9 
Macn b. Zaoidah b. cAbd Allah b. 
Matar b. Sharik b. al-Sulb b. 
Muýrah b. Hammam b. 
-Murrah b. Dhuhl al-Shaybani (7) 142-51/759-68 
Za 3 idah b. Macn (8) 
(9) 151-3/768-70 
al-Hajjaj b. Mansur 
al-Furat b. Salim 
(10) 
153-4/770-1 
(6) Cf. Ibn Khayydt, 431; Idr'ls, f174a; Ibn cAbd al-Ma4lid, 19; 
al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 78; C Asdad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba 
_ 
_Qurra , 
I. 121f; 
_Bughyat, 
28. He travelled to Baghdad 
leaving his son in charge. Omitted by Smith, "History of 
San Ca '3 11)53. 
C 
The latter and Bikhazl., "Coins". 15, instead ihey insert Ali b. al-Rab-irc. See also 30,9 above. 
(7) For a detailed discussion of the MacnIs governorship, 
cf . 308,13 above. 
(8) He replaced his father "Ma C n", who left to go to Sijistan., 
in 151/768, cf, al-Tabari, 111,368 (citing of al-W: ýqjdi); 
al-Yacqubi, Tarikh, 'III, 118. See also Ibn cAbd al- T C Maj'jd, 20. Al-Khazraji, Kifayah., 81; Asjad 26f; 
Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, 1,123; Bughyat, 28, all of 
them say that ZaOidah ruled the Yemen three years after 
his father, which is not acceptable, see-Bikhazi, 
16. We have already mentioned that Macn was appointed 
over the Yemen in 142/759-60, Cf. 308 above, and 
al-Yacqu-b-1, Tarlikh, 111,108, says he remained there 
for nine years. It is quite probable he left the 
Yemen in 151/768 the year in which his son replaced 
him. 
(9) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 82; c Asjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybac 
Qurra J, 123; Bughyat, 2S. - Idr-is., Ibn c Abd al- 
Majid omit. 
He was in office in 153/770, see al-Hamdani, Sifat, 
17 59. See also Idr'is. f 174b; C 
Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 
20; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 82.; Asja , 
27; Ibn al- 
Daybac, Qurrat, 1,123. Bughyat omits. They all give 
three years f or the period of his governorship. 
Ibn Khayyat, 431, does not give a specific date. See 
also Bikhazi, 16; Smith, "History of San 
Caj 53. 
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Yazid b. Mansur al-Himyari (154-8/770-5) 
appointed by al-Mahdi 
Yazid b. Man: ý, ur al- 
IJimyari (12) 
Raja'3 b. 
- 
Rawb al- 
Judhami (13) 
c 
Ali b. Sulayman b. 
c AbdcAllah b. al- 
Abbas (14) 
(158-69/775-85) 
159/775-6 
159-60/776-7 
161-2/777-8 
Al-Hamdani, Sifat, 1,59, confirms that he arrived in 
the Yemen early in 154/771. See also Idris, f174b; 
Ibn cAbd al-Majild, 20; al-Khazraji,, Kifayah, 82f; 
C Asjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 123f; Bughyat, 
28f, who confirm that he came in 154/771, except 
Ourrat which records he replaced al-Furat b. Salim. 
Ibn Khayyat, 431, mentions that he occupied this post 
in the latier part of al-Manýur's caliphate and gives 
no specific date. Al-Tabarl, iii, gives two contra- 
dictory accounts; in týe first quoting al-WzTqidi, 
372, he says that in 153/770, Yaz'ld was the governor 
of al-Yaman; in the second, 371 he 'ý(ays in this year 
Yazid was governor of Basra. 
(12) He was re-appointed by al-Mahd: L for the whole year and 
left designating cAbd al-Khdliq b. Muhammad al-Shihahi 
in charge for some two months, Cf. Iaris, f 174b; C Ibn cAbd al-Maj-id, 20; al-Khazraj'!, KifHyah, 83; Asjad, 
27; Ibn al-Daybac., Qurrat, 1.124; Bughyat, 29. See 
also Ibn Khayyat, 431 who says al-IMahdi reappointed 
him for a while. See also Bikhazi, 19. Smith, "History 
of San C ao omits, instead he inserts al-Shihabi. 
(13) Al-Tabarl., 111,466. ibn cAbd al-Majid, 20, says 
thai he arrived in the Yemen in Dhu-'J-Ijijjah. Idris, 
f 174b, confirms that his governorship lasted for 
thirteen months. See also al-Yacqubi, Tarikh, III, 
132, who mentions that he succeeded Yazid b. Imansur 
in this post. 
(14) Idris, f 174b; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 20; al-, T,, -, hazraj -L, 
KifýLya , 
8'33; cAs, jad, 27; Ibn al-Daybac, Buý--,, hyat, 
all of them confirm that he arrived in San`a) in 
Aluýarram 161/0c-tober, 777. In the foilowing 
0 
t> 
year he left appointing -; --asf b. cIsmall, in his 
place, ibid. Bikhaz--L, 19, follows al-Hamdani, Sifat 
T, (-)ýI, and gives 16121 for his arrival in the Yemen. 
-'ý11-Tabar-[, 111,493, states 
that he -was dismissed in 
ti-, ls year. 
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cAbd Allah b. Sulayman 
(15) 
163-4/779-81 brother of above. 
Man,, 5ur b. Yazid b. Man$ur 165/781-2 
al-Himyari (16) 
c Abd Allah b. Sulayman 166/782-3 
C- al-Rab i 17) 
c Sulayman b. Yazid b. Abd 167-9/783-5 
Madan al-HErith-i (18) 
F (15) Idris, f174b; Ibn cAbd al-Maji-d, 20f; al-Khazraji, 
Kifayah, 83f; cAsjad, 27; Ibn al- Daybac, Bughyat, 29 
all of-them say he arrived at San Ca in Rabic II, 
and stayed some seventeen months. In al-Tabari, 
111) 502, he was dismissed in 164. See aiso Ibn 
W, 440; Bikhazi, 19f; Smith, "History of Khayp7. a 
San a 53. 
(16) He came in 165/781-2 and stayed about one year, cf. 
Ibn cAbd al-Alajid, 21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 84; 
cA, ýýad, 27; Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 29. Al-Tabari 
111;, 502, gives 164/780-1 for his appointmeni, and 
followed by Bikhazi, 20. Zambaur, 113,, has al- 
Mansur b. Yazid b. al-Mansur. 
(17) Al-Tabari, 111,521. 
_Idris. L 
f 174b; Ibn cAbd 
aji _ýýjad, 
27; M Id, 21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 84, cAAs 
Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 29, all of them say he 
stayed one year; in _ýLurrat, 
1.126, he remained until 
the death of al. -Tvlahdi (169/785), a-nd these sources 
have al-Nawfall instead of al-Rabci. 
(18) Al-Tabari, 111,, 521., says he was in the Yemen 
in i67/783-4. Ibn Khayvat, 440, places him 
after PA11 b. Sulayman'b'. cAll b. ýbd Allah b. 
al-cAbbas. In Idr-is, f 174b; c 
Ibn Abd al-Majid, 
21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 85; Asjad, 28; Ibn 
al-Day. ba C 
. 
Bughyat, 29, all of them confirm that 
lie stayed throughout al-_', Iahdi's reign. Qurrat 
omits. 
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appointed by al-Illadi (169-70/785-6) 
Abd Allah b. Muhammad b 
Ibrahim b. Mubammad Ali 
c b. Abd Allah b. al- Abbas (19) 
Ibrahim b. Salm 
- 
b. Qutaybah 
b. Muslim al-Bahill (20) 
7 
appointed by al-Rashid (170-93/786-809) 
c -j (21) al-Ghitrif b. Ata 170-3/786-90 
-C c al-Rabi b. Abd Allah b. (22) cAbd al-Madan al-Harithi 174-5/79-0-1 
(19) Idrifs, f., 174b; Ibn Abd al-Majild, 21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
cc 85; Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba , Bughyat, 
29, all of 
them say that he remained one year. In al-Yacqubi,, 
Týrlkh, 111,132, Abd Allah b. Muhammad b. Ibrah . im 
al-Zaynabl-. Omitted by Ibn Khayyat; Zambaur; Bikhazi. 
See also Smith, "History of San c a: ), " 54. 
(20) In Idris., f 174b; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, Pl; al-Khazraji, 
KifýTyah, 85; c Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba";,,. Bughyat, 29; 
Qurrat, 1,127, read Sulayman instead of Salm; 
and all say he_stayed for four months until death of 
al-Hadi in Rabic I, 170ZSeptember 786. See Ibn 
__ Khayyat,, 446. Al-Tabari, 111., 568, says that Ibrahim 
governýd the Yemen'in 169/785-6. 
(21) Al-Tabari, III, 590f; he was appointed in 170/786Z7. 
,CC Ibn Abd al-Majid, 21; al-Khazraji,. Kifayah, 86; Asjad, 28; 
all of them say he stayed in al-Janad, while the 
former gives three years nine months for the period 
of al-Ghitrif's governorship, the latter gives three 
years seven months. This governor struck coins ZD in his own name. Cf. Bikhazi., 20; Muharram 
"Dananir Islamiyyah", 24; Lowick, "Mini 303. In 
173/790, he left 
- 
the Yemen appointing cAbbad b. 
Muýammad al-Shihabi in his place, the latter remained 
in office until the end of the following year. 
(22) Idrj7s, f 174b; Ibn OAbd al-Maji , d, 21; c: al-Khazraji, 
Yy Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, I, K 86f; 
cAsjadc 28 T 
128, all of them say that he arrived in the Yemen 
in the later part of 174/791. Ibn Khayyat omits. 
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c4im b. 
-cUtbah 
al- 175/791-2 
Ghassani (23) 
Ayyub b. Jacfar b. Sulayman 176/792-3 
b. c Ali b. c Abd Alla-h 
b. al-cAbbas (24) 
-r Cc 
al-Rabl_ b. Abd Allgh. bFAbd 
al-Madan al-]ýaritbT (24) 
c 
177-8/793-5 
al- Abbas b. Sacid (mawla of 
B. Hashim) (25) 
joint authority 
Mu4ammad b. Ibrahim al- 178-9/795-6 
Hashim! (26) 
(23) Idri's, f174b; Ibn cAbd al-'-Majid, 21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
87; cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-DaybaP, Bughyat, 29, all of them 
record that he stayed only one year, though they give 
no date for his arrival Cin 
San c9z' in the latter c Utaybah 
and in _Qurrat, 
1,128, Uyaynah. Ibn Khayyat omits. 
Bikhazi., 21, suggests that he arrived early in 175/791. 
(24) Idris, f 174b; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 87; CAsjad, 28; 
Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 29, all of them mention that he 
remained in San, ýiP for a whole year; Qurrat omits. 
0 
(25) Both al-Rablic and al-cAbbas were appointed as joint 
authority, the former to head the military and lead 
the prayer and the latter to supervise the levy of 
the alms-tax. Cf 302 above. 
-Idris., 
f 175a; Ibn cAbd 
al-Majid, 21; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 87; cAsjad, 28; 
Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 29, all of-them mention that they 
remained in the Yemen for some two years. It is most 
likely that al-cAbbas stayed in SancP, since al- 
Yacqdbl, Tarikh, 111,137 says that al-Rashid sent 
back al-Rabic to the Yemen except Sana", and in page 
143 he (i. e. al-Yacq5b! ) records tLt al-Rash1d 
Z: D, 
appointed his mawla i. e. al-cAbVa-s over the Yemen. 
Both governors are omitted by Bikhazi. Al-cAbf; as 
omitted by Smith "History of ýancd :)". 
(26) He was appointed over the Hijaz and. the Yemen, stayed 
in the Hijaz and sent his son al-cAbbas to the Yemen. 
Cf. Idr-is, f 175a; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 21f; al- 
87f- '. Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybac Khazraji, Kif iiyah, 
RLIrrat, 1,129; Bughyat, 29f (the latter records 
that al-cAbbas was dismissed after si. --.: months) 
Ibn_Khayyat, 461, say that first he sent his son 
Ibrahim, týen, he dismissed him and appointed al- 
cAbbas. Al-Tabari. III, 63T., confirms that Muharnmad 
178/79, 'r was the governor of . )N. ecca in -5 
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cAbd Allah b. Mus'ab b. Thabit 180/796-7 
b. cAbd Allah b. ' al-Zubayr (27) 
Ahmad b. Ismacil b. cAlli al- 181/797-8 4- - Hashimi (28) 
Ibrahim b. cAbd Allah b. Talhah 182-3/798-9 
00 al-Hajabi (of B. Abd al- 
Dar5 (29) 
Muhammad b. Khalid b. 183-4/799-800 
Býrmak (30) 
Hammad al-Barbari (Mawla 184-93/800-9 
of al-Rashid (31) 
cAbd a! -MajId, 22; %1-Khazraji, (27) Idris, f175a; C 
Ibn 
K 88; Asjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba , Bughyat, 30, 
all of them say that he remained only one yearc,., )though they give no indication of his arrival in San a. 
Bikhazi, 22, gives 180/796-7, for his goveýnorship; 
Lowick, "Mint".. 303, has 180-1/796-8. 
C -r (28) Idr-is, f175a; Ibn Abd al-Majid 22, both give 181/797-8 
for his governorship. Smith, "History" 54; Bikhazi., C- C 22, both read Abmad b. Isma 11 b. All b. cýbd Allah 
b. Talhah b. Abi Talbah. For the correct name, 
00-C cf. al Khazraji, Kifayah, 88; Asjad, 28; Ibn al- 
Daybac, Qurrat, 1,129; Bughyat, 30. 
(29) Al-Hamdani, Sifat, 1,58, say that 
182/798-9 followed by Bikhazi, 22. 
IbncAbd al-Majid, 22; al-Khazraji, cAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Dayba c, Bughyat, 
say that he remained only one year 
Omits. 
he came in 
Idrls, f175a; 
Kifayah, 89; 
30Y all of them 
Qurrat 
(30) He arrived in Shawwal 183/November, 799. For the 
reference, cf note 8 in Chapter X. 
(31) He reached Sanca 3 in Shaw-wal 184/November 800. For 
the referenýe, cf note 61 in Chapter x. This 
governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. 
Bikhazi, 23; Lowick "Mint", 303. 
0 
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CHAPTER XI 
The Yemen from the death of Haru-n al-Rashid to 
the first year of al-Alutawakkil's reign 
(193-233/809-47) 
c When Harun al-Rashid died in 193/809, the Abbasid 
Empire was divided between two of his sons,, al-AmIn and 
al-Ma"mu-n, with the stipulation that the former assume the 
off ice of caliph and the latter be his heir apparent. In the 
following year the power struggle between the two brothers 
flared up, which led the Muslim world into the Civil War. 
This war continued until the murder of al-Amin in Baghdad 
in 198/813, and the office of the caliphate fell to al-Ma3mun 
ý1) 
It is noticeable that this Civil War is considered the watershed 
of cAbbasid rule; it clearly hastened many changes in the fabric Z: > 
(2) C of Muslim society. Apparently, Abbasid domination over 
the regions, including the Yemen, became weak. In this region, 
while local power appeared in strength disputing the caliphal 
regime in the area, the Abbasids failed to suppress them. In 
c 
some parts of the country the caliphs worked to safeguard the 
loyalty of the area, in other regions their regime was opposed 
and the governors were expelled. However, the following 
chapter will cover the political situation in the Yemen and its 
relations with the cAbbasid administration from. the death of 
al-Rashild to the first year of al-MutawtLkkil's rule 
(193-233/809-47), showing the escalation of local uprisings 
and caliphal policy towards it. 
See, al-Yacqu-b-i, Tarikh, 111,146 ff; al-Taloari, III, 651 ff 
Tbn Khald*dn, c1bar 111, '471 ff. Cf. also'Shacban, Islamic 
History, 11,39 ff. 
(2) Lassner, The Shaping- of 'Abbasid Rule, 48. Z-) 
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A. The Yemen during the Civil War 
By the end of al-Rash-ld's reign 193/809, the cAbbasid 
influence was clearly manifest in the central and northern 
parts of the Yemeni highlands (Najd al-Yaman) and could be 
felt, albeit less strongly in the other Yemeni regions. 
(3) 
Throughout the period of the Civil War (193-8/809-14) the 
eastern part of the empire represented the focal point of 
events. Consequently, our sources pay considerably less 
attention to the other provinces under caliphal rule. Thus 
reports of affairs in the Yemen are limited to the appointment 
and replacement of governors there., with few references to 
their activities. 
During the first year of al-Amin's caliphate, 193/809, 
the Yemenis themselves were working for the dismissal of 
Hammad al-Barbar-1 from the governorship of the Yemen, a 
post which he held during the period 184-94/800-10. 
(4) 
Although the sources at our disposal do not directly illum- 
inate the political situation of the area during this period, 
messages and complaints made by the inhabitants of Sanca 
D 
-to 
the caliph and his minis-ter, al-Fndl b. al-Rablic, do throw 
some light on the aggressive attacks of Hammad al-Barbari 
against certain Yemeni tribes., especially those in Tihamah 
and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. The SanýanLs 
alluded to the areas under attack from Hammad's troops in 
(3) As has already been mentioned Hammad al-Barbari,, the 
governor of the Yemen (184794/ý00-10), succeeded in 
con-trolling the central and the northern parts of 
the highlands-, see 321 above. 
(, I ) See Table ZS, 11. 
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the following verses sent to al-Fadl b. al-Rab-1 
5 
"I1 t)'L 
J1 
L-lj. ý ý 3--- li 1 15 
"So grant favours to those who have put their hope in you - 
and whose Lands San Ca :) and the countries, cAns and Yahsub. 
And be merciiul to our wretched orphans and childýýn 
whose tears flow continuously towards al-Sakasik. 
And be merciful to the widows of al-Husayb whose eyes 
are full of tears, flowing constantly. ý55 
Although our information concerning Hammad's incursions 
against the Yemenis is scant, it is clear from these verses 
that he attempted to control the regions of Tihamah and the 
southern part of the Yemeni highlands. Ibn al-Mujawir 
(6) 
writes that the territory of al-Ashacir, in the southern part 
of Tihamah, was the scene of tribal conflict which resulted 
in the leaders of the hostile factions going to Baghdad to 
seek the mediation of the caliph, al-Amin, and to ask him 
to designate one of them as ruler of the area concerned. 
Yet., despite the fact that an overall leader was agreed upon, 
political disorder in the territory did not abate. Thus 
a political vacuum was created in the Ashacir area which 
existed until the governor of the Yemen presented a report 
to al-Ma': mun on the disturbances in 202/817-8. 
(7) 
Apparently, Hammad al-Barbari had managed to recruit 
various loyal Yemenis with the aim of attacking Tihamah and 
the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. This was conf irmed 
by the Saricanis in their message to the caliph, al-Amin, which 
(5) Anon, Tarikh, f 160b. See also al-Akwac, Vyatha iq, 223. 
(I-c- 6) Tarikh al-Mustabýýir. 65f. For the territory of al-. ', ý, ha ir 
seo Mýip 2 
( "0 For this disturbance, see 347-8 below. 
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A 
reads as follows: His [i. e. Hammad] first act of injustice 
towards the Muslims and treachery towards the caliph was 
that he used - in ruling the country - some Yemenis and his 
own followers who are arrogant, tyrannical, treacherous, 
immoral, ignorant and straying from what is right who know 
no kindness and do not oppose any forbidden. " 
(8) 
Yet despite 
this, our knowledge of the political situation in Sanca :) 
during this year remains vague. From the above complaint, 
however, it is clear that the Sancanlis were suffering to a 
considerable extent from the aggression of Hammad and his 
followers. 
In 194/810, Hammad was replaced by Muhammad b. C Abd 
-C- (9) Allah b. Malik al-Khttza 1. The new governor's main 
achievement was his pursuit" of 4ammad's representatives in 
the different regions of the Yemen and the subsequent con- 
fiscation of their properties. These steps satisfied the 
Yemenis. (10) Such an initiative on the part of the new 
governor leads us to believe that the Sancan-isl petition to 
al-Amin and his minister, al-Fadl b. al-Rabic, had been both 
-C- welcomed and accepted. Within a year Muhammad al-KhkAza 1 was 
able to restore law and order in the area. However, in 
C- Sha ban 195/May-June 811, he was replaced by 
a C- d b. al-Sarh al-Kin Our sources are Muhammad b. Sia1. 
silent on both the achievements of the new ruler and the 
overall political situation in the area during his governorship, 
(8) 
-U-Akwac, Watha')iq, 220, 
-0; Ibii al-Dayba (9) Al-Khazraji. Kil'avah, 93; ad 90 
Qurrat, I, 136r 
(10) 
-1,1--Khazr., ij! i, 
Kifýayah, 93; al- c ; 
30. 
(11) Ibid. 
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although al-Yacqu-b-i 
(12) 
confirms that the governor left the 
Yemen for Palestine, having amassed great wealth. 
Such are the only references to Muhammad al-Khuzaci 
and Muhammad al-Kinan-i in our sources. The paucity of 
information about them may indicate the lack of any significant 
achievement on their part in their services to the central 
government. If the first governor managed to eliminate 
Hammad's representatives there, then the sole claim to fame 
his successor had was the fortune he accumulated while in 
office. Politically, it appears that the situation in the 
area was not unlike that during the caliphate of Har-un 
al-Rashid. 
However, in 196/811-2, the power struggle between 
al-Amin and al-Ma'rnu-n changed considerably in f avour of the 
latter. From Khurasan al-Ma-)mun sent his army to capture 
Baghdad and to declare his caliphate. Once in Baghdad his 
general, Tahir b. al-Husayn, despatched al-Malmun's governors 
to various regions, including the Yemen. There Yazid 
b. Jarir al-Q-asri was appointed governor, arriving in 
c (13) San a in Dhu I-Ijijjah 196/August-September 812. Although 
the local historians make no mention of the political sit- 
uation in the Yemen at the time of Yazlidls appointment, they 
165. 
(13) Al-Tabari, III 857,64; -al-Yacqu-b-i, Tarikh, 111,165, both 
giving the name Yazid b. Jar-ir al"-Bajali. Al-Janadi , CT Sul-Uk, f. 45b; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 94; Asiad, 30 Lbn 
al-Dayba C, Qurrat, 1,138; al-Ahdal, Tuýfat, f 40b; 
Idris Kanz f 175a the latter giving: the date. It seerl. s 
.7P-2 C). to be that Yazid was appointed over the Yemen, except C Akk territory ,,, "h--, -ch 
belon, --, --. d to the governor of :, Iiecca 
at that t-1-me, see al-Taba-ci, 111,863. 
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readily accept that he abused his power by bolstering 
Qahtani solidarity and treating the Abna D in Sanca ý) badly 
with considerable hostility. 
(14) 
In discussing the main 
,ý 15) reasons behind Yazid's appointment to the Yemen, al-Tabarl 
records that the former was despatched there bY Tahir b. al- 
ýusayn with a large army and swore that he would persuade 
his people and also his kinsmen of the Yemeni "kings" and 
.3- nobles to recognise the caliphate of al-Ma 'mun. Thus the 
main purpose behind the appointment was a political one. 
Yazid, according to al-Tabaril, 
(16) 
succeeded in his mission, 
duly convincing the Yemenis to depose (khal c) al-AmIn and 
recognize al-Ma: )mu-n. According to many sources, 
(17) 
Yazid 
concentrated his efforts against the Abna* through the ploy 
of fostering Qahtan-1 solidarity. No other explanation offers 
any real credibility. Naturally, Yazid's good relationship 
with the Qahtani chiefs, especially the Sancanis, meant the 
(18) 
certain enmity of the Abna in that town. It is thus 
apparent that his aggression towards the Abna3 was aimed at ZD 
satisfying the Qahtanis in Sanca If al-Tabarl's statement 
is correct, two things became obvious ; firstly the intention 
(14) Al-Janadi., f 46a; Idris, fl75a, b; al-Khazraj-1, Kifayah, 94; 
al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 40b; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, !, 139. 
(15) IIIY864. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Especially the local ones, such as Idris, Kanz, f 175 a-b, 
al-Janadi, f 4-6a; al-Khazraýi, Kifayah, 94; al-Ahdal, 
Tuýf_at, f40b; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 1,139- 
(18) Such as B. al-Ilarith and B. Shiliab, the former a clan of 
Madhýiij . See, Table 2 -And the latter 
is a clan 
of Himvar, see al-Hamdan-l-, Ikl'll, I, 1551f. 
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by the caliphate to win over the Yemeni chiefs in the Yemen 
and secondly, the fact that the territory as a whole became 
involved in the political life of the Islamic Empire. 
Unfortunately, our sources throw little light on the 
political situation of the Yemen during the governorship of 
Yazid b. Jar'lr,, 196-8/811-4. with the exception of his 
aggression against the Abna ýP in SancV. Yet the historians 
do recount how this governor was dismissed, although they 
differ on the direct cause of his dismissal. Al-Janadi., 
(19) al-Khazraji and al-Ahdal confirm that he lost his 
position after al-Ma3mu-n heard of his harsh aggression 
against the Abna3. Idr-is., Ibn C Abd al-Majid and another 
(20) 
account in al-Khazraj-1 mention that, since YazId failed 
to show generosity towards Abu -)l-Salt, the Iraqi delegate, 
the latter encouraged the caliph to strip him of the gov- 
ernorship. The second account seems somewhat exaggerated 
and is., therefore, unacceptable. To the credibility of the 
first account may be added the fact that it was Abu 1-Salt 
himself who delivered the news to al-Nla'-3mun of Yazid's 
aggression against -the Abna: ' . Then when he received the 
C 
news, al-Ma"mu-n replaced Yazid by Umar b. Ibrahim b. Waqid 
al-'Uma-r-l, one of the few non-Qahtan-1 chiefs in the Yemen, 
and ordered him to arrest Yazld and punish him for his 
misdeeds. 
(21) 
Al-Maomu-n's directive was issued upon the 
(19) Al-Janadi, f 46a; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 94; al-Ahdal, 
f 40b. 
(20) idris, f 175b; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 2,3); al-Khazraj*l, 
Kifayah, 94f; 'Asjad, 30. 
al-T-1 azraji, (21ý Idris, Kanz, f 175b; al-Tjan-, di-, f 46a; 
Kifayah, 95; cAsjad, 30, al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40b. 
cUmar 
b. Ibralii-Lim b. ý, ýiaqid b. Munamroad b. Zayd b. cAbd Allali 
b. cUmar b. al-Khattab, see al-Ziibaý-ri, Nasab, 360. 
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murder of al-Amin in Muharram 198/September 813, when the 
office of caliphate officially fell to him. So, in the 
following month al-cUmar-1 entered ýancV where he arrested 
Yazid b. Jarir and imprisoned him. 
(22) 
Al- C Umar-i's 
governorship lasted until Dhu-31-Qacdah of the same year, when 
he was replaced by Isýaq b. Musa b. cIsa al- cAbbas-L. 
(23) 
The latter ruled the Yemen until he was forced to leave in 
early 200/815 due to the spread of the Alid revolt throughout 
Iraq and the Hijaz. 
B. The expansion of the Alid revolts to the Yemen 
This revolt was led by Abu ýl-Saraya, an adventurer 
and soldier of fortune who had fought with al-Ma )mun against 
al-Amin and, in JumadH II., 199/January-February 815, he 
joined forces with the Alid pretender Ibn Tabataba at 
Kufa. Following their Capture of Kufa, Abu- :ý 1-Saraya, in 
the name of Ibn Tabataba, sent a detachment to take over 
the important cities of the empire and thus widen the extent 
of the revolt. 
(24) Besides those delegated to Basra, Wasit, 
Fars and al-Ahwaz,, Abu : )l-Saraya sent troops under the leader- 
ship of al-Husayn b. al-Aftas and Muhammad b. Dawud, both 
descendants of cAlT b. Abli Talib., to capture the Holy Cities 
of Mecca and Medina, while despatching Ibrahim b. AIusa b. Jacfar 
(22) Ibid 
(23) Idris, f 175 b.; al-Janadli, f 46a; al-Khazraji I- c T'-raz,, f 83a, gives 201 A. H.; Kifayah, 95; Asjad, 30; 
Ibn al-Daybac Qurrat, 1,141; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40b. 
(24) see Ibn Khavydu, J68-70; al-Yacýqdbli, For 
I 
this revolt, I -. 111,976. Tarikh II 1) 17" -6 al-Tabari, 
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al-Sadiq to seize control of the Yemen. 
(25) 
-, Ieanwhile, the 
governor of the Yemen Ishaq b. 'ýMudsa al- cAbbas-1 had received 
orders f rom al-Ma mun to march on Mecca with his army in 
order to protect the pilgrims (ýujjaj). 
(26) 
Designating his 
C_ cousin, al-Qasim. b. Isma 11, as governor in his absence, 
Ishaq duly moved south towards N-lecca. Somewhere in the 0 
Yemen he was attacked by bedouins and forced to retreat 
as far as Sanea-: '. 
(27) 
When Ishaq received news that Ibrahim 
C-: ) b. Musa was on his way to San a, he and his troops left for 
the 41jaz via the Yemeni highlands, (Najd al-Yaman). The 
departure of the cAbbasid forces left the country completely 
C-: ) at the mercy of Ibrahim b. Musa., who easily entered San a 
in Safar 200/September 815. (28) 
3-V (25) Geddes, "Al Ma mun's Si'ite Policy", 99. Al-Tabari, 
IIIY 987, records that Ibrahim had previously come 
to TMecca with his family for the 4aii , and from there he moved to the Yemen, but he does not mention by 
whom he was appointed for this post. Ibn cAbd 
al-Majid, Bahjat, 24, says that he_was designated by 
al-Husayn b. al-Aftas. Al-Isfahani, Maqatil, 533, C0C al-Khazraji, Ki ayah, 97; Asiad, 31; and Ibn al-Dayba 
_qurrat, 
1,142, all confirm that he was directly 
appointed by Abu 'l-Saraya. Al-Mas C udi, VII, 
56., states that he appeared in. the Yemen in 19191814-5. 
(26) For the letter sent by al-Ma. 3 mu-n to Ishaq on this 
matter, cf . Anon, Tarikh, 
f 167a. Cf. also al-Akwac, 
Wath&iq, 224f. 
(27) Idris, f175b; al-KbLazraji, Kifayah, 96; al-cAsjad, 
31. See also Geddes, I'Al-Ma'ý'mfinll. 100. 
(28) Al-Tabari, 111,987 gives A. H. 201. Al-Hamd ni, Ikl 
Iý ZD 
a-i 
11) 131; Idris, Kanz, fl75b; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
C 96f Asjad, 30f. See also al-Tabari, III, 1995ý 
who sa: _ysthat at the end of this year (i. e. A. 11, I. 22 00 
Ibrahim desýatched an army led by an un-named des- 
cendent of Aqil b. Abi Talib to Mecca as the leader 
of the ýajj, cf also341below. 
-340- 
Hardly anything is known of Ibrahim b. Musa's journey 
from Mecca to Sanca". Al-Hamdani (29) records that Ibrahim 
made a stop in Saedah where B. Sacd b. Sacd of Khawlan 
immediately declared their support for him. Ibrahlim, b. 
Miisa then moved southwards with a large force, his aim being 
the capture of Sanca Al-Isfahani 
(30) 
mentions that Ibrah-im 
was able to take the Yemen with comparative ease, although 
he identifies neither Ibrah-im's opposition, nor the place 
where any clash might have taken place. 
However . upon the arrival of Ibr-ah-17m b. Mu-sa in the 
Yemen., the rivalry and conflict between the local tribes 
began to manifest itself. Ibrahim was able to capitalize 
on the situation and enjoyed the support of some of these 
-1 (31) tribes. ' Al-Hamdanl confirms that support was given to 
him from B. Futaymah, a batn of B. S. cd b. Sacd from Khawlan. 
Although little is known of Ibrahim b. Musa's 
administration over the Yemen, his harsh treatment of the 
populace and the confiscation of private property, often 
resulting in the death of his victims, earned for him the 
title of al-Jazzar, "The Butcher. , 
(32) The existence of tribal 
conflict had a profound effect upon his administration in the 
Yemen. In order to satisfy B. Futaymah, his allies, Ibrahl'm 
arrested the chiefs of Ukayl (a batn of Khawlan who were the 
(29) Ikllllýiit 131f. 
(30) Maqatil, 534. 
(31) Iklil, II, 131f; 1,425,530. 
(32) Geddes, "Al-Ala')mu-n", 101. See also al-Tabari, III, 988; 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, V, 177; Ibn 
cAbd L-Majid, 24; 
al-Khazraji, Kifdyah, 97; 
c Asjad, 31; Ibn al-Daybac 
Qurrat, I, 144. 
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enemy of B. Futaymah), along with their Himyar-1 allies, and 
subsequently slaughtered them. 
(33) 
And on -the request of his C> 
Yemeni allies, Ibrahim expelled B. Shihab, a batn of Hinnyar, 
c-j (34) f rom ýan a. 
Ibrahim b. Musa was able to rule the Yemen throughout 
200/815-6, and dinars wer, %: -ý struck in the mint of Sanea-3, 
bearing his name. 
(35) 
By the end of this year, he despatched 
an army, led by an unnamed descendant of cAq-11 b. Abil Talib, 
to Mecca as the leader of the pilgrimage (bajj) in the name of 
IC-. '. . (36) 3 the Shi 1 imam. At the same time al-Ma mu-n appointed 
his brother, Ishaq, as Iýajj leader, and the latter arrived 
in Mecca with a large body of troops. When the Alid leader 
heard of the size of the cAbbasid army, he chose to stay 
with his own men on the outskirts of Mecca. From there 
he attacked the pilgrim caravan, capturing the new kiswah 
destined for the Kacbah and robbing the merchants of their 
goods. Informed of the raid, the 'Abbasid leader despatched 
an army led by cisa b. Yazid al-Jaludi, one of al-Ma 3 mun's 
generals; the Alid troops were soundly defeated and the 
stolen goods were recovered. 
(37) 
Hamdawayh b. Mahan, one of al-Ma ) munfs generals, had 
accompanied the pilgrim caravan on his way to the Yemen, 
over which he had been appointed governor by the minister, 
(33) Al-Hamdani Ikl-il, II, 131f. 
3)4 Al-Hamdan-1 Iklil) I., 530f , confirms that 
both al-c Umar-L 
and the Abn-a-) were behind Ibrahlim's action against 
B. Shiha-b. 
(35) Personal co-rurunicaLion with Mr. N. Lowick- dated 10.12.198, c... 
2 
(36) Al-Tabarl,! Ii, 995. 
(37) Ibid. 
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al-Hasan b. Sahl. 
(38) 
After completing the hajj ceremonies, 
he continued southwards to take up his new post and expel 
Ibrahim b. Musa from the province. At the beginning of 
201/815, he met the Alid forces on the outskirts of 
C-) 
- ýan a, and in the resulting battle the Alid troops were 
defeated and their leader, Ibrah-im b. Mu-sa, was forced to 
leave the region. 
(39) 
Our sources differ on the route taken by Ibrahim b. 
Musa following his defeat. Al- Yacqub-i (40) states that lie f led 
directly to Mecca. Local sources, 
(41) 
on the other hand, 
insist that he remained in the Yemen until his appointment 
by al-Ma"mu-n to the governorship of the province in the 
latter part of 202/818. In all probability Ibrahim b. Musa 
remained in the Yemen during the early part of 201/817, 
venting his wrath against the cAbbasid allies in the northern 
area of the highlands. In Sacdah., therefore, he made an 
attack upon B. Ukayl, a batn of B. Sacd, b. al-Rab7icah from 
Khawlýn and representative of the cAbbasid allies in the 
region, destroying their old dam, al-Khaniq, in the process. 
(42) 
Meanwhile his ally, Muhammad al-cUmari, murdered one of the 
(43) Dhu Lacwah chiefs., a batn of Bakil. These aggressions 
by Ibrahim and his Yemeni allies in the country undoubtedly 
(38) Al-Tabarili, 111,995. 
(39) Al-Ya c qubi, Tarikh, 111,176; Idris, Kanz, f 175b; Ibn 
ci'lbd 
al-Majid, 25; ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, I, 146. 
(40) Ta-rl-*kh, 111,176. 
(41) See_Idr-is, f 175b; Ibn cAbd al-Maj-id, 25; al-Khazraji, 
iýifayah, 98; c ayb c Qttrrat, I, 146. A,,: -, j ad, 31; Ibn al-D a 
(42) Al-Hai,, lclanl, Ikj- 11, VI Ii 1115; al-R-azi. 
T-. ar-ikh 2'35 f. See al. -: ýo 
Geddes, "AL-ý! 111' midn" 102. 
c 
(43) For the friendship of al- Umari wit-1 Lklil, 117. 
Ibrahiui b. ',, Jusa, see Iklil, 11,131; 1.530. 
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took place during the early months of that year, thus 
al-Tabari 
(44) 
regards it as the first year of the former's 
uprising. From ýacdah Ibrahlim b. Mu-sa continued northwards 
to capture the Holy City of Mecca. Informed of the Alid 
troops imminent arrival in Mecca, the CAbCasid commander 
there Yazid al-Makhzumi., took the of f ensive against them; 
however his men were routed and he was killed. Consequently, 
the Alids had little difficulty in obtaining control over 
Mecca and its surrounding areas. 
(45) 
The rebellion of Hamdawayh b. Mahan. 
In Dhu "'1-Hijjah 201/June-July 817, the house of cAl-l 
received an unexpected boost when cAlll al-Rida, a son of 
Imam MUsE b. Jalfar al-Sadiq, was appointed heir to the 
throne (waliyyan li-'l'ahd) bY al-Ma3M-Un. 
(46) Taking 
advantage of his brother's new position, Ibrahim b. Musa 
took illegal control of Mecca, calling upon its citizens 
3- 
to support al-Ma mun and his brother, cAlll al-Rida. In the 
latter part of 202/818, however, Ibrahlm was officially 
appointed by the caliph as governor of Mecca and the 
leader of the ýajj. 
(47) 
Upon the completion of the ýajj ceremonies, Ibr-ahlm b. 
Musa advanced towards the Yemen, where he had been appointed 
(. 44) IIIY 987. 
(45) Geddes "Al-ý, Ia mu-n" 103. See also al-Yacqu-bl-, Tar-i-kh, 
176; al-Fasl, Iqd, 111,264. 
(46) Cf. al-Yacqu-bi, Tarikh, 111,176, who says in 
Ramadan; 
al-Tabari, III, 1.012; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 61. 
See also 
Gedaes, "Al-Ma-)mun" 103. 
(47) Ibn Habib, Muliabbar, 40; 
Tarikh, 471; al-Janadi, f 
al-Fasl', cIqd, III, 264. 
al-Tabarl, III, 1029; Ibn Khayya*- 
46a; al-Khazraji, Tiraz, f 581); 
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a governor. 
(48) 
Gaining control over the area, however, ývas 
not an easy matter for him, given the resistance of Hamdawayh 
b. Mahan, whom he was to replace. During his two years as 
governor of the Yemen, (201 -2/816-8), Hamdawayh had succeeded 
in strengthening his own army, among which were certain 
Yemenis. With the approach of Ibrahim and his army towards 
ýanc-a: ' early in 203/818, Iýamdawayh rode out to meet them at 
Jadir. In the battle which ensued, Ibrah-im's forces were 
routed and he was forced to flee back to Mecca. (49) 
Following his victory over Ibrah-im, ýamdawayh b. 
Mahan revolted against the caliph, proclaiming independence 
from the central government. 
(50) 
When the news of the 
rebellion reached al-Ma3mu-n. who was on his way to Baghdad 
from Marw, he immediately appointed cIsa b. Yazid al-Jaludi 
over the Yemen with orders to send Hamdawayh as a prisoner 
(51) to Baghdad. 
(48) Al-Yacqu-bi, Ta-r-ikh, 111., 177. Idris Kanz, f175b; Ibn 
C6 Abd al-Majid, 25; and Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 1,146, 
mention that he received the cahd al-wil'ayah while he 
was in the vicinity of San aj 
states that Ibrahim at (49) Al-Yacqudbl, Tarlikh, 111,177) 
first defeated Hamdawayh's son and pushed on towards 
Sanca: ) When he' reached that city ýIamdawayh himself 
went out to meet him and it was -then that Ibrahim fled 
to Mecca; see Geddes, "Al-Ma: lmun. 11 104, 
Ynote 
29. 
Cf. also Idris, Kanz, f 175b; Ibn al-D bac, Qurrat, I, 
146, who mention the place of the battle; Ibn Ab-d- 
al -Maj Id, 25. Jadir are two villages Jadir al-OUlya C. 
and_Jadir al-Sufla; see Iklil, Iý ý-526. C 
Al- A-wa in, 
Iklil), IY 526, note 1561; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 
I. 
146-, note 4) says the Jadirs are in al-Rahabah, north 
of Sanca ý) The village of Jadir is about'13 kms north 
San"dl , personal communication with 
Dr. R. IVilson 
dated 15 July 1983. 
(50) Al-YacqUdb-i, Tarlikh, III, See also Geddes, "the 
Yucfi-rid-1,41. 
(51) Al-Yacqu-b-ii., TTI, lS2. 
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While our sources agree that Hamdawayh did revolt in 
the Yemen, no specific reasons for the rebellion are given. 
Yet if we connect this revolt with other uprisings against 
the pro-Shicite Policy of al-Ma"'mu-n at that time we may 
conclude that Ijamdawayd may have been one of those opposed 
to the caliphal policy. 
(52) 
Geddes (53) suggests this when 
he writes that Ibn Mahan was "probably in revolt against the 
-C 
pro-Shi ite policy of the caliph". 
However, on this occasion we should not ignore the Z: D. 
role played in this revolt by some Yemenis, especially 
those who had suffered a year of Ibrahim b. Musa's domin- 
ation over the Yemen in 200-1/815-6, such as B. Ukayl of 
c Khawlan in Sa dah and their allies among the different Yemeni 
tribes. 
(54) 
Thus we may assume that these Yemenis may have 
encouraged Hamdawayh to reject Ibrahim b. Musa's governorship, 
offering, by way of compensation, their support for him 
against the Iraqi army. The reasons for this assumption are 
threefold : the first is the high number of Uamdawayh's 
army; 
(55) 
the second is the appointment of certain Yemenis 
who were hostile towards the rule of Ibrahim b. Musa, such 
as Muhammad b. cAbbad al-Ukayli, as representatives of 
(52) When al-Ma mun appointed cAli al-Rida as a heir to the 
throne., many of his followers opposýd his and revolted 
against him, thus-they elected Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi as 
a caliph in Baghdad, see al-Tabari, III, 1015f; al- 
Yacqu-bil, Tarikh, 111,178; Iýn Khayyat, 470; al-'Mas C ud i, 
Muruj, VII, 615; Tanbih, 349 f; Ibn Ký. ald_un, al- C Ibar, 
III, 526f. 
(53) "The Yucf-irid 11,41; 
(54) See 340-1 above. And see al-Yacqubll, Tarikh, 111,177, who 
says that Hamdawayh convinced a group of the "Yemeni and 
then he dismissed the caliph. 
(55) Jýiamdawayh -ývas able to recruit -ten thousand men and used 
See belov;. them to stop al-Jalud-J's advance to Sanca. %346 
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Hamdawayh in some Yemeni provinces- 
(56) 
and the third is 
the inflammatory propaganda spread by some of these opposing 
Ibrahim's rule in the Yemen, such as Ahmad b. Yazi-d al- 
(57) 
Qushaybi of Himyar. 
Once informed of his appointment as governor of 
C- 
the Yemen, Isa b. Yazid 9-1-Jaludi- left Iraq with the 
hajj caravan in 204/820. The ýajj ceremonies over., al- 
Jaludi continued south to take up his new position and 
arrest Hamdawayh. 
(58) 
Informed of the approach of 
al-JalUdi's army, Hamdawayh added to his own troops a 
number of men recruited. from the local tribes. He then 
sent his son., cAbd Allah, in the van of his troops to 
make the first attack upon the imperial army. The two 
armies clashed on the 5th of Jumada I, 205/23rd of October 
820; ýamdawayh's men were routed and his son fled to 
Mecca. With his army defeated and his son gone, ýamdawayh 
found himself in this impasse. He thus fled to Sanca: 3 
to hide from al-Jaludi, but in vain. There he was 
easily arrested, put in chains and sent to Baghdad. 
(59) 
(56) MI-11 I, 317f. 
(57) IkIll, 11,131 f. 
c 
(58) Al-Ya qubi, Tarikh, 11,182. 
(59) Al-Ya cqu-b-i, Tarlikh, 111,182; Idris, Kanz, fl-75b; (, gives the 
cc Ibn Abd al-Ma--Jý 98; -As, jadY Ld, 25; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 
31; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, 1,147. See also Geddes, 
fD- 'I "Al-', 1a mun, 104f. 
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In actual fact these political disorders which had 
plagued the Yemen for approximately five years, 200-5/815-20, 
were centred on the highland area. The influence of the 
unrest on the other Yemeni regions, except Tihamah, is not 
clear in our sources. This influence is however seen in the 
uprising of the 
cAkk and the Ashacir, the two major tribal 
powers in the region, in 202/817-8. But this trouble was 
swiftly checked by al-Ma: mu-n, who appointed Muhammad b. 
Ziyad over the area and allowed him to establish his own 
dynasty there. Now we must turn our attention to this 
region and discover the main reasons for the-establishment 
of the new rule in Tihamat al-Yaman. Naturally, a history 
of this dynasty is beyond the scope of the present study; 
the aim at this point is to illustrate the reasons behind 
the caliph's decision to set up such a state in this part- 
icular area. 
D. The establishment of the B. Ziyad dynasty 
The new dynasty was named after its founder, Muhammad 
C b. 'Abd Allah b. Ziyad, a descendent of -Ubayd Allah b. 
Ziyad, who was at that time settled in Yemen. 
(60) The 
idea for the establishment of the state having been conceived 
immediately after the political disturbances in the region 
during 202/817. 
In Muharram 202/July-August 817, whilst Ibrahim 
al-IMahdi, the caliph's uncle, was being declared caliph 
in Baghdad by the inhabitants of the city, a letter arrived 
(60) Kay, Yaman, its Early Mediaeval History, text, 104, 
trans 141. 
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in al-Ma mun's capital at that time., Marw, carrying the news 
that the two major tribes of Tihamah, the c Akk and al-Asha c ir, 
had risen in revolt against the cAbbasid authorities in the 
Yemen. As soon as the news reached the court of al-Ma3mu-n 
his minister, al-Fadl b. Sahl, suggested that the caliph 
appoint Muhammad b. Ziyad as amir there in order to quell the 
insurrection. Duly accepting his minister's suggestion, al- 
Ma: )mu-n appointed Ibn Ziyad as amir and designated two of the 
latter's own companions to assist him. 
(61) 
The following year, Ibn Ziyad and his assistants 
accompanied an army sent to oppose the anti-caliph Ibrah'im 
b. al-Madhi in Baghdad. From there they travelled to Mecca 
with the pilgrimage caravan and, upon completion of the 
bajj ceremonies, they continued southwards to Tihamat 
al-Yaman. After waging war with the inhabitants there Ibn 
Ziyad succeeded in securing a foothold. in the area. In 
Shacban 204 /January -February 820, he laid the foundations of 
Zabid., the city which was to be the capital of his dynasty 
for another two'hundred and five years. 
(62) 
Certain historians link the establishment of this 
dynasty with Alid activities in Tihamah, even though there 
is no concrete evidence in our sources which might conf irm the 
existence of such activities in the region at that time. Ibn 
Khaldun makes an unacceptable statement regarding this matter, 
(61) Cf. Kay, text, 2f -trans, 3 f; Ibn al-Nilujawir 6 al- 
Mustab*i 1,66 f; Idris, Kanz, f 176a; Ibn Abd al- C MajIld, 25; al-Khazraj'l, Kifayah, 99 f; Ibn al-Dayba 
_Qurrat, 
I, 320f; Bughyat, 
- 
39; Abu- Makhramah, 11,216. 
See also Geddesl "Al-Majmun", 105f. 
(62) See Kay, trans, 4-text 3. Ibn al-Daybac Qurrat, I. 321f) 
confirms that the descendants of Ibn Ziyad remained 
in 
the city until the last of them was dismissed 
in 409/ 
1018-9. 
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saying, "Among the leading men of Yaman sent up to al-Ma3mu-n 
there was one, Muhammad son of ZiyEd, a descendant of cDba,,,, -d 
Allah son of Ziyad son of Abi-i Sufyan. He propitiated the 
Khalifah, and having engaged to protect Yaman against the 
'ýAlids., he won his f avour and was appointed to the government 
of the province [Tihamah] where he arrived in A. H. 203.11 
(63) 
Besides this statement two modern scholars suggest that the 
reason behind the appointment of Ibn Ziyad over the area 
was the Shi cite activities there; the first is Geddes 
(64) 
who insists that the rebellion of the cAkk and the Ashacir in 
Tihamah was a result of Ibrahim b. Musa's year long domination 
of the Yemen, and thus assumes that the rebels were Shicite; 
the second scholar 
(65) believes that, since the Shicites 
were dominant in the Tihamah area, al-Ma .) mun realized that a 
Sunni principality there could never be anything but an ally 
of the caliphate. Both Ibn Khaldun and the two modern 
scholars,, apparently, have based their suggestions on the 
assumption that the revolt of the cAkk and the Ashacir in 
Tihama in 202/817 was a Shi Ci uprising against the cAbbasid 
regime which Ibn Ziyad sent to suppress and -thus to protect 
the region from further Alid activities. However, nothing 
is mentioned in the source material concerning the political 
leaning of these rebels. On the other hand., the various t: > 
revolts which took place in Tihamah during the twenty year 
period before the arrival of Ibn Ziyad there, do not appear 
to have been Shicite in motivation. 
(66) 
(63) Kay, trans, 141 - text, 104f. 
(64) YUC firid 42f; "Al-Ma ') mun 
(65) Bikhazi, "Coins", 27. 
(66) - the political disorder in the area during thý 'Poi 
caliphate of al-Rashid, cf. 31z-)-22 abc,. ve. 
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Concerning Ibraham b. Musa's year-long rule over the 
Yemen in 200-1/815-6, there exists nothing in the sources 
which might point to any spread of his power to Tihamah. 
The main gathering of the Alid followers in the Yemen was 
ýacdah, from where Ibrahim b. Mu-sa extended his authority 
over a large part of the highlands between there and 
:) (67) Sanca. As for the revolt of the inhabitants of Tihamah 
in 202/817-8, apart from the fact that the sources do not 
specifically consider it to have been an Alid uprising 
it is clear that the Alids themselves were enjoying 
harmonious relations with al-Nla-ý'mu-n at that time. 
(68) 
Given., then, that ill intention towards al-Maý'mu-n by the 
Alids, and vice versa, was unlikely, it is diff icult to 
believe that Ibn Ziyad was sent with the express purpose of 
suppressing Alid activities in the region. Further con- 
firmation of this can be seen in the attitude of Ibn Ziyad 
himself towards the Alid uprising led by cAbd al-Rahman 
b. Ahmad in the region of cAkk in 207/822-3, 
(69) 
apparently, 
Ibn Ziyad took no part in its suppression. Subsequently, 
al-Ma3mu-n sent an army, under the leadership of Dinar b. 
c (70) Abd Allah., to put down the revolt. Thus, if Ibn 
Ziyad had been appointed specifically to protect the area 
from the Alids, one must assume that he would also have 
participated in the suppression of a revolt which did, after 
all, take place within the borders of his state. However, 
Ibn Ziyad's role in the af fair - be it direct or otherwise - 
(67) Cf - 340 above. 
(6S) See 343 above. 
(69) cAbd al-Raýiman b. Ahmad b. c Abd Allah b. _Muýammad 
b. 
c Umar b. c All b. Abi JL Talib. See al-Tabari, III, 1062f-, 
Ibn al-Athir, Kamili-, V, 20-1. 
(70) Ibid. 
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has received no mention in the sources at our disposal. 
The non-appearance of Ibn Ziyad - supposedly sent to protect 
Tihamah from the Alids - on the scene of cAbd al-Rahman b. 
Ahmad's uprising corroborate the more tenable conclusion 
that the purpose of his presence in Tihamah was solely to 
fill the political vacuum from which the area had been 
suffering for so long. 
(71) 
It was obvious from the escalation of events in the 
Yemen from the reign of al-Mansur until the spread of Alid 
influence during the caliphate of al-Ma3mu-n that the latter 
could not afford to ignore this region and, therefore, should 
pay more attention to it in his foreign policy. In the Yemeni 
highlands, for example, although al-Maýmu-nys governor, 
Ilamdawayh b. Mahan had succeeded in retaking ýan a following 
the expulsion of Ibrahim b. Musa, he was unable to effect 
entire control over the rest of the Yemen. Furthermore, 
local tribes had emerged as participants in the political 
arena in the area, which was by now closely related to the 
(72) 
scene of political unrest in the Hijaz. Without a 
doubt it was this situation which forced al-Ma3mu-n to pay 
special attention to his policy vis-a-vis the. Yemen, in 
order to preserve its loyalty to the caliphate. 
Apart from its several seaports, Tihamah's over- 
riding importance lay in the fact that it was the commercial 
(71) For the struggle for power in the region amongst its 
inhabitants during the caliphate of al-Amin, 
cf, 333 above. 
(72) Political opposition had_--scalated in the 11ijaz since the 
early period of the cAbbasid caliphate due to Alid 
attempts to take over the two Holy Cities, ", Tecýa and' 
Medina. See a! -YacqUbi, Tarikh, III., 11iff; al- 
Tabari, II, 1S9ff. See alE-o- -Lassner, _Shaping, 
69-79- 
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cross-roads between Oman and ', Iecca. It was also of crucial 
significance as an area of transit for the pilgrims 
(bujjaj) coming from the Omani coast via the coastal lands 
of Hadramawt. 
(73) 
Leaving Tihamah vulnerable to the 
attacks of uncontrollable tribal rebels., then, would be 
contrary to caliphal interests for two main reasons : firstly 
it would jeopardize the economic interests of the cAbbasid 
government in the coastal ports; and, secondly, were an 
anti-caliphal state to emerge there, an extremely undesirable 
example would be set which would no doubt endanger consid- 
(74) 
erably the political security of the Hijaz. 
The question of how to control Tihamah came up during 
the most critical period of al-Ma: mu-n's reign. In 202/817-8, 
the year of the Tihamah troubles, most regions of his empire 
broke away from the caliphal administration. 
(75) The 
following year, his governor in the Yemen, 4amdawayh b. 
Mahan, rebelled and proclaimed independence in the high- 
(76) 
lands. At this point al-Ma3mu-n had no alternative but 
to establish an independent state under a ruler who would 
always remain loyal to his government and observe its 
interests in the area. Brockelmann 
(77) 
comments on 
Ibn Ziyad's appointment to Tihamah, saying "The 
cAbbasid 
(73) Ibn Jacfar, Kitab al-Kharaj, 192-3; 
-7 - (74) When cAli b. Muhammad al-Sulayýi succeeded in unifying 
the Yemen in 45ý/1063, he' set out for Mecca to take it 
over, seeHasan S. Tarikh al-Yaman al-Siya s 1)181-3. Cf. C 18-trans also Ibn al-Dayba, Qur at, 1,246-7; Kay, text, 
24-5; Ibn cAbd al-Maj-id, 5,2. 
(75) See al-Tabar-1,111,1016 ff; al-Yacqu-bi-, Tarikh, 111,178 
ff. 
(76) See 343 above. 
(77) Tarikh al-Shucu-b al--Islamiy, ý-ah, Nj,, -j'oic trz. -ins., iýýalabakkl, 226. 
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government saw, for some time, that it would be better to 
encourage the development of local power to go along with 
the official governors. An evidence for this is that when 
3- al-ma mun's Alid policy in the southern Arab Land [i. e. 
the Yemen] failed, he sent a Khurasan-i force led by an 
experienced soldier called Muhammad (i. e. Ibn Ziyad] who 
proclaimed himself as a descendant of Ziyad b. Abih -a 
half-brother of MucHwiyah, both having the same father, the 
amir of Iraq. Muýammad succeeded in controlling the coastal 
lands down to al-Shihr in Hadramawt as well as the areas 
facing them, while the mountainous country remained under 
the control of the rulers of Sanca". 11 Geddes 
(78) 
says, 
"the appointment of Ibn Ziyad split the administration of 
the province [i. e. the Yemen as a. whole] in-to two equal 
units; the size and geographical complexity of Yemen did 
not allow for a single administrative whole. " 
On this basis al-Ma3mu-n appointed Ibn Ziyad over 
Tihamah, advising him to construct a city as his capital, 
from where he would be able to control the region. 
(79) 
Ibn Ziyad chose a -site at Zablid which is situated half way 
between the sea and the mountains on the northern bank of 
the Wadi Zabid, and beL-, ween the two provinces (sing-mikhlaf) 
of cAkk and the Ashacir. 
(80) 
The structural style of the new 
city was military. 
(81) 
(78) l'Yucfirid " 44; "Al-Ma3mu-n", 106. See also Salih, 126, 
who says, The caliphate had followed a new policY in the 
Yemen by establishing a strong rule in the lowlands to 
control the mountainous area from the west and the south". 
(79) Ibn al-Daybac, Bughyat, 39. 
L-Hamdani, ýifat, 
il'ý; Kay, (80) For its location see, a' I, 
d es 5- ) trans, 11 - te: Kt 8-9. Cf. also Ge d 
"Al-'Aa inun 
106; and map 
(81) Al-cAm-Id, "Bina D madinat Zablid", 3343. 
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Our sources differ concerning the boundaries of Ibn 
Ziyad's territory. Although it is agreed that he controlled 
the coastal area extending f rom Haly, 65 km south of al- 
Qunfudah, in the north to al-Shihr in the south, there is no 
consensus on the extent of his domination over the other 
Yemeni provinces. cUmarah, Ibn al-Mujawir, Ibn al-Dayba C 
(82) 
and Abu Makhramah all mention that he ruled the Yemen 
in its entirety, both coastal and mountainous areas alike. 
Both Idr-Is and Ibn cAbd al-Maild 
(83) 
maintain that Ibn 
Ziyad ruled Iýaqramawt and the coastal areas as f ar as ýaly, 
C- 
but of the mountainous areas controlled only al-Ma afir, al- 
Janad and Mikhlaf Jacfar. In Bughyat al-Mustafid, Ibn 
(84). 
al-Daybac disregards his previous assertion that Ibn Ziyad 
ruled the mountainous areas, insisting now that the rulers 
of these areas used to mention Ibn Ziyad's name in the 
Friday khutbah. The view of the latter writer seems to carry 
the most weight. There are several reasons which lead us to 
believe that Ibn Ziyad enjoyed comprehensive influence over 
Tihamah and the coastal ports, from al-Shiýr in the south 
to Ualy in the north. Firstly, when al-Ma3mun sent Ibn 
Ziyad to the Yemen, he def ined the borders of the latter's 
state as Tihamah and whatever land he was able to acquire 
from the mountainous areas. 
(85) Secondly, some of the local 
(82) Kay, text, 4-trans,, 5; Ibn al-Mujawir, mustabsiry I Y67; 
Ibn al-Dayba', Qurrat, I, 322f; Abu Makhraniah, 
Il, 216. 
, thjat., 
26f. (83) IdrTis, Kanz, f176a; Ibn c-q'bd al-Maj-1d, jo 
(84) 39f - 
j1 '1 (85) See Ibn ýAbd cal-Ma- 25; Idr-s. 
f 176a. 
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chiefs in the mountainous provinces appeared to be indepen- 
dent rulers of their regions. 
(86) 
Thirdly, the calipha-Le 
had regularly been sending its own governors to Sanca- :) in 
order to keep its-influence in the region. 
(87) 
The fourth 
reason is that there is no mention in the source material 
of Ibn Ziyad's full domination over the mountainous areas. 
Nevertheless these sources do assert that the rulers of 
these provinces mentioned Ibn Ziyad's name in the Friday 
khutbah. 
(88) 
This, however, does not mean that these 
provinces were under the political control of Ibn Ziyad; 
what it does point to, quite simply, is the recognition by 
these rulers of the power of the Ziya-d-17 regime in the 
country. 
Thus with the establishment of Ziyadi rule in Tihamah, 
C 
al-Ma mun forestalled the appearance of an anti- Abbasid 
power in the region, safeguarding the loyalty of the area 
in the process. Initially, this policy was focused on 
Tihamah alone, with different strategies employed by al- 
Ma mun and his successors vis-a-vis the highland regions. 
C- It was with the Abbasid re-capture of the highlands in Z: > 
Jumada I. 205/October-November 820, that they focused this 
policy on that area in order to safeguard their existence 
there. 
(86) Such as B. Manakh and B. Yucfir, cf. F. below. 
(87) Cf. Table 11 and below. 
c 
(88) Ibn Hawqal, 23f; Ibn Abd al-Majid, Bq--hjat., 27; 
Ibn al-Dayba c, Bucyhyat, 40. Z-17, - 
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E The Yemeni highlands folio-wing the rebellion of Ibn !, ý ' , 
Diýn 
After cIsa b. Yazid al-Jaludills subjugation of 
Sanca3 his representatives were sent to the provinces, whilst 
he returned to Baghdad appointing ýi§n b. al-Minhal in 
his post. 
(89) 
In due course Ibrahim a! -Ifri-q-i came to the 
Yemen as governor, remaining there until he was replaced 
c 
by Nu aym b. al-Waddah al-Azdi and al-Muzaf far b. Yahya al- 
Kindi, who entered ýanca" in ýafar 206/July-August 821. These 
two shared the joint administration of the Yemeni hi-D-hlands 
with al-Azdl in Sanca-3 and al-Kind-l in al-Janad. 
(90) 
In 
208/822-3, Muýammad b. C Abd Allah b. Muhriz, the mawlH a of 
al-Ma mun, arrived in the Yemen as the caliph's governor 
there. He himself stayed in Sanca" and sent his son to al- 
Janad. 
(91) 
However., shortly afterwards the people of al- 
Janad rebelled against his son. Realising the weakness of 
his own administration, Muhammad b. Muhriz appointed c Abbad 
b. al-Ghamr al-Shihabi, a Yemeni chief , in Sanea-2' and 
left 
for the Hijaz. 
(92) 
Al-Shihabi was replaced by Ishaq b. 
al-cAbbas b. Muhammad al-cAbbas-i,, who arrived in sanca' 
(89) Idris, Kanz, f 176b; Ibn cAbd al-Maild, 25,31; al- 
Khazraji, Kifayah, 99; 'Asjad, 31f; Ibn al-Daybal, 
Qurrat, 1,147; Bughyat, . 31; al- c Arshl, Bulugh, 12. 
(90) Idris, f 176b; 
c 
Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 31f; al-Khazraji, 
l, '. 'if aya-h, 100, Asjad, 32; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,147. 
(91) Idr-is, f 176b; Ibn cAbd al-Nlaj-1d, 32; al-Khazraji 
Kifayah, 101; al-cAsjad, 32; 
(92) Idris, f 176f; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 32; al-Khazrajj 
--ind followed by Geddes, Asjad; 32ý Kif5, yah, 101; 
"ýý_ýfirid. " Appendix A, c-Abb-ad b. cUmar al-Shiliabi. 
However, according to al-Ilamdan'l, Iklll_, 1,471,5; 
IIý 152; and Ibn al-Dayb,,. tc, Qurrat, 1,148 
cAbbad 
b. al-Ghanir al-ShiliHbli. Cf. 'Ilso -table 
11. 
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at the end of Rajab 209/December 824. (93) 
Unfortunately, the information offered by our Sources 
does not lend itself to a proper evaluation of the Political 
situation of the region, or of its relations with Baghdad 
during the approximately four year period (205-9/820-4) 
following the suppression of Ibn Mahan's rebellion in the 
Yemeni highlands. That the cAbbasids were in control of 
San'UP and al-Janad during this period is not doubted; what 
is needed is a more precise view of the actual political sit- 
uation in the Yemeni highlands. Despite this lack of data, 
the frequency with which governors to the area were changed Z: > 
over such a short period, 
(94) 
plus the rebellion by the 
inhabitants of al-Janad against Ibn Muhriz's son and the 
emphasis made by the sources on the weakness of Ibn ', Iuhrizs 
administration in Sanca-:., all lead us to believe that the 
highland country had been in the throes of political unrest. 
This was especially reflected in the governorship of Ishaq 
b. al-cAbbas who expressed his anger towards the inhabitants .7 '1: ), 
of the region by insulting and humiliating them, the Himyaris 
in particular. 
(95) 
our sources do not disclose the reasons 
behind such behaviour towards the Yemenis. However, whether 
the reasons were personal or merely designed to ensure 
control over -the area, Ishaq's aggressive stance cast no 
(93) Idris, f 176b; al-Khazrajl)Kifayah, 101; cAsjad, 32. Ibn 
-----O-Qurra 
, 
T-,. 148, 
cIsh,, 
tq 'Abd al-Majid, 32; Ibn al-ljaayba 
b. al-cAbbas b. ý, -Tuhammad b. cAll b. cAbd All-a-li b. Abbas. 
(94) Cf. Table 11. 
(95) Idris, f 176 b 'Abd al-, M,., tj-jd, 32; al-7 f 177a; Ibn I 
Khazraji. Ki-fay ah, 101f; al-'Asiad, 32; Ibn a-, --D, -i,, -I)a , 
gh, 12. Qurrat, I, I-Ir-8; -, aI-'. Arshi:, Bulýi- 
11 
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uncertain discredit on the cAbbasid presence in general 
throughout the highland Provinces. Al- Ma3mu-n subsequently 
endeavoured to avoid Yemeni hostility by replacing Isýaq 
with Muhammad b. Naf ic in SancV and Malik b. Luqman al- 
Arhabi, a Hamdani chief, in al-Jawf, 
(96) 
but in vain. 
In due course the area became witness to various Uimyarl- 
led uprisings against the cAbbasid regime. 
(97) 
Before 
discussing these revolts in more detail we must first turn 
to the political upheaval which occurred in the central part 
of the highlands, instigated by Ahmad b. Muhammad al-cUmar-1, 
a descendant of cUmar b. al-Khattab., nicknamed Ahmar 
al-cAyn. 
(98) 
This particular disturbance suggests that the area 
was politically unstable, and that a power struggle was 
taking place between some of the influential chiefs in the 
region. This conflict apparently emerged when Ishaq b. 
al-'Abbas left the Yemen., leaving a weak governor behind 
him. (99) In 212/827-8, according to al-Tabarl- 
(100) 
(96) For -the appointment of Ibn Naf i c, see al-Ya 
cqubi, 
Tarlkh., 111,188. For Ibn Luqman, Cf al-Hamdani, 
Iklil.? X, 212f. 
'97) These uprisings represented by the B. Manakh and B. 
Yuc f ir emergence in the area, see 360-71 below - 
(98) Ahmad b. Muhammad b. cUm, -ctr b. Ibrahl-m b. Viaqid b. 'Zayd b' 
t ab. See al-Zubayrl, Nasab, cAbd Allah L cUmar b. al-Khat, 1 
3 154. 'Por his nickname, cf. 360; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 
al-Tabarli., 111 1099; al-Hamdani Iklil, TIY 177; X 117. 
(99) Aleans Muhammad b. Naf ic in SancV - 
(100) 111,1099. See also al-Yacqubli-', Tarl-k1h " 
111,188, Who 
confirms this event, but does not give the date. 
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Ahmar al-cAyn rebelled against cAbbasid authority. The aim 
of the uprising was the deposition (khalc) Of al-'Ma :ý mun, 
and he began by attacking caliphal authority in ýanca3. (101) 
3- 
In response., al-Ma mun despatched an army to the Yemen 
under the leadership of Muhammad b. cAbd al-Ham-id, Abu- 
(102) 
RaZi. When Abu 31-Razli arrived in Sanca3 Ahmar al-cAyn 
requested amnesty (aman) which he had initially been granted. 
Abu "l-Razli, however, subsequently arrested him and sent him 
to Baghdad where he was imprisoned. 
(103) 
Although the revolt 
was ineffective, it was indicative of the appearance of 
independent uprisings against 'the cAbbasids in this region. 
Such political upheaval was reflected., especially in two 
revolts, led by the influential Himyari chiefs, Ibrahim b. 
Dhi al-Muthlah al-Manakhl and Yucf ir b. cAbd al-Rabnian al- 
H-i w-al'i-. 
(104) 
A twenty-one-year struggle (212-33/827-47) 
against the 'Abbasid forces by these Uimyari chiefs event- 
ually came to fruition with the expulsion of caliphal 
authority from the highland regions. 
(101) Al-Yacqu-b-i, Tar-ikh, 111, - 
188, says he expelled the 
caliphal governor, Ibn Nafic, from there. 
(102) Al-Tabari., 111., 1099; al-Yacqubl, TýirTkh, 111,188. 
In, al-Janadi, Sul5k, f 46a; al-Khazraji, Tiraz, 
f 83b, he was appointed in (213/828-9). 
(103) Al-Ya'qubi, Tarikh, 111., 188. Cf. also al-Zubayri, 
Nasab, 360. 
(104) For the nasab of these leaders, see Table 9,. 10 -_ 
In Idris, f 177a; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 105; Tiraz, -3 
f 96b; al-cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Husayn, Anba .f 
22b)- 
and al-cArshi, Bul: dgh, 18, one reads Yucfir 
b. cAlbd 
al-Raýlm. But, the correct version is 
Ibn cAbd al- 
Rahman, see al-Hamdanl', Iklil, 1,230; 
11,66 and 
passim; VIII, 85; a! -Himyar-1, MulUk, 
165. Cf . also 
Zambaur, Manuel, 116; Geddes "Yu firid' 
54; 
Smith, "History of Sanca 55. 
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F. The emergence of Himyari power in the highlands 
a. B. Manakh in the southern part of the_jLlLghILands 
In the same year as Abu : ýl-Razi's arrival in SanY 
212/827-8, the southern area of the highlands also became the 
scene of political opposition to caliphal authority. The 
focal point was the province of al-Kalac, where Ibrahim b. 
Muhammad al-Manakhi rose up against the cAbbasid recrime. 
(105) 
Within two years his power had spread to the mountainous areas 
of Jabal Thuman and Raymat al-Manakh. 
(106) 
In 214/829, AbU 31- 
Ra-zi and his forces went to the province of al-Kala-C in an 
attempt to suppress the rebels arriving there in Shacban/ 
October-November. Abu 1-Razi took the offensive, but he was 
killed and his troops were routed. 
(107 The defeat of the 
caliphal army left the southern part of the highlands at 
the mercy of Ibrahim al-Manakhl. In the following month, he 
attacked al-Janad, looting and destroying most of the 
(108) 
town. Following this victory, Ibrahim al-Manakhi con- 
tinued to rule over his mountain domain for another thirty 
years, apparently without any further action taken against 
(105) Al-Yacqu-bi, Tarlkh, 111,188; al-Janad-1, Sulak, f 46a; 
al-Khazraji, 3, f 
57b; al-Ahdal, Tuh at, 40b. For 
the location of the province of al-Kalac, see Map2, 
(106) Al-Janadi', f46a; al-Khazraji, Tiraz f 57b; al-Ahdal, 
f 40b. 
-InGeddes) 
"Yucfirid", 
c50) 
reads Thawman; al- 
Hamdani, Sifat, 213 (al-Akwa ) Thuman. For the location 
of Thuman, cf. Sifat, Ibid, note 1. And for Raymat al- 
Alanakh, see al- . klajr!, Buldan, 11,112, who says its from 
Mikhlaf Jacfar [al-Mud'haykhirah] in al-cAdin. 
(107) Al-Janadi f 46a; al-Khazraji, TirTz, f 57b; al-Ahdah, 
f 40b. Al Yacqubi, Tarihh, III, 1S8., mentions that this 
occurred in 212/827-8 which is absolutely v: rong, 7 '0 
1 111 110i who s-lt-)_tes that in 211 see al-Tabar 
S2 ý) -3 
17 en -11 Abu "I-Razi. was killed in the . men. See , -so 
Gedcý. _, s, 
''Yuleffirid 11,49., note 59. 
(108) Al-Yacqu-b-ii, Tcr_Lr_1*kh, 111,188, al-Raz-17,211; al- 
Janadl-, fl6a.; al-Khazraji, Tiraz, f 57b; aj-Ahdal. 
f 41a. 
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him on the part of the caliphate. 
(109) 
Al-Mýinakhi Is challenge to cAbbasid authority in the 
Yemen confirmed two important points : firstly, the inability 
of the cAbbasid authorities to suppress local uprisings in 
the area; and secondly, the emergence of influential local 
chiefs with power enough to be able to . rule their own 
regions with relatively little opposition. Al-Ma'ý'mun was 
simply unable to take any serious action against these mush- 
rooming forces which threatened and defied his authority in 
the region. Instead he merely reappointed Ishaq b. al- C Abbas 
to succeed his murdered governor, Abu 1-Razi. Ishaq arrived 
in San ca-3 in early 215/830. 
(110) 
However, neither Isýaq nor o 
(109) "He was followed by his son Ja C far who built the town and 
the fortress of al-Mudhaykhirahon the slopes of Jabal 
Thawman (Thuwan), which he continued to rule with an iron 
hand for nearly fifty years until he was killed by the 
Falimid da iC hi Ibn 
- 
al-Fadl in 292. Geddes, "Yucfirid: 
_, 
" 
49. See also al-Hamdani, Iillil, 11,93-4; Sifat, J, 100. 
Al-Himyarl, Muluk 167, states that they ruled the area 
for some one hundred and fifty years, which is patently 
wrong, because they were dismissed by the Ismacill 
dac-l* cAl-I b. al-Fadl in 292/904-5, see al-cAlaw-1, S"Trat, 
389; al-4ammadi, Ký. shf 30; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 76. -j al- 
Janadi, Suluk; f 50a; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 44a. Cf also Ged- 
des, tlYucfirid,, " 50. 
(110) Al-Janadi, f 46b; al-Khazraj-i, Tiraz, f58a, f 83a; al- 
Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 41a; they all cj-n-firm that he arrived in 
the Yemen in 215/830-1, after Abu- '31-Razlils murder, 
however, they record his name as_follows, Ishaq b. 
Musa b. cIsa al-'Abbasi. In Idris, f 176bý f 177a; 
al-Khazraji, 
_Kifayah, 
101f; al-cAsjad 32; Ibn al Daybac, 
Qurrat, I, 148f, there is no mention of the Abu 1-Razi's 
governorship. They all consider the existence of Isýaq 
as a continuation of his first governorship since 
209/824, moreover they give an incorrect name (i. e. Ishaq 
b. Mulýammad b. cAlli b. al-cAbbas). Although Ibn 'Abd al- 
32 agrees with the above idea, he gives a Ma-jid, Bahjat 3C 
correct name (i. e. Ishaq b. al-cAhbas b. Muhammad 
b. A 
al- cAbbas-1). It is most likely. Isýaq himself who 
had 
occupied the governorship of ýancP in - 
209/82-1 and stayed 
until he was replaced by Nluýammad b. Nafic- 
in 212/827-8. 
But when Ab-d ')l-Raz-1, Ibn Nafic successor, was 
killed 
in 214/829-30, al-Ma'mu-n reappointed him to put pressure 
upon the Himyari chiefs, i. e. B. Manakh and 
B. Yucfirii 
Cont . 
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his successor dared to invade the territory of al-Kala 
and thus it may be said that the year 214/829 marked the 
foundation of the B. al-Manakh dynasty in the southern 
part of the highlands. 
The situation in the northern part of the highlands., 
however, was quite a different one. In this area, there 
were no ambitious local chiefs ready to come forward and 
dispute the caliphate in the region, quite simply because 
I the area was in the gri p of a tribal struggle between the 
various branches of Khawlan. But these Khawlan-1 factions 
were indirectly involved in the conflict between the 
Yucf irids and tIje cAbbýsid authorities in the central 
highland area. 
(111) 
b. B. YU cf ir in the central highland area. 
The most prominent example of a local political power 
which helped to put an end to cAbbasid authority in the Yemen 
is that of the Yucfirids. They strongly opposed the caliphal 
authority in the area for some nineteen years (214-33/829-47). 
The head of the family at this time was Yucfir b. cAbd al-Raýman 
al-Hiwall., who was anxious to establish independent rule 
from his fortress in Jabal Dhukhar. 
(112) 
(Cont) -who began revolting against his authority there. 
Therefore, Ishaq led the haj ceremony in 214/830, on 
behalf of al-Ma'3mu-n and from there he continued south- 
wards to assume his post, where he entered ýan a at 
the early part of the following year, and died 
in the 
same year.. Cf. Ibn Khayyat, 474 f. 
Cf. 368 below. 
(112) Jabal Dhukhar is the ancient name of the mountain which S E'k' 
is now known as J. al-Dulac (west of Shibam 
KawkabLin) 
Cf. also al-Hamdaniy Sifat2ly Wilson, 
_,, 
Nla-pping" 272. C Sirat, 19 and pass1m, it is Al-WaYs', 168. In al- Alawi, 
Cf. -aIso Map 6. called Jabal Bayt Dhu'r,: har. 
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It is not certain exactly when the Yucfirids first 
appeared as a direct threat to cAbbasid rule in the Yemen. 
However, most of the sources agree that the family was 
able to force the legitimization of its claims onto the 
caliphate, as a letter written by the caliph al-Mutawakkil 
in 257/870-1, recognizing Muhammad b. Yucfir as the ruler 
of the region clearly confirms. 
(113) 
It is obvious that 
such recognition marked the end of the cAbbasid-Yucfirid 
struggle in the area, although the origins of the conflict 
are unclear. Al-Hamdani 
(114) 
maintains that the Yucfirids 
began their rule of the Yemen - i. e. the central and the 
northern highlands - in Ramaýan 214/November-December, 829, 
an assumption which is confirmed by none of the other 
sources. Moreover, it also contradicts the actual pol- 
itical situation in the region at that time, for between 
214/829 and 233/847, the first year of al-Mutawakkil's 
caliphate, Sancao had been ruled by cAbbasid governors. 
(115) 
It was during this period that the Yucfirids rose in the 
area in opposition to the caliphate, although the actual 
struggle for power in the area between them and the 
cAbbasids 
only became truly manifest during the governorship of 
cAbd 
al-Rahilm b. Jacfar al-Hashim-i (221-5/835-9). 
(116 This 
clearly makes al-Hamdani's assumption untenable, although 
CAbd al- (113) Al-Himyari , 
Muluk, 165f; IdrIs, f 177b; 1bn 
Majid, 34; al-Khazraj'i, Kifayah, 109; 
cAs. iad, 34; 
Tiraz, f 58 b; al-Janadi, Sulýiik, f 48a;, al-Ahdal, 
Tuýf at, f 42b; Ibn al-Davbýý, 
ýý-, ý'urrat, 1,161f 
(114) Ikl-Il, II, 71f. 
(115) See Table 11. 
(116) Cf. al-Hamdani, Iklil, 181; 
107, the latter 
--fou, c, -, ht tLe governors of says that Yuc-fir 
al-Wathiq an, -j al-I, T,, _itaviakkil- 
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the year 214 may have marked the emergence of Yucfir b. c-, ', bd 
al-Rahman al-Hiwali on the scene in the area, which was at that 
time in a political vacuum following the murder of the C Abbasid 
- :)-- (117) governor, Abu 1-Razi. It is quite possible that Yucfir's 
attempt to establish independent rule in the area (since 
214/829) was inspired by both his military expertise and 
high social status. 
(118) 
But, the political vacuum in the 
c region was filled by Ishaq b. al- Abbas, who arrived to govern 
ýanca'-'-' on behalf of al-Ma-"m-un in early 215/830, remaining 
there until he was replaced by 'ý'Abd Allah b. cUbayd Allah b. 
al-cAbbas two years later. 
(119) 
Al-Ma3mu-n was also able to 
enjoy the support of some of the tribal 
by appointing them as his representativ 
Such a policy prohibited Yucfir b. cAbd 
expanding his activities throughout the 
reign. 
chiefs in al-Jaivf 
es in the region. 
(120) 
al-Rahman from 
rest of ,: -: tl-Ma mun's 
On the death of al-Ma mun in Rajab 218/August 833,, 
3-3 
C- 
(117) Who was killed (Sha ban 214), and his successor entered 
. ýanca3 at the early following year, see 360 above. 
(118) See al-Khazraj-1, Tiraz, f 96b, who states that he was a 
soldier early in his career. 
(119) For the former, see note 108 above. For the latter, 
Cf. al-Tabarl., 111,1106; Idris, f 177a; Ibn 
cAbd 
al-Majid, 33. In al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 103; 
cAsjad, 
32f; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat_ 1,149, 
cAbd AllTih b. c-', 1-1* 
b. cUbayd Allah b. aY-77-bbas. The correct name is 
cAbd Allah b. cUbayd Allah b. al-cAbbas b. ',, ',, ilýammad b. 
C All b. cAbd Allah b. cAbbas see al-Azraqi7 , 
Alýhbar, 11, 
162; al-Tabar-L, 111,1106. Cf. also al-Baladliuri, 
Ansab, 111, 
281f for his father's nasab. 
(120) He appointed Malik b. Luqman al-Arhabi, a 
Hamdani 
chief, see 358 above. 
-365- 
cAbd Al lah b. C Ubayd All-ah left ýanca: ) for Irag, appointing 
C Abbad b. al-Ghamr al-Shihabi in his place. 
(121) 
This des- 
ignation was authorized by al-Mucjaý; im and cAbba-d continued 
to rule ýanca-' until he was replaced by cAbd al-Rahilm b. 
Jacfar b. Sulayman al-Hashimi., who entered the town in 
mutiarram 221/December 835-January 836. (122) Knowledge of 
the political situation in the §anoV region during the 
governorship of cAbbad is virtually non-existent; al- 
-- (123) Hamdani merely alludes to a clash which took place 
between cAbbad and Yucfir, explaining neither the reasons 
for the conflict nor its outcome. It is obvious, however., 
that the confrontation was related to the Yucfirid 
expansion in the region. It appears that throughout the 
whole of cAbbad's governorship, Yucfir was endeavouring to 
extend his influence in the area. eAbbad, as a governor of 
the cAbbRsid caliphate in the region, was obliged to take 
steps to curtail the spread of Yucfirid power; such a sit- 
uation may have provoked the confrontation between them. 
Thus when cAbd al-Rahim b. Ja cf ar was appointed over Sanc a-3 
he too found himself compelled to fight the Yucfirids, who 
had begun to become a real threat to the cAbbasid presence 
in the region. The new governor's campaign against the 
Yuefirids was unsuccessful, I and his son was taken hostage. 
(124) 
(121) Al-Hamdani., Iklil, I., 471f; Ibn cAbd al-majid, 33; C 
al-Khazraji, Kifdyah, 103, cAsjad., 33; Ibn al-Dayba 
Qurrat., 1., 149. 
(122) Idris, Kanz, f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-Majld, 33; al-Khazraýl, 
Tiraz, f Mb; Kifdyah, 104; cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba 
Qurrat, 1.149; AbUL Makhramah, II, 104f. 
(123) Mill, 1,475; 11,181. 
(124) Ibid. al-Shamaýll, al-Yaman, 94; and al-Sliami, 
B. 
'Yucfir".. 337, both say that "-Abd al-Rahman al-Hi, -1,: all 
and his son Yulfir were representatives of 
this 
governor in al-Janad. This statement, 
howevers is 
not confirmed in our sources. 
I 
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cAbd al-Rah7im b. Jacfarls governorship continued 
until 225/839, when he was replaced by Jacfar b. D-inar. 
The latter, remaining in Baghdad., sent Mansu_r b. cAbd al- 
Rahman al-Tanukhi to represent him in the region. Mansur 
entered ýan cP in ýaf ar/December of the same year. Later, 
cAbd Allah b. lIamdawayh b. Mahan joined him as joint- 
governor. 
(125) - It is intersting to note that the change of 
C7 
governor in Baghdad - Ja far b. Dinar being replaced by 
Itakh al-Turki - did not result in a change of deputy gov- 
ernors in San'g. '. This was because they were reappointed 
(126) 
by Itakh. 
Our sources confirm that these deputy governors were 
able to control the country, 
(127) 
their success apparent 
-- (128) from their campaigns against the rebels. Al-Hamdani, 
for example, mentions al-Tanukhl's pursuit of Muhammad b. 
Abi al- cAyzar, a rebel from Al Muqri of Himyar, in the 
Dhamar region. Despite the emphasis placed by our source 
material on the success of these deputy governors in con- 
trolling the area, they fail to describe or analyse their 
relations with the Yucf irids during the last two years of 
al-Muctasim's reign (225-7/839-42). One must assume, 
therefore, that the Yucfirids remained in control of Jabal 
Dhukhar throughout this period. Thus on the death of 
(125) Idrils, f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-Mailid, 33; al-Khazraji, 
Ibn al-Daybac, Qtlrrat, 151f- Ki-fayah, 104f-c Asjad, 33; 
(126) Ibid. 
(127) Ibid. 
(128) IkIll, II, 252f. 
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c -C al-Mu tasim in Rabi I) 227/December 841-January 842 
, Yu 
cf i. id 
power had emerged as a strong opponent of the c Abbasid ZD 
regime in San 
ca-' 
Following his accession to the caliphate, al-ý, athiq 
reappointed Itakh over Sanca':. The latter remained in 
Samarra sending Abu "ýJ-cAlV as his deputy to the region. 
On hearing that Abu 01-cAla3 had reached Sacdah, Yucfir 
sent an army under the leadership of Tar-if b. Malik, a 
Hamdani, to occupy Sanca-: ' before the arrival of the neNv 
governor. This time, however, the cAbbasid forces, supported 
by the San cýn-is, were able to def eat the Yu cf irid troops 
and drive them from the town. 
(129) 
Although the Yucfirids 
failed to occupy ýancao , the attack heralded the escalation 
of the cAbbasid-Yucf irid conflict in the region. Thus from I 
Jabal Dhukhar., Yucf ir was subsequently able to survive all 
the cAbbRsid campaigns sent throughout al-Wathiq's reign and Z:: ý 
the first year of that of his successor. 
During the caliphate of al-Wathiq (227-23"9/842-7) 
the local tribes in the central and northern parts of the 
highlands began to emerge and participate in the Z-: ) 
'Abbas id-Yucf ir id conflict. In these regions the Yemenis 
were divided into 'two factions : one supporting the Yucfj-rid. s, 
the other aligned with the cAbbasids. Among the Hamdani 
chiefs, for example, could be found members of both factions. 
This is illustrated by the f act that while some of Hashidi 
(129) Idris, Kanz, f 177a; Ibnc 
c-Abd . 1-'ý, Trajlld, 33; al -c 
Kha. rajT, Kif ayah, 105; As-ja 3"); Ibn al-Davba 
Qurrat, --l. 
nb--' f 92b 153-5; I! Dn al-Ilusavn, Aa 
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joined the Yu Cf irids in their uprising against the C Abba-sid 
(130) 
regime, some of Bakil preserved their good relations 
with the caliphate. 
(131) 
The conflicts between the KhawlanT 
tribes in Saodah were also reflected in the cAbbasid- A 
Yucfirid struggle. Al-Hamdan'l., (132) for instance, mentions 
that during the conflict between B. Sacd b. Sacd and 
I B. al-Rablah b. Sacd - both tribes of Khawlan in Sa c dah - 
Yucfirids supported the former. The reason for their 
partisanship was obviously a political one, since B. al- 
RabIcah were acknowledged as supporters of the caliphate. 
The leader of the B. al-Rabi C ah, cAbd Allah b. Muhammad b. 
cAbbad, travelled to Samarra to inform al-Wathiq of the 
increasing power of the Yucfirids and to ask for re- 
inforcements. 
(133) 
c 
Al-Wathiq responded immediately to Ibn Abbad's 
appeal, sending with him an army led by one of his generals, 
I 
Sharbamiyan, who reached the Yemen in Rabi 
C II, 229/January 
844. (134) It seems that this army was initially directed 
(130) Such as B. Tarif b. Thabit al-Kibari., Cf. al-Hamdani, 
Iklllj, X) 5i; Idr-is, f 177a; Ibn C Abd al-Maj1d, 33; 
al-Khazrajil, Kifayah., 106; al-cAsjad, 33; Ibn al- 
Daybac, Qurrat, 1., 154. 
(131) Such as Malik b. Luqman al-Arhabi who represented 
al-Maýmu_n in al-Jawf, see 359 above., and Yazid 
b. Abi 
-C 
Uyaynah al-A§qar, leader of Arýab see al- 
Hamdani., Iklil, X. 9 212. For the support of 
B. 
cUyaynah' granted to the C Abbasid general, Sharbamiyan 
during his invasion against B. Yucfir, Cf. 369 below 
(132) Al-Hamdanili, Ikli-1, I, 322f. 
(133) Ibid. 
(134) Al-Tabari, 111,1335, reads Sharbamiyan. Al-Hamdanly 
Ikl'11Y 1,323 gives the same name, but says it is 
arabized ('Curriba) and has become al-Bashir. 
He also 
gives the y. ear 230/844 for his arrival. In 
Idris, 
f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-Majid, 33; al-Khazraij.. iýý, 
106; 
cAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybac, Qurrat, 1,155; Ibn al- 
. 
sayn, Anbý', f 22b, we had 11arthamah 
b. al-Bashi7r. 
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to Sacdah to suppress B. Sacd b. Sacd, the Yucfirid allies. 
This assumption is confirmed by al-Hamdanl, 
(135) 
who records 
that Ibn cAbbad and Sharbamiyan moved from Sacdah on their 
way to Jabal Dhukhar via al-Jawf. In al-Jawf they were 
joined by B. cUyaynah, a branch of Arhab of Bakil. 
(136) 
(137) From there, according to al-Hamdani, the cAbbasid forces 
moved directly to Jabal Dhukhar,, where they camped and 
later besieged the Yucfirids. Some historians 
(138) 
mention 
that Sharbamlyan and his troops went first to San'a: ' and 
from there marched on Shibam, Jabal Dhukhar,, camping below 
c 
the town in lower Wadi Dula Sharbamiyan and his army 
continued to try to breach the Yucfirid fortress but in 
vain. Without inflicting any appreciable damage on the 
- (139) enemy position, they retired to Sanca-l. 
The news of Sharbamiyan's failure was brought to 
Samarra by Ibn cAbbad., who. went there to complain about the 
former's refusal to consider his suggestion regarding the 
-- (140) invasion of the Yucfirid fortress. Al-Hamdani who 
(135) Ikl1l, 1,323-4. 
(136) Ikl-11) 14 324. In Ikl-1l, X) 212 B. cUtaybah, Cf. also 
§dliý, Tarikh, 141. 
(137) Iklil, I, 323f. 
(138) Cf. the account of-Ahmad al-Mucidi, in Ikl-il, 
_I., 323. See also-Idris: f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-Majj-d, 
34; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 106; cAsjad, 33; Ibn 
C al-Dayba , Qurrat, 1,155; 
Ibn al-Husayn, Anba 
f 22b. 
(139) Idris, f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-Malid, 34; al-Khazraji, 
CIDC Kifavah, 106; 
' 
Asjad, 33; Anba, f 22b; Ibn al-Dayba 
Qurrat, 1,155. See also Geddes, "Yu'ffirid", 56. 
(140) Tk-111,1,325-7, Ahmad b. IMuham-madis account. 
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records this statement, gives no exact date for Ibn cAbba-d's 
petition, although he confirms that it came after the death 
of al-Wathiq in Dhu 31-Hijjah 232/ July-August 847; it was 
the latter's successor, al-Mutawakkil who responded to the 
complaint by sending an army led by Ja cEar b. D-inar to the 
Yemen According to al-Tabarl., 
(141) 
Jaefar b. D-inar was 
appointed by al-Wathiq in Shacban 231/April, 846, and left 
Samarra for the Hijaz., but did not reach Sanca-3 until he had 
completed the ýa-jj ceremonies. This statement is more 
credible-ý-,,. - since it is confirmed by al-Hamdani himself and 
some local historians, who state that in the following 
year (i. e. 232/846-7) the cAbbasid governor in the. Yemen 
(i. e. Sanc a3') at that time was Jacfar b. D-linar. 
(142) 
it 
0 
can be assumed, therefore that Ibn c Abbad arrived in Samarra 
in 231/845-6, and petitioned al-Wathiq and not al-Mutawakkil. 
Thus it was al-Wathiq who responded by sending Ibn Dinarfs 
army to Sanca3) which they entered at the beginning of the 
following year. 
Soon after his arrival in Sancao, Ibn DInar went 
out to jabal Dhukhar in an attempt to suppress the 
Yucfirids., (143) who were relying on their defensive position, 
rather than risking open conflict. Seeing that it was 
impossible in such a situation to dislodge the rebels, 
Ibn Dinar retired tO Sanca-',, leaving the Yucfirids in 
T IIA. Y 1350. 
(142) Al-Hamdani, Jawharatayn, 263; Idris,. f 177a; 
al-Janadi, SulTik, f 46b. Cf also table ii. 
(143) Tdris, f 177a; Ibn cAbd al-, Nlaj-id, Bahja 34; al- 
Khazrajil, KifTiyah, 10-i, c-Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba c 
Qurl: ', -Lt, 1,155. 
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- (144) full control of Jabal Dhukhar. Before long, however, he 
returned to Jabal Dhukhar to put down the Yu C firid rebellion, 
besieging his enemy until the news of al-Wathiq's death at the 
end of Dhu 1-ýijjah 232/ August 847 reached him. Without 
delay Ibn D'inar lifted the siege, concluded a truce with the 
Yucfirids, and rode off at the head of his troops to Sancf. 
Shortly after receiving the news of his reappointment as 
governor of the Yemen by the new caliph, al-Mutawakkil, Ibn 
Dinar left his son Muhammad in. charge of San a and made 
(145) back to Samarra. 
cI-f Upon Ja far b. Dinar s arrival in Samarra, al-Muta- 
0 wakkil, replaced him as governor of the Yemen by Uimyar b. 
al-Harith. Following his arrival in San ca-" in the early 
233/847, the new governor immediately took the offensive 
against the Yucfirids in Jabal Dhukhar. In the open battle 
that ensured, Himyar was forced to flee and his troops were 
defeated. Following this, the cAbbasid governor left the 
Yemen., leaving the highlands, except the province of the 
al-Kalac., completely under the control of the Yucfirids. 
In this way Yucfir was able to establish control of the 
capital, Sancal, and to overrun a large part of the country 
between Sacdah and al-Janad. 
(146) 
(144) This idea was first advanced by Geddes, '-Yu 
Cf irid", Z57. 
(145) Al-Hamdani, Iklil, 327; Idris, Kan_z_, f 177a; al-Janadi, 
f 46b; Ibn "ýAbd al-Majid b 34; al-Khazraji, 
Kifayah, 107, 
cý, Sjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat, 1,155. 
Cf. also 
Geddes, "Yucfirid" 57. 
(146) Al-Janadi, f 46b. Cf. also Geddes, "Yulfirid", 58, 
who states that, "Following this battle Yucfir 
established I-, imself in control of the capit, -tl 
i. e. ýancd) and over-run a large part of the country 
between Sacda and al-Janad. 
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Thus during the year after al-Wathiq's death (i. e. 
233/847), the Yucf irids succeeded., by and large, in erasing 
the caliphate's political authority from the central and 
the northern areas of the highlands. Henceforward the sole 
vestige of the caliphate in the Yemen was the customary 
mention of the caliph's name in the Friday Khu-tbah. Polit- 
ically, the Yemen was now split into three independent 
states : the Ziyadids held Tihamat al-Yaman as far as al- 
Shihr; B. Manakh took over a part of the southern Yemeni 
Cý highlands; and the Yu firids also occupied a large part 
of the highlands, their power extending from al-Janad in the 
south to Sacdah in the north. 
(147) 
Hadramawt remained 
unoccupied until Muýammad b. Yucfir conquereditin 
258/871-2. (148) 
(147) For the distribution of these states, see Map 6. 
C 
(148) Cf. al-Himyarl, Mulu 165-6; Idris, f 177b; Ibn Abd 
al-Majid, 34; al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 109, who call 
him Muýammad b. Jacfar; al-'Asjad, 34; 
_Ibn 
al-Daybac 
Qurrat, 1.161-2. It seems that B. Manakh had been 
-trying to extend their authority as far as. al-Janad 
whenever they found an opportunity, see al-Hammadi., 
Kashf, 24; al-Janadi Suluk f 49a; al-Ahdal 
Tuhfat, f 43b, who mention that al-janad was under 
ihe control of B. IManakh who had removed it from 
B. Yu'fir during the seventh decade of the third century of 
C _r LlheHijrah. 'Cf also Ibn al-Dayba Qurrat, 163. 
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lable 9 r". " The nasab of Ibrahim al-Mana-khl: - 
ýiimyar (al-Akbar) 
al-Hamaysac 
Ayman 
Zuhayr 
c I- 
. ýrib 
Qatan 
jaydan 
al Ghawth 
Wa 11 
c Abd Shams 
ic 
Zur ah (Dhu Manakh) 
ShUf c ah 
(2) 
I Zayd 
I- (3) Shurahbil 
I-- (4) 
Shurahil 
Zayd 
1 (5) Khamr 
Lahicah 
Murrah 
Hassan 
Suwayd 
Aksum 
Salamah 
cI- Abd Allah 
Muhammad (Dhu 
ý- 
- (6) Ibrahim 
(1) 
3 
1-Muthlah) 
One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathaminah) 
who ruled the Yemen after the murder of Sayf-b. Dhi 
Yazan, see a! -Rasuli-, Turfat, 55. In al-Hamdani, Iklil, 
IIY 294., they ruled the Yemen dfter Dhu Nuwas. 
(2) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 437, reads Subqah, while al- 
1W "ý, ýimyari, Muldk, has Sufcah. 
(3) Omitted by Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 437, instead he records 
Sharahil b. Sharahil. 
(4) Omitted by al-Ijimyari, Muluk., 167. 
(5) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 437, has 'Himyar. 
(6) The leader of the r, -bellion against the 
cAbb-asid regime 
in the southern part of the Yemeni higinlands. 
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Table 10 The nasab of Yucf ir al-Uiwall 
Abd al-Rahman 
1 (4) 
Yucfir 
Ya dras (2) 
A wn 
-Ic Ma ti 
I-- 
Ibrahim 
al-lVaddah 
Kuray 
(3) 
-1 
(Dhu- Hiwal Al-Akbar) 
"-AM'ir (Dhu- Hiwal al-Asghar) 
Yarim 
al-Sharmah 
Ila Zad 
cI Awsajah 
^I 
I 
Sadad 
I 
Zayd 
-I Mal ik 
Zurcah (Himyar al-Asghar) 
One of al-Mathaminah, the eight most influential 
chiefs, who_ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. DhI Yazan, 
Cf al-Rasull, 55; in al-Hamdani, ikli 11,294 
after Dhu Nuwas. See also al-Himyari, Muluk, 157,165. 
Ibn Hazm, Jamharat 437 reads Maghar. 
(2) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat,, 437, has Tadras. 
C (3) Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 437, has Kurayb b. Uthman b. 
al-Wýddafi. 
C, (4) The leader of the rebellion against the Abb'ýLsid re, 'Time 
in the central area of the Yemeni highlands. 
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Table 11 The governors of the Yemen from the time 
of al-AmiD to the first year of al-IMutawakkills 
reign. (193-233/809-47) 
appointed by al-Am, 7n (193-6/809-11) 
Hammg-, d al-Barbarl (1) 193-4/809-10 
Muhammad b. cAbd Allah b. 194-5/810-11 
Malik al-Khuza 1(2) 
C- 
Muhammad b, Sa id b. al- 195/811 
Sarh al-Kinani 
appointed by al-Ma3mu-n(196-218/811-33) 
Yazid b. Jarl'-r b. Yaz-ld b. 
c Khalid b. Abd Allah 
al-Qasri al-Bajali 
196-8/811-4 
c Umar b. Ibrahim b. -ffaqid b. 
Muhammad b. Zayd b'. cAbd 
Aligh b. cUmar b. al- 
Khattab 
c Ishaq b. Musa b. Isýa b. Musa 
cc b. Muhammad b. All b. Abd 
0c Allah b. al- Abbas 
Ibrahim b. Musa b. Ja cf ar b. 
Muhammad b. cAli b. al-- 
Husayn b. cAll b. Abi Talib 
Hamdawayh b. cAlil b. c Isa b. 
a, MEhdn (4) 
C- (5) Isa b. Yazid al-Jaludii 
198/814 
198-200/814-5 
200/815-6 Alid rebel 
(3) 
201-5/816-20 
205/820 
Remained only one year attacking certain Yemeni 
tribes, see 332-4 above. 
(2) This governor struck coins in his own name, Cf Bikhazi, 24. 
(3) He occupied the Yemen f orc a whole year in the name 
of Ibn Tabataba, the Shi ite imam. See 341 above. 
(4) Omitted by Smith, of Sanc-i-O', 5,11, instead 
he inserts cIsa b. Yazid al-Jaludi. 
Smith, ibid, places him after Ibrahim b. Musa. 
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Hisn b. al-Minhal (6) 205/820 
Ibrahim al-Ifriqi 
Nucaymb. Wad. d. ah al-AzdT 
al-Muzaffar b. Yahya al- 
Kindi 
Muhammad b. cAbd Allah b. 
Muhriz (7) 
9 
Ishaq b. al-cAbb'ds b. 
7 Mýhammad b. cAll b. cAbd 
Aliah b. al-cAbbas 
Muhammad b. Na fic (8) 
Muhammad b. cAbd al-Ham-id(9) 
Isýaq b. al-cAbbas b. 
Muhammad b. cAlli b. cAbd 
Aliah b. al- c Abbas (10) 
205-6/820-1 
206-8/821-3 joint authority 
208-9/823-4 
209-212/824-7 
212/827-8 
212-4/828-9 
mawla of al- 
Mu: l mun 
known as Abu- 
11-Razi 
215-7/830-32 
cAbd Allah b. cUbayd Allah 217-8/832-3 
b. al-cAbbas b. Muharrumad 
b. cAlif b. cAbd All-a-h b. 
al-cAbbas (11) 
(6) Deputy of above. Smith, ibid, places him after 
Ahmad (Muhammad) b. cAbd al-Hamid. 
(7) Geddes, "Yucfirid", Appendix A-7, reads Nilaýriz. 
(8) Omitted by Geddes, ibid; Smith, "History of San Ca3) 54. 
11 
(9) Smith, ibid, has Ahmad instead of Muhammad, and places 
him before Hisn b. al-Minhal 
9. 
(10) The second governorship, see Chapter XI, note 110. 
C 
(11) He left SancV appointing Abbad b. al-Ghamr al- C it Shihabi in his place. Smith, "History of San a omits. 
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appointed by al-Muctasim (218-27/833-42) 
-- (12 cAbbad b. al-Ghamr al-Shihabi 218-20/833-5 
Abd al-Rahman b. Ja f ar b. c- 
Sulayman b. All-b. al- eAbbas al-Hashimi 
MansUr b. cAbd al-Rahman al- 
TaAU-kh-i 
cAbd Allah b. Hamdawayh b. 
Mahan (13) 
221-5/835-9 
225-7/839-42 
Abu 13 1- cAla (14) 
Sharbamiyan (15) 
227-9/842-4 
229-31/843-5 
Jacfar b. Dlvndr al- 232-846-7 
Khayyat (16) 
appointed by al-Mutawakkil 
joint authority 
ýimyar b. al-ýarith (17) early in 
23'13/847 
(12) Geddes, IIYucf irid". Appendix, A. 12; Smith, "History of 
SancV , 
54 reads "-Abbad b. cUmar al-Sl-iih'Týblii. kowever, his second name, according to al-Hamdani 
and Ibn al-Dayba c., is al-Ghamr, see Chapter XI, 
note 92. 
(13) Both are deputies of Ja'ýar b. DInEr and later -they were 
both reappoInted by Itakh al-Turki. Both Geddes 
"Yucfiridll, Appendix A, 15 and Smi-t-.. h, "History of 
Sanc5, '11,54 insert Muhammad instead of Hamdawayh. 
He was sent 'by -ftakh as his deputy in the Yemen. 
(15) Geddes, IIYucf irid", Appendix A 17, reads Seri-Bamikan; 
Smith, "History of San Ca 311,54, has Harthamah Shar 
Bamiyan. He might ýave been sent as deputy of Ttakh, 
since coins bear the latter's name. Cf. Bikhazi, 30. 
(16) This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf-Bi-'-,. hazi, 
31. He left Sanc, 9. ý' leaving his son in charge. 
(17) He was defeated by the Yucfirids who expelled him and his 
army from the Yemen, see 371 above. 
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CONCLUSION 
During this two hundred and twenty-four year period 
f 
the political history of the Yemen with its relations to 
the Islamic administrations had passed through various 
phases. 
In the time of the Prophet and in the first year of 
Abu Bakr's reign (9-11/630-2) the area was distinguished for 
its political activities on the whole and particularly for 
the interest of the Medinan government to spread Islam 
and consolidate its grip on some of the Yemeni provinces. 
The Prophet practised two styles in his dealings with the 
Yemeni tribes; at one time we find him using military 
pressure and negotiations with some of the Yemeni powers; 
in the second he uses diplomacy and sends envoys to the 
others. It was clear that the Prophet always avoided direct 
military interference in local disputes in the Yemen, even 
though' some of these disputes could have threatened the 
interests of the Muslims in the region.. And for this reason 
he quelled the. movement of cAbhalah b. K. cb by sending bp 
envoys to some of the groups distressed as a result of the 
movement. 
The Yemenis who converted to Islam played a great part 
in suppressing those who opposed the Islamic authority in 
the Yemen and also they helped to consolidate the ý, Iuslim 
regime in the area during the early period of Abu Bak-L's 
Caliphate. 
The 'Muslims managed to b-L-; j-ncT Io an end local political ZD ty 
dispute in some of the Yemeni regrions and to main-uain their 
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authority. In other regions the Muslim political domination 
was not evident because these regions were under the control 
of the local tribes. 
The contribution of the Yemeni tribes to the conquests 
was considerable. The caliph Abu- Bakr and his successor) 
C Umar, encouraged these tribes to join the Medinese armies. 
The Yemeni tribes played a great military role in the 
decisive battles at the beginning of the conquests; moreover 
they formed the majority amongst the Muslim warriors. Because 
of their military experience their leaders became distinguished 
amongst the other Muslim commanders. These Yemeni leaders 
took part in leading the troops and negotiations on both 
the Byzantine and Persian fronts. 
The Yemeni warriors were accompanied by their families 
and carried with them their belongings to the battle fronts. 
When the Muslims conquered Syria, Iraq and Egypt and built 1 ; --3 
villages and cities there, the Yemenis were the first amongst 
the Muslims to inhabit them. They spread all over the 
conquered provinces and their numbers were greater, in some 
of these regions, 'than the other Arab tribes which 
conquered these countries with them. 
C, 
At the end of the caliphate of Uthiman and during the 
period of cAll b. Abil Talib the Yemeni migrants played an 
important part in the internal events of the Islamic Empire; 
for some of them were the driv-ing force behind the uprising ýZ-) 
Ic against the caliph Uthman in Ku. Pa and al-Fusýaý and so 
-they con-stituted a direct challenge to the caliplial authorities Z__) 
14 ý; e was seen distinctly in the varkioui there. TIlLs driving for, 
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stages of the uprising. These Yemeni migrants were also 
engaged in the first civil war and played a great part in 
it. During the course of the battles of the civil war, 
they were also recognized as a military and political fotce. 
, Because of this recognition their leaders had the upper 
hand in making important and decisive decisions, as was 
clear in the battle of ýiffin. 
The politýical stagnation began in the Yemen when its 
tribes joined the Islamic expeditions elsewhere though 
their contacts with their motherland continued. This rel- 
ationship with their homeland, the Yemen'. appeared distinctly 
during the first civil war. This war had spread to the 
Yemen after the battle of Siff in. The Yemenis in the Yemen 
were split into two different camps in this war and we find 
one camp backing C All and the other Mucawiyah. C> 
The migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered 
provinces and the continuation of the conquests during the 
caliphate of the Umayyads had a great impact in the political 
isolation of the Yeme, n and its neglect by the Islamic 
authority during the first/seventh century. The assass- 
ination. of al-Husayn b. cAl-J and Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution 
were two of the most serious events which occurred during 
the same period, though neither had any effect on the 
Yemen. When Ibn al-Zubayr took over Mecca and established 
himself there, the Yemen received no attention from his 
administration and as a rc-: ýsult of this, the region suffered 
from the lack of political leadership and fell an easy prey 
lubayr his to Khariji invaders. After tiie fall of Ibn al-ý 
-382- 
successor cAbd al-Mal. ik b. Marwan saw no importance in sending 
a military expedition to the Yemen in order to consolidate 
his authority there. 
The sudden appearance of the IbHdiyyah in Hadramawt 
and the extent of their influence to ýanc-al was the 
consequence of the disinterest of the Umayyads in the 
Yemen. The Umayyads only stood against the Ibadiyyah when 
they, the Ibadiyyah, extended their influence to the ýijaz 
and had the control of the holy cities. 
The relationship between the Islamic authority and 
I the Yemen was cold in the f irst decade of the 
cAbbasid 
Caliphate. In the following decade the relationship of 
this region with the Islamic authority improved gradually 
as was very obvious in the time of Harun al-Rashid when the 
Calipliate tried to keep its influence there. The cAbbasid 
administration had witnessed -the emergence of the local 
opposition to its authority in the Yemen which was embodied 
in -the uprising of al-Hayýam b. 
cAbd al-ýamad al-ýimyari. 
One of the features of the policies of the caliphate at 
that time was its attempts to f ind competent administrators 
to rule this region. By following this policy the first five 
C Abbasid caliphs managed to keep their control of centres 
of administration in the Yemen, but not for long, for the 
weakness of the caliphate began to appear from the end of the 
second/eiglith century. 
The importance of the Yemen became clear in that period 
when Ibn Tabataba started his revolution in Kufa. This 
revolution spread to the Hijaz. The Yernen , vas one of the main 
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targets for the revolutionaries in which they extended 
their influence by appointing one of them as its governor. 
Several local powers were found -supporting or opposing the 
Al ids. The cAbbasids., when they t. ried to take the Yemen, 
sent a regular army to expel the Alid governor. 
The emergence of the local power in the course of 
the events in the Yemen and the increasing interest of the 
caliphate in it came at the time when thecAbbasids were 
nearer the decline of their influence over their adminis- 
tration, particularly after the civil war. The disturbance 
in Tihamat al-Yaman at the beginning of the third/ninth 
century forced the 
cAbbasid administration to send 
Ibn Ziyad as a ruler of the region in order that he might 
protect its interests there and ensure the allegiance of 
that area. 
This policy of the cAbbasids was successful excep-It, 
in the highland area which underwent a succession of 
uprisings against the caliphal authority. These uprisings 
were led by some influential and ambitious chiefs. As a 
result the central Islamic authority lost its political 
control over this region. 
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